

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPEAL RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE  
ICAO COUNCIL UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 2, OF THE  
1944 INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICES TRANSIT AGREEMENT**

(BAHRAIN, EGYPT AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES v. QATAR)

**MEMORIAL OF THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN,  
THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

**Volume III of VII**

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27 DECEMBER 2018

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## **Annex 22**

Request for the Intervention of the ICAO Council in the Matter of the Actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain to close their Airspace to aircraft registered in the State of Qatar, attaching Application (1) of the State of Qatar, Complaint Arising under the International Air Services Transit Agreement done in Chicago on December 7, 1944, and Application (2) of the State of Qatar, Disagreement Arising under the Convention on International Civil Aviation done in Chicago on December 7, 1944, 8 June 2017



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**Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu**  
**President of the Council**  
**International Civil Aviation Organization**  
**999, Robert-Bourassa Boulevard**  
**Montréal, Quebec**  
**Canada**

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ص ٤ ز ر 2017 15984  
8/6/2017

**Sub: Request for the Intervention of the ICAO Council in the Matter of the Actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain to close their Airspace to aircraft registered in the State of Qatar**

Your Excellency,

As Your Excellency is aware, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the Arab Republic of Egypt on 5 June 2017 cut all diplomatic ties with the State of Qatar and implemented a series of coordinated measures that, if allowed to stand, effectively impose an air blockade of the State of Qatar. This collective action, which is ongoing, was undertaken without the mandate or sanction of the United Nations Security Council or any other international body, and is inconsistent with existing laws and conventions.

In an unprecedented act, the above-mentioned States announced that, effective immediately, all Qatar-registered aircraft, including the aircraft of the national carrier, Qatar Airways, will be prevented from accessing the airspace over their national territories. In the case of the Kingdom of Bahrain, a verbal threat of imminent military interception of Qatar-registered aircraft, has prompted the State of Qatar to write for the urgent intervention of the ICAO Council under Chicago Convention Article 54(n), as Bahrain's actions in particular are wholly unwarranted and pose a direct and imminent threat to the safety and good governance of international air transport. This unwarranted action is being taken in peacetime, and in the absence of any threat from the State of Qatar. The State of Qatar consistently has maintained open and cooperative relations with its neighboring countries, and takes strong objection to this precipitous and unilateral action taken by its neighbors.

This letter supplements our letter QCAA/ANS.02/502/17 dated 05 June, which was addressed to Her Excellency Dr. Liu FANG. In addition to requesting urgent consideration under Article 54(n), this is a formal notice of the State of Qatar's intent to invoke Article 84 of the Council's Dispute Settlement mechanism.

The following information provides the background of the unlawful and coordinated acts of our neighbors, which threaten the sovereignty and security of the State of Qatar, and violate numerous provisions of the ICAO Convention and Transit Agreement, discussed more fully herein.



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## BACKGROUND

### 1. Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a member of the ICAO Council since 1986. Located to the west and south of the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the only State sharing a land border with the State of Qatar. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has closed all overland routes to Qatar.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also decided that Qatar-registered aircraft will no longer be allowed to use Saudi airspace. The air transport corridor controlled by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the major air corridor from the State of Qatar to Africa and Middle East. The State of Qatar is dependent upon the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for access to southern destinations.

In addition Saudi Arabia issued a NOTAM closing the airspace of Yemen to all Qatari registered aircraft with immediate effect, without giving due regard to the safety of aircraft on-route to Africa over the high seas.

### 2. United Arab Emirates

To the east of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been a member of the ICAO Council since 2006, has also announced that Qatar-registered aircraft will not be allowed to use UAE territorial airspace. The UAE is a major aviation partner of the State of Qatar and its decision will affect Qatar's access to the international air transport system.

### 3. Arab Republic of Egypt

The Arab Republic of Egypt, which has been a member of the ICAO Council since 1974, also announced that all Qatar-registered aircraft would be prevented from flying to, from or within its territorial airspace, which has a serious immediate impact on over 200,000 Egyptian ex-patriots and families resident in Qatar.

### 4. The Kingdom of Bahrain

Qatar's northern air transport corridor is the most critical to the State of Qatar in maintaining its access to international civil aviation. Access to our most important markets in Europe, Asia and North America is only available through the northern corridor.

The northern air corridor is controlled by the Kingdom of Bahrain, an ICAO Member State, which has announced that Qatar-registered aircraft will no longer be allowed to use its airspace or airport. The decision taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain to close its airspace to Qatari aircraft, has profoundly affected the operations of our national air carrier, Qatar Airways.



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Furthermore, the Kingdom of Bahrain has gone further than either KSA or UAE by informing the State of Qatar that it intends to establish a so-called "buffer zone", adjacent to its territorial waters, and will not allow Qatar-registered aircraft access to its territorial airspace or to the "so-called" buffer zone. During a telephonic conversation, Bahraini government officials implied that any Qatari-registered aircraft that entered into this unilaterally declared "buffer zone" will be subject to interception by Bahraini military aircraft. The threat of military interception of our aircraft in international airspace has forced the State of Qatar to re-route air traffic through the northern corridor into airspace controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In relation to the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Council should be aware that there is a signed agreement between the Ministry of Transport of the State of Qatar and the Ministry of Transport of the Kingdom of Bahrain that details that Qatar's airspace at 24,500 feet and above is delegated to Bahrain to provide air navigation services.

Under the terms of this agreement and Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention, the Kingdom of Bahrain has an international obligation to provide air navigation services within this airspace and has no right to close the airspace or deny air navigation services to aircraft in this airspace without following the terms of the Agreement between the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of Bahrain.

The State of Qatar denounces the decision of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to close their airspace to Qatar-registered aircraft. These measures amount to a blockade of the State of Qatar, which under international law is a hostile act.

## 5. Economic impact

The unilateral and uncoordinated action taken by the concerned States is having a significant economic impact on the State of Qatar and has resulted in disruption of services at all levels of the State.

### ARGUMENT

#### 1. Violation of the International Air Services Transit Agreement

The collective action of Qatar's neighboring States is in violation of the **International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA)** to which the State of Qatar (effective 25 June 2008), the Arab Republic of Egypt (effective 12 April 1947), the United Arab Emirates (effective 25 May 1972), and the Kingdom of Bahrain (effective 12 October 1971) are Contracting Parties.

**Article 1, Section 1 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement**, states, in relevant part, as follows:

*"Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services:*

1. *The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;*
2. *The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes;"*



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The collective actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain violate this most basic principle, in that each of these States have now refused to allow Qatar-registered aircraft to fly across its territory.

## 2. Violations of the Chicago Convention

The actions of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the U.A.E. further violate the Chicago Convention, to which these states and Qatar are parties, and stand against accepted practice and international consensus.

**Article 9 of the Chicago Convention** sets out the factors that a contracting State must observe to validly restrict access to its airspace.

**Article 9 (Prohibited Areas) of the Chicago Convention** states, in part:

*"Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged . . . (Article 9(a).)*

Further, under Article 9(b), each State "reserves the right in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety," to prohibit overflights of its territory, as long as the prohibition is applied without distinction based on nationality. The four neighboring countries have not and cannot justify the closure of their airspace under the requirements of **Article 9(a) or (b)**. These States have not shown that there is a military necessity justifying the prohibition of Qatar-registered aircraft from their airspace or that a period of emergency has been declared. Further, no claim of public safety has been advanced by any of the States which have closed their airspace to the State of Qatar.

Even if any of these factors were present, under Article 9, the States would need to apply the prohibition uniformly to all States, rather than single out the State of Qatar. In this case, each of the States involved have prevented only Qatar-registered aircraft from utilizing their airspace. Aircraft registered in other countries are allowed free navigation over each of the countries that have prevented Qatari-registered aircraft from flying over their territory. As noted above, Qatar is not embroiled in any sort of military conflict with any of the States that have imposed this illegal blockade, underscoring the unlawfulness and lack of logic for this action.



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### 3. Unlawful Restriction of International Airspace

In the case of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the international law violation is not limited to the confines of its own airspace. This week, Bahrain's civil aviation authorities informed the State of Qatar that a purported military "buffer zone" has been unilaterally created with no reference to the internationally agreed prerequisites justifying the establishment of such a buffer zone. This buffer zone is designed to block Qatar-registered aircraft from transiting around Bahraini airspace, and Bahrain unlawfully has threatened military action should a Qatar-registered aircraft attempt to enter it.

The principle of freedom of access to international airspace is well-settled in international aviation law and is explicitly recognized in other international treaties in addition to the Chicago Convention.

The freedom of navigation in international territory, which includes freedom of navigation and of overflight, is recognized in **Article 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Convention 1982**.

Article 87 states:

*"The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:*

- (a) Freedom of navigation;
- (b) Freedom of overflight..."

Therefore, the high seas and the airspace above the high seas, are acknowledged to be beyond the territory or jurisdiction of any State.

Over the high seas, the "rules of the air" mentioned in **Article 12 of the Chicago Convention** govern:

*"Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention."*

The ICAO Council, through the Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs) promulgated by **Annex 2** of the Chicago Convention, regulates the flight and movement of aircraft over the high seas. ICAO member States cannot unilaterally depart from such standards.

Additionally, the State of Qatar recalls **Assembly Resolution 39/15 of the ICAO 39th Assembly**, in which the Assembly urged Member States to avoid adopting unilateral and extraterritorial measures that may affect the orderly, sustainable and harmonious development of international air transport.





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The action of the Kingdom of Bahrain, threatening military action against our airlines in international airspace, is wholly unlawful and poses an unwarranted threat to the State of Qatar and to the traveling public, and is in direct contradiction of the **Assembly Resolution 39/15 of the ICAO 39<sup>th</sup> Assembly**.

#### State of Qatar Request to ICAO Council

The State of Qatar wishes to remind the Council of the guiding principles of the Convention. According to the Preamble of the Convention, "it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends.

Based on **Assembly Resolution 39/15**, the Civil Aviation Authority of the State of Qatar believes that the ICAO Council, which is the supreme decision-making body of ICAO, has the overriding authority and obligation to address concerns about unilateral measures that affect the orderly development of international air transport.

The Council of ICAO has the duty to urge all Member States to cease using these unjustified measures against the State of Qatar, in order to ensure the rights of the State of Qatar under the Chicago Convention are fully respected.

While the State of Qatar is in the process of formulating a formal complaint under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, we hereby formally invoke **Article 84 of Chicago Convention 1944** on the following bases:

- (1) against the Arab Republic of Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain for the violation of fundamental principles of Chicago Convention and the limitations set out in Article 9 of such Convention,
- (2) against the Arab Republic of Egypt, United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain for the violation of the International Air Services Transit Agreement; and
- (3) against the Kingdom of Bahrain for violation of the Law of the Sea Convention and Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention.

The State of Qatar also invokes Article 54(n) and requests that the ICAO Council urgently convene to consider the actions of the Kingdom of Bahrain in refusing to provide the legally required air navigation services to the carriers and aircraft of the State of Qatar within its FIR, and in threatening military intervention in international airspace.

The State of Qatar further requests that the ICAO Council urgently provide contingency measures for the disruption of air traffic services, as per Chicago Convention Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services), Attachment C. We ask that the ICAO Council consider the establishment of a direct ATS routes between Doha and Tehran FIR, and the provision of an Air Navigation Services within the portion of the ATS route situated within Bahrain's FIR, which will be supported by a Doha Approach Control Unit.



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Finally, the State of Qatar requests that the Council :

- Declare that the actions of the aforementioned States have adversely affected the safety, regularity and efficiency of international air transport, which constitutes an egregious violation of the fundamental principles of Chicago Convention (**Articles 28, 37, 44 and 69**);
- Investigate the actions of the Kingdom of Bahrain and determine whether these action violate Bahrain's international obligations to civil aviation under **Article 69 of the Chicago Convention**;
- Reaffirm its commitment to the orderly development of international air transport pursuant to **Article 44 of the Chicago Convention**;
- Reaffirm that all Member States are obligated to respect the principles of the Chicago Convention and must refrain from interfering with international civil aviation.
- Urge the concerned countries to cease using these unjustified measures against the State of Qatar, in order to ensure the rights of the State of Qatar under the Chicago Convention are fully respected; and
- Require the Kingdom of Bahrain to continue to meet their legally binding obligation to provide air navigation services to the carriers and aircraft of the State of Qatar in accordance with the FIR agreement between Qatar and Bahrain.
- Based on the forgoing, the State of Qatar urges the ICAO Council to take immediate steps for the establishment of a distinct Qatari Flight Information Region (FIR), encompassing the area over the exclusive economic zone and contiguous with the Tehran FIR. This will cater for the current and forecasted traffic growth and will enable safe and efficient provision of air navigation services. It is to be noted that Qatar has at present about 1000 movement per day and the current system will not be able to cope with the airspace capacity. This will also ensure that never ever will the State of Qatar be landlocked to the outside world.

The Civil Aviation Authority of the State of Qatar avails itself of this opportunity to express the assurances of our highest consideration to the President of the ICAO Council.

Sincerely,

Abdulla Nasser Turki Al-Subaey  
Chairman

CC: Dr. Liu FANG  
Regional Director, ICAO Middle East Office



Before the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization  
(ICAO) Under the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences  
(Doc. 7782/2)

APPLICATION (1)  
OF  
THE STATE OF QATAR

Complaint Arising under the  
International Air Services Transit Agreement  
Done at Chicago on December 7, 1944

NAME:

H.E. Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey,  
Chairman,  
Civil Aviation Authority of the State of  
Qatar  
Agent for the State of Qatar



8 June, 2017

## APPLICATION OF THE STATE OF QATAR

The State of Qatar ("Applicant") hereby submits its Application, pursuant to Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the "Chicago Convention"), Section 2 of Article II of the International Air Services Transit Agreement "IASTA" or "Agreement", and Article 21 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (the "Rules"), for the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to address the below-described Complaint relating to the violation of the Agreement by the Parties described below. This blatant disregard for settled legal obligations has caused injustice and hardship to the State of Qatar, which is also a signatory to the Agreement. The Memorial of the State of Qatar is attached hereto, in accordance with Article 21 of the Rules. The Applicant requests that the Secretary General act upon this Application in accordance with Article 22 of the Rules.

This Complaint is lodged against the Kingdom of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and the Arab Republic of Egypt ("Respondents"). As the Applicant demonstrates below, the Respondents, through a series of collective actions, have imposed a de facto peacetime air blockade of the State of Qatar. These actions, taken without warning and without justification, have already imposed significant hardship on the State of Qatar, its residents, and international passengers who flying to, from, and through the State of Qatar. As described in more detail in the attached Memorial, Respondents' actions have violated their international obligations under the IASTA.<sup>1</sup>

The Respondents have prevented all Qatar-registered aircraft, including the aircraft of the national carrier, Qatar Airways, from accessing their flight information regions. Additionally, they have imposed restrictions on other aircraft proceeding to/from Qatar, and, in the case of the Kingdom of Bahrain, issued a verbal threat of imminent military interception of Qatar-registered aircraft, which poses a direct and imminent threat to the safety and good governance of international air transport.

The Respondents have:

- Deprived the State of Qatar of its right to transit over their territories as granted under the International Air Services Transit Agreement;
- Discriminated in the provision of Air Traffic Services in the Airspace over the High Seas;
- Denied operations in the international airspace over the high seas;
- Disrupted the safe and efficient flow of air traffic in the region;
- Prevented international air carriers from flying to/from or through the State of Qatar by imposing additional approval process as described in the NOTAM's attached in the Memorial; and
- Unlawfully restricted the access of Qatar-registered aircraft to international airspace.

<sup>1</sup> The State of Qatar concurrently is filing a separate but related application to the ICAO Council which requests that the Council take action on a disagreement with the Respondents, as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under Article 2 of the Rules, for violations of the Chicago Convention and other international legal obligations.



For these reasons, the State of Qatar requests that the ICAO Council determine that the Respondents have violated the International Air Services Transit Agreement; order Respondents to comply with all provisions of the Agreement; order Respondents to take immediate steps to remove all air transport sanctions they have unilaterally and wrongfully imposed on the State of Qatar. The State of Qatar further requests that the ICAO Council develop contingency plans to facilitate traffic flow to/from Hamad International Airport-Doha.

This Application and the attached Memorial are being submitted to the Secretary General on 8 June 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

Agent for the State of Qatar

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'Q' followed by a horizontal line and a vertical stroke.

**MEMORIAL**

IN THE MATTER OF

THE STATE OF QATAR  
Applicant

AND

THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN  
First Respondent

AND

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
Second Respondent


AND

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
Third Respondent



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(a) Description of Parties

Applicant: THE STATE OF QATAR

Respondent(s): THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

(b) Name of the Agent:



Mr. Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey, Chairman of the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, is authorized to act for and represent the Applicant in these proceedings. All communications relating to this case, including notice of the dates of any meetings, should be sent to the attention of Mr. Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey located at QCAA Headquarters, P.O. Box 3000, in Doha, Qatar. The telephone number is +974 4455 7100 and fax number +974 4465 9015 and the email address is [a.subaey@caa.gov.qa](mailto:a.subaey@caa.gov.qa).

(c) Statement of Relevant Facts:

In an unprecedented act, the Respondents on June 5, 2017 announced that, effective immediately, all Qatar-registered aircraft, including the aircraft of the national carrier, Qatar Airways, would be denied access to their Flight Information Regions. Respondents also have imposed restrictions on other aircraft proceeding to/from Qatar.

In the case of the Kingdom of Bahrain, a verbal threat of military interception of Qatar-registered aircraft has prompted the State of Qatar to seek the urgent intervention of the ICAO Council, as the Kingdom of Bahrain's actions in particular are wholly unwarranted and pose a direct and imminent threat to the safety, security, regularity and efficiency of the lawful operation of civilian air transport services by Qatari carrier.

This unwarranted action has been taken in peacetime, and in the absence of any threat from the State of Qatar. Indeed, the State of Qatar has consistently maintained open and cooperative relations with the Respondents, and has signed an agreement for the administration by the Kingdom of Bahrain of both Qatari and Bahraini Flight Information Regions. In the absence of any international approval to do so, the Respondents have taken collective actions to isolate and





impose Flight Information Regions restrictions against the State of Qatar, in clear violation of their settled rights enshrined in the Transit Agreement.

The Kingdom of Bahrain, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates acted collectively to close the Flight Information Regions (FIRs) for traffic to/from Qatar, including Qatar Airways flights landing to/or overflying the respective FIRs.

### **1. Kingdom of Bahrain**

Qatar's northern air transport corridor is the most critical to the State of Qatar in maintaining its access to international civil aviation. This northern corridor provides critical access to national points in Europe, North America and parts of Asia, serving as a key point of access to global and regional markets. The unwarranted denial of such access, paired with the unwarranted threat of military interception, imposes undue threats to Qatari nationals and to expatriates living in the country, as well as to global transit travelers. The actions come close to grounding Qatar Airways, which plays a critical role in Qatar's national economy. With all ground access to Qatar eliminated by the decision of Saudi Arabia to close its land border with Qatar, the country relies heavily upon Qatar Airways and other airlines to provide critical supplies of food and necessary goods.

The northern air corridor is controlled by the Kingdom of Bahrain, an ICAO Member State since 1971, which has announced that Qatar-registered aircraft will no longer be allowed to use its Flight Information Region (FIR) or airport. The decision taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain to close its (FIR) to Qatari registered aircraft, has imposed significant constraints on the operations of Qatar Airways.

The Kingdom of Bahrain has informed the State of Qatar that it intends to establish a so-called "buffer zone," adjacent to its territorial waters, and will not allow Qatar-registered aircraft access to its territorial airspace or to the "so-called" buffer zone. During a telephonic conversation, Bahraini government officials indicated that any Qatari-registered aircraft that entered into this unilaterally declared "buffer zone" will be subject to interception by Bahraini military aircraft. The threat of military interception (and the threat this poses to the safety of innocent civilians) in international airspace has forced the State of Qatar to re-route air traffic through the northern corridor into (FIR) controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>2</sup>

The State of Qatar denounces the decision of the Respondents to close their (FIRs) to Qatar-registered aircraft. These measures amount to a de facto and wholly illegal peacetime blockade of the State of Qatar.

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<sup>2</sup> As noted in the application referenced in footnote 1, the Council should be aware that there is a signed agreement between the Ministry of Transport of the State of Qatar and the Ministry of Transport of the Kingdom of Bahrain that details that Qatar's airspace at 24,500 feet and above is delegated to Bahrain to provide air navigation services. The Kingdom of Bahrain has an international obligation to provide air navigation services within this airspace and has no right to close the airspace or deny air navigation services to aircraft in this shared airspace.



## **2. United Arab Emirates**

To the east of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been a member of the ICAO Council since 2007, has also announced that Qatar-registered aircraft will not be allowed to use UAE (FIR). The UAE decision has affected Qatar's access to the international air transport system.

## **3. Arab Republic of Egypt**

The Arab Republic of Egypt, which has been a member of the ICAO Council since 1974, also announced that all Qatar-registered aircraft would be prevented from flying to, from or within its (FIR). In addition to being a clear and unjustified breach of the International Air Transit Services Agreement, this action also will have a serious immediate impact on over 200,000 Egyptian expatriates and families resident in Qatar.

## **4. Economic impact**

The unilateral action taken by the Respondents without international consultation or coordination is having a significant economic impact on the State of Qatar and has resulted in disruption of services at all levels of the State.

The de facto air blockade of Qatar has drastically reduced the flow of needed goods and supplies into the country, and has resulted in serious hardship to passengers who rely upon the services of Qatar Airways.

The State of Qatar is aware of a number of passengers who are stranded in several regions, specifically the Gulf region, where national carriers of the Respondents have taken another collective action against passengers ticketed on Qatar Airways, causing further disruption to international air transport and traffic. For example, in the UAE and Kuwait, Egypt Air has refused carriage to Egyptian nationals who are holders of Qatar Airways tickets to Egypt. The Respondents' national carriers are perpetuating the unlawful collective action against Qatar Airways by refusing carriage, transfer and interline for Qatar Airways' ticketed passengers stranded at airports, including Abu Dhabi International Airport, Dubai International Airport, and all other UAE airports, as well as Bahrain International Airport and all airports in Egypt.

Qatar Airways' offices were closed in the Respondents' territories by written civil aviation directives and using, in some cases, security forces located in the territory of the Respondent countries, inclusive of town and airport offices. Currently Qatar Airways is unable to resolve problems for its international passengers stranded in those territories, including individuals and families of all nationalities, because it is being prevented from re-routing and re-issuing tickets to facilitate travel.



**d) Supporting Data Related to the Facts:**

Please see Appendix 1: The NOTAMs of the Respondents.

Appendix 2: NOTAM of the Republic of Yemen issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
The State of Qatar reserves the right to submit further supplemental data in support of this Application.

**e) Statement of Law:<sup>3</sup>****Violation of the International Air Services Transit Agreement**

The collective action of the Respondents is in violation of the **International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA)** to which the State of Qatar (effective 25 June 2008), the Arab Republic of Egypt (effective 12 April 1947), the United Arab Emirates (effective 25 May 1972), and the Kingdom of Bahrain (effective 12 October 1971) are Contracting Parties.

**Article 1, Section 1 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement**, states, in relevant part, as follows:

*“Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services:*

- 1. The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;*
- 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes;”*

The collective actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain violate this most basic principle, in that each of these States have now refused to allow Qatar-registered aircraft to fly across its territory and the international airspace under their jurisdiction.

**f) Desired Relief**

The State of Qatar wishes to remind the Council of the guiding principles of the Convention. According to the Preamble of the Convention, “it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends.”

The Council of ICAO has the duty to urge all Member States to cease using these unjustified measures against the State of Qatar, in order to ensure the rights of the State of Qatar under the IASTA are fully respected.

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<sup>3</sup> As noted in footnote 1, the State of Qatar is concurrently filing an application requesting that the ICAO Council take action on a disagreement with the Respondents, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the basis of violations of the Chicago Convention and other international legal obligations.



Pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement, the State of Qatar hereby formally invokes Article 84 of Chicago Convention against the Arab Republic of Egypt, United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain for the violation of the IASTA.

The State of Qatar further requests that the ICAO Council urgently provide contingency measures for the disruption of air traffic services, as per Chicago Convention Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services), Attachment C. We ask that the ICAO Council consider the establishment of a direct ATS routes between Doha and Tehran FIR, and the provision of Air Navigation Services within the portion of the ATS route situated within Bahrain's FIR, which will be supported by a Doha Approach Control Unit.

Further, the State of Qatar requests that the Council:

- Suspend the participation of the Respondents at the Council, as well as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who are parties to this dispute and the dispute submitted under our second Application, from all consideration of the application presented herewith;
- Reaffirm its commitment to the orderly development of international air transport pursuant to Article 44 of the Chicago Convention;
- Reaffirm that all signatories to the International Air Services Transit Agreement are obligated to comply with its terms, and must refrain from interfering with international civil aviation by violating the transit rights of other signatories.
- Urge the concerned countries to cease using these unjustified measures against the State of Qatar, in order to ensure the rights of the State of Qatar under the Agreement are fully respected;
- Require the Kingdom of Bahrain to continue to meet their legally binding obligation to provide air navigation services to the carriers and aircraft of the State of Qatar in accordance with the FIR agreement between Qatar and Bahrain; and
- Develop contingency plans to facilitate traffic flow to/from Hamad International Airport-Doha.

Finally, based on the forgoing, the State of Qatar urges the ICAO Council to take immediate steps for the establishment of a distinct Qatari Flight Information Region (FIR), encompassing the area over the exclusive economic zone and contiguous with the Tehran FIR. This will account for the current and forecasted traffic growth and will enable safe and efficient provision of air navigation services. It is to be noted that Qatar has at present about 1000 movements per day and the current system will not be able to cope with the airspace capacity. This will also ensure that never again will the State of Qatar be denied critical access to the outside world.

#### **g) Report of Negotiations**

Direct discussions, occurring on June 5 and 6, 2017 via conference call with officials of the Governments of the Respondents did not bring the crisis to a conclusion. In fact, the crisis has



continued to intensify despite the best efforts of the State of Qatar. The escalation of the situation has continued unabated to the point that the Respondents have now declared that all nationals and residents of Qatar are *personae non grata* and must leave the territory of the Respondents within 14 days. As a result, all diplomatic ties between the nations concerned have been ruptured and negotiations are no longer possible.



Appendix 1: NOTAMs of Respondents

BAHRAIN

UAE

EGYPT

as of 08.06.2017



## BAHRAIN NOTAMs (OBBB)

LYA9537 1706051117

GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX

051117 OBBBYNYX

(A0204/17 NOTAMN

Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/

A) OBBB

B) 1706060000

C) PERM

E)NO FLIGHT WILL BE ALLOWED FROM KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN TO STATE OF QATAR AND FROM STATE OF QATAR TO KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN.)

LYA6666 1706071749

GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX

071749 OBBBYNYX

(A0212/17 NOTAMR A0211/17

Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/

A) OBBB B) 1706071748 C) PERM

E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORISED TO OVERFLY BAHRAIN AIRSPACE.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN INTENDING TO USE BAHRAIN AIRSPACE FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM BAHRAIN CAA ON THE FLW CONTACT:

TEL:00973 17329035 / 00973 17329096

EMAIL: SCHEDULE(AT)MTT.GOV.BH)

## UAE NOTAMs (OMAE)

LYA7213 1706050837  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
050837 OMAEYNYX  
(A0812/17 NOTAMN  
Q)OMAE/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E/000/999/2500N05430E999  
A)OMAE B)1706060000 C)PERM  
E)ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY EMIRATES FIR,DEPART OR LAND AT UAE AERODROMES.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN UAE INTENDING TO USE EMIRATES FIR FROM  
OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM GCAA AVIATION  
SECURITY AFFAIRS ON THE FLW CONTACT:  
TEL: 00971 50 642 4911  
EMAIL: AVSEC-DI(A)GCAA.GOV.AE)





## EGYPT NOTAMs (HECC)

LYA1479 1706051225

GG OTNOYNYX OTZZEADN

051224 EUECYIYN

(A0202/17 NOTAMN

Q) HECC/QAFX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2810N03128E521

A) HECC B) 1706060400 C) PERM

E) ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY CAIRO FIR, DEPART OR LAND AT EGYPTIAN AERODROMES.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN A.R.E INTENDING TO USE CAIRO FIR FROM

OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM ECAA ON THE FLW  
CONTACT :

TEL : +202 22678535

+202 24175605

AFTN : HECAYAYX)



## YEMEN NOTAMs (Issued by SAUDI)

LYA4147 1706061546  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
061546 OEJDYNYX  
(A0603/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/M /E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706061535 C) PERM  
E)ON BEHALF OF REPUBLIC OF YEMEN/ADEN.

ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AIRSPACE.)

LYA6777 1706061818  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
061818 OEJDYNYX  
(A0604/17 NOTAMR A0603/17  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706070001 C) PERM  
E)ONBEHALF OF REPUBLIC OF YEMEN/ADEN.

ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AIRSPACE.)





Before the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization  
(ICAO) Under the ICAO Rules for the Settlement of Differences  
(Doc. 7782/2)

APPLICATION (2)  
OF  
THE STATE OF QATAR

Disagreement Arising under the  
Convention on International Civil Aviation  
Done at Chicago on December 7, 1944

NAME:

H.E. Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey,  
Chairman,  
Civil Aviation Authority of the State of  
Qatar  
Agent for the State of Qatar



8 June, 2017

## APPLICATION OF THE STATE OF QATAR

The State of Qatar ("Applicant") hereby submits its Application, pursuant to Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the "Chicago Convention") and Article 2 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (the "Rules"), for the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to decide the below-described disagreement relating to the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. The Memorial of the State of Qatar is attached hereto, in accordance with Article 2 of the Rules. The Applicant requests that the Secretary General act upon this Application in accordance with Article 3 of the Rules.

The present disagreement involves the Kingdom of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("Respondents"). The Government of each Respondent has terminated diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar and has, without justification, has not only denied aircraft registered in the State of Qatar the right to depart or land at its airports, but also has taken the unprecedented step of barring aircraft registered in Qatar from overflying its Flight Information Region (FIR). These unjustified collective actions constitute a *de facto* air blockade of the State of Qatar. By imposing these sanctions the State of Qatar in peacetime and without notice or justification, the Respondents have violated their international obligations under the Chicago Convention, ICAO guidelines, and international practice for non-discriminatory air navigation standards to preserve the safety, regularity and efficiency of international air transport, including Chicago Convention Articles 5, 12, 28, 37, 44 and 69, Standards in Annexes 2 and 11, and Assembly Resolution A38-12 Appendix G *Delimitation of air traffic services (ATS) airspaces*.<sup>1</sup>

Respondents' actions raise questions of interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes.

The Respondents have prevented all Qatar-registered aircraft, including the aircraft of the national carrier, Qatar Airways, from accessing the FIR (International and National Air Space). Additionally, they have imposed restrictions on other aircraft proceeding to/from Qatar and in the case of the Kingdom of Bahrain, issued a verbal threat of imminent military interception of Qatar-registered aircraft, an action which poses a direct and imminent threat to the safety and good governance of international air transport.

The Respondents have:

- Discriminated in the provision of Air Traffic Services in the Airspace over the High Seas;
- Denied operations in the international airspace over the high seas;
- Disrupted the safe and efficient flow of air traffic in the region;

<sup>1</sup> The State of Qatar notes that it is concurrently submitting a separate application bringing a complaint against the Kingdom of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and the Arab Republic of Egypt under the International Air Services Transit Agreement of 1944.



- Prevented international air carriers from flying to/from or through the State of Qatar by imposing additional approval process as described in the NOTAM's attached in the Memorial; and
- Unlawfully restricted Qatar's access to international airspace.

For these reasons, the State of Qatar requests that the ICAO Council determine that the Respondents have violated the Chicago Convention, order Respondents to comply with all provisions of the Convention, order Respondents to take immediate steps to remove all air transport sanctions they have imposed on the State of Qatar. The Applicant further requests that the Council develop contingency plans to facilitate traffic flow to/from Hamad International Airport-Doha.

This Application and the attached Memorial are being submitted to the Secretary General on 8 June 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

Agent for the State of Qatar



**MEMORIAL**

IN THE MATTER OF

THE STATE OF QATAR  
Applicant

AND

THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN  
First Respondent

AND

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
Second Respondent

AND

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
Third Respondent

AND

THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  
Fourth Respondent



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**(a) Identification of the Parties:**

Applicant: THE STATE OF QATAR

Respondent(s): THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN  
THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

**(b) Authorized Agent:**



Mr. Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey, Chairman of the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, is authorized to act for and represent the Applicant in these proceedings. All communications relating to this case, including notice of the dates of any meetings, should be sent to the attention of Mr. Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey located at QCAA Headquarters, P.O. Box 3000, in Doha, Qatar. The telephone number is +974 4455 7100 and fax number +974 4465 9015 and the email address is [a.subaey@caa.gov.qa](mailto:a.subaey@caa.gov.qa).

**(c) Statement of Facts:**

On 05 June 2017, the above-mentioned States announced that, effective immediately, all Qatar-registered aircraft, including the aircraft of the national carrier, Qatar Airways, would be barred from their (FIRs). These actions, taken during peacetime and without any warning, is wholly unprecedented and is, in effect, a de facto air blockade.

In addition to closing its (FIRs) to Qatar-registered aircraft, the Kingdom of Bahrain also issued a verbal threat of imminent military interception of any Qatar-registered aircraft that overflies its (FIR). These threats, made in the complete absence of any threat to the Kingdom of Bahrain, have prompted the State of Qatar to request the urgent intervention of the ICAO Council, as the Kingdom of Bahrain's actions in particular are wholly unwarranted and pose a direct and imminent threat to the safety, security, regularity, efficiency and good governance of international air transport.





Despite the State of Qatar consistently maintaining open and cooperative relations with the Respondents, the Respondents have taken unlawful collective actions to isolate and impose air travel sanction and airspace restrictions against the State of Qatar, inclusive of its national carrier, Qatari nationals and residents in Qatar from over 140 different nationalities.

The Respondents acted collectively to close the Flight Information Regions (FIRs) for traffic to/from Qatar, including Qatar Airways flights landing to/or overflying the respective FIRs. The State of Qatar denounces the decision of Respondents to close their airspace to Qatar-registered aircraft. These measures amount to a blockade of the State of Qatar, which under international law is a hostile act.


### **1. The Kingdom of Bahrain**

Qatar's northern air transport corridor, which is controlled by the Kingdom of Bahrain, is the most critical to the State of Qatar in maintaining its access to international civil aviation. This northern corridor provides Qatar Airways with critical access to Europe, North America and much of Asia. The unwarranted denial of such access, paired with the unwarranted threat of military interception, imposes undue threats to Qatari nationals and to expatriates living in the country, as well as to global transit travelers. The actions come close to grounding Qatar Airways, which plays a critical role in Qatar's national economy. With all ground access to Qatar eliminated by the decision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to close its land border with Qatar, the country relies heavily access to air transport lanes in order to maintain critical supplies of food and other necessary goods. The unlawful acts of the Kingdom of Bahrain to block the State of Qatar's access to critical air traffic lanes, threatens the health, safety and security of every Qatari citizen.

The Kingdom of Bahrain has been an ICAO Member State since 1971. The decision taken by the Kingdom of Bahrain to close its (FIR) to Qatari registered aircraft has profoundly infringed upon the lawful and authorized operations Qatar Airways. By interrupting the safe and efficient flow of air traffic through this specific Flight Information Region, the Kingdom of Bahrain has breached its international obligations and posed a severe threat to regional safety and security.

The Kingdom of Bahrain has taken further illegal action by informing the State of Qatar that it intends to establish a so-called "buffer zone" adjacent to its territorial waters, and will not allow Qatar-registered aircraft access to its territorial airspace or to the "so-called" buffer zone, despite the fact that this is shared airspace. During a telephonic conversation, Bahraini government officials indicated that any Qatar-registered aircraft that entered into this unilaterally declared "buffer zone" will be subject to interception by Bahraini military aircraft. The threat of military interception of our aircraft in international airspace has forced the State of Qatar to re-route air traffic through the northern corridor into (FIR) controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In relation to the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Council should be aware that there is a signed agreement between the Ministry of Transport of the State of Qatar and the Ministry of Transport of the Kingdom of Bahrain that details that Qatar's (FIR) at 24,500 feet and above is delegated to Bahrain to provide air navigation services.



Under the terms of this agreement and Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention, the Kingdom of Bahrain has an international obligation to provide air navigation services within this (FIR) and has no right to close the (FIR) or deny air navigation services to aircraft in this airspace without following the terms of the Agreement between the State of Qatar and the Kingdom of Bahrain.

## **2. United Arab Emirates**

To the east of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been a member of the ICAO Council since 2007, has also announced that Qatar-registered aircraft will not be allowed to use UAE (FIR). The UAE decision will affect Qatar's access to the international air transport system.

## **3. Arab Republic of Egypt**

The Arab Republic of Egypt, which has been a member of the ICAO Council since 1974, also announced that all Qatar-registered aircraft would be prevented from flying to, from or within its (FIR). This unilateral action was taken without justification or warning. The precipitous ban on air ties will have a serious and immediate impact on over 200,000 Egyptian expatriates and families resident in Qatar.


## **4. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a member of the ICAO Council since 1986. Located to the west and south of the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the only State sharing a land border with the State of Qatar. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has closed all overland routes to Qatar.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also decided that Qatar-registered aircraft will no longer be allowed to use its (FIR). The air transport corridor controlled by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the major air corridor from the State of Qatar to Africa and Middle East. The State of Qatar is dependent upon the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for access to southern destinations.

In addition, Saudi Arabia issued a NOTAM closing the airspace of Yemen to all Qatari registered aircraft with immediate effect, without giving due regard to the safety of aircraft en-route to Africa over the high seas. Thus, the Civil Aviation Authorities of Saudi Arabia have unlawfully issued a mandate, purportedly on behalf of the Yemen Civil Aviation Authority, to prohibit Qatari-registered aircraft from over-flying the Yemeni airspace or an adjacent air corridor.

Further, the Civil Aviation Authorities of Saudi Arabia have disrupted the flow of safe and efficient international air traffic in violation of Assembly Resolution A38-12, Appendix G *Delimitation of Air Traffic Services (ATS) Airspaces*.



## 5. Economic impact

The unilateral and unjustified action taken by the Respondents is having a significant economic impact on the State of Qatar and has resulted in disruption of services at all levels of the State.

The State of Qatar is aware of a number of passengers who are stranded in several regions, specifically the Gulf region, where national carriers of the Respondents have taken another collective action against passengers ticketed on Qatar Airways, causing further disruption to international air transport and traffic. For example, in the UAE and Kuwait, Egypt Air has refused carriage to Egyptian nationals who are holders of Qatar Airways tickets to Egypt. The Respondents' national carriers are perpetuating the unlawful collective action against Qatar Airways by refusing carriage, transfer and interline for Qatar Airways' ticketed passengers stranded at airports, including Abu Dhabi International Airport, Dubai International Airport, and all other UAE airports, in addition to Bahrain International Airport and all airports located in Egypt.

Qatar Airways' offices were closed in the Respondents' territories by written civil aviation directives and using, in some cases, security forces located in the territories of the Respondent countries, inclusive of town and airport offices. Currently, Qatar Airways is unable to resolve problems for its international passengers stranded in those territories, including individuals and families of all nationalities, because it is being prevented from re-routing and re-issuing tickets to facilitate travel.

The Civil Aviation Authorities of Saudi Arabia have even refused to authorize the State of Qatar to use its aircraft on an emergency basis to evacuate nationals of Qatar and any other nationals who were stranded in various airports in Saudi Arabia, so that they might be safely returned to their home countries.

Accordingly, Qatar Airways had to urgently request carriers from other neighboring states to operate emergency charter flights to evacuate passengers from Saudi Arabia. These passengers were flown to Muscat, Oman or to Kuwait, and then had to be transported to the State of Qatar. These actions, taken in peacetime and in the absence of any threat whatsoever, caused a serious hardship upon innocent passengers who have been deprived of the minimum rights of movement in the international air transport system.

### d) Supporting Data Related to the Facts:

Please see Appendix 1: The NOTAMs of the Respondents.

Appendix 2: NOTAM of the Republic of Yemen issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The State of Qatar reserves the right to submit further supplemental data in support of this Application.



**e) Statement of Law:**

**1. Violations of the Chicago Convention**

The actions of the Respondents violate the Chicago Convention, to which the Respondents and Qatar are parties, and stand against accepted practice and international consensus.

**Article 5 of the Chicago Convention**

As referenced in the letter from the ICAO Secretary General (reference number AN 13/4.3.Open-AMO66892 dated 7 June 2017), “. . . besides some ASAs, **Article 5 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation** . . . governs the operation of international non-scheduled flights.”

**Article 9 of the Chicago Convention** sets out the factors that a contracting State must observe to validly restrict access to its airspace.

**Article 9 (Prohibited Areas) of the Chicago Convention** states, in part:

*“Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. (Article 9(a).)*

Further, under Article 9(b), each State “reserves the right in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety,” to prohibit overflights of its territory, as long as the prohibition is applied without distinction based on nationality. The Respondents have not and cannot justify the closure of their airspace under the requirements of **Article 9(a) or (b)**. These States have not shown that there is a military necessity justifying the prohibition of Qatar-registered aircraft from their airspace or that a period of emergency has been declared. Further, no claim of public safety has been advanced by any of the States which have closed their airspace to aircraft registered in the State of Qatar.

Even if any of these factors were present, under Article 9, the States would need to apply the prohibition uniformly to all States, rather than discriminating against the State of Qatar. In this case, each of the States involved have prevented only Qatar-registered aircraft from utilizing their airspace. Aircraft registered in other countries are allowed free navigation over each of the countries that have prevented Qatari-registered aircraft from flying over their territory. As noted

above, Qatar is not embroiled in any sort of military conflict with any of the States that have imposed this illegal blockade, underscoring the unlawfulness and lack of logic for this action.

## 2. Unlawful Restriction of International Airspace

In the case of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the international law violation is not limited to the confines of its own (FIR). This week, Bahrain's civil aviation authorities informed the State of Qatar that it had created a purported military "buffer zone." The creation of this buffer zone, taken against a neighboring state during peacetime, cannot withstand legal scrutiny. This buffer zone is solely designed to block Qatar-registered aircraft from operating lawfully within and around Bahraini airspace, and Bahrain unlawfully has threatened military action should a Qatar-registered aircraft attempt to enter it.

The principle of freedom of access to international airspace is well-settled in international aviation law and is explicitly recognized in other international treaties in addition to the Chicago Convention.

The freedom of navigation in international territory, which includes freedom of navigation and of overflight, is recognized in **Article 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Convention 1982**.

**Article 87** states:

*"The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:*

- (a) Freedom of navigation;*
- (b) Freedom of overflight..."*

Therefore, the high seas and the airspace above the high seas, are acknowledged to be beyond the territory or jurisdiction of any State.

Over the high seas, the "rules of the air" mentioned in **Article 12 of the Chicago Convention** govern:

*"Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention."*

The ICAO Council, through the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) promulgated by **Annex 2** of the Chicago Convention, regulates the flight and movement of aircraft over the high seas. ICAO member States cannot unilaterally depart from such standards.



Additionally, the State of Qatar recalls **Assembly Resolution 39/15 of the ICAO 39th Assembly**, in which the Assembly urged Member States to avoid adopting unilateral and extraterritorial measures that may affect the orderly, sustainable and harmonious development of international air transport.

By threatening military action against Qatar-registered airlines in international airspace, the Kingdom of Bahrain has breached its duties under the Chicago Convention and settled international law. These actions pose an unwarranted threat to the State of Qatar and to the traveling public, and is in direct contradiction of the **Assembly Resolution 39/15 of the ICAO 39th Assembly**.

### 3. Violation of Assembly Resolution A38-12

As referenced in the letter from the ICAO Secretary General (reference number AN 13/4.3.Open-AMO66892, dated 7 June 2017), **Assembly Resolution A38-12**, Appendix G: *Delimitation of air traffic services (ATS) airspaces*, Resolving Clause 7 states, “...the provision by a State of air traffic services within airspace over the high seas does not imply recognition of sovereignty of that State over the airspace concerned.” Accordingly, prohibiting Qatari-registered aircraft to transit through entire FIRs controlled by the Respondents that contain non-sovereign airspace violated **Assembly Resolution A38-12**.

#### f) Requested Relief


The State of Qatar wishes to remind the Council of the guiding principles of the Convention. According to the Preamble of the Convention, “it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends.”

Based on **Assembly Resolution 39/15**, the Civil Aviation Authority of the State of Qatar believes that the ICAO Council, which is the supreme decision-making body of ICAO, has the overriding authority and obligation to address concerns about unilateral measures that affect the orderly development and conduct of international air transport.

The Council of ICAO has the duty to urge all Member States to cease using these unjustified measures against the State of Qatar, in order to ensure the rights of the State of Qatar under the Chicago Convention are fully respected.

The State of Qatar hereby formally invokes **Article 84 of Chicago Convention 1944** on the following bases:

- (1) against the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the violation of fundamental principles of Chicago Convention and the limitations set out in Article 9 of such Convention;
  - (2) against the Kingdom of Bahrain for violation of Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention;
- and



(3) against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Bahrain for interrupting the safe and efficient flow of air traffic in violation of the Assembly Resolution A38-12, Appendix G *Delimitation of Air Traffic Services (ATS) Airspaces*, Resolving Clause 7.<sup>2</sup>

The State of Qatar requests that the ICAO Council urgently provide contingency measures for the disruption of air traffic services, as per Chicago Convention Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services), Attachment C, and further urges that the ICAO Council consider the establishment of a direct ATS routes between Doha and Tehran FIR, and the provision of Air Navigation Services within the portion of the ATS route situated within Bahrain's FIR, which will be supported by a Doha Approach Control Unit.

Further, the State of Qatar requests that the Council:

- Suspend the participation of the Respondents at the Council who are party to this dispute - the Arab Republic of Egypt, United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - with regard to all consideration of the application presented herewith;
- Declare that the actions of the Respondents have adversely affected the safety, security, regularity, efficiency and good governance of international air transport, which constitutes an egregious violation of the fundamental principles of Chicago Convention (**Articles 5, 28, 37, 44 and 69**);
- Reaffirm its commitment to the orderly development of international air transport pursuant to **Article 44 of the Chicago Convention**;
- Investigate the actions of the Kingdom of Bahrain and determine whether these actions violate Bahrain's international obligations to civil aviation under **Article 69 of the Chicago Convention**;
- Reaffirm that all Member States are obligated to respect the principles of the Chicago Convention and must refrain from interfering with international civil aviation.
- Urge the concerned countries to cease using these unjustified measures against the State of Qatar, in order to ensure the rights of the State of Qatar under the Chicago Convention are fully respected;
- Require the Kingdom of Bahrain to continue to meet their legally binding obligation to provide air navigation services to the carriers and aircraft of the State of Qatar in accordance with the FIR agreement between Qatar and Bahrain; and
- Develop contingency plans to facilitate traffic flow to/from Hamad International Airport-Doha.

Finally, based on the forgoing, the State of Qatar urges the ICAO Council to take immediate steps for the establishment of a distinct Qatari Flight Information Region (FIR), encompassing the area over the exclusive economic zone and contiguous with the Tehran FIR. This will

<sup>2</sup> As noted in footnote 1, the State of Qatar in a separate but related application, is also invoking Article 84 against the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain for violations of the International Air Services Transit Agreement.



account for the current and forecasted traffic growth and will enable safe and efficient provision of air navigation services. It is to be noted that Qatar has at present about 1000 movements per day and the current system will not be able to cope with the airspace capacity. This will also ensure that State of Qatar will never again be deprived of critical access to the outside world.

**g) Report of Negotiations**

Direct discussions, occurring on June 5 and 6, 2017 via conference call with officials of the Governments of the Respondents, did not bring the crisis to a conclusion. In fact, the crisis has continued to intensify despite the best efforts of the State of Qatar. The escalation of the situation has continued unabated to the point that the Respondents have now declared that all nationals and residents of Qatar are persona non grata and must leave the territory of the Respondents within 14 days. As a result, all diplomatic ties between the nations concerned have been ruptured and negotiations are no longer possible.





Appendix 1: NOTAMs of Respondents

BAHRAIN

UAE

EGYPT

SAUDI ARABIA

as of 08.06.2017



## BAHRAIN NOTAMs (OBBB)

LYA9537 1706051117  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
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A) OBBB  
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C) PERM  
E)NO FLIGHT WILL BE ALLOWED FROM KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN TO STATE OF  
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LYA6666 1706071749  
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(A0212/17 NOTAMR A0211/17  
Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OBBB B) 1706071748 C) PERM  
E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORISED TO  
OVERFLY BAHRAIN AIRSPACE.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN INTENDING TO USE  
BAHRAIN AIRSPACE FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR  
APPROVAL FROM BAHRAIN CAA ON THE FLW CONTACT:  
TEL:00973 17329035 / 00973 17329096  
EMAIL: SCHEDULE(AT)MTT.GOV.BH)



## UAE NOTAMs (OMAE)

LYA7213 1706050837

GG OTBQQRNO OTZZNAZX

050837 OMAEYNYX

(A0812/17 NOTAMN

Q)OMAE/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E/000/999/2500N05430E999

A)OMAE B)1706060000 C)PERM

E)ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY EMIRATES FIR,DEPART OR LAND AT UAE AERODROMES.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN UAE INTENDING TO USE EMIRATES FIR FROM  
OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM GCAA AVIATION  
SECURITY AFFAIRS ON THE FLW CONTACT:

TEL: 00971 50 642 4911

EMAIL: AVSEC-DI(A)GCAA.GOV.AE)



## EGYPT NOTAMs (HECC)

LYA1479 1706051225  
GG OTNOYNYX OTZZEADN  
051224 EUECYIYN  
(A0202/17 NOTAMN  
Q) HECC/QAFXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2810N03128E521  
A) HECC B) 1706060400 C) PERM  
E) ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY CAIRO FIR,DEPART OR LAND AT EGYPTIAN AERODROMES.  
OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN A.R.E INTENDING TO USE CAIRO FIR FROM  
OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM ECAA ON THE FLW  
CONTACT :  
TEL : +202 22678535  
+202 24175605  
AFTN : HECAYAYX)



## SAUDI ARABIA NOTAMS (OEJD)

LYA3245 1706050442  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
050442 OEJDYNYX  
(A0592/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706050435 C) PERM  
E)ALL FLIGHTS REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTH TO LAND  
AT SAUDI ARABIAN AIRPORTS.)

LYA7940 1706050937  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
050937 OEJDYNYX  
(A0593/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706060001 C) PERM  
E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY SAUDI ARABIAN AIRSPACE.)

LYA8262 1706051004  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051004 OEJDYNYX  
(A0594/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706060001 C) PERM  
E)ALL NON QATAR REGISTERED AIRCRAFT INTENDING TO OPR TO/FM QATAR  
AIRPORTS THROUGH SAUDI ARABIAN AIRSPACE SHALL COORDINATE WITH  
GENERAL AUTHORITY OF CIVIL AVIATION (GACA)  
FOR SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT VIA EMAIL 'SPECIAL(AT)GACA.GOV.SA')

LYA0611 1706051141  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051141 OEJDYNYX  
(A0596/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/M /E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706060001 C) PERM  
E)ALL NON-SAUDI OR NON-QATARI REGISTERED ACFT INTENDING TO USE SAUDI  
AIRSPACE TO/FM QATAR AIRPORTS SHALL COORDINATE WITH GENERAL  
AUTHORITY OF CIVIL AVIATION (GACA) WI ONE WEEK FM TODAY TO OBTAIN  
ALL GACA REQUIREMENTS FM THE FLW CONTACT  
TEL: +966115253336  
EMAIL: 'SPECIAL(AT)GACA.GOV.SA')



## Appendix 2: NOTAM of the Republic of Yemen, issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

LYA4147 1706061546  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
061546 OEJDYNYX  
(A0603/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/M /E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706061535 C) PERM  
E)ON BEHALF OF REPUBLIC OF YEMEN/ADEN.

ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO OVERFLY REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AIRSPACE.)

LYA6777 1706061818  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
061818 OEJDYNYX  
(A0604/17 NOTAMR A0603/17  
Q) OEJD/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OEJD B) 1706070001 C) PERM  
E)ONBEHALF OF REPUBLIC OF YEMEN/ADEN.

ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO OVERFLY REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AIRSPACE.)

+-+



## **Annex 23**

Application (B) and Memorial of the State of Qatar Relating  
to the Disagreement on the Interpretation and Application of  
the International Air Services Transit Agreement, (Chicago, 1944),  
30 October 2017



**Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar  
to ICAO**

**777 Rue Robert-Bourassa**

**Evo Tower Suite 2804**

**Québec, Montreal H3C 3Z7**

**Cel: +1 514-667-0734**

**Email: [Qatar@icao.int](mailto:Qatar@icao.int)**





الهيئة العامة للطيران المدني  
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

30 OCT. 2017

مكتب الرئيس  
Chairman's Office



Date: 21/10/2017

Ref:



2017/OuJ/07538

H.E. Dr Fang LIU  
Secretary General  
International Civil Aviation Organization  
999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard  
Montreal, Quebec  
Canada

**Subject: Submission of the Applications and Memorials by the State of Qatar under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation**

Your Excellency,

With reference to Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) and the Rules for the Settlement of Differences, I have the honor to submit herewith, on behalf of the State of Qatar, the following documents

- 1) Application (A) by the State of Qatar entitled "Disagreement on the interpretation and application of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) and of its Annexes (the Respondents are the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and
- 2) Application (B) by the State of Qatar entitled "Disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago 1944) (the Respondents are the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates)

In accordance with the Rules for the Settlement of Differences a Memorial is attached to each of the Applications.

These documents fully replace the following two documents which were hand-delivered to you on 13 June 2017, namely

- a) Application (1) of the State of Qatar entitled "Complaint under the International Air Services Transit Agreement and
- b) Application (2) of the State of Qatar entitled "Disagreement Arising under the Convention on International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago on December 7, 1944".



الهيئة العامة للطيران المدني  
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

مكتب الرئيس  
Chairman's Office



Furthermore, I have the honor to advise you that I have appointed Mr. Essa Abdulla Almalki, Qatar Civil Aviation Authority Permanent representative to ICAO, to act as the Agent of the State of Qatar in the proceedings relating to the Applications by the State of Qatar.

*Accept, Madam, the assurances of my highest considerations*

Abdulla Nasser Turki Al Subaey  
Chairman, Civil Aviation Authority

CC: Dr Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu, President of the ICAO Council

**APPLICATION (B)**  
**OF**  
**THE STATE OF QATAR**

**Disagreement on the interpretation and application  
of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago 1944)**

**Submitted on behalf of the State of Qatar by its Agent**

**Essa Abdulla Almalki**

**Qatar Civil Aviation Authority Permanent representative to ICAO**

### **APPLICATION (B) BY THE STATE OF QATAR**

The State of Qatar ( "Applicant" ) hereby submits its Application B under the terms of Article II, Section 2 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), Article 1 (b) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) and Chapter XVIII of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944).

The Respondents in this disagreement on the interpretation and application of the IASTA are the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain the United Arab Emirates.

On 5 June 2017 the Governments of the Respondents announced, with immediate effect and without any previous negotiation or warning, that Qatar-registered aircraft are not permitted to fly to or from the airports within their territories and are barred from their respective national air spaces., The Respondents' actions are an unprovoked economic aggression unprecedented in the time of peace in the civilized world. It is also an unashamed contempt of international law and morality.

This unprovoked action by the Respondents is unparalleled in the 70 years' history of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and represents a serious threat to the fundamental principles on which ICAO is based. It violates the letter and spirit of the IASTA, as well as other principles of general international law. It also cynically violates the sanctity of international treaties which are to be complied with "in good faith".

The Respondents specifically are in breach of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago 1944) to which both the Applicant and the Respondents are parties. Under the terms of this Agreement the parties granted to each other two non-commercial privileges in scheduled international services, namely

- The privilege to fly across their territories without landing; and
- The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes.


The unlawful action of the Respondents denied to the Qatar-registered aircraft the privileges expressly granted by the IASTA and closed their airspaces to such aircraft.

The actions of the Respondents continue to have serious impact on the safety, security, regularity and economy of civil aviation in the region. Qatar Airways, the national carrier of the Applicant, operates some 800 flights per day and carries thousands of passengers of many nationalities world-wide. The travel plans and bookings of thousands of travelers of many nationalities were upset, families forcibly separated and bookings/ticketing by Qatar Airways were not honored by the Respondents' airlines. Qatar Airways operations were barred from established international airways, including those over the high seas. Rerouting the flights to limited corridors extends the flight times and fuel consumption and causes considerable economic losses.

The State of Qatar requests the Council of ICAO

- To determine that the Respondents violated by their actions against the State of Qatar their obligations under the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA) and other rules of international law,
- To deplore the violations by the Respondents of the fundamental principles of the IASTA,
- To urge the Respondents to withdraw, without delay, all restrictions imposed on the Qatar-registered aircraft and to comply with their obligations under the IASTA and
- To urge the Respondents to negotiate in good faith the future harmonious cooperation in the region to safeguard the safety, security regularity and economy of international civil aviation.

Respectfully submitted



Essa Abdulla Almalki  
Agent for the State of Qatar

30 October 2017



## **MEMORIAL**

**Presented by the State of Qatar  
to the Application (B) by the State of Qatar**

**Disagreement on the interpretation and application of the  
International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944)**

**Applicant:** the State of Qatar

**Respondents:** the Arab Republic of Egypt

the Kingdom of Bahrain

the United Arab Emirates

**(a) The parties:**

- **applicant:** the State of Qatar
- **respondents:** the Arab Republic of Egypt  
the Kingdom of Bahrain  
the United Arab Emirates

**(b) Authorized Agent for the applicant:**

Mr. Essa Abdulla Almalki  
 Address at Montreal:  
 Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to ICAO  
 777, Rue Robert-Bourassa  
 EVO Tower Suit 2408  
 Montréal, QC, H3C 3Z7  
 Cell: +1 514 667 0734  
 E-mail [Qatar@icao.int](mailto:Qatar@icao.int)

**(c) Statement of relevant facts**

On 5 June 2017 the Governments of the three Respondents severed diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar and published NOTAMs according to which all Qatar-registered aircraft were barred from landing at or departing from their airports and were denied the right to overfly their airspace. The Kingdom of Bahrain issued a verbal threat of imminent military interception of any Qatar-registered aircraft that would overfly Bahrain's FIR.

Certain restrictions applied, according to the Respondent's' NOTAMs, to foreign aircraft flying to/from the State of Qatar and via the FIRs of the Respondents. Foreign (non-Qatar-registered) aircraft were required to obtain prior approval from the civil aviation authorities of the Respondents.

These drastic restrictions were imposed without any previous warning and without any effort to negotiate with the Applicant. There is no precedent in the 70 years of ICAO history of such a brutal action of Member States of ICAO against another member State – an action endangering the very foundations of ICAO and violating the legitimate expectations of the community of ICAO member States. The Qatar-registered aircraft never represented any danger for the Respondents and there have never been any disputes between the Applicant and the Respondents in matters of international aviation. The civil aviation of Qatar has been unjustly targeted, victimized and singled out for a discriminatory treatment never seen before in the history of aviation.

The restrictions imposed without notice by the Respondents caused considerable stress on the Qatar Airways – the national carrier of the State of Qatar that operates some 800 flights per day and carries thousands of passengers of many nationalities all over the world. The travel plans and bookings of thousands of stranded passengers were ruined, families were separated and the airlines of the Respondents refused to accept the confirmed bookings and ticketing originated by Qatar Airways. There will be an immediate impact on over 200.000 Egyptian expatriates and families resident in Qatar and many other expatriates of some 130 nationalities residing in Qatar will not have access to the international air transport network.

The blocked airspaces forced the Qatar Airways to use limited airways, leading to danger of congestion. The safety, security, regularity and economy of civil aviation have been seriously compromised.

**(d) Supporting data related to the facts**

Appendix 1 to this Memorial lists the relevant NOTAMs issued by the Respondents that introduced the prohibitions applicable for the Qatar-registered aircraft.

The Applicant reserves the right to present additional documentary evidence supporting the statement of facts.

**(e) Statement of law**

While the Application (B) relates to the application and interpretation of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA, this Agreement itself is subject to more general rules of international law. All rules of international law are created by States to regulate their mutual relations and States are obliged to comply with such rules in good faith.

1. The **Charter of the United Nations** is the supreme source of international law and the obligations under the Charter prevail over any other obligation (Article 103 of the Charter). In its solemn Preamble the Charter proclaims

*“.. to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained...”*

It is generally recognized that a Preamble to an international treaty is the key to the interpretation of its letter and spirit.

Among the purposes of the United Nations Article 2, 2 of the Charter states



*"2. All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter".*

The actions of the Respondents against the Applicant violate the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. **The United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 1969)** confirms the sanctity of international treaties (*"pacta sunt servanda"*). In Article 26 that Convention states:

*"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".*

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention states

*"A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform the treaty"*

Consequently, no legislation, administrative orders or any governmental decision of legal nature adopted by the Respondents could legally justify their violation of international agreements.

Article 63 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the severance of diplomatic relations does not invalidate the treaty obligations.

3. **The International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago 1944)** is the core issue of the disagreement between the applicant and the Respondents.

The Agreement has been a major achievement of the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago from 1 November to 7 December 1944. It embodied a non-commercial freedom of overflight in scheduled international air services when States failed to agree at the Conference on the granting of commercial rights in international scheduled air services.

At present the Agreement is in force for 130 States. Several past ICAO Assemblies adopted unanimous resolutions exhorting all ICAO Member states to adhere to this Agreement that creates the basic "right to fly" in scheduled international air service.

**The Applicant and the Respondents are parties to the Agreement.**

**By the Agreement the parties grant each other in scheduled international air services**

- **The privilege to fly across its territory without landing, and**
- **The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes**

**In accordance with Article I, Section 2 of the Agreement the exercise of such privileges is to be in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation.**

**By their actions starting on 5 June 2017 and lasting to the present time the Respondents violated the letter and spirit of the International Air Services Transit Agreement. They denied all Qatar-registered aircraft the privileges under the Agreement and blocked for them their airspaces. By their actions the Respondents caused unprecedented dangers to the safety, security, regularity and economy of Qatar-registered aircraft. The established international air routes have been blocked, rerouting of the flights extended the flight time and fuel consumption and the entire network of interconnected flights was put at risk.**

**The Respondent cannot invoke any legal basis for the denial of the IASTA privileges to Qatar-registered aircraft. They are in blatant default of their obligations under the IASTA.**

**(f) The relief desired by the action of the Council**

**The applicant respectfully request the Council**

- **To determine that the Respondents violated by their actions against the State of Qatar their obligations under the International Air Services Transit Agreement and other rules of international law,**
- **To deplore the violations by the Respondents of the fundamental principles of the International Air Services Transit Agreement,,**
- **To urge the Respondents to withdraw, without delay, all restrictions imposed on the Qatar-registered aircraft and to comply with their obligations under the International Air Services Transit Agreement, and**
- **To urge the Respondents to negotiate in good faith the future harmonious cooperation in the region to safeguard the safety, security regularity and economy of international civil aviation.**

**(g) A statement of attempted negotiations**

The Respondents did not permit any opportunity to negotiate the aviation aspects of their hostile actions against the State of Qatar. They repeatedly gave an ultimatum to the State of Qatar on matters unrelated to air navigation and air transport. The last contact with the Respondents was a conference call with officials of the Respondents on 5 and 6 June 2017 that did not result in any understanding. In fact, the crisis gradually escalated when the Respondents declared all Qatar's citizens and resident "undesirable" (*persona non grata*) in their territories and ordered them to leave the Respondents' territories within 14 days. The severance of diplomatic relations makes further negotiating efforts futile.

## **Appendix 1 – NOTAMs issued by the Respondents**

**Arab Republic of Egypt**

**Kingdom of Bahrain**

**United Arab Emirates**

### **EGYPT NOTAMs (HECC)**

LYA1479 1708051225  
GG OTNOYNYX OTZZEADN  
051224 EUECYIYN  
(A0202/17 NOTAMN  
Q) HECC/QAFXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2810N03128E521  
A) HECC B) 1706060400 C) PERM  
E) ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY CAIRO FIR, DEPART OR LAND AT EGYPTIAN AERODROMES.  
OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN A.R.E INTENDING TO USE CAIRO FIR FROM  
OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM ECAA ON THE FLW  
CONTACT :  
TEL : +202 22678535  
+202 24175605  
AFTN : HECAYAYX)

LYA8477 1708101136  
GG OTNOYNYX OTZZEADN  
101135 EUECYIYN  
(A0208/17 NOTAMR A0202/17  
Q) HECC/QAFXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2810N03128E999  
A) HECC B) 1706101130 C) PERM  
E) ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY EGYPTIAN AIRSPACE, DEPART OR LAND AT EGYPTIAN AERODROMES.  
OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN A.R.E INTENDING TO USE EGYPTIAN AIRSPACE  
FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM ECAA ON  
THE FLW CONTACT :  
TEL : +202 22678535  
+202 24175605  
AFTN : HECAYAYX)

## BAHRAIN NOTAMs (OB BB)

LYA9537 1706051117  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051117 OB BBYNYX  
(A0204/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OB BB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OB BB B) 1706060000 C) PERM  
E)NO FLIGHT WILL BE ALLOWED FROM KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN TO STATE OF  
QATAR AND FROM STATE OF QATAR TO KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN.)

LYA9690 1706051122  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051122 OB BBYNYX  
(A0205/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OB BB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OB BB B) 1706060000 C) PERM  
E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORISED TO  
OVERFLY BAHRAIN AIRSPACE)

LYA0006 1706051129  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051129 OB BBYNYX  
(A0206/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OB BB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OB BB B) 1706060000 C) PERM  
E)FOR FLIGHTS AFFECTED BY NOTAM A0204/17 THE FOLLOWING AWYS ARE  
AVBL:  
1-UT430 OUTBOUND VIA RAGAS  
2-UR659 INBOUND VIA MIDS1)

LYA0964 1706051157  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051157 OB BBYNYX  
(A0207/17 NOTAMC A0206/17  
Q) OB BB/QXXXX/IV/M /E /000/999/  
A) OB BB B) 1706051155  
E)CNL OB BB NOTAM A0206/17)

LYA1022 1706051159  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
051159 OBBBYNYX  
(A0208/17 NOTAMN  
Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OBBB B) 1706060000 C) PERM  
E)FOR FLIGHTS AFFECTED BY NOTAM A0205/17 THE FOLLOWING AWYS ARE  
AVBL:  
1-UT430 OUTBOUND VIA RAGAS  
2-UR659 INBOUND VIA MIDS)

LYA0120 1706071140  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
071140 OBBBYNYX  
(A0210/17 NOTAMR A0205/17  
Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OBBB B) 1706071135 C) PERM  
E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORISED TO  
OVERFLY BAHRAIN AIRSPACE.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN INTENDING TO USE  
BAHRAIN AIRSPACE FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR  
APPROVAL FROM BAHRAIN CAA ON THE FLW CONTACT:  
TEL:00973 17329035 / 00973 17329069  
EMAIL: AT-SCHEDULE(AT)MTT.GOV.BH)

LYA1473 1706071253  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
071253 OBBBYNYX  
(A0211/17 NOTAMR A0210/17  
Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
A) OBBB B) 1706071250 C) PERM  
E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORISED TO  
OVERFLY BAHRAIN AIRSPACE.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN INTENDING TO USE  
BAHRAIN AIRSPACE FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR  
APPROVAL FROM BAHRAIN CAA ON THE FLW CONTACT:  
TEL:00973 17329035 / 00973 17329096  
EMAIL: AT-SCHEDULE(AT)MTT.GOV.BH)

LYA6666 1706071749  
 GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
 071749 OBBBYNYX  
 (A0212/17 NOTAMR A0211/17  
 Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
 A) OBBB B) 1706071748 C) PERM  
 E)ALL FLT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORISED TO  
 OVERFLY BAHRAIN AIRSPACE.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN INTENDING TO USE  
 BAHRAIN AIRSPACE FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR  
 APPROVAL FROM BAHRAIN CAA ON THE FLW CONTACT:

TEL:00973 17329035 / 00973 17329096

EMAIL: SCHEDULE(AT)MTT.GOV.BH)

LYA9861 1706081104  
 GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
 081104 OBBBYNYX  
 (A0213/17 NOTAMR A0087/17  
 Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/  
 A) OBBB B) 1706081101 C) 1706082359 EST  
 D)DAILY BTN 0500-0700  
 E)ALL FLIGHTS DEPARTING OR OVERFLYING BAHRAIN FIR EXITING VIA ROTOX  
 ON ATS ROUTE UT444 OR UT602 REQUESTED LEVELS FL340-FL360-FL380 MAY  
 BE LIMITED TO LOWER LEVELS DUE TO TRAFFIC VOLUMES)

LYA9262 1706092207

GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
 092207 OBBBYNYX  
 (A0214/17 NOTAMR A0208/17  
 Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2616N05038E005  
 A) OBBB B) 1706092202 C) PERM  
 E)FOR FLIGHTS AFFECTED BY NOTAM A0212/17 THE FOLLOWING AWYS ARE  
 AVBL:  
 1-UT430 OUTBOUND VIA RAGAS  
 2-UR859 INBOUND VIA MIDS)

LYA6271 1706102311  
 GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
 102311 OBBBYNYX  
 (A0215/17 NOTAMR A0214/17  
 Q) OBBB/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2616N05038E005  
 A) OBBB B) 1706110600 C) PERM  
 E)ALL ROUTES WITHIN BAHRAIN FIR ARE AVAILBLE FOR FLIGHTS AFFECTED BY  
 NOTAM A0212/17, EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING AWYS THAT FALL WITHIN BAHRAIN  
 AIRSPACE:  
 1- B/UB457, L/JUL604 AND N/UN685 BETWEEN DENVO AND NARMI  
 2- M/UM444 AND T/UT444 BETWEEN DENVO AND DESBU  
 3- N/UN318 BETWEEN LADNA AND ASTAD  
 4- A/UA453 BETWEEN ASTAD AND DESBU  
 5- P/UP699 BETWEEN ASTAD AND NARMI)

## UAE NOTAMs (OMAE)

LYA7213 1706050837  
GG OTBDQRNO OTZZNAZX  
050837 OMAEYNYX  
(A0812/17 NOTAMN  
Q)OMAE/QXXXX/IV/NBO/E/000/999/2500N05430E999  
A)OMAE B)1706080000 C)PERM  
E)ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO  
OVERFLY EMIRATES FIR,DEPART OR LAND AT UAE AERODROMES.

OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN UAE INTENDING TO USE EMIRATES FIR FROM  
OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR REQUIRE PRIOR APPROVAL FROM GCAA AVIATION  
SECURITY AFFAIRS ON THE FLW CONTACT:  
TEL: 00971 50 642 4911  
EMAIL: AVSEC-DI(A)GCAA.GOV.AE)

LYA7689 1706121012  
GG OTNOYNYX OTZZEADN  
121012 EUECYIYN  
(A0848/17 NOTAMR A0812/17  
Q) OMAE/QAFLP/IV/NBO/E /000/999/2500N05430E999  
A) OMAE  
B) 1706121010  
C) PERM  
E) ALL ACFT REGISTERED IN THE STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED  
TO OVERFLY UAE AIRSPACE, DEPART OR LAND AT UAE AERODROMES.  
OPERATORS NOT REGISTERED IN UAE INTENDING TO OPERATE NON-SCHEDULED  
FLIGHTS OR CHARTER INCLUDING PRIVATE FLIGHTS, CARGO AND PASSENGER  
FROM OR TO THE STATE OF QATAR VIA UAE AIRSPACE SHALL OBTAIN  
APPROVAL FROM THE GCAA AVIATION SECURITY AFFAIRS BY PROVIDING A  
COPY OF THE DETAILED MANIFEST OF THE FLIGHT INCLUDING PASSENGER  
NAMES AT LEAST 24 HOURS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE TO THE FLW CONTACT:  
TEL: 00971 50 642 4911  
EMAIL: AVSEC-DI(A)GCAA.GOV.AE)



## **Annex 24**

Preliminary Objections of the Arab Republic of Egypt,  
the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in  
Re Application (B) of the State of Qatar Relating to the  
Disagreement Arising under the International Air Services  
Transit Agreement done at Chicago on 7 December 1944,  
19 March 2018

Before the Council of the International Civil  
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Under the ICAO  
Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc. 7782/2)

**PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS**

**OF**

**THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, THE KINGDOM OF  
BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

In Re Application (B) of the State of Qatar Relating to  
the Disagreement Arising under the  
International Air Services Transit Agreement  
done at Chicago on 7 December 1944

H.E. Sherif Fathi  
Agent for the Arab Republic of Egypt

H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohamed  
Agent for the Kingdom of Bahrain

H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori  
Agent for the United Arab Emirates

19 March 2018

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2013, following years of diplomatic engagement, several States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Qatar, concluded an Agreement by which they committed themselves to cease supporting, financing or harbouring persons or groups presenting a danger to each other's national security, in particular terrorist groups; two supplemental agreements to the same end were concluded in 2014 (the 2013 and 2014 agreements are jointly called "the Riyadh Agreements"). When subsequently Qatar failed to abide by the Riyadh Agreements and its other relevant international obligations, and after repeated calls upon Qatar to honour its commitments were of no avail, the Respondents took measures on 5 June 2017 to induce Qatar to comply with its international obligations.

The actions taken by the Respondents—including, in particular, the airspace closures—constitute a package of measures adopted in reaction to Qatar's multiple, grave, and persistent breaches of its international obligations relating to matters essential to the security of the Respondents, and constitute lawful countermeasures authorised by general international law. Under international law, breaches of international obligations entitle states to adopt countermeasures, provided they are proportionate and reversible.

Resolution of the claims submitted in this case by Qatar would necessarily require the Council to determine issues forming part of the wider dispute between the Parties. In particular, the Council would have to determine, amongst other things, whether Qatar had breached its relevant counter-terrorism obligations under international law, and its binding international obligations not to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbours. The narrow dispute submitted by Qatar to the Council relating to airspace closures cannot be separated from these broader issues and the legality of the airspace closures cannot be judged in isolation.

Under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, and by reference Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, the jurisdiction of the Council is limited to "any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application" of the IASTA and the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. Accordingly, the Council does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues as to whether Qatar has breached its other obligations under international law. The Council's limited jurisdiction is consistent with ICAO's role as a specialised agency of the United Nations. While the Council has considerable expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention, it is not well-suited or well-equipped to

handle disputes of a wider nature such as those described above, including issues regarding terrorism and other matters related thereto.

In short, as the Council recognised at its Extraordinary Session on 31 July 2017, there are wider, overarching issues underlying the disagreement that need to be addressed in an appropriate, non-technical forum. In light of the fact that the Council does not have jurisdiction to resolve the wider legal issues—issues that it would necessarily have to determine to resolve the disagreement relating to the IASTA raised in the Application and Memorial—the Council does not have jurisdiction to decide Qatar’s claims.

Qatar has also failed in this case to satisfy the prior negotiations requirement in Article II, Section 2 of the IASTA, pursuant to which only disagreements that “cannot be settled by negotiation” may be submitted to the Council. This requirement is reflected as a procedural requirement in Article 2(g) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences, and the Council’s own prior decisions recognise that an attempt to initiate negotiations is a necessary precondition to the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Qatar’s Application and Memorial expressly recognise that no negotiations were attempted relating to the disagreement contained in the Application prior to it being submitted to the Council. As a consequence of Qatar’s failure to meet this precondition, and its failure to meet the procedural requirement in Article 2(g), the Council is without jurisdiction to hear Qatar’s Application. Alternatively, the Council should declare Qatar’s Application to be inadmissible.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782/2) (“the Rules”), these Preliminary Objections are submitted jointly by the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (collectively the “Respondents”), in response to Application (B) and the accompanying Memorial dated 30 October 2017, submitted by the State of Qatar (“Qatar”) to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (“Council”) relating to a disagreement arising under the International Air Services Transit Agreement done at Chicago on 7 December 1944 (“IASTA”).
2. The Agents authorised to act for each of the Respondents and their respective addresses for service at the seat of the Organization are:

H.E. Sherif Fathi  
Agent for the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Minister of Civil Aviation  
Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt to ICAO  
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Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications  
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999 Robert-Bourassa Boulevard, Suite 15.05  
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H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori  
Agent for the United Arab Emirates  
Minister of Economy  
Chairman of the General Civil Aviation Authority  
Delegation of the United Arab Emirates to ICAO  
999 University Street Suite 14.20  
Montreal, Quebec H3C 5J9

3. The Respondents fully recognise the leading role of ICAO in the development of air transport world-wide, as well as in the establishment of the necessary common framework enabling this development. They reaffirm their strong commitment to the rules and principles of the Chicago Convention, to the strategic objectives and principles of ICAO, as reaffirmed during the recent 39th Session of the Assembly, and

as Member States of ICAO to achieving the mutual objective of ensuring the safety of international civil aviation at all times.

4. The Respondents also fully support the mandate of ICAO, as a specialised agency of the United Nations (“UN”), to ensure that civil aviation operates in a safe, secure and environmentally sustainable manner at all times.
5. The Respondents respectfully submit—consistent with the foregoing—that the Council does not have jurisdiction to address the claims raised in Qatar’s Application (B) and Memorial. In the alternative, the Respondents submit that the Council should decline to hear Qatar’s claims and declare them inadmissible. In summary, it is the Respondents’ position that:
  - (a) resolving the disagreement between Qatar and the Respondents would necessarily require the Council to determine issues that fall outside its jurisdiction under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA; and
  - (b) in any event, Qatar has not complied with:
    - (i) the necessary precondition to the existence of jurisdiction of the Council, contained in Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, of first attempting to resolve the disagreement with the Respondents through negotiations prior to submitting its claims to the Council; and
    - (ii) the procedural requirement in Article 2(g) of the Rules of establishing in its Memorial that negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not successful.
6. As regards paragraph 5(a) above, it is the Respondents’ position that, insofar as they require any justification, the measures adopted by them, which form the subject of Qatar’s complaints in Application (B), are lawful countermeasures under customary international law, taken in response to Qatar’s failure to comply with its international obligations, unrelated to civil aviation, owed to the Respondents. The legality of the countermeasures cannot be adjudicated without ruling upon the legality of Qatar’s actions. The real issue in the present case lies outside of international civil aviation. The scope of the Council’s jurisdiction under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, and

by reference Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, does not extend to such matters, as they fall outside the scope of the Chicago Convention.

7. As regards paragraph 5(b) above, it is the Respondents' position that it is an essential requirement under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, and by reference Article 84 Chicago Convention and Article 2 (g) of the Rules, for an Applicant to show that it has attempted negotiations before submitting a case to the Council, and that this is a precondition for the Council's jurisdiction. That requirement has not been met, for reasons that are related to the substance of the real issue between the Parties, set out at paragraph 45-64 below. If the Council were to find that Qatar had satisfied the precondition of negotiation, this would amount to rewarding Qatar's strategy of avoiding engagement on these issues of capital importance.
8. The present Preliminary Objections are naturally submitted without prejudice to the Respondents' position on the merits of the claims made by Qatar, as set out in Application (B) and the accompanying Memorial, regarding the alleged breach by the Respondents of their obligations under the IASTA. The Respondents fully reserve their rights, in the event that the present Preliminary Objections are not upheld, in due course, and in accordance with the Rules, to submit a Counter-Memorial in which they will respond to the merits of Qatar's claims.
9. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in the present Preliminary Objections is to be taken as constituting an admission in relation to any matter pertaining to the merits of Qatar's claims. In particular, the Respondents take the view that, in the circumstances, the adopted measures of which Qatar complains are consistent with their obligations under the IASTA.

## **II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

10. On 30 October 2017, Qatar submitted to the Council two Applications and accompanying Memorials pursuant to the Rules:
  - (a) The first application ("Application (A)") was submitted pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, and alleges that the Respondents have violated several provisions of the Chicago Convention. Application (A) names the



Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates as Respondents.

(b) The second application (“Application (B)”) was submitted pursuant to Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, and alleges that the Respondents have violated several provisions of the IASTA. Application (B) names the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates as Respondents.

11. The present Preliminary Objections concern only Application (B). Separate Preliminary Objections are submitted in respect of Application (A).
12. The notification of the Applications and Memorials by the Secretary General, pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Rules, occurred on 3 November 2017. By letter dated 17 November 2017, received by the Respondents on 20 November 2017, the Council pursuant to Article 3(1)(c) of the Rules set a deadline of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of the letter—that is, 12 February 2018—as the time-limit for the submission of the Respondents’ Counter-Memorial.
13. On 16 January 2018, by letter addressed to the President of the Council, the four Respondent States requested an extension of the time-limit of six weeks. By letter of 9 February 2018, the Respondents were informed that they were granted an extension of six weeks until 26 March 2018.

### **III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING JURISDICTION**

14. The competence of the Council to decide upon Qatar’s claims in Application (B) is governed by Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, which provides:

“If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement cannot be settled by negotiation, the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the above-mentioned Convention [i.e. Articles 84 to 88 of the Chicago Convention] shall be applicable in the same manner as provided therein with reference to any disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of the above-mentioned Convention”.

15. Article 84 of the Chicago Convention provides:

“If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council”.

16. Since Article II, Section 2 of the IASTA incorporates Article 84 in its entirety, the issues before the Council are identical in the two proceedings.
17. When the Council reaches decisions on disagreements submitted to it under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, the Council exercises judicial functions. This means that the general international law approach to the determination of the scope of jurisdiction of tribunals involved in the judicial settlement of international disputes applies in determining and delimiting the competence and jurisdiction of the Council to hear a dispute or disagreement.
18. Functioning as a judicial body means that decisions on its own jurisdiction shall be primarily guided by the rules and principles of international law governing that subject matter, rather than by criteria of policy, political expediency or desirability of outcome. In particular, the principles developed by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) on this subject as well the Council’s own previous decisions, should be taken into account.
19. The Council has itself recognised that, when hearing applications made under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention (and by extension applications under Article II, Section 2 of IASTA), it functions as a judicial body.

- (a) At the meeting of the Council on 16 November 2000, convened for the purpose of hearing the submissions of the parties in relation to the preliminary objections raised by the fifteen European States in response to the application filed by the United States, the President of the Council affirmed that: [See **Summary Minutes, Exhibit 1**]

“The Council was sitting as a judiciary body and only those Members who were not parties to the dispute had the right to deliberate”.<sup>1</sup>

- (b) Similarly, at the recent meeting of the Council on 21 June 2017, convened for the purpose of hearing the submissions of the parties in relation to the preliminary objections raised by the United States in response to the application filed by Brazil, the President of the Council recalled at the outset of the meeting that: [See **Summary Minutes, Exhibit 2**]

“for the case before it, the Council was sitting as a judicial body under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, taking its decisions on the basis of the submission of written documents by the Parties, as well as on the basis of oral arguments”.<sup>2</sup>

20. That the Council’s functions under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, are judicial is further confirmed by the following considerations:

- (a) The language of Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, both of which refer to disagreements between States “relating to the interpretation or application” of the relevant treaty, reflect the terms of jurisdictional or compromissory clauses commonly found in treaties which confer jurisdiction on international courts or tribunals, such as the ICJ.
- (b) Article 84 of the Chicago Convention (and therefore Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA) gives a party the right to appeal against a decision of the Council adopted in relation to a disagreement submitted thereunder to an arbitral tribunal or the ICJ.

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<sup>1</sup> Exhibit 1, Summary Minutes of the Council, Sixth Meeting 161<sup>st</sup> Session, 16 November 2000 ICAO doc. C-MIN 161/6 (Open), para. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Exhibit 2, Summary Minutes of the Council, Ninth Meeting 211<sup>th</sup> Session, 21 June 2017 ICAO doc. C-MIN 211/9 (Closed), para. 8.

- (c) The Rules, which were adopted by the Council to govern disputes under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, establish a procedure which parallels that of an international court or tribunal. Indeed, the Rules were “drafted in close alignment with the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice”.<sup>3</sup> In this regard, the Rules provide for a distinctly “judicial” process, involving, amongst other things: submission of an Application and a Memorial by the Applicant;<sup>4</sup> the entitlement of the Respondent to raise preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Council as well as a process for the determination of any such preliminary objections;<sup>5</sup> the submission of a Counter-Memorial by the Respondent;<sup>6</sup> and the right of other affected third-party contracting States to intervene in the proceedings.<sup>7</sup>

21. The essentially judicial character of the Council when deciding disagreements submitted to it under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, has also been widely recognised by the ICJ,<sup>8</sup> and academic commentators.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>3</sup> M. Milde, *International Air Law and ICAO* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), (Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2016), p. 201.

<sup>4</sup> Articles 2 and 4 of the Rules.

<sup>5</sup> Article 5(a) of the Rules.

<sup>6</sup> Article 4 of the Rules.

<sup>7</sup> Article 19 of the Rules. See similarly M. Milde, *International Air Law and ICAO* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), (Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2016), at pp. 202-203. In this context, Milde observes that the Rules “provide a detailed, formal and legalistic procedure suitable for a court of law” (ibid., at p. 202).

<sup>8</sup> See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh in *Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan)*, *ICJ Reports 1972*, p. 164, at pp. 164-165, paras. 2-4; p. 169, para. 10; pp. 171-172, paras. 15-16; and p. 178, para. 17. See, in particular, at p. 165, para. 4(c), “The Council is a functional organ required to promote the objectives enshrined in the Convention as well as to undertake settlement of disputes arising out of its functions. The latter aspect, namely the settlement of disputes, is admittedly a judicial function. In the discharge of this specific function the ICAO Council has to act as a judicial tribunal and must, therefore, necessarily discharge its obligations in a judicial manner. [...]”. See similarly, the Declaration of Judge Lachs, *ICJ Reports 1972*, p. 72, at pp. 74-75.

<sup>9</sup> For instance, Bin Cheng, one of the most distinguished authorities in international and air law, affirmed that “the Council must consider itself an international judicial organ and act in accordance with rules of international law governing judicial proceedings.” See B. Cheng, *The Law of International Air Transport*, (Stevens, London, 1962), p. 101. Similarly, Ludwig Weber affirms that: “Under Chapter XVIII of the Convention, the Council is entrusted with certain judicial functions regarding disputes between contracting States; such judicial functions of the Council are also foreseen in certain multilateral and bilateral agreements, in particular the International Air Services Transit Agreement, where the Council is entrusted with the judicial settlement of disputes between contracting States”. L. Weber, *International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)*, (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), (Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2017), at p. 52. Milde, who is somewhat more skeptical of the fully judicial character of the Council when acting under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, nevertheless expresses the view that “the [Chicago] Convention gives a mandatory power to decide on the disputes to the ICAO Council.

22. It is a fundamental and well-established principle of international law that an international court or tribunal may only adjudicate a dispute between States to the extent that those States have consented to the exercise of such jurisdiction.<sup>10</sup>
23. The jurisdiction of the Council over Qatar’s Application (B) derives solely from the jurisdictional or compromissory clause in Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA.<sup>11</sup>
24. As the ICJ has underlined, where the consent of the parties to a dispute:
- “is expressed in a compromissory clause in an international agreement, any conditions to which such consent is subject must be regarded as constituting the limits thereon”.<sup>12</sup>
25. Further, the Court has emphasised that an express requirement of prior negotiations in a compromissory clause:
- “performs an important function in indicating the limit of consent given by States”.<sup>13</sup> [emphasis added]
26. Thus, whether the Council may in fact exercise jurisdiction over the dispute is a legal question that rests squarely upon the basis of the legal framework set out by the ICJ. Four points bear particular emphasis in this regard:

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[...] The Council of ICAO is thus—unlike the governing bodies of other specialised agencies—also a quasi-judicial body” [emphasis added]. M. Milde, *International Air Law and ICAO* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), (Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2016), at p. 199, 203-204.

<sup>10</sup> *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 2006*, p. 6, at p. 32, para. 65; and p. 39, para. 88: “[The Court’s] jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties and is confined to the extent accepted by them [...]”. See also *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011*, p. 70, at p. 125, para. 131. See also the emphasis by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2*, at p. 16 that: “its jurisdiction is limited, [...] is invariably based on the consent of the respondent and only exists in so far as this consent has been given”. And see R. Jennings and R. Higgins, “General Introduction”, in A. Zimmerman et al (eds.), *The Statute of the International Court of Justice* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), p. 3, at p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh in *Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), ICJ Reports 1972*, p. 164, at pp. 164-165, paras. 3-4, in particular at p. 165, para. 4(c): “even though the Council is an administrative organ, because it is required under Article 84 to perform a judicial function, it is indeed indispensable for any quasi-judicial or even administrative body when required to undertake a judicial task, as in this case, not only to know to respect judicial procedures prescribed for it but also to strive to conform to proper judicial standards”.

<sup>12</sup> *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 2006*, p. 6, at p. 39, para. 88; see also *ibid.*, at p. 32, para. 65; *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011*, p. 70, at p. 125, para. 131.

<sup>13</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011*, p. 70, at p. 125, para. 131.

- (a) First, as Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA refers expressly only to disagreements “relating to the interpretation and application” of the IASTA, the jurisdiction of the Council thereunder is consequently limited to disagreements that fall within the scope of those words. As the ICJ has declared, where jurisdiction derives from a compromissory clause in a treaty,

“[...] that jurisdiction exists only in respect of the parties to the treaty who are bound by that clause and within the limits set out therein”.<sup>14</sup>

Conversely, disputes or disagreements that do not relate to the interpretation and application of the IASTA, and/or which extend beyond such matters, thus fall outside of the scope of the Council’s jurisdiction, and it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon them. As a consequence, discussed below in Section V, the Council has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon Qatar’s claims insofar as they seek a declaration that the Respondents have violated their obligations under other instruments, including the UN Charter, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and bilateral agreements between Qatar and the Respondent States.<sup>15</sup>

- (b) Second, Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA confers jurisdiction on the Council in relation to disagreements relating to the interpretation or application of the relevant agreement only insofar as those disagreements “cannot be settled by negotiation”. As a result, discussed below in Section VI, a proper attempt to settle the dispute through negotiation is a precondition to the existence of the Council’s jurisdiction. Consequently, on the express terms of Article II, Section 2, the Council only has jurisdiction over disagreements to the extent that negotiations aimed at settling the disagreement have demonstrably been attempted by Qatar as the initiating party and, despite good-faith efforts, have

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<sup>14</sup> *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)*, *Jurisdiction and Admissibility*, ICJ Reports 2006, p. 6, at p. 32, para. 65; see also at p. 39, para. 88.

<sup>15</sup> In its Applications, and in the statement of “relief desired” in the Memorial, Qatar requests the Council to determine that “the Respondents violated by their actions against the State of Qatar their obligations under [the Chicago Convention/IASTA] and other rules of international law” [emphasis added]: Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, at p. 2; Memorial presented by the State of Qatar to the Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, at p. 5.

proved incapable of resulting in a settlement of the dispute, prior to the filing of an Application and Memorial.

- (c) Third, insofar as the jurisdiction of the Council derives only from Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, it is the Council itself which must, in the first instance, determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide upon a disagreement submitted to it by a contracting State (although, in accordance with Article 84, its decision in this regard may then be the subject of an appeal). This power of the Council is an essential concomitant of its judicial function in accordance with the principle according to which any international court or tribunal has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction (the principle of *Kompetenz-Kompetenz/compétence de la compétence*).<sup>16</sup>
- (d) Fourth, Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA must be interpreted in light of its particular context, as forming part of the IASTA, an agreement that is administered by ICAO, a specialised agency of the UN. As such, it must be read by reference to the “principle of speciality”, and also taking into account the logic of the overall system contemplated by the UN Charter, to ensure that ICAO does not encroach on responsibilities of other bodies within the UN system.<sup>17</sup> The adjudicatory function of the Council is necessarily circumscribed by ICAO’s particular and technical specialisation: civil aviation.

27. Finally, the Respondents recall that, in principle, matters impacting upon jurisdiction must be satisfied at the time of an Application. That, too, is a general rule of international procedural law.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See e.g.: *The Walfish Bay Boundary Case (Germany/Great Britain)* Award of 23 May 1911, RIAA, vol. XI, p. 263, at p. 307; *Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection*, ICJ Reports 1953, p. 111, at pp. 119-120; quoted in part in *Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal)*, ICJ Reports 1991, p. 53, at pp. 68-69, para. 46; *The Abyei Arbitration (Sudan/The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement)*, Final Award of 22 July 2009, RIAA, vol. XXX, p. 145, at pp. 329-331, paras. 498-502.

<sup>17</sup> *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion*, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 66, at pp. 78-79, paras. 25-26; see also *Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)*, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14, at p. 53, para. 89.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2*, at p. 16: “the Court, before giving judgment on the merits of the case, will satisfy itself that the suit before it, in the form in which it has been submitted and on the basis of the facts hitherto established, falls to be decided [under the applicable compromissory clause]”; *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial*

#### IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING ADMISSIBILITY

28. In light of the judicial functions exercised by the Council, the general approach of international courts and tribunals to questions of admissibility of claims is also applicable when the Council considers applications under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA.

29. In this regard, it is well-established in international law that an international court or other adjudicatory body may be required to consider the admissibility of a claim, and may be required to decline to exercise such jurisdiction, as it may have to decide a dispute on the basis of a legal reason which, “while it does not exclude its authority in principle, affect[s] the possibility or propriety of its deciding the particular case at the particular time”.<sup>19</sup> As the ICJ explained in *Oil Platforms*:

“Objections to admissibility normally take the form of an assertion that, even if the Court has jurisdiction and the facts stated by the applicant State are assumed to be correct, nonetheless there are reasons why the Court should not proceed to an examination of the merits”.<sup>20</sup>

30. Similarly, in its judgment on preliminary objections in the *Croatian Genocide* case, the Court observed that:

“Essentially such an objection consists in the contention that there exists a legal reason, even when there is jurisdiction, why the Court should decline to hear the case [...]”<sup>21</sup>

31. The Council has itself previously, in proceedings under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, dealt with an objection to the admissibility of a claim based on an

*Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)*, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, at p. 85, para. 30: “[t]he dispute must in principle exist at the time the Application is submitted to the Court”.

<sup>19</sup> J. Crawford, *Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law* (8<sup>th</sup> ed.) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), at p. 693; see also G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles and Substantive Law” (1950) 27 *British Yearbook of International Law* 1, at p. 13; Y. Shany, “Chapter 36: Jurisdiction and Admissibility”, in C. Romano et al (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 779, at p. 787; R. Jennings and R. Higgins, “General Introduction”, in A. Zimmerman et al (eds.), *The Statute of the International Court of Justice* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), p. 3, at pp. 12-13.

<sup>20</sup> *Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*, Merits, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161, at p. 177, para. 29.

<sup>21</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia)*, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 412, at p. 456, para. 120.



alleged failure to exhaust local remedies as a preliminary objection.<sup>22</sup> In the present case, the fact that the true centre of gravity of the dispute is distinct from, and much broader than, international civil aviation is one of the root causes of Qatar’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 2 (g) of the Rules. That is in itself a sufficient legal reason for the Council to decline to address Qatar’s claims as a matter of inadmissibility.

## V. THE COUNCIL DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE LEGALITY OF THE MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE RESPONDENTS

32. It is the Respondents’ position that their actions—including, but not exclusively, the airspace closures—constitute a package of measures instituted in reaction to Qatar’s multiple, grave, and persistent breaches of international obligations essential to the security of the Respondents. They are thus to be categorised as lawful countermeasures, authorised by general international law. As such, the wrongfulness of any non-compliance by the Respondents with the IASTA would be precluded by definition. The Respondents reject the allegation that they have failed to comply with their obligations under the IASTA. But the point for present purposes is that there is a body of law outside of the IASTA—and accordingly outside of the Council’s jurisdiction—which affords the Respondents a dispositive defence that is legally prior to the issue of compliance with the IASTA.
33. As already noted, under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, the jurisdiction of the Council is limited to “any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application” of the IASTA. When faced with a dispute that appears to go beyond these bounds, including a dispute where countermeasures are invoked as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, it is the Council’s “duty to isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim”;<sup>23</sup> it “must

<sup>22</sup> Decision of the ICAO Council on the Preliminary Objections in the Matter “United States and 15 European States (2000)”, 16 November 2000.

<sup>23</sup> *Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)*, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253, at p. 262, para. 29; (*New Zealand v. France*), ICJ Reports 1974, p. 457, at p. 466, para. 30.

ascertain the true subject of the dispute, the object and purpose of the claim”.<sup>24</sup> An “incidental connection between the dispute and some matter regulated by the Convention is insufficient to bring the dispute, as a whole, within the ambit” of the title of jurisdiction.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the appropriate question for the Council to ask is whether the “real issue”, which must be considered as being the centre of gravity of the dispute, falls outside the ICAO Council’s jurisdiction. The Council should exercise jurisdiction over the dispute only if it can do so whilst refraining from any determination of issues falling outside of the IASTA and the Chicago Convention, and therefore outside its jurisdiction.<sup>26</sup>

34. It is not disputed that the Council could exercise jurisdiction over a reciprocal invocation of countermeasures involving suspension by a State party of performance of its obligations under the IASTA in response to an alleged breach by another State of its own obligations under that Convention. The Respondents do not contend that the invocation of countermeasures precludes the Council’s jurisdiction *per se*.<sup>27</sup> Rather it is a question in each particular case whether the scope of the compromissory clause, properly interpreted in its institutional context, is sufficiently wide to permit an assessment of whether countermeasures were justified. In the present instance of Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA this is not the case, as demonstrated below.
35. The jurisdiction of the Council is limited to disputes or disagreements relating to the interpretation or application of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, or of the IASTA. The Council thus has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the wider dispute between the parties unrelated to international civil aviation, in particular, Qatar’s non-compliance with the Riyadh Agreements, other instruments relating to counter-terrorism and its obligations relating to non-interference in the internal affairs of other States (see paragraphs 46-54) which constitute the centre of gravity and the “real

<sup>24</sup> *Id.*, at p. 263, para. 30 and p. 467, para. 31, referring to *Interhandel*, *ICJ Reports 1959*, p. 6, at p. 19 and *Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Merits*, *ICJ Reports 1960*, p. 6, at pp. 33-34; *Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)*, *ICJ Reports 1998*, p. 432, at p. 449, para. 31.

<sup>25</sup> *In the matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)*, PCA Case No. 2011-03, Arbitral Award of 8 March 2015, para. 220.

<sup>26</sup> *In the matter of an arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China)*, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015, para. 150.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), in *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session (2001)*, UN doc A/56/10, chapter IV, reproduced in *ILC Yearbook 2001*, vol. II(2), p. 31 *et seq.*, Article 50(2)(a).

issue” of the dispute. It also has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality of the actions taken by the Respondents as countermeasures in response to Qatar’s violation of its obligations. In line with the rules of international law regarding countermeasures, the determination of the legality of the countermeasures would necessarily require the Council to adjudicate upon Qatar’s actions, most notably whether Qatar has breached its international obligations as referred to in paragraphs 46-54 below.

36. Since countermeasures operate as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, the Council could not determine whether there has been a breach by the Respondents of the IASTA without necessarily also determining whether the wrongfulness of the Respondents’ conduct (if any) was precluded by a valid invocation of countermeasures. As a consequence, the Council is without jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disagreement between the Parties.
37. The Respondents’ preliminary objection based on the Council’s lack of jurisdiction to rule on the question of whether the measures can be justified as countermeasures is discussed in more detail below. The observations that follow are limited to those aspects of the Respondents’ countermeasures defence underlying its objection that the Council is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims submitted by Qatar. As noted in paragraph 9 above, nothing in the present Preliminary Objections is to be taken as constituting an admission in relation to any matter pertaining to the merits of Qatar’s claims, and, specifically, the Respondents reject the allegations that the measures adopted by them, of which Qatar complains, are in any way inconsistent with their obligations under the IASTA.

#### **A. Countermeasures are Permissible under International Law**

38. Contemporary international law permits a State to respond to a breach by another State of its obligations under international law through the adoption of countermeasures, i.e. non-forcible measures of self-help consisting of the temporary suspension of the performance of one or more obligations, adopted with a view to inducing the wrongdoing State to comply with its international obligations. To the extent that measures adopted in response to a breach by another State of its international obligations comply with the relevant procedural and substantive

conditions foreseen by customary international law, the wrongfulness of those measures is precluded.

39. The right of States to adopt countermeasures in response to a breach by another State under international law has been consistently affirmed by the ICJ and other international tribunals:

(a) The Arbitral Tribunal in the *Air Services Agreement* arbitration recognised the legality of countermeasures, explaining that:

“Under the rules of present-day international law, and unless the contrary results from special obligations arising under particular treaties, notably from mechanisms created within the framework of international organisations, each State establishes for itself its legal situation *vis-à-vis* other States. If a situation arises which, in one State's view, results in the violation of an international obligation by another State, the first State is entitled, within the limits set by the general rules of international law pertaining to the use of armed force, to affirm its rights through ‘counter-measures’”.<sup>28</sup>

(b) In *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*, the ICJ observed that the internationally wrongful acts of which Nicaragua was accused—if proven and found to be attributable to it—might “have justified proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of these acts . . .”<sup>29</sup>

(c) Similarly, in *Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project*, having found that Czechoslovakia had committed an internationally wrongful act (i.e. breached its international obligations), the Court turned to consider:

“whether such wrongfulness may be precluded on the ground that the measure so adopted was in response to Hungary's prior failure to comply with its obligations under international law . . .”<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France*, Award of 9 December 1978; RIAA, vol. XVIII, p. 417, at p. 443, para. 81.

<sup>29</sup> *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)*. Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at p. 127, para. 249.

<sup>30</sup> *Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 55, para. 82.

In that regard, the ICJ held that “in order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain conditions...”<sup>31</sup> Although it ultimately concluded that, on the facts before it, the relevant conditions had not been fulfilled, the Court recognised that the wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise constitute a breach of a State’s international obligations would in principle be precluded to the extent that it qualified as a lawful countermeasure.

40. Relying on these and other precedents, the UN International Law Commission (“ILC”), a body established by the General Assembly to promote the codification and progressive development of international law, has likewise recognised the existence of countermeasures as a legal notion precluding wrongfulness in its *Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts* (hereinafter “ARSIWA”). Article 22 of the ARSIWA provides:

“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State...”<sup>32</sup>

41. As recognised by the ILC in its Commentary on the ARSIWA, as a matter of customary international law, there is no requirement that countermeasures should involve suspension of the same or a closely-related obligation, or an obligation arising under the same treaty as the obligation breached (so-called “reciprocal countermeasures”).<sup>33</sup>
42. Neither the IASTA nor the Chicago Convention preclude contracting States from resorting to countermeasures involving the suspension of performance of their obligations thereunder in response to a breach by another Contracting Party of its international obligations. As such, the States Parties to the IASTA retain their sovereign rights under customary international law to adopt measures involving the

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<sup>31</sup> *Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 55, para. 83.

<sup>32</sup> International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), in *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session* (2001), UN doc A/56/10, chapter IV, reproduced in *ILC Yearbook* 2001, vol. II(2), p. 31, para. 75-76, Article 22.

<sup>33</sup> See ARSIWA, Introductory Commentary to Part Three, Chapter II, para. 5; the term “reciprocal countermeasures” refers to “countermeasures which involve suspension of performance of obligations towards the responsible State ‘if such obligations correspond to, or are directly connected with, the obligation breached’”. (ibid. [internal reference omitted]).

suspension of performance of their obligations thereunder to another State Party by way of countermeasures in response to a prior breach of international obligations by that State.

43. While the IASTA and the Chicago Convention do not restrict the contracting States' substantive entitlement to adopt countermeasures, the Council does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues as to the validity of actions taken by way of countermeasures when the wrongful acts to which the countermeasures respond are unrelated to international civil aviation and thus fall outside of the IASTA or the Convention.<sup>34</sup> This is the case here, as the challenged measures were adopted in response to Qatar's breaches of its international obligations relating to counter-terrorism and non-interference in the Respondents' internal affairs.

**B. The Actions of the Respondents Underlying Qatar's Claims are a Response to Qatar's Prior Internationally Wrongful Acts**

44. In its Applications and Memorials, Qatar directs its claims against certain "published NOTAMs according to which all Qatar-registered aircraft were barred from landing at or departing from [Respondents'] airports and were denied the right to overfly their airspace".<sup>35</sup> As Qatar acknowledges, these NOTAMs were issued on 5 June 2017, the same day the Respondents severed diplomatic relations with Qatar.<sup>36</sup>
45. What Qatar omits, however, is that diplomatic relations were severed, and the various other measures were adopted by the Respondents, due to the fact that Qatar—despite repeated calls to cease and desist by the Respondents—had continued to breach multiple multilateral obligations incumbent upon it (including at the regional level) to prevent, suppress and criminalise support for, and funding of, terrorist organisations, and to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Qatar adverts to this in its Application, acknowledging that "they [the Respondents] gave an

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Republic of Mauritius v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)*, PCA Case No. 2011-03, Arbitral Award of 8 March 2015, para. 220.

<sup>35</sup> Memorial presented by the State of Qatar to the Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, para. c.

<sup>36</sup> Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, para. c.

ultimatum to the State of Qatar on matters unrelated to air navigation and air transport”.<sup>37</sup>

46. The Respondents had repeatedly, over the course of several years going back to the period before 2013, raised their very serious concerns about Qatar’s support for extremism and terrorist organisations, as well as its meddling in the internal affairs of its neighbours, including the Respondents. This resulted in multilateral negotiations in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”), and culminated in Qatar’s signing and ratifying of the 2013 Riyadh Agreement and its 2014 Supplements in which Qatar committed to cease the wrongful activities complained of. [See **2013 Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit 3; Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit 4; The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit 5**] Despite these commitments and repeated affirmations that it would cease and desist from its wrongful conduct, Qatar has continued to support terrorism and to sow regional unrest, including within the Respondents’ countries. Qatar has funded terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, the Al Nusra Front, Da’esh, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas, as well as supported extremist groups in war-ravaged countries, such as Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen, thereby fuelling unrest in the region. Further, Qatar continues to harbour known terrorists, and has failed to arrest, prosecute, or extradite wanted persons. Qatar has also failed to take enforcement actions against prominent terrorism financiers operating from within its borders. These actions and omissions by Qatar are violations of Qatar’s international legal obligations owed to the Respondents, and constitute internationally wrongful acts.
47. The Riyadh Agreements, adopted within the framework of the GCC,<sup>38</sup> contain a series of important commitments undertaken by each of Qatar, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates related to security and regional stability.

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<sup>37</sup> Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, para. g.

<sup>38</sup> Exhibit 3, First Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 23 November 2013; Exhibit 4, Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 2014; Exhibit 5, The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 16 November 2014.

48. The 2013 Riyadh Agreement<sup>39</sup> contains commitments including, among others, undertakings by each State as regards the cessation of support for groups which threaten the security and stability of GCC States, denying safe harbour or refuge to groups threatening GCC States or their governments, and non-interference in the affairs of other GCC States, whether directly or indirectly. [See **2013 Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit 3**] It was signed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain.
49. The 2013 Riyadh Agreement was supplemented by an Implementation Mechanism Agreement in spring 2014, and by the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, signed in November 2014 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. [See **Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit 4** and **The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit 5**] The obligations under the Riyadh Agreement and the Implementation Mechanism Agreement<sup>40</sup> were incorporated into the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement pursuant to Article 1 of the latter Agreement, which provides that “non-committing to any of the Articles of the Riyadh Agreement and its executive measure amounts to a violation of the entirety of the agreement”.
50. The Implementation Mechanism Agreement detailed a series of specific measures to be adopted by the States Parties in implementation of the commitments contained in the Riyadh Agreements. These commitments, which are to a large extent reflective of obligations set out in the original 2013 Riyadh Agreement, include an obligation requiring each State to take all necessary precautions so as to guarantee no interference in the internal affairs of other GCC states, and not to support entities that pose a risk to the GCC.<sup>41</sup> The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement<sup>42</sup> likewise reiterates and expressly incorporates the obligations previously undertaken in the original 2013 Riyadh Agreement, and in the Implementation Mechanism Agreement. Together,

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<sup>39</sup> Exhibit 3, First Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 23 November 2013.

<sup>40</sup> Exhibit 4, Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 2014.

<sup>41</sup> Exhibit 4, Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 2014.

<sup>42</sup> Exhibit 5, The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 16 November 2014.



these treaties are referred to as the Riyadh Agreements and impose legally binding obligations on all States Parties as a matter of international law.

51. Qatar is also bound by other multilateral international obligations in the field of counter-terrorism, including obligations arising within the framework of the UN.
52. Qatar is a Party to the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (“the Terrorism Financing Convention”),<sup>43</sup> pursuant to which the States Parties assume sweeping obligations to suppress the funding of terror groups, including obligations requiring the adoption and enforcement of laws criminalising the provision of financial support to such groups, as well as the adoption of appropriate mechanisms to prosecute or extradite, punish, and seize the assets of terrorists.<sup>44</sup>
53. In addition, Qatar is also bound by obligations arising under Security Council resolutions, including resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposing specific counter-terrorism obligations. Pursuant to Article 25 of the UN Charter, the obligations contained in such resolutions are binding upon all Members of the UN. Relevant resolutions adopted by the Security Council include, in particular, Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)<sup>45</sup> and, more recently, Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016) on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts: Aviation security”.<sup>46</sup>
54. Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted unanimously by the Security Council, was the first significant counter-terrorism resolution adopted following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. It was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and imposes obligations upon all Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, refrain from providing any form of support (active or passive) to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, deny safe haven to those who

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<sup>43</sup> International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197; Ratification Status of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999, available at: [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg\\_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en). The Respondent States are all party to the Terrorism Financing Convention. *Id.*

<sup>44</sup> Terror Financing Convention, Articles 4, 5, 6, 8 and 18.

<sup>45</sup> Resolution 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).

<sup>46</sup> Resolution 2309 (2016), 22 September 2006, UN doc. S/RES/2309 (2016).

finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning or perpetration of terrorist acts is brought to justice, and prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups through the implementation of effective border controls.<sup>47</sup>

55. Upon severing diplomatic relations with Qatar and adopting the other measures (including the airspace closures complained of by Qatar), the Respondents made clear that they were taking those actions as a result of Qatar’s breaches of its international obligations, in particular, its obligations to cease supporting and funding terrorist organisations and interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbours, including the obligations in relation to those matters under the Riyadh Agreements. The Respondents also made clear that the measures in question had been adopted with the aim of inducing Qatar to cease its unlawful conduct.
56. The Arab Republic of Egypt [See **Declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Exhibit 6**] declared:

“The Egyptian government decided to cease all diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar. That came due to the insistence of the Qatari regime on adopting a hostile approach to Egypt, and the failure of all trials to deter its support to the terrorist organizations, topped by the terrorist group of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qatari regime sheltered its leaders, who have received judicial rulings in terrorist operations targeted the safety and security of Egypt, in addition to promoting the doctrine of Al-Qaeda and ISIL, as well as supporting the terrorist operations in Sinai. Qatar has been insisting on interfering in the internal affairs of Egypt and the countries of the region, in a way that threatens the Arab national security and boosts the feelings of schism and fission inside the Arab communities, according to well-planned schemes targeting the unity of the Arab nation and its interests”.<sup>48</sup>

57. The Kingdom of Bahrain’s statement [See **Declaration of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Exhibit 7**] explained:

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<sup>47</sup> Resolution 1373 (2001), 28 September 2001, UN doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), para. 1(a)-(d), 2(a)-(g).

<sup>48</sup> Exhibit 6, Declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/MFAEgypt/posts/1521555834583024>.

“Based on the insistence of the State of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and stability of the Kingdom of Bahrain and to interfere in its domestic affairs, as well as on the escalation and incitement of its media and its support to acts of terror and to financing armed groups associated with Iran to carry out subversive attacks and spread chaos in the Kingdom in flagrant violation of all agreements, covenants and principles of international law without any regard to values, law, morals or consideration of the principles of good neighbourliness or pledge to the premises of Gulf relations, and the denial of previous commitments, the Kingdom of Bahrain announces the severing of its diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar in order to preserve its national security. [...] Bahrain is also closing its airspace [...] to air traffic [...] to and from Qatar within 24 hours of the announcement of the statement”.<sup>49</sup>

58. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates issued a statement announcing that measures, including the airspace closure, were being taken “based on the insistence of the State of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and stability of the region and its failure to honour international commitments and agreements”. [See **Declaration of the United Arab Emirates, Exhibit 9**]<sup>50</sup> The statement further explained:

“The [United Arab Emirates] is taking these decisive measures as a result of the Qatari authorities’ failure to abide by the Riyadh Agreement on returning GCC diplomats to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in 2014, and Qatar’s continued support, funding and hosting of terror groups, primarily Islamic Brotherhood, and its sustained endeavours to promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al-Qaeda across its direct and indirect media in addition to Qatar’s violation of the statement issued at the US-Islamic Summit in Riyadh on May 21st, 2017 on countering terrorism in the region and considering Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. The UAE measures are taken as well based on Qatari authorities’ hosting of terrorist elements and meddling in the affairs of other countries as well as their support of terror groups—policies which are

<sup>49</sup> Exhibit 7, Declaration of Kingdom of Bahrain; see also Bahrain severs relations with Qatar, 5 June 2017, available at: <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/788935>.

<sup>50</sup> Exhibit 9, Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates announcing the measures against Qatar, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.mofa.gov.ac/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-06-2017-UAE-Qatar.aspx>.

likely to push the region into a stage of unpredictable consequences”.<sup>51</sup>

59. The Respondent States took these measures following a lengthy deliberative process conducted through the framework of the Riyadh Agreements. These measures followed repeated requests from the Respondent States to Qatar between 2014 and June 2017, including through the Committee established to implement the Riyadh Agreements, that Qatar desist from its long-standing support of extremism and terrorism, and its continuing interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours. Qatar failed to engage seriously with those requests and maintained its conduct in breach of the Riyadh Agreements and its other international law obligations. For example, in April 2017, Qatar was widely reported to have paid US\$1 billion as “ransom” to entities affiliated with known terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaida, a matter which the Arab Republic of Egypt brought to the attention of the Security Council.<sup>52</sup>
60. Notwithstanding the sensitivity of the information underlying their decision, on 9 June 2017, the Respondent States released a joint list of designated terrorists and expressed concern about “the continued violation by the authorities in Doha of their signed commitments and agreements that included a pledge not to support or harbour elements or organisations that threatened the security of states”.<sup>53</sup> The list comprises 59 persons

<sup>51</sup> Exhibit 9, Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates announcing the measures against Qatar, 5 June 2017, available at: <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/05-06-2017-UAE-Qatar.aspx>.

<sup>52</sup> See Exhibit 10, *Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts*, United Nations Security Council, 7962nd Meeting, S/PV.7932, 8 June 2017, available at: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7962](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7962). See also, Erika Solomon, The \$1bn hostage deal with enraged Qatar’s Gulf rivals, *Financial Times*, 5 June 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/dd033082-49e9-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43>; Michelle Nichols, Egypt calls for U.N. inquiry into accusation of Qatar ransom payment, *Reuters*, 9 June 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-un/egypt-calls-for-u-n-inquiry-into-accusation-of-qatar-ransom-payment-idUSKBN18Z26W>; Alex Lockie, Qatar may have paid \$1 billion in ransom for release of royal family members captured while hunting with falcons, *Business Insider*, 5 June 2017, <http://www.businessinsider.com/qatar-ransom-al-qaeda-iran-falconry-2017-6>; Egypt calls for UN probe on Qatar giving terrorists \$1 bln in Iraq, *Al Arabiya English*, 8 June 2017, <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/06/08/Egypt-calls-for-probe-on-Qatar-giving-terrorist-groups-in-Iraq-1-billion.html>.

<sup>53</sup> See Exhibit 11, Arab states release list of Qatar-supported terror financiers, *Saudi Gazette*, 9 June 2017, <http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/180172/Arab-states-release-list-of-Qatar-supported-terror-financiers>; Exhibit 12, ‘Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain issue terror list’, 9 June 2017, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/789544>.

and 12 entities with links to Qatar.<sup>54</sup> On 22 November 2017, the Respondents States released a supplementary list of designated terrorists comprising 11 persons and two entities.<sup>55</sup> The Respondents, confirming “that the Qatari authorities continue to support, sponsor and finance terrorism, encourage extremism and spread hate speech”, reiterated their “commitment to consolidating efforts aimed at countering terrorism and reinforcing pillars of security and stability in the region”.<sup>56</sup>

61. Internationally sanctioned persons that continue to reside in Qatar include individuals such as Mr. Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy, considered by the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to be a “Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator who has provided financial support to, and acted on behalf of, the senior leadership of Al-Qaida”. Qatar released him from prison after only six months, following which he immediately resumed his activities, including organising financing in support of Al-Qaida, and he remains on a UN terrorist sanctions list today.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, according to the ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Abd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari citizen and resident, “has facilitated significant financial support to Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115), and served as an interlocutor between AQI leaders and Qatar-based donors.”<sup>58</sup> As a top advisor to the government of Qatar, Al-Nuaimi advised

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<sup>54</sup> See Exhibit 13, Letter from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain to the UN Secretary General, UN/SG/Qatar/257, 16 June 2017.

<sup>55</sup> See Exhibit 14, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, Anti-terror quartet adds two entities, 11 individuals to terrorism lists, 23 November 2017, <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/23-11-2017-UAE-terrorism-lists.aspx#sthash.WF7CBkRk.dpuf>. See also, Arab states blacklist Islamist groups, individuals in Qatar boycott, *Reuters*, 22 November 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-security/arab-states-blacklist-islamist-groups-individuals-in-qatar-boycott-idUSKBN1DM2WQ>.

<sup>56</sup> *Id.*

<sup>57</sup> Exhibit 15, Narrative Summary: QDi.253 Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy, United Nations sanctions list issued by the Security Council Commission pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh) Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities, last updated 3 February 2016, [https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/individual/khalifa-muhammad-turki-al-subaiy](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/khalifa-muhammad-turki-al-subaiy).

<sup>58</sup> Exhibit 16, Narrative Summary: QDi.334 ‘Abd al-Rahman bin ‘Umayr al-Nu’aymi, United Nations sanctions list issued by the Security Council Commission pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh) Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities, last updated 13 May 2016, [https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/individual/%27abd-al-rahman-bin-%27umayr-al-nu%27aymi](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/%27abd-al-rahman-bin-%27umayr-al-nu%27aymi).

Qatar's royal family on charitable giving even while Al-Nuaimi was publicly denounced as someone who had been secretly financing Al-Qaeda.<sup>59</sup>

62. The Respondent States are not alone in recognising the risk that Qatar poses to the region. The former United States Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, for example, described Qatar as a “permissive jurisdiction” for terrorist financing,<sup>60</sup> [see **U.S. Department of the Treasury, Exhibit 19**] and a number of the individuals identified by the Respondent States in their joint list of banned terrorists are, or have been designated as terrorists by Australia<sup>61</sup>, Canada,<sup>62</sup> New Zealand,<sup>63</sup> the United Kingdom,<sup>64</sup> and the United States.<sup>65</sup> In addition, the majority of those individuals designated by the Respondent States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States are also listed by the UN Security Council ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.<sup>66</sup>
63. The Respondents have consistently declared that the measures taken against Qatar, including the closure of their airspace to Qatari aircraft, were taken as a result of

<sup>59</sup> Exhibit 17, Joby Warrick & Tik Root, Islamic Charity Officials Gave Millions to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Says, *Washington Post*, 22 December 22, 2013, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/islamic-charity-officials-gave-millions-to-al-qaeda-us-says/2013/12/22/e0c53ad6-69b8-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.4a5e64f49291](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/islamic-charity-officials-gave-millions-to-al-qaeda-us-says/2013/12/22/e0c53ad6-69b8-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html?utm_term=.4a5e64f49291). According to U.S. Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen, both Al-Subaiy and Al-Nuaimi lived freely in Qatar as recently as 2014. Exhibit 18, Joyce Karam, Terror designation lists highlight Qatar's failure to tackle extremist funding, *The National*, 13 July 2017, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/terror-designation-lists-highlight-qatar-s-failure-to-tackle-extremist-funding-1.582320>; Robert Mendick, Terror financiers are living freely in Qatar, US discloses, *The Telegraph*, 16 November 2014, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11233407/Terror-financiers-are-living-freely-in-Qatar-US-discloses.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Exhibit 19, Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing’, 3 April 2014, <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx>.

<sup>61</sup> Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Consolidated List, <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/pages/consolidated-list.aspx>.

<sup>62</sup> Canada Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Anti-terrorism Financing, <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/amlc-clrpc/atf-fat/Pages/default.aspx>.

<sup>63</sup> New Zealand Police, Lists associated with Resolutions 1267/1989/2253 and 1988, <http://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities/lists-associated-with-resolutions-1267-1989-2253-1988>.

<sup>64</sup> United Kingdom Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Financial sanctions targets: list of all asset freeze targets, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets/consolidated-list-of-targets>.

<sup>65</sup> Exhibit 20, United States Office of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, 20 February 2018, <https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf>.

<sup>66</sup> Exhibit 21, List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267/1989/2253, 22 February 2018, <https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/al-qaeda.xsl>.

Qatar's breach of its international obligations and to induce Qatar to cease its unlawful conduct.

64. At the 31 July 2017 meeting of the Council, [See **Summary Minutes, Exhibit 22**] the Respondents collectively made clear that the closures of their respective airspaces to Qatari aircraft were legitimate and lawful measures, permissible under international law. The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, declared that:

“Our four States maintain that these airspace closures are a legitimate, justified, and proportionate response to Qatar's actions and are permitted under international law”.<sup>67</sup>

**C. The Council Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Resolve Qatar's Claims, As It Would Require the Council to Adjudicate Whether Qatar Has Breached Its Obligations under International Law**

65. In light of the fact that the Respondents' measures of which Qatar complains should be evaluated as countermeasures under customary international law, this being a determination that is outside the bounds of “interpretation and application of [the IASTA] Agreement”, within the meaning of IASTA Article II, Section 2, the Council does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims submitted by Qatar.
66. Resolution of the claims submitted by Qatar would necessarily require the Council to determine issues forming part of the wider dispute between the Parties. In particular, determination of whether any non-compliance by the Respondents with their obligations under the IASTA resulting from the measures adopted by the Respondents was justified as lawful countermeasures, so that wrongfulness was by definition precluded, would require the Council to determine, amongst other things, whether Qatar had breached its relevant counter-terrorism obligations and its commitments not to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbours.

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<sup>67</sup> See Exhibit 22, Summary Minutes of Extraordinary Session of the Council, 31 July 2017 ICAO doc. C-WP/14640 (Restricted), para. 32.

67. As already noted, the fact that there are wider issues at the core of this dispute is admitted by Qatar, which notes in its Application that the Respondents “gave an ultimatum to the State of Qatar on matters unrelated to air navigation and air transport”.<sup>68</sup>
68. Considering its limited and specialised jurisdiction under the IASTA, however, the Council has no jurisdiction to rule upon those wider issues between the Parties.
69. To expand the role of the Council so as to allow it to consider the validity of countermeasures adopted in relation to a completely different dispute regarding subversion and terrorism would be to disregard the careful allocation of responsibilities within the UN system, and particularly regarding its specialised agencies. Clearly, the dispute between the parties, the centre of gravity of which lies outside the sphere of civil aviation, is not a matter which can be properly adjudicated by a specialised agency concerned solely with civil aviation, and the dispute falls well beyond the scope of Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA.
70. As noted above, the Council’s jurisdiction is limited, under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, to disagreements relating to the “application or interpretation” of the IASTA. This is for good reason. The Council, comprised of aviation specialists, has considerable expertise in the technical aspects of aviation enshrined in the Chicago Convention and the IASTA, but is not well-suited or well-equipped to handle disputes about interference, violation of sovereignty, subversion and terrorism. This applies *a fortiori* here, where the “real issue” in the dispute between the parties requires a legal assessment of a broad-ranging situation entirely unrelated to civil aviation.
71. Moreover, the role of ICAO as a specialised agency further confirms that adjudication under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA must be limited to issues of civil aviation.<sup>69</sup> If a specialised agency took jurisdiction over a broad dispute involving—at its core—issues manifestly beyond its mandate, it would do a disservice to the parties by failing to adjudicate the dispute within its proper parameters. That is indeed what the “real

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<sup>68</sup> Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, para. g.

<sup>69</sup> See D. Akande, ‘The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the ICJ’ (1998) 9 *European Journal of International Law*, p. 437, at p. 451: “The [International Court of Justice] seemed to be saying that specialized agencies should confine their attention to technical and functional matters”.



issue” doctrine recognises—that the proper characterisation of a dispute is a matter for objective assessment, so as not to allow a dispute artificially to be broken into discrete morsels that happen to suit the tactical needs of the complaining party.

72. Accordingly, the Council does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues as to whether Qatar has breached its other obligations under international law, in particular its obligations under the Terrorism Financing Convention, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions relating to counter-terrorism, and the Riyadh Agreements.
73. The Council is therefore unable to decide the core issue dividing the Parties in relation to the merits of the dispute. As a consequence, it cannot accept jurisdiction over the Application of Qatar.

#### **D. Conclusion**

74. As the Council has recognised at its Extraordinary Session on 31 July 2017, there are wider, overarching issues underlying the disagreement submitted by Qatar that need to be addressed in an appropriate non-technical forum. Indeed, the “real issue” between the parties inescapably implicates these wider issues and they form the true subject-matter of the dispute between them. In light of the fact that the Council does not have jurisdiction to resolve the wider legal issues that it would necessarily have to determine in order to resolve the disagreement relating to the IASTA raised in the Application and Memorial, the Council does not have jurisdiction to decide Qatar’s claims. In the alternative, it should decline to examine Qatar’s claims on the basis that they are inadmissible.

#### **VI. QATAR FAILED TO SATISFY THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE IASTA AND THE RULES**

75. Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA provides that only disagreements which “cannot be settled by negotiation” may be submitted to the Council. It is therefore a requirement that an Applicant show that it has attempted negotiations before submitting a case to the Council, and thus it is a precondition for the Council’s jurisdiction.
76. This requirement is reflected in Article 2(g) of the Rules, which provides that an Application and Memorial must include “[a] statement that negotiations to settle the

disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not successful”. The purpose of the Rules is to set out the procedural requirements that must be met in order to bring a proceeding under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA before the Council.

77. Qatar’s Application (B) and Memorial do not fulfil these requirements. The Application and Memorial expressly recognise that no negotiations were attempted in relation to the disagreements or disputes contained in the Application prior to its submission to the Council.<sup>70</sup> As a consequence of Qatar’s failure to meet this precondition, and its failure to meet the procedural requirement in Article 2(g), the Council is without jurisdiction to hear Qatar’s Application.
78. Alternatively, the Council should declare Qatar’s Application to be inadmissible. As discussed in Section IV above, the Council may decline to exercise jurisdiction where there exist grounds that affect the possibility or propriety of it deciding the claims submitted to it at the particular time.
79. Qatar’s self-serving assertion as to the supposed “futility” of negotiations is immaterial. As the party asserting jurisdiction, the burden is upon Qatar to show that it has fulfilled the jurisdictional preconditions, in particular by showing that it (at the very least) made a genuine attempt to initiate negotiations. As the Arbitral Tribunal in *Murphy v. Ecuador* held, “[t]o determine whether negotiations would succeed or not, the parties must first initiate them”; and, according to the decision, it is not for one party unilaterally to proclaim futility without having first sought to initiate negotiations.<sup>71</sup> By its own acknowledgement, Qatar has failed to so initiate negotiations. Qatar did not attempt to initiate negotiations in order to avoid confronting the real issues that are at the core of the dispute with the Respondents. Of course, Qatar not having made any attempt to date, it is an entirely hypothetical question how such negotiations, if any, would unfold.

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<sup>70</sup> See paras. 105-106, below.

<sup>71</sup> *Murphy Exploration and Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador*, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/4, Award on Jurisdiction of 15 December 2010, para. 135.

80. Even if Qatar were now to propose negotiations, it would be too late to remedy the defects in its Application, since the precondition of negotiations must be fulfilled prior to submitting the disagreement to the Council.<sup>72</sup>

**A. Prior Unsuccessful Negotiations Constitute a Precondition to the Council's Jurisdiction**

81. As already noted, Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA states, in relevant part:

“If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement cannot be settled by negotiation, the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the above-mentioned Convention [i.e. Articles 84 to 88 of the Chicago Convention] shall be applicable in the same manner as provided therein with reference to any disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of the above-mentioned Convention”.  
[emphasis added]

82. On the express terms of the jurisdictional provision, a disagreement between two or more contracting States as to the interpretation or application of the IASTA may only be submitted to the Council if the disagreement “cannot be settled by negotiations”. Thus, the occurrence of prior negotiations between the parties in relation to the subject matter of the disagreement to be submitted to the Council is an essential precondition to jurisdiction, which must be satisfied before the Council has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter.
83. Similar requirements in jurisdictional or compromissory clauses contained in treaties, requiring that a State party attempt negotiations before submitting a dispute to a judicial body for resolution, are widespread in international practice. These clauses reflect important underlying principles and policy objectives—notably that (as recognised in Article 33 of the UN Charter), negotiation is the primary form of dispute resolution between States. As the ICJ emphasised in a case concerning a clause having an effect equivalent to Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA:

“[I]t is not unusual in compromissory clauses conferring jurisdiction on the Court and other international

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<sup>72</sup> See para. 27 above.

jurisdictions to refer to resort to negotiations. Such resort fulfils three distinct functions.

In the first place, it gives notice to the respondent State that a dispute exists and delimits the scope of the dispute and its subject-matter. [...]

In the second place, it encourages the parties to attempt to settle their dispute by mutual agreement, thus avoiding recourse to binding third-party adjudication.

In the third place, prior resort to negotiations or other methods of peaceful dispute settlement performs an important function in indicating the limit of consent given by States”.<sup>73</sup>

84. As is evident from the third consideration highlighted by the Court, and as already noted above, a requirement in a dispute resolution clause in a treaty that a dispute must be one which “cannot be settled by negotiation” or other similar formulation, constitutes a limitation upon the consent of the States parties. As such, fulfilment of the condition is a precondition to the existence of jurisdiction, rather than merely affecting the admissibility of a claim.<sup>74</sup>
85. In this regard, the ICJ has consistently interpreted jurisdictional provisions or compromissory clauses, which require that a dispute “cannot be settled through negotiation” or “is not settled through negotiation”, as setting limitations upon the consent of the States Parties thereto, such that their fulfilment constitutes a precondition to the existence of jurisdiction.
86. In *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, the jurisdictional clause at issue was that in Article 22 of the Convention (“CERD”), which provides as follows:

“Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be

<sup>73</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011*, p. 70, at pp. 124-125, para. 131.

<sup>74</sup> *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 2006*, p. 6, at p. 32, para. 65.

referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement”. [emphasis added]

87. Having considered its prior jurisprudence, in relation to jurisdictional clauses containing similar language, the Court concluded that:

“in their ordinary meaning, the terms of Article 22 of CERD, [...] establish preconditions to be fulfilled before the seisin of the Court”.<sup>75</sup>

88. Similarly, in *Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute*, the jurisdictional provision in question was contained in Article 30(1) of the *UN Convention Against Torture*. This provision, as with Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, requires that, for the Court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the dispute must be one that “cannot be settled through negotiation”. Article 30(1) of the *Convention Against Torture* provides:

“Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court”.

89. As in *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, in *Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute*, the Court proceeded on the basis that the requirement in Article 30(1) that the dispute “cannot be settled through negotiation” constituted a precondition to its jurisdiction. Having concluded that there existed a “dispute” between the Parties, the Court turned to consider:

“the other conditions which should be met for it to have jurisdiction under Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Convention against Torture [...]. These conditions are that the dispute cannot be settled through negotiation and that, after a request for arbitration has been made by one of the parties, they have been unable to agree on the organization

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<sup>75</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011*, p. 70, at p. 128, para. 141.

of the arbitration within six months from the request”.<sup>76</sup>  
[emphasis added]

90. Accordingly, the requirement of Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA that the dispute is one that “cannot be settled by negotiations”, likewise establishes a precondition to the exercise of the Council’s jurisdiction (and indeed to the proper seisin of the Council by the Applicant).
91. In addition, both as a matter of the ordinary meaning of the words, and as a matter of prior authority, the requirement that a dispute or disagreement “cannot be settled by negotiation” necessarily implies that there should have been a “genuine attempt” to settle the disagreement or dispute by negotiations prior to submission to the Council.<sup>77</sup>
92. Thus, in its Judgment in *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* on the preliminary objections raised by the Russian Federation, the Court observed that:

“Manifestly, in the absence of evidence of a *genuine* attempt to negotiate, the precondition of negotiation is not met. However, where negotiations are attempted or have commenced ... the precondition of negotiations is met only when there has been a failure of negotiations, or when negotiations have become futile or deadlocked”.<sup>78</sup>  
[emphasis added]

93. The requirement that there should be a “genuine attempt to negotiate” also necessarily requires that some attempt to negotiate should in fact have been made. For instance, in *Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute*, having quoted passages of its decision in *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial*

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<sup>76</sup> *Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal)*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 445, para. 56.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 353, at p. 388, para. 114.

<sup>78</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)*, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, at p. 133, para. 159; see also *Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal)*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, at pp. 445-446, para. 57; *Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, para. 43.

*Discrimination*, reproduced at paragraphs 92 above and 95 below, the Court observed:

“The requirement that the dispute ‘cannot be settled through negotiation’ *could not be understood as referring to a theoretical impossibility* of reaching a settlement. It rather implies that, as the Court noted with regard to a similarly worded provision, ‘no reasonable probability exists that *further* negotiations would lead to a settlement’ *South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962*, p. 345”.<sup>79</sup> [emphasis added]

94. In addition, Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA requires that the negotiations must be attempted with a view to “sett[ing]” the disagreement. Thus, on its clear terms, Article 84 imposes a concrete obligation on the claimant party to attempt negotiations with a view to settling the disagreement before submitting the dispute to the Council.
95. In *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* the ICJ also provided guidance as to the characteristics of negotiations for the purposes of the “precondition of negotiation” contained in Article 22 of the CERD. It explained:

“In determining what constitutes negotiations, the Court observes that negotiations are distinct from mere protests or disputations. Negotiations entail more than the plain opposition of legal views or interests between two parties, or the existence of a series of accusations and rebuttals, or even the exchange of claims and directly opposed counter-claims. As such, the concept of “negotiations” differs from the concept of “dispute”, and requires — at the very least — a genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute”.<sup>80</sup> [emphasis added]

<sup>79</sup> *Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal)*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 446, para. 57.

<sup>80</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)*, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, at p. 132, para. 157; see also *Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v. Senegal)*, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, at p. 446, para. 57; *Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, para. 43.

96. As the ICJ has also made clear, to satisfy the “precondition of negotiation”, the negotiations, which must have been at least attempted, must directly concern the disagreement between the two States that has been submitted for adjudication, and must have particularly addressed (or at least have sought to address) the specific question of interpretation or application of the treaty that gives rise to the dispute between the parties. As the ICJ explained in *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* in respect of Article 22 of the CERD:

“[T]o meet the precondition of negotiation in the compromissory clause of a treaty, these negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the treaty containing the compromissory clause. In other words, the subject-matter of the negotiations must relate to the subject-matter of the dispute which, in turn, must concern the substantive obligations contained in the treaty in question”.<sup>81</sup>

97. In that case, there had been prior negotiations between the parties, but not on the subject matter of the CERD. The Court held that these were not sufficient to constitute negotiations for the purpose of that Convention. *A fortiori*, a complete failure even to attempt negotiations cannot satisfy the precondition under the Chicago Convention.
98. The Council’s own prior decisions recognise that an attempt to initiate negotiations constitutes a precondition to the existence of its jurisdiction, and that any failure to fulfil the precondition is a matter which may properly be raised by way of preliminary objection and which will affect its jurisdiction. For instance, in *United States v. 15 European States*, the Council, in rejecting the Respondent States’ Preliminary Objection based on an alleged inadequacy of the negotiations, held that:

“[T]he negotiations between the Parties, which were held over a period of three years at various levels, were adequate

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<sup>81</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation)*, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 70, at p. 133, para. 161; *Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017, para. 43.



and sufficient to fulfil the requirements of Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation”.<sup>82</sup>

99. In addition, the requirements of Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA are reflected as a procedural requirement in Article 2(g) of the Rules. In accordance with Article 2(g), an Application and Memorial must include “[a] statement that negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not successful”.
100. Article 2(g) thus requires an Applicant to affirm that negotiations took place. A statement acknowledging that negotiations were not attempted plainly cannot satisfy the procedural requirement in Article 2(g) as such an acknowledgement plainly does not constitute “[a] statement that negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties but were not successful”. Rather, such a statement is an acknowledgement of precisely the contrary situation, that is, that negotiations to settle the disagreement have not taken place between the parties.

**B. The Precondition of Negotiations Has Not Been Fulfilled by Qatar**

101. As discussed in the previous section, Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA requires an Applicant to make a genuine attempt to resolve the disagreement through negotiations as a pre-condition to the existence of the Council’s jurisdiction.
102. The Council itself has called for negotiations between the parties at its Extraordinary Session of 31 July 2017. Despite the Council’s decision, negotiations were not initiated by the Applicant.
103. Qatar has made no attempt to initiate negotiations in relation to the subject matter of the disagreements it has purported to submit to the Council. As a consequence, it has failed to fulfil the precondition of prior negotiations contained in Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA with the result that the Council is without jurisdiction. For similar reasons, Qatar has also failed to comply with the procedural requirement in Article 2(g) of the Rules to include, in its Application (B) and Memorial, a statement that

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<sup>82</sup> Decision of the ICAO Council on the Preliminary Objections in the Matter “United States and 15 European States (2000)”, 16 November 2000.

negotiations to settle the disagreement had taken place between the parties, but were not successful.

104. Given Qatar's failure even to attempt negotiations, the question whether such negotiations would or would not have been capable of settling the disagreement does not arise here.
105. In the Memorial accompanying Application (B), Qatar asserts the following under the heading "A statement of attempted negotiations" :

"The Respondents did not permit any opportunity to negotiate the aviation aspects of their hostile actions against the State of Qatar. They repeatedly gave an ultimatum to the State of Qatar on matters unrelated to air navigation and air transport. The last contact with the Respondents was a conference call with officials of the Respondents on 5 and 6 June 2017 that did not result in any understanding. In fact, the crisis gradually escalated when the Respondents declared all Qatar's citizens and resident 'undesirable' (persona non grata) in their territories and ordered them to leave the Respondents' territories within 14 days. The severance of diplomatic relations makes further negotiating efforts futile".<sup>83</sup>

106. By its own clear and candid admission, Qatar has failed to comply with the jurisdictional precondition of negotiations under Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA. Instead, Qatar alleges that negotiations would have been futile. That is a self-serving statement. Qatar cannot be heard to make such an allegation without having at the very least attempted to initiate negotiations.
107. Qatar, however, does not identify any attempt on its part to request negotiations as required by Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, and has provided no evidence whatsoever that it attempted to initiate such negotiations.
108. Qatar's reference in its Memorial to the "conference call with officials of the Respondents on 5 and 6 June 2017 that did not result in any understanding" does not satisfy the precondition of negotiations for the following reasons:

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<sup>83</sup> Memorial presented by the State of Qatar to the Application (B) by the State of Qatar in relation to the disagreement on the interpretation and application of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 1944), dated 30 October 2017, para. g.

- (a) As outlined in paragraph 94 above, Article II, Section 2 of the IASTA requires that negotiations must relate to the legal issues of interpretation and application dividing the parties. Qatar refers to a conference call with officials of the Respondents on 5 and 6 June 2017, but fails to identify the officials involved or the subject matter or content of the alleged conference call. The onus is on Qatar to show that the conference call constituted negotiations and addressed the issues which form the basis of Qatar’s claims relating to the disagreement between the contracting States raised in Qatar’s Application and Memorial. Qatar has not satisfied this onus. The Respondents are not aware of any conference calls between Respondents and Qatar on 5 or 6 June 2017. The Respondents are aware of a technical level call on 13 June 2017 in which clarification was provided by the UAE ATC to Qatar ATC of the territorial scope of the NOTAM issued by the United Arab Emirates. [See **Transcript from Telephone Conversations, Exhibit 23**] This technical level call on 13 June 2017 does not qualify as an attempt at “negotiation” and therefore does not satisfy the requirements of Article II, Section 2.
- (b) Moreover, the “conference call with officials on 5 and 6 June 2017” that Qatar describes<sup>84</sup> would neither be “adequate” nor “sufficient” for the purposes of the precondition of negotiations under the IASTA. Such a call, even assuming it had indeed occurred, would stand in sharp contrast with the extremely lengthy discussions and negotiations, spanning a period of three years, which took place in the *United States and 15 European States* dispute. Whereas, in that case, the Council found that “the negotiations between the Parties, which were held over a period of three years at various levels, were adequate and sufficient to fulfil the requirements of Article 84 of the Convention”,<sup>85</sup> the call described by Qatar, even if it would have taken place, would have involved two days only, and Qatar does not allege that such a call involved any negotiations.

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<sup>84</sup> See *id.*

<sup>85</sup> Decision of the ICAO Council on the Preliminary objections in the Matter “United States and 15 European States (2000)”, 16 November 2000.

109. The Council should also reject Qatar’s attempt to avoid the requirement of prior negotiations by claiming that negotiations would have been futile. That argument should be rejected for the following reasons:
- (a) First, Qatar’s statement that “[t]he severance of diplomatic relations makes further negotiating efforts futile” [emphasis added] is misleading. Qatar has made no effort to initiate negotiations at all.
  - (b) Second, Qatar’s attempt to justify its failure to initiate negotiations with the severance of diplomatic relations is unpersuasive. The severance of diplomatic relations does not render the initiation of negotiations impossible, and does not itself constitute a valid excuse for the failure to attempt to initiate negotiations. On the contrary, Article 63 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that “[t]he severance of diplomatic or consular relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established between them by the treaty”. As a result, Qatar remained bound by the requirement to make a genuine effort to attempt to settle the disagreement through negotiation prior to submitting it to the Council.
  - (c) Third, the purpose of the precondition of negotiations in Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA would be frustrated if an Applicant were permitted to unilaterally declare that negotiations would be futile before even attempting to initiate them. Rather, a claim that negotiations would be futile must, at the very least, rest on a clear showing that a “genuine attempt” was made to initiate negotiations. If it were otherwise, the requirement to initiate negotiations would be easily circumvented.
  - (d) Fourth, Qatar’s claim that negotiations would be futile cannot properly be based on any express or implied rejection or refusal of negotiations by the Respondents. No attempt was ever made by Qatar to initiate negotiations, so it cannot be said that they would have been futile.
  - (e) Fifth, Qatar’s reliance on the supposed “ultimatum to the State of Qatar on matters unrelated to air navigation and air transport” likewise provides no support for its claim that it has satisfied or is otherwise dispensed from the prior negotiations requirement in Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA. It is

unclear whether the term “ultimatum” is used by Qatar in relation to the legitimate demands made by Respondents, prior to resorting to countermeasures, that Qatar fulfil its obligations to cease supporting terrorism and interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbours, or to other circumstances. However, the fact that the Respondents have sought to insist that Qatar comply with its international obligations in no way dispenses Qatar from the clear requirement under the IASTA to attempt to initiate negotiations prior to submitting a dispute to the Council. Whilst Qatar’s argument does nothing to advance its position that it satisfied the precondition of negotiations in Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, it simply underlines the Respondents’ position, as set out in Section V. C. above, that the real dispute between the parties does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Council.

- (f) Finally, Qatar’s unsubstantiated allegations about measures taken with respect to Qatari citizens are similarly unavailing. They provide no support for the proposition of Qatar that negotiations regarding the alleged disagreement relating to the IASTA were not possible or would necessarily have been futile.

110. Put simply, Qatar expressly acknowledges that it did not attempt to initiate negotiations with the Respondents prior to submitting its Application to the Council.
111. In sum, Qatar has failed to establish that it attempted to negotiate with the Respondents prior to submitting the disagreement to the Council. Further, in the absence of any attempt at negotiation, it cannot establish that negotiations would have been unsuccessful in resolving the dispute.
112. In the circumstances, the Council must conclude that Qatar failed to comply with the precondition of negotiations required by Article II, Section 2, of the IASTA, and did not satisfy Article 2(g) of the Rules, and consequently, must decide that it is without jurisdiction to hear Qatar’s claims. In the alternative, in case the Council does not come to this conclusion, it is submitted that the Council should refrain from examining Qatar’s claims as these claims are inadmissible.

**VII. SUBMISSIONS FOR RELIEF**

113. **For the foregoing reasons, the Respondents respectfully request that the Council accept their Preliminary Objections and therefore decide:**

(a) **that it lacks jurisdiction to resolve the claims raised by Qatar in Application (B); or**

(b) **in the alternative, that Qatar's claims are inadmissible.**

114. The Respondents reserve the right to file a Reply to any Written Statement of Qatar in response to these Preliminary Objections.

## LIST OF EXHIBITS

The exhibits are listed in order of appearance.

Number	Title
1.	Summary Minutes of the Council, Sixth Meeting 161st Session, 16 November 2000 ICAO doc. C-MIN 161/6 (Open)
2.	Summary Minutes of the Council, Ninth Meeting 211th Session, 21 June 2017 ICAO doc. C-MIN 211/9 (Closed)
3.	First Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 23 November 2013, Arabic and English versions
4.	Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 2014, Arabic and English versions
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15.	Narrative Summary: QDi.253 Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy, United Nations sanctions list issued by the

	Security Council Commission pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh) Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities, last updated 3 February 2016, <a href="https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/khalifa-muhammad-turki-al-subaiy">https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/khalifa-muhammad-turki-al-subaiy</a>
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22.	Summary Minutes of Extraordinary Session of the Council, 31 July 2017 ICAO doc. C-WP/14640 (Restricted)
23.	Transcript from telephone conversation between Doha ATC and UAE ACC on 13th June 2017 confirming the possibility of using UAE FIR over high seas – [Excerpt from the Appendix of the Extraordinary Session of the Council, 19 July 2017 ICAO doc. C-WP/14640 (Restricted)]



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10.	<i>The Walfish Bay Boundary Case (Germany/Great Britain) Award of 23 May 1911, RIAA, vol. XI, p. 263</i>
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12.	<i>Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal)</i> , <i>ICJ Reports 1991</i> , p. 53
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24.	<i>Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)</i> , ICJ Reports 1998, p. 432
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37.	<i>Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 October 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 353</i>
38.	<i>Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 April 2017</i>

Exhibit 1

Summary Minutes of the Council, Sixth Meeting 161st Session, 16 November 2000 ICAO doc.  
C-MIN 161/6 (Open)

**COUNCIL — 161ST SESSION**

**SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE SIXTH MEETING**

**(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, THURSDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 2000, AT 1430 HOURS)**

**OPEN MEETING**

President of the Council: Dr. Assad Kotaite

Secretary: Mr. R.C. Costa Pereira, Secretary General

**PRESENT:**

Algeria	— Mr. T. Chérif	Kenya	— Mr. S.W. Githaiga
Argentina	— Mr. J.L. Bacarezza	Lebanon	— Mr. R. Abdallah
Australia	— Dr. J. Aleck	Mexico	— Mr. R. Kobeh González
Botswana	— Mr. K. J. Mosupukwa	Netherlands	— Mr. M.A. Kraan
Brazil	— Mr. A.M. Cunha	Norway	— Mr. O.M. Rambech
Cameroon	— Mr. T. Tekou	Pakistan	— Mr. S.N. Ahmad
Canada	— Mrs. G. Richard	Panama	— Mr. R.E. García de Paredes
China	— Mr. Y. Zhang	Russian Federation	— Mr. V.P. Kuranov
Colombia	— Mr. J. Hernández López	Saudi Arabia	— Mr. S. Al-Ghamdi
Cuba	— Dr. M. Molina Martínez	Senegal	— Mr. M. Ndiaye (Alt.)
Egypt	— Mr. A.Y. El Karimy	Slovakia	— Mr. O. Fabrici
France	— Mr. M.-Y. Peissik	Spain	— Mr. L. Adrover
Germany	— Dr. H. Mürl	United Kingdom	— Mr. D.S. Evans
India	— Mr. A.P. Singh	United States	— Mr. E.W. Stimpson
Indonesia	— Mr. J. Sjoen	Uruguay	— Mr. C.A. Borucki
Italy	— Mrs. L. Aghillarre (Alt.)		
Japan	— Mr. K. Okada		

**ALSO PRESENT:**

Mr. E. Martínez Gondra (Alt.)	— Argentina
Mr. F. Robledo (Alt.)	— Argentina
Mr. J.F. Murphy (Alt.)	— Canada
Mr. J. Yuan (Alt.)	— China
Mr. E.E. Falcón (Alt.)	— Colombia
Mrs. M.C. Saucedo (Alt.)	— Colombia
Mr. D. Wibaux (Adv.)	— France
Mr. A. Veillard (Alt.)	— France
Mr. T. Mickler (Alt.)	— Germany
Mr. E.K. Karayannis (Obs.)	— Greece
Mr. K. Ohashi (Alt.)	— Japan
Mr. S. Takano (Alt.)	— Japan
Mr. K. Keldusild (Alt.)	— Norway
Mr. E.N. Lobachev (Alt.)	— Russian Federation
Mr. D.S. Newman	
(Authorized Agent)	— United States
Mr. A.I. Mendelsohn (Adv.)	— United States
Mr. F.W. Price (Alt.)	— United States
Mr. D.M. Shapiro (Alt.)	— United States
Mrs. M. Camposano (Alt.)	— Uruguay
Mr. J.-L. Dewost	
(Authorized Agent)	— 15 European States
Mr. E. White (Adv.)	— 15 European States
Ms. M. Tousseyn (Adv.)	— 15 European States
Mr. P. van den Heuvel (Adv.)	— 15 European States

**SECRETARIAT:**

Dr. L.J. Weber	— D/LEB
Mrs. C. Rideout	— CSO

**Subject No. 26: Settlement of disputes between Contracting States**

**Subject No. 16: Legal work of the Organization**

**Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States (2000)  
(Note on Procedure: Preliminary Objections)**

1. The Council resumed (161/4 & 5) and completed its consideration of the above subject, documented in C-WP/11380, memorandum SG 1670/00 dated 17 August 2000, and memorandum SG 1674/00 dated 27 September 2000.

2. The President of the Council recalled the proceedings which had taken place at the previous two meetings in accordance with the procedure outlined in the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*. In the light of the views which had been expressed during the deliberations stage (161/5), and further to the understanding reached at the close of the previous meeting, the President of the Council had prepared a draft Council decision, the different language versions of which would be distributed at this meeting for the Council's review.

3. The Representative of India recalled that at the previous meeting, when he had asked for some additional time for consideration of this issue, his suggestion had been based on the idea that sometimes last-minute efforts did result in unexpected and pleasant returns. In the *Pakistan vs India* case of 1971, quoted in C-WP/11380, after initial legal proceedings and the ceasing of military hostilities it had been possible to arrive at an amicable settlement, and the Council of ICAO had recorded the discontinuance of the proceedings. There was thus always a scope in the present case, since the situation was not as grave as that which had existed in the precedent. The Representative of India recalled that in the *Pakistan vs India* case, India's argument had been that the Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement had been suspended as a result of military hostilities between the two countries. India's arguments had not challenged, but had, rather, implicitly assured that the Council would have jurisdiction over disputes between States for which the Conventions were in force. The Representative of India therefore wished to take this opportunity to reiterate India's viewpoint that the ICAO Council had competence to consider such applications under Article 84.

4. The Representative of India also wished to take this opportunity to support the numerous Representatives who, at the previous meeting, had mentioned that the good offices of the President of the ICAO Council may be requested to help resolve the present case. Having mentioned the legal jurisdiction of ICAO, the Representative of India reminded the Council that ICAO had some moral obligations as well, which it was trying to fulfil through the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection. The CAEP could play a very effective role in mitigating the miseries of noise pollution, all the more so in developing countries. The Representative of India wished to highlight that the nuisance of noise pollution was more serious in places like the Indian sub-continent, where most of the international flights arrived or took off between midnight and dawn, seriously inconveniencing communities around the airports. This point had been raised at the previous meeting by the Representative of Pakistan in the context of noise pollution and the geographical location of south Asia. ICAO was required to act in accordance with the legal jurisdiction bestowed on it and had to continue to play its apex role as the international convention and standards setter, including the provision of relief internationally from noise pollution.

5. The Representative of Panama observed that the Council had now reached the stage in its consideration of the Preliminary Objections where it would have to take a formal decision. In this connection, the Representative of Panama believed that the Council should assume all its responsibilities and not allow itself to get bogged down in the judicial details. The proposal of the Representative of Panama would therefore be to first of all take action on the competence of the Council to address the case; once this was done the Council could go ahead with considering the merits. Before doing so, however, the Council could decide to apply Article 14 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* and ask the parties concerned to resume direct negotiations, in which case the Council would establish a deadline for the conclusion of such negotiations and thus suspend its own consideration of the merits of the case during the negotiations period. The Council could assist in the negotiation process by appointing one or more conciliators. In this way, the Council would meet the requirements upon it and would help in seeking the negotiated solution which was the wish of all the Representatives who have spoken.

6. The Representative of Australia indicated that when he had offered remarks at the previous meeting, these had been limited to the third preliminary objection, and he had refrained from giving any views on the first and second; in view of the way the proceedings might progress at this meeting, the Representative of Australia felt obliged to put his Delegation's view on the record.

7. Having carefully considered the parties' arguments and the evidence tendered in support of those arguments, and on the basis of his Delegation's own understanding of the facts and circumstances and analysis of the law applicable to the limited procedural issues before the Council, it was Australia's view that negotiations in which the parties had engaged prior to the filing of the United States' Application had been adequate for the purposes of meeting the threshold requirements of Article 84 of the Convention and Article 2(g) of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*.

8. It was Australia's view that the rule of international law requiring that local remedies be exhausted before the jurisdiction of an international body exercising quasi-judicial authority of the kind contemplated by Article 84 was not applicable in the present case, in the event the Council should find that it was not necessary for it to come to any conclusions in respect of the availability or effectiveness of the remedies that may be available. Australia had already expressed its view in relation to the third preliminary objection concerning the scope of the relief sought, in accordance with which view Australia believed that this matter need not and ought not to be decided at this time.

9. In joining with those who had similarly found that contrary to the preliminary objections of the Member States of the European Union, there was no bar to the admissibility of the Application of the United States and the Council could proceed to consider the matter on its merits, the Representative of Australia believed it would be useful to clarify a few important points.

10. First, the Council's decision to reject two of the three Preliminary Objections should not be taken as indicative or suggestive of any position Australia may yet adopt in relation to the underlying merits of the matter. The Council had endeavoured to limit its focus to the procedural issues before it, and its decisions here were likewise limited.

11. Second, it was of concern to Australia that the inclination to support a disposition of the matters to hand that would permit the Council to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 84 might be

characterized or perceived as favouring a resolution of the differences between the parties by way of a formal, quasi-judicial proceeding in the Council, as opposed to a more conciliatory approach by way of negotiations or mediation. The Representative of Australia asserted that nothing could be further from the truth. The Council had heard a good deal from the parties about the duration, status, intensity, seriousness and comprehensiveness of the extensive negotiations that had taken place thus far, and even if there was a difference between the parties about the inclusion, or the need for the inclusion, of specifically legal issues in such exchanges, there was no denying that the parties had attempted to achieve a negotiated *modus vivendi*, however unsuccessful their efforts may have proven to be.

12. Far from discouraging or preventing the resumption of such efforts by assuming substantive jurisdiction of this matter, the Council would be especially well-placed to encourage and facilitate further negotiations in a way that it could not have done previously. Indeed, in accordance with Article 14 of the rules, the very first action the Council might take in the exercise of its jurisdiction could be--and in Australia's view, should be--to invite the parties to engage in further direct negotiations, during the course of which the rules provided that the proceedings be suspended. Subject to the consent of the parties, the rules also authorized the Council to designate an individual or a group of individuals to act as a conciliator during the negotiations and to render any other kind of assistance likely to further constructive negotiations. Of course the Council could not, any more so than some other agency or individual might do, compel or coerce the parties into reaching a satisfactory and mutually acceptable compromise of the differences that separated them, but assuming there was a sufficient measure of good will and a genuine commitment to that objective, if negotiations were to resume in the context of a pending action under Article 84 it seemed to the Representative of Australia that the incentive for both sides to redouble their efforts to bring about a successful result would almost certainly be greater, considerably greater perhaps, than it had been in the past.

13. Finally, if Council should decide to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 84, once the proceedings on the merits had resumed the Member States of the European Union would then be obliged to file their counter-memorial, presumably without undue delay. The Representative of Australia did not believe that any order would be necessary to bring this about, since it would follow on automatically, as it were, under the rules. In the circumstances, it seemed to the Representative of Australia that this was something the Member States of the European Union should welcome, since it was clear that the principal defect they had identified in the negotiations that had taken place so far had been the absence of a clear and explicit statement by the United States of the legal issues involved. To the extent that this had been the fatal defect in the negotiation process, it was a defect that had surely been cured by the filing of the Applicant's Memorial and subsequent submissions in support of its claims. By filing their Counter-Memorial, the Member States of the European Union did no more, but no less, than put their legal cards on the table as well; to the Representative of Australia this was only fair.

14. The Representative of Australia saw nothing divisive in a disposition of the Preliminary Objections along these lines. He saw no special advantage benefiting one or another of the parties or any particular burden falling unfairly on one or another's shoulders. What he did see, however, was a rare chance to confirm and clarify an important aspect of the constitutional authority of the Council of ICAO and a real opportunity to advance the process by which a meaningful, constructive and conciliatory resolution of this matter could be achieved.



15. The English version of the above-mentioned draft Council decision was circulated, pending availability, in approximately 45 minutes, of the other language versions.

16. The Representative of Botswana sought clarification with regard to the second preambular clause, which, in the draft version, contained an editorial note indicating that a list of the 26 Members of the Council participating in the decision would be inserted at that point. The Representative of Botswana noted that the Representative of Nigeria had not been present at the meetings addressing this subject and that the number of Representatives should be adjusted to 25. The President of the Council clarified that the text of the editorial note appearing in parentheses, including the number referred to by the Representative of Botswana, would in fact be replaced in toto by a list of the names of the Representatives present and not parties to the dispute.

17. Referring to the third operative clause of the draft, the Representative of Saudi Arabia agreed with the assertion therein that the third Preliminary Objection was not preliminary in nature but was related to the merits; he sought clarification, however, on the second part of that clause, wherein it was proposed that the Council decide that the third Preliminary Objection be joined to the merits. Perhaps the question of whether the third Preliminary Objection should be covered in a discussion on the merits would best be decided upon by the parties to the dispute, since the Council was, at this time, only being requested to decide on the admissibility of the Application under Article 84. The President of the Council indicated that the second part of the third operative clause reflected the opinion which had been offered during the previous meeting's deliberations to the effect that the third Preliminary Objection was related to the merits of the case. The proposal that it be "joined to the merits" was intended to facilitate procedures for the parties concerned, with the understanding that the Council would examine this third point when examining the merits.

18. The Representative of Cameroon believed that the Council could only begin to discuss the draft decision when it had all of the language versions available. The President of the Council agreed with the Representative of Cameroon, and indicated that the English version had been circulated simply to allow for some preliminary clarifications which would in no way commit Members of the Council; the Council's formal discussion would only commence when all language versions were available.

19. The Representative of Panama noted that in accordance with the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, if the parties to the dispute agreed to undertake negotiations, the Council could set a time limit for the completion of such negotiations, during which time other proceedings of the merits would be suspended. The Representative of Panama assumed that such suspension of further proceedings would include the suspension of presentation of the Counter-Memorial. The President of the Council believed that the question raised by the Representative of Panama was covered by the eleventh and thirteenth preambular clauses of the draft, which, he believed, made clear the time-limit of 16 calendar days in accordance with the quoted provisions of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* and which also recorded that no request had been received to extend that 16 calendar day time limit. The document was, however, a draft at this stage, subject to improvements and clarifications which Representatives may wish to incorporate.

20. The Representative of France indicated that he had a great many comments on the document, but would, at this time, simply limit himself to the preliminary procedural questions. It was obvious that this kind of a proposal committed the Council to a very important line of action and under such conditions a number of Representatives, himself included, would need to consult their capitals; it was for this reason that

the Representative of France had mentioned the need to have the text well in advance of its formal presentation to Council. Since the Representative of France believed that the text would probably be the subject of a vote, he wished to remind the Council of Rule 47 of its Rules of Procedure, which provided that “upon the request of any Member of the Council, and unless a majority of its Members decide otherwise ... final action on any motion, or amendment thereto, contained in a document distributed less than twenty-four hours before the meeting [which, the Representative of France pointed out, was the case at this time] or presented during the meeting shall be delayed until the proposed text has been available to Representatives for at least twenty-four hours ...”. Limiting his comments to this procedural point for the time being, the Representative of France believed that in such an important matter, Representatives could not take a decision hastily or without referring back to their capitals.

21. The President of the Council noted the comments just offered by the Representative of France, which he would return to, as well as with regard to interventions from other Members of the Council who were not parties to the dispute, once the other language versions of the draft Council decision were available.

22. Following a brief recess, the other language versions of the draft Council decision were distributed, and, after ascertaining that all Representatives had the necessary copies in the appropriate language versions, the President of the Council invited comments during the Council’s paragraph-by-paragraph review of the text.

23. It was pointed out by the Representative of Algeria that in the French version, the sixth preambular clause, third sub-paragraph of the draft did not use wording which was consistent with the text of C-WP/11380. A similar observation in connection with the sixth preambular clause was offered by the Representative of Uruguay, who noted that the wording used in the second sub-paragraph of the draft did not use the term “local remedies”, employed in C-WP/11380. The President of the Council indicated that in reviewing the submission of the Respondents, it had been decided to retain the wording used in the Preliminary Objections.

24. A suggestion put forward by the Representative of Cameroon was accepted, whereby the tenth preambular clause would be amended to conclude with a reference to the framework of the Convention. A linguistic point raised by the Representative of Panama in connection with the Spanish version of the tenth preambular clause was retained, whereby the word “jurisdicción” would be replaced by “competencia” in order to be consistent with the terminology used in Article 5 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*.

25. The Representative of France observed that the Council was beginning to look at the draft text without his having received a reply to the procedural issue that he had raised earlier.

26. The President of the Council explained that consideration of the present item represented a somewhat unusual situation in terms of the Representatives who made up the Council. The Council was sitting as a judiciary body and only those Members who were not parties to the dispute had the right to deliberate. Representatives who had been present at the previous meeting had discussed the subject, and it was those same Members who had a right to vote. Therefore, it was for those Members to determine whether, in accordance with procedure, they wanted more time; whether the draft reflected the ideas that they had expressed at the previous meeting or whether changes were necessary; and whether they wished to vote on

it or not. The President felt that since the Council now had the different language versions, he could provide this clarification on the procedure.

27. The Representative of France believed that whereas the applicable rules did indeed preclude States parties to the dispute from voting, it would be a debatable innovation to say that they did not have the right to take part in the discussion. The request which the Representative of France had made in line with Rules 47 and 43 of the Council's Rules of Procedure was a request by a Member of the Council and was subject to a decision on the part of the Council. The Representative of France therefore sought a ruling on this point before the Council continued the examination of the text. If the Council did not agree, certainly it was the Council which would decide, but the Representative of France believed that any orderly discussion should begin with a ruling on the procedure. The Representative of France reiterated that this was a very important decision and was certain that some other Representatives on the Council would need to refer the matter to their capitals. This was why he thought that Rules 43 and 47 should apply.

28. The President of the Council confirmed that Members of the Council who were parties to the dispute were of course nevertheless still Members of the Council. The President simply felt that the Members who were parties to the dispute and who wished to intervene in the Council decision had a different status in the debate because of a conflict of interest. The fact that the Council was sitting as a judiciary body created a very sensitive situation for its President, who wished to abide by the appropriate legal principles and avoid conflicts of interest; this was the basis for his ruling.

29. The Representative of France asked that the minutes of this meeting reflect his request and the refusal which the President had presented. The President of the Council gave assurances that these interventions would appear in the minutes.

30. The Representative of Saudi Arabia indicated that with due respect to the Representative of France, he fully shared the views which the President had expressed and that his Delegation supported the President fully.

31. The Council resumed and completed its review of the draft text, examining and deciding upon each of the operative clauses individually. The Representative of Norway recorded his abstention from the Council decision in its entirety, and the Representatives of Cuba and Slovakia abstained from the action taken at operative clauses 1, 2 and 3.

32. The Representative of China recalled that in his statement of the previous meeting, he had expressed the wish that the problem could be resolved through other channels, rather than a decision of the Council, because China believed that this was basically a matter of a procedural nature; the Representative of China therefore felt compelled to express his opinion again. Recognizing that the Council had jurisdiction over the matter, China preferred that this matter be resolved through other, better, means.

33. The Representative of Australia requested clarification on the draft decision's fourth operative clause, whereby the parties to the dispute would be invited to continue their direct negotiations. Once this decision was received by the parties, that invitation in the third operative clause would be taken to have been given. According to the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, once the parties accepted the invitation, the Council could then set a time-limit during which other proceedings on the merit would be

suspended. Without taking a view, the Representative of Australia wished to know if, in the event that the decision was received by the parties, the invitation was accepted by the parties before the sixteen-day limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial elapsed, and a time limit was set by the Council, thereby suspending the proceedings, would that then suspend the obligation for the filing of a Counter-Memorial?

34. The President of the Council explained that there was a relation between the fourth operative clause just referred to by the Representative of Australia and the clause which immediately followed it. Paragraph 4 was an invitation to the parties to the dispute to continue their direct negotiations. Paragraph 5 would invite the President of the Council to be available to provide his good offices as conciliator during such negotiations, with the agreement of the parties, and would determine that the matter be further reviewed during the 163<sup>rd</sup> session of the Council, i.e. the May-June session of 2001. If the Council took the action proposed in the fifth operative clause, the Council would be anticipating the appointment of the negotiator, but the President would not be able to start his negotiations until Article 6 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, which indicated that "Upon the filing of the counter-memorial by the respondent, the Council shall decide whether at this stage the parties should be invited to enter into direct negotiations as provided in Article 14," had been complied with.

35. Following up on the query raised by the Representative of Australia, the Representative of Canada recognized that there was a relationship between operative clauses 4 and 5, but in order to avoid any kind of ambiguity wished to know whether it would be possible for the parties to be invited to follow their negotiations directly without the intervention of a negotiator, following the terms of paragraph 4, and that otherwise with respect to paragraph 5, the President of the Council be invited to provide his good offices as per the wishes of the different parties, if they so desired. Was it possible to consider one or another option? If this was not the wish of the Council, the Representative of Canada believed it would be important to clarify as of now whether the invitation referred actually to operative clause 4 or 5.

36. The President of the Council's understanding of operative clause 4 was that there was no reason why the parties would not be in a position to continue their negotiations directly at any moment. It was up to the two parties concerned to do so or not. The President did not see any kind of any incompatibility between operative clauses 5 and 4; paragraph 5 made it possible to have a conciliator, should the two parties concerned agree. If they agreed, then the President of the Council, as conciliator, would do his work and would present a report to the Council that had asked him to be conciliator. Therefore both possibilities were available and were not in contradiction with each other. This was the understanding of the President of the Council when he had drafted the decision with the Director of the Legal Bureau, in light of the views which had been expressed at the previous meeting.

37. Noting the clarification just provided by the President of the Council, the Representative of Canada therefore understood that in either case it would be necessary to contemplate that the Counter-Memorial be submitted within the time-frame stipulated in the preambular part of the draft decision. The President of the Council indicated that this was his response to the question raised by the Representative of Australia, making reference to Article 6 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*. If the Council wished to include a reference to that Article 6 in operative clause 5, it could of course be done. While leaving it in the hands of the President of the Council, the Representative of Canada observed that a reference to Article 6 would be a useful clarification.

38. The Representative of Egypt saw no contradiction between operative clauses 4 and 5. Paragraph 4 was based on the unanimous will of the Council Members as expressed during the previous meeting s deliberations, and the contents of paragraph 5 were also based on the desire of the Council Member States. The Representative of Egypt recalled that fourteen Council Members had requested the President of the Council to intervene to solve this problem, adding yet another burden to the President s numerous obligations. Paragraphs 4 and 5 were thus based on the desire of the Council Member States as reflected in the previous meeting s debate.

39. As a follow-up to the point raised by the Representative of Canada, the Representative of India suggested that operative clause 5 could be amended to refer to the “invitation of the Parties” in order to make a distinction between paragraphs 4 and 5. The President of the Council explained that the text of the draft now under consideration was based on the terminology used in the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*. In this connection, operative clause 5 was amended to refer to the “consent of the Parties” in order to be consistent with the terminology used in Article 14, sub-paragraph 3 of those rules. The Representative of India agreed that this amendment would distinguish between paragraphs 4 and 5.

40. The Representative of Australia saw no conflict between paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft decision, but noted that under Article 14, sub-paragraph 1 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, the Council “ may at any time in the course of the proceedings invite the parties to negotiate.” If such an invitation was given, as was the case in the draft decision, and if the parties accepted that invitation - and one must hold open the possibility that it could be accepted at the moment that it was received - was there a discretion that a time-limit should be imposed? If it was discretionary, the suspension of the proceedings only occurred on the basis of a time-limit having been imposed. The Representative of Australia also observed that Article 6 of the rules, referred to by the President of the Council, represented one situation in which parties may be invited to negotiate after a counter-memorial had been filed, but he believed that Article 14 could be invoked prior to the filing of a counter-memorial in accordance with the first sub-paragraph of that Article, which said “at any time”. If the invitation was combined with the decision and the invitation was accepted, its not clear to the Representative of Australia whether that invitation was being accepted within the terms of the four corners of Article 14, or whether it was an invitation that had been made contingent on Article 6 as well.

41. The President of the Council indicated that in drafting the text now under consideration, the intention had been to cover the question of the time-limit with the indication, in paragraph 5, that “ the matter be further reviewed at the 163<sup>rd</sup> session of the Council.” This was the time-limit with regard to the negotiations. With regard to the second point raised by the Representative of Australia, the President indicated that he had just replied to the Representative of Canada regarding Article 6, which was linked to Article 14. The Director of the Legal Bureau indicated that obviously, Article 6 proceeded from the basis that the Counter-Memorial had been filed and the Council would then decide whether the parties should be invited to enter into direct negotiations. At present this was not the situation because the Counter-Memorial had not yet been filed. The question was then whether Article 14, sub- paragraph 1 could be applied even prior to the filing of the Counter-Memorial. If one would apply Article 14, sub-paragraph 1 prior to the filing of the Counter-Memorial, it would then be for the parties to decide whether they accepted to negotiate, and thereby to have the proceedings suspended if both parties so agreed. If, on the other hand, one of the parties did not agree to do so prior to the filing of the Counter-Memorial, it then remained for that party to wait until the Counter-Memorial was filed.

42. It seemed to the Representative of Canada that, pursuant to the clarifications just given by D/LEB in connection with paragraph 4 of the decision, the Council would be inviting the parties to continue their direct negotiations, so that would be negotiations undertaken under Article 14, sub-paragraph 1, i.e. directly. If both parties agreed to do so, the proceedings were suspended, and the Counter-Memorial did not have to be filed. Under paragraph 5 of the decision, the Council invited the President of the Council to make his good offices available and to act as negotiator with the agreement of the parties. In that case, the Representative of Canada understood that the Counter-Memorial had to be filed, otherwise the President could not act as conciliator or as a mediator. So there were really two distinct situations.

43. With regard to the question raised by the Representative of Canada, the President of the Council observed that in both paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft decision, the requirement was the consent of the two parties regarding the negotiations. Article 6 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* made reference to the filing of the Counter-Memorial by the respondents, but this element would of course depend on the will of the two parties. If the two parties accepted to start negotiations through the negotiator without filing the Counter-Memorial, it was a matter which was left to the two parties. The President of the Council saw no problem from the point of view of pure logic; this was the agreement of the two parties and the responsibility of the negotiator was vis-a-vis the Council. In his report, the President of the Council, as conciliator, would confirm that there had been no Counter-Memorial; that this had been with the agreement of the two parties; that he had used his good offices; and that he had thus far obtained these results. This was how the President of the Council interpreted the situation in purely practical, pragmatic terms, without infringing on any principle of international law.

44. The Representative of Saudi Arabia agreed with the clarifications that the President of the Council had provided regarding operative clauses 4 and 5 of the decision, but suggested that the text be redrafted in order to make a distinction between the report of the Council at the 163<sup>rd</sup> Session and the item in general. The suggestion put forward by the Representative of Saudi Arabia was accepted.

45. The Representative of Botswana indicated that in light of the questions raised by Australia and Canada and the clarifications given by the President of the Council and the Director of Legal Bureau, he now had a problem with operative clause 4, especially as the Council was now referring to Article 14, sub-paragraph 1 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* which would require the suspension of the filing of the Counter-Memorial. If that situation was to occur, given that the likelihood of the parties agreeing in the negotiations, that would mean that the Counter-Memorial then could only come to be filed probably after the 163<sup>rd</sup> Session when the matter was brought again to the Council. Given this problem, the Representative of Botswana was of the opinion that the Council should probably delete the fourth operative clause altogether.

46. It was the understanding of the Representative of Australia that Article 6 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* actually did not apply in this case. Under Article 14 of those rules, the decision of the Council would, in its paragraph 4, invite the parties to negotiate and, in its paragraph 5, invite the parties to consider a conciliator, i.e. the good offices of the President. It was up to the parties to say ‘yes we agree to negotiate’; ‘no we don’t agree to negotiate’; ‘yes we agree to negotiate on the condition that...’; ‘we agree to negotiate but we don’t want a conciliator’; or any other possibility. The parties were free to accept or not accept on condition or unconditionally. Therefore, the idea of the filing of a Counter-Memorial, whilst in some respects and from some views might usefully be included in the decision, to the extent that that became

a determinative factor as to whether or not one or another party entered into negotiations was for the parties to decide. The President of the Council confirmed that this was the case.

47. The Representative of Saudi Arabia wished to know what would happen in a situation whereby both parties did not agree to continue the negotiations, did not ask for the assistance of the President of the Council, and did not raise the issue. What would be the next step that would be taken? Would the Council be content with a report simply stating that nothing had happened on the subject, or would there be any mandatory move by any of the two parties to take such action as necessary? The President of the Council indicated that if nothing happened, it was possible that the law would leave the parties in a vacuum. The matter would then come to the Council and the Council would continue the proceeding to consider the merits of the case. In such a situation, the matter would come before the Council not during the 163<sup>rd</sup> Session, but during the 162<sup>nd</sup> Session. Unless the party which had presented the case to the Council for some reason withdrew its case, in which case that party would have to inform the Council officially that it did not want the Council to continue the proceeding, the matter would return to the Council for its consideration of the merits, taking into account the Council's decision at this meeting.

48. As a follow-up to the matter just raised by the Representative of Saudi Arabia, the Representative of France requested clarification, through the President of the Council, regarding whether the United States was, for its part, prepared to negotiate. The European delegation, both in writing and orally, had reiterated its desire to negotiate, and the Representative of France believed that that the procedure as a whole would be simplified if the Representative of the United States could clarify this position.

49. The Representative of the United States wished to honour the consensus which was being developed in the Council and before making a commitment at this time would like to see where the Council was at the end of the day. The United States certainly appreciated the progress that was being made in the Council and had expressed its previous intent to negotiate, but the filing of the Counter-Memorial was also very important.

50. The Representative of France observed that the highly conditional response just given did not really reply to his question, which he had posed with Article 14, sub-paragraph 2 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* in mind. If the United States was prepared to negotiate, that paragraph would apply and obviously the whole procedure would be simplified and expedited.

51. The Representative of the United States indicated that the United States would await the invitation of the Council and respond accordingly after it received the invitation.

52. The President of the Council indicated that the Council decision would be communicated to the parties concerned, with a letter with regard to this decision. If it was the wish of the Council, of course the President of the Council would expect a reply from the parties concerned.

53. The Representative of the United Kingdom appreciated that as one of the parties, he would have to be very careful to avoid any conflict of interest; he would not say anything about the merits of the case or about the merits of the preliminary case, but simply sought clarification in order to fully understand where the Council stood when the decision was taken. In relation to Article 14, sub-paragraph 2 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, the Representative of the United Kingdom wished to know how operative

clauses 4 and 5 would be redrafted, because it seemed that there was a difference between talking of a review in the 163rd session of the Council in the context of conciliation, and setting a time-limit for the completion of negotiations during which other proceedings would be suspended, which was related not to conciliation, but related to the invitation to negotiate and the agreement by the parties to do so. The Representative of the United Kingdom was therefore asking whether in such re-casting as there may be, it could be made clear that there was a time-limit — it could be the same one, 163<sup>rd</sup> Session — which related to the invitation to continue direct negotiations, rather than being keyed only to the business of conciliation. The Representative of the United Kingdom believed it was very important for the Council to know what that situation would be so that it was not left in limbo.

54. The President of the Council concurred that the point raised by the Representative of the United Kingdom, if clarified in the decision, would be very useful to all parties and to the person in charge of negotiations. It would be made clear that the time-limit was the 163<sup>rd</sup> Session of the Council.

55. The Representative of France indicated that he was somewhat disappointed with the answer provided by the Representative of the United States, and requested that his two interventions be recorded in the minutes of the meeting. The President of the Council confirmed that the answer of the United States would appear in the record, and expressed the hope that with good offices things could be arranged.

56. The Director of the Legal Bureau read out to the Council the draft text of a new sixth operative clause which, in accordance with the request of the Representative of the United Kingdom, would make clear that the time-limit of the 163rd Session applied not only to the good offices but also to the invitation to the parties to negotiate: “6. The matters referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall be further reviewed at the 163<sup>rd</sup> Session of the Council”.

57. The President of the Council observed that the new operative clause just read out by D/LEB would no doubt clarify the text and would improve it. Noting that there were no further comments or remarks, the President took it that the Council had approved the decision with the amendments introduced during its consideration of the draft. This being the case, the President indicated that the decision would be communicated to the parties officially.

58. The decision rendered by the Council on the preliminary objections in the matter “United States and 15 European States (2000)”, incorporating all modifications agreed to by the Council, reads as follows:

“*THE COUNCIL,*

*ACTING* under Article 84 of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* and the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*;

*COMPOSED* of the following Representatives entitled to vote: Mr. T. Chérif (Algeria), Mr. J.L. Bacarezza (Argentina), Dr. J. Aleck (Australia), Mr. K. J. Mosupukwa (Botswana), Mr. A.M. Cunha (Brazil), Mr. T. Tekou (Cameroon), Mrs. G. Richard (Canada), Mr. Y. Zhang (China), Mr. J. Hernández López (Colombia), Dr. M. Molina Martínez (Cuba), Mr. A.Y. El Karimy (Egypt), Mr. A.P. Singh (India), Mr. J. Sjoen (Indonesia), Mr. K. Okada (Japan), Mr. S.W. Githaiga (Kenya), Mr. R. Abdallah (Lebanon),



Mr. R. Kobeh González (Mexico), Mr. O.M. Rambech (Norway), Mr. S.N. Ahmad (Pakistan), Mr. R.E. García de Paredes (Panama), Mr. V.P. Kuranov (Russian Federation), Mr. S. Al-Ghamdi (Saudi Arabia), Mr. M. Ndiaye (Alt.) (Senegal), Mr. O. Fabrici (Slovakia) and Mr. C.A. Borucki (Uruguay); Mr. D.O. Eniojukan (Nigeria) being absent;

*THE PARTIES* being: the United States of America (Applicant), represented by Mr. D. Newman, Authorized Agent, assisted by Mr. A.I. Mendelsohn, on the one hand, and 15 European States, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Respondents), represented by Mr. J-L. Dewost, Authorized Agent, assisted by Mr. E. White, Ms. M. Tousseyn and Mr. P. Van Den Heuvel, on the other hand;

*CONSIDERING* that an Application and Memorial of the United States under Article 84 of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* was filed on 14 March 2000; that a Statement of Preliminary Objections of the 15 European States was filed on 19 July 2000; and that a Statement of Response to the Preliminary Objections was filed by the United States on 15 September 2000;

*HAVING HEARD* the Parties in the above matter and having held its deliberations at the fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of its 161st Session on 15 and 16 November 2000;

*HAVING CONSIDERED* the preliminary objections of the Respondents, namely:

- the Application is inadmissible at the present time since the United States has failed to demonstrate that there is a disagreement with the Respondent relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention and its Annexes that cannot be settled by negotiation;
- the Application is inadmissible at the present time since the US has failed to exhaust the remedies that are available in the legal systems of the Respondents;
- the second to fourth items of requested relief are inadmissible since the first item fully describes the forms of decision which a Contracting State is entitled to request the Council to take under Article 82 of the Convention;

*CONSIDERING*, regarding the first preliminary objection, and based on the exhibits submitted by the Parties, that the negotiations between the Parties, which were held over a period of three years at various levels, were adequate and sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Article 84 of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*;

*CONSIDERING*, regarding the second preliminary objection, that the Applicant is not required to exhaust local remedies in the present case, since the Applicant seeks to protect not only its nationals, but also its own legal position under the Convention; further, that the exhaustion of local remedies is not stipulated as a requirement in Article 84 of the Convention;

*CONSIDERING*, regarding the third preliminary objection, that the question of the powers of the Council to provide the relief requested by the Applicant in Nos. 2 to 4 of its Application and Memorial, is not preliminary in nature; that this question does therefore not require decision of the Council at this stage; that this matter should therefore be joined to the merits of the case;

*CONSIDERING* therefore that the claims of the Applicant are admissible and that the Council has jurisdiction to deal with them in the framework of the Convention;

*CONSIDERING* that, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 3 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, the time-limit for filing the counter-memorial by the Respondents will run again as from the date of the present decision, and that 16 calendar days are remaining for doing so;

*CONSIDERING* that it is therefore not necessary to decide on the second request of the Applicant in its Response to the preliminary objections;

*CONSIDERING* that it is also not necessary to decide at this time on the third request of the Applicant in the Response to the preliminary objections, since no request for extension of the time-limit for the filing of the counter-memorial has been received;

*CONSIDERING* also that it would be desirable that the Parties continue their negotiations on the matter in dispute;

*CONSIDERING* that in order to further such negotiations, the good offices of the President of the Council, acting as conciliator, with the agreement of the Parties, would be desirable;

**DECIDES** as follows:

1. The first preliminary objection is denied.
2. The second preliminary objection is denied.
3. The third preliminary objection, not being preliminary in nature but related to the merits, shall be joined to the merits.
4. The Parties to the dispute are invited to continue their direct negotiations.
5. In accordance with Article 14, paragraph 3 of the said Rules, the President of the Council is invited to be available to provide his good offices as Conciliator during such negotiations, with the consent of the Parties.
6. The matters referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall be further reviewed at the 163rd Session of the Council.

This decision was taken unanimously, Mr. O.M. Rambech (Norway) abstaining with respect to the decision in its entirety, and Dr. M. Molina Martínez (Cuba) and Mr. O. Fabrici (Slovakia) abstaining with respect to the action taken at operative clauses 1, 2 and 3.

Rendered on 16 November 2000 in Montreal.”

59. The Council having thus completed, for the time being, its consideration of this part of the proceedings, the President, proceeding in accordance with the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences*, asked if there were statements.

60. The Representative of France requested a reasonable suspension, approximately half an hour, to enable the fifteen EU Member States to coordinate on the appropriateness of a statement which would be presented on their behalf before the Council completed its work. The meeting was suspended for 30 minutes in accordance with this request.

61. Mr. Dewost, the Authorized Agent of the fifteen EU Member States, wished to record for the minutes of this Council a reservation with respect to the irregularity of the procedure followed during the Council's consideration of this item, and to also add that the fifteen Member States which he represented also reserved their right to see what was to follow this procedure.

62. Directing a question to the President of the Council, Mr. Dewost understood from the discussions - which he thanked the President for having been allowed to listen to - that there was a link between the timetable for the Counter-Memorial and the acceptance by the United States of the President's proposal in connection with operative clause 4 of the President's decision. Mr. Dewost wished to put to the Council the logical consequence, which would be that the time limit for filing the Counter-Memorial would be extended by the number of days between the date of the Council's adoption of this decision, and the date on which the United States was prepared to negotiate.

63. The President of the Council wished to clarify that the decision taken at this meeting was not the President of the Council's decision; it was the Council's decision. The preambular part of that decision mentioned that sixteen days remained; the sixteen days would start from the date of the Council's decision.

64. Mr. Dewost clarified that what he had put to the Council, through its President, was a question going in the direction of what he understood to be the viewpoint of several Members of the Council, to the effect that there was obviously a link between the timetable of the Counter-Memorial, and the disposition of the United States to follow what the Council itself said in paragraph 4 of the Council's decision. There was obviously a link, and Mr. Dewost wished for this link to be clarified.

65. Responding to the question which the Authorized Agent of the 15 European States Members of the EU had put to the Council, the President of the Council recalled that this question had been asked during the Council's consideration of the draft decision. It had been asked by three or four Members of the Council not party to the dispute. The reply for clarification had been, with regard to paragraph 4, that there was a flexibility. If the parties agreed to negotiate without the filing of the Counter-Memorial, nothing prevented them from doing so since it was a matter for the parties themselves. If one party should not agree to negotiate until the filing of the Counter-Memorial, then there was a time limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 were flexible without contravening any rules or any principles of law, whether national or international. The President of the Council observed that national and international law applied certain principles; when entering into negotiations, everything depended on the parties who were willing to negotiate. If such negotiations took place, the rules which covered the proceeding would permit the suspension of the proceeding, provided that the parties agreed.

66. The Authorized Agent for the fifteen EU Member States indicated that, like the President of the Council, he was very closely attached to the rules. It seemed to him that it would have been more correct if the States which he represented had had a clear reply from the Representative of the United States to the very clear question that had been asked by the Representative of France on behalf of the fifteen European States, so that the latter could determine the deadline by which the European Union would have to present its Counter-Memorial. Mr. Dewost noted that the Council believed that the position of the United States was clear.

67. The President of the Council recalled that when the Representative of France had asked the question, he had given the floor to the Representative of the United States. The question of the Representative of France, as well as the reply of the Representative of the United States and the questions posed by the Authorized Agent of the fifteen European States, would be reflected in the minutes.

68. The Representative of Uruguay suggested that the question was out of context, since it was the Council that was inviting the parties and not the other way around. The President of the Council concurred that operative clause 4 of the decision was very clear in stating that the Council was inviting those parties: "that the parties to the dispute are invited to continue their direct negotiations". The Council clearly invited the parties, and the President of the Council wished to personally invite them to continue their direct negotiations. The President hoped that the parties would find an adequate solution concerning this problem, and was certain that the Council would applaud when it would be possible to report to the Council that this matter had been settled through negotiations. Everybody in the world of civil aviation knew the policy of the Council, which very much favoured the resolution of conflicts among Contracting States by a good understanding among them and by solutions which were adequate and appropriate, and the Council had, in operative clause 5, put at the disposal of the parties concerned, the good offices of the President of the Council. The President would, with great pleasure, make every effort so that the parties could agree on a solution. A report would be presented to the Council at the appropriate time.

69. The Representative of Spain indicated that throughout the discussions that had taken place on this subject, he had not spoken because he felt it was not appropriate. The Representative of Spain believed, however, that the latest question put to the Council was a very important one and related to the time-frame for presentation of the Counter-Memorial. Obviously, the time-frame for presentation of the Counter-Memorial would have to be linked to the time at which one of the parties or both parties agreed that they were going to negotiate. Therefore, the Representative of Spain believed that what the Council had been requested, i.e. that it extend the time for the presentation of the Counter-Memorial, should be considered by the Council and the Council should decide on this matter, in its wisdom. A very difficult situation would otherwise arise, and it was for this reason that the question and the response must be taken into account by the Council.

70. The President of the Council indicated that he had no further speakers requesting the floor, and that the intervention of the Representative of Spain would be recorded.

71. The meeting adjourned at 1815 hours.

Exhibit 2

Summary Minutes of the Council, Ninth Meeting 211th Session, 21 June 2017 ICAO doc. C-MIN 211/9 (Closed)



**International Civil Aviation Organization**

C-MIN 211/9 (Closed)  
5/7/17

**COUNCIL — 211TH SESSION**

**SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE NINTH MEETING**

**(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE 2017, AT 1000 HOURS)**

**CLOSED MEETING**

President of the Council: Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu

Secretary: Dr. Fang Liu, Secretary General

**PRESENT:**

Algeria	— Mr. A.D. Mesroua	Kenya	— Ms. M.B. Awori
Argentina	— Mr. G.E. Ainchil	Malaysia	— Mr. Y.-H. Lim
Australia	— Mr. S. Lucas	Mexico	— Mr. D. Méndez Mayora
Brazil	— Mrs. M.G. Valente da Costa	Nigeria	— Mr. M.S. Nuhu
Cabo Verde	— Mr. C. Monteiro	Panama	— Mr. G.S. Oller
Canada	— Mr. M. Pagé	Republic of Korea	— Mr. J. Hur
China	— Mr. Shengjun Yang	Russian Federation	— Mr. A.A. Novgorodov
Colombia	— Mr. A. Muñoz Gómez	Saudi Arabia	— Mr. S.A.R. Hashem
Congo	— Mr. R.M. Ondzotto	Singapore	— Mr. T.C. Ng
Cuba	— Mrs. M. Crespo Frasquieri	South Africa	— Mr. M.D.T. Peege
Ecuador	— Mr. I. Arellano	Spain	— Mr. V.M. Aguado
Egypt	— Mr. A. Khedr	Sweden	— Ms. H. Jansson Saxe
France	— Mr. P. Bertoux	Turkey	— Mr. A.R. Çolak
Germany	— Mr. U. Schwierzinski	United Arab Emirates	— Miss A. Alhameli
India	— Mr. A. Shekhar	United Kingdom	— Mr. M. Rodmell
Ireland	— Mrs. A. Smith Floch	United Republic of Tanzania	— Mr. R.W. Bokango
Italy	— Mr. M.R. Rusconi	United States	— Mr. S. Kotis (Alt.)
Japan	— Mr. S. Matsui	Uruguay	— Mr. M. Vidal

**ALSO PRESENT:**

Dr. N. Luongo (Alt.)	— Argentina
Mrs. M.F. Loguzzo (Alt.)	— Argentina
Mr. O. Vieira (Authorized Agent)	— Brazil
Mr. N. Moretti (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. N. Castro da Silva (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. L. Sacchi Guadagnin (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. G. do Prado Lima (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. R. da Rosa Costa (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. D.A. Tavares Taufner (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. R.H. Godinho (Alt.)	— Brazil
Ms. A. Brandão Barbosa (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. L.A. Angelo Junior (Alt.)	— Brazil
Mr. P. Langlais (Alt.)	— Canada
Mr. F. Neubauer (Alt.)	— Canada
Mr. Chunyu Ding (Alt.)	— China
Mr. M. Millefert (Alt.)	— France
Mr. N. Naoumi (Alt.)	— Germany
Mr. M. Usami (Alt.)	— Japan

**SECRETARIAT:**

Mrs. J. Yan	— C/OSG
Mr. J. Augustin	— D/LEB
Mr. S. Creamer	— D/ANB
Mr. B. Verhaegen	— SELO
Mr. A. Jakob	— SLO
Mr. C. Petras	— LO
Mr. A. Opolot	— LO
Ms. M. Weinstein	— LO
Mr. Y. Nyampong	— LO
Mrs. D. Brookes	— LEB
Mr. M. Vaugeois	— LEB
Mr. A. Larcos	— ACC
Miss S. Black	— Précis-writer

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**ALSO PRESENT (CONTINUED):**

Mr. K. A'amali bin Ismail (Alt.)	— Malaysia
Mrs. D. Valle Álvarez (Alt.)	— Mexico
Mr. S. Kim (Alt.)	— Republic of Korea
Mr. K. Lee (Alt.)	— Republic of Korea
Mr. D. Subbotin (Alt.)	— Russian Federation
Mr. M.S. Habib (Alt.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. S. Vuokila (Alt.)	— Sweden
Mr. Ö. Dođrukol (Alt.)	— Turkey
Mr. M.A.B. Salem (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. A. Alnaqbi (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. J.C. Salazar (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mrs. L. Coquard-Patry (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mrs. K.L. Riensema (Alt.)	— United Kingdom
Ms. K. McManus (Authorized Agent)	— United States
Ms. D. Polebaum (Alt.)	— United States
Ms. L. Fussell (Alt.)	— United States
Ms. W. Teel (Alt.)	— United States
Mr A. Iyi-Eweka (Alt.)	— United States
Mr. C. Burleson (Alt.)	— United States
Mr. D. Sullivan (Alt.)	— United States
Mr. J. Klang (Alt.)	— United States
Mr. J. Duncan (Alt.)	— United States
Mrs. M. Gonzalez (Alt.)	— Uruguay
Mr. F. de Medina (Alt.)	— Uruguay

Representatives to ICAO

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  
 Chile  
 Cyprus  
 Ghana  
 Greece  
 Indonesia  
 Nicaragua  
 Paraguay  
 Peru  
 Sudan  
 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)



**Subject No. 16: Legal work of the Organization**  
**Subject No. 26: Settlement of disputes between Contracting States**

**Settlement of Differences: Brazil and the United States (2016) – Preliminary Objection stage**

1. On behalf of the Council, the President extended a welcome to Mr. Olyntho Vieira, the Authorized Agent of Brazil, Ms. Katherine McManus, the Authorized Agent of the United States, and their respective Delegations.
2. The Council then proceeded to consider the above case on the basis of: C-WP/14617Restricted (with Addendum No. 1), in which the Secretary General provided an overview of the procedure applicable to the disagreement between Brazil and the United States during the preliminary objection stage; memorandum **SG 2360/17** dated 10 April 2017, in which the Secretary General transmitted the Statement of Preliminary Objection filed by the Delegation of the United States to ICAO in accordance with Article 5 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782), and related memorandum **SG 2362** dated 23 May 2017; memorandum **SG 2364/17** (with Blue rider) dated 24 May 2017, in which the Secretary General transmitted the Comments in response to the Statement of Preliminary Objection, including exhibits, filed on behalf of Brazil; and, pursuant to C-DEC 211/8, paragraphs 19 and 20, memorandum **SG 2368/17** dated 20 June 2017, in which, with the agreement of the two Parties on the understanding that circulation on that date should not be used as a reason to postpone discussion and decision on this matter, the Secretary General transmitted a Note Verbale from the Delegation of the United States to ICAO dated, and received on, 16 June 2017, submitting two documents as additional evidence and requesting their inclusion in the record.
3. Document C-WP/14617Restricted presented, in paragraph 2, the Application and Memorial filed by Brazil on 2 December 2016 for the settlement, under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 2 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782), of the disagreement with the United States regarding the application of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention and Standard 3.1.1 of its Annex 2 – *Rules of the Air* in the aftermath of “the collision, on September 29<sup>th</sup> 2006, of the air carrier Boeing 737-8EH operating a regular flight GLO 1907, and air jet Legacy EMB-135BJ operating a flight by ExcelAire Services Inc.” The four types of relief sought from the Council by Brazil, as Applicant, were also set forth in that paragraph.
4. The Statement of Preliminary Objection submitted by the United States, as Respondent, on 27 March 2017 in accordance with Article 5 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) requested that the Applicant’s claim be dismissed by the Council as time-barred under the generally-accepted international law principle of extinctive prescription.
5. Pursuant to Article 5 (3) of the said Rules, upon a preliminary objection being filed, the proceedings on the merits shall be suspended and, with respect to the time-limit fixed under Article 3 (1) (c) of the Rules as regards to the Counter-Memorial, time shall cease to run from the moment the preliminary objection is filed until the objection is decided by the Council
6. Addendum No. 1 to document C-WP/14617Restricted summarized the Comments submitted by the Applicant (Brazil) on 19 May 2017 in response to the Statement of Preliminary Objection of the Respondent (United States), in which the Applicant requested the Council to: reject the propositions in the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection and reaffirm the Council’s competence to consider Brazil’s Application and Memorial; and order that the period given to the Respondent for the filing of its Counter-Memorial shall begin to run again immediately following the Council’s rejection of the Preliminary Objection.

7. In the executive summary of the paper, the Council was invited to hear the arguments of the Parties relating to the Preliminary Objection and to take a decision on the matter in line with the procedure set forth in Article 5 of the Rules for the Settlement of Differences (Doc 7782), paragraph (4) of which specified that “If a preliminary objection has been filed, the Council, after hearing the Parties, shall decide the question as a preliminary issue before any further steps are taken under these Rules.”. The requirements set forth in Article 15 of the said Rules were referenced in paragraph 5.3 of the paper.

8. It was recalled that, for the case before it, the Council was sitting as a judicial body under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, taking its decisions on the basis of the submission of written documents by the Parties, as well as on the basis of oral arguments. The Council’s consideration was limited to the United States’ Statement of Preliminary Objection and to Brazil’s Comments in response thereto, and would not address the merits of the case. The *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) and the *Rules of Procedure for the Council* (Doc 7559) served as reference documents.

9. In then inviting each Party to present their arguments relating to the Preliminary Objection, the President of the Council indicated that the presentations should not exceed 20 minutes in duration and that each Party would subsequently be afforded an additional five minutes for a rebuttal, if necessary.

#### ***Presentation by the Authorized Agent of the United States***

10. The Council heard a presentation by Ms. Katherine McManus, a Deputy Legal Adviser at the United States’ Department of State, who was the Authorized Agent of the United States in this proceeding. She was joined by a highly qualified group of United States Government colleagues – technical and legal experts from the Department of State and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including FAA Deputy Assistant Administrator Carl Burluson. They appreciated the opportunity to set forth the United States’ position concerning its Preliminary Objection to the Members of the Council.

11. Ms. McManus recalled that the present case had arisen out of a tragic accident which had occurred on 29 September 2006 when a Boeing 737 with 154 on board (148 passengers and 6 crew members) and an Embraer executive jet, flying on the same airway in opposite directions at the same altitude as directed by Air Traffic Control, had collided in mid-air. All aboard the passenger jet had perished; the Embraer had successfully made an emergency landing.

12. The United States recognized the shock and profound loss that tragic accident had caused for Brazil and for the families of those lost. In the aftermath of the accident, it had taken immediate action both to work with Brazil in the accident investigation and to undertake its own investigation into the conduct of the flight – as was standard procedure. The United States had also taken several positive actions to promote aviation safety after the accident. Brazil was now asking the Council to find that the United States’ actions in investigating that matter and the conduct of the US airmen, and its 2007 decision not to impose punitive measures against them, violated the Chicago Convention.

13. The United States strongly affirmed that its investigation and conclusions concerning the conduct of the US airmen fully complied with the Chicago Convention. The United States was firmly committed to aviation safety. It had been committed to ICAO and the safety of civil aviation for decades, and remained so today. The United States also recognized Brazil as an important partner on those issues. It stood ready to work with Brazil and other States to enhance aviation safety.

14. The present discussion, however, was about the United States’ Preliminary Objection, which demonstrated that Brazil had waited too long to bring its claim, and that undue delay had prejudiced the United States’ ability to defend this case on the merits. Thus the United States urged the Council to apply the doctrine of extinctive prescription, also known as *laches*, to dismiss this 10-year-old claim as

untimely. Representatives were thus being asked to decide today whether the case should proceed before the Council.

15. Ms. McManus indicated that in her opening statement she would: set forth the key facts related to the United States' Preliminary Objection; demonstrate that each element of the legal defense of extinctive prescription was met; and finally, identify some additional reasons for applying that doctrine and dismissing Brazil's claim.

#### Factual situation

16. In beginning with the facts, Ms. McManus underscored that the United States took the said accident very seriously. Immediately after the accident in 2006, an accident investigation had been initiated. That official investigation had been led by Brazil's Center for Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents (CENIPA), with United States' participation under Annex 13 – *Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation* by both the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the FAA. The investigation had been completed in 2008.

17. Ms. McManus noted that, simultaneously, the FAA had led a regulatory compliance investigation to determine whether to bring enforcement action against the US airmen. The FAA had determined in 2007 that the conduct of the pilot-in-command and second-in-command of the US-registered aircraft had not warranted enforcement measures. Nevertheless, the FAA had taken the extra precaution of sending inspectors to monitor the training of the two airmen, and to personally conduct their line checks. Of course, the FAA had an interest in insuring that US pilots who fly in the United States and other countries were fully qualified. That was a crucial aspect of its aviation safety mission. Additionally, in order to promote safety, the FAA had issued safety alerts for operators and had taken actions responsive to the NTSB's three safety recommendations arising from the accident investigation. The FAA had also provided English-language training for air traffic controllers, and co-authored a number of papers relating to safety as a result of "lessons-learned" from the said accident.

18. It was recalled by Ms. McManus that the Government of Brazil had been made aware in December 2008, April 2010, and December 2011 that the United States had concluded that no enforcement action against the said airmen was warranted but that the United States was taking broader steps in the interests of aviation safety. It had been the considered conclusion of the United States, as had been expressed to Brazil at an early date, that the primary responsibility for the accident had been with Brazilian Air Traffic Control which, in managing the airspace, had directed the two aircraft to fly directly at each other, on a collision course. Not until five years after the accident, in late 2011 and early 2012, did Brazil submit Notices of Infraction (NOI) to the United States raising regulatory issues against the pilot-in-command: that the flight lacked a Letter of Authorization (LOA) from the FAA to fly in reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) airspace and that the flight was operated with the transponder and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) "switched off".

19. Thereafter, in 2011 and 2012, Brazil and the United States had engaged in diplomatic exchanges, in which the United States had reiterated its conclusions that no enforcement action against the said airmen was warranted. No further diplomatic exchanges had occurred from 2012 to 2015.

20. It had not been until 2015, when Brazil had asked for bilateral consultations regarding the airmen's conduct, that Brazil had finally alleged that the United States was in violation of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention. And Brazil had not filed this claim under the Convention until December 2016.

21. Ms. McManus emphasized that Brazil's delays in (1) submitting NOIs (2) in notifying the United States that it believed it had a claim under the Chicago Convention, and (3) in bringing this claim

had prejudiced the United States' ability to defend on the merits and to provide the relief sought. For that reason, it was appropriate for the Council to dismiss Brazil's claim as barred by the equitable principle of prescription.

Legal argument – laches

22. In then outlining the elements of the United States' legal argument, Ms. McManus noted that the principle of prescription held that a Claimant cannot delay in presenting and pressing a claim if such delay prevents the respondent government from preparing its defense and invoking remedies in response to the claim.

23. The first point that Ms. McManus wished to make was that prescription was a long-established principle of international law that applied to the present case. As Brazil stated in its Comments (cf. memorandum SG 2364/17 dated 24 May 2017, Part IV.2, Section B, p. 21, second paragraph), it did not dispute that extinctive prescription was a recognized general principle of international law. Prescription was applicable in this case as a background principle of international law. That was true even though it is not specifically mentioned in the Chicago Convention or in the ICAO *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782). As a principle of international law, prescription was applied by bodies deciding disputes under international law. The ICAO Council, when acting in an Article 84 case, was such a body.

24. Ms. McManus noted that, as the cases cited in both briefs illustrated, for prescription to be applied, it need not be written in the specific treaty that was being interpreted by an international tribunal. Indeed, the doctrine existed primarily for cases like this where there was no time limit in the treaty. She recalled that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which had jurisdiction over an appeal under the Chicago Convention, had held that the principle of extinctive prescription was effective "even in the absence of any applicable treaty provision." [cf. *Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru vs. Austl.)*, Preliminary Objection, 1992 I.C.J. 240, ¶32 (June 26) (Ex. L-16)]. Thus, there was no real dispute that prescription can be a bar to a claim under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention.

25. The next step was to examine how the two elements of prescription were met in the present case. The two elements of extinctive prescription were undue delay, and prejudice as a result. Before showing how each element was met, Ms. McManus wanted to show how Brazil's Comments confused prescription with other international doctrines, such as abandonment. Contrary to the implications of Brazil's Comments, abandonment was not a required element of prescription. As numerous tribunals had recognized, the only two elements were undue delay and prejudice.

26. In looking specifically at the said two elements of prescription, Ms. McManus noted that the first element was met as Brazil's delay was undue. Brazil claimed that its delay of ten years between the accident and the submission of its Application was not sufficiently long to give rise to prescription (cf. memorandum SG 2364/17 dated 24 May 2017, Part IV.1, p. 13, second paragraph). However, the time period for a finding of undue delay was not fixed by international law, but depended on the circumstances of each case. It was a case-by-case determination. As Brazil itself had noted, the ICJ had stated that "international law does not lay down any specific time-limit in that regard. It is therefore for the Court [or other entity that is deciding the case] to determine in the light of the circumstances of each case whether the passage of time renders an application inadmissible." (cf. memorandum SG 2364/17 dated 24 May 2017, Part IV.1, p. 12, second paragraph, citing the above-mentioned ICJ *Phosphate Lands* case at paragraph 32 of the Report). To try to buttress its argument that ten years was too short, Brazil cited cases where delays of 40 years had not qualified for prescription.

27. In underscoring that the timeframes in those cases should not apply in the present case, Ms. McManus emphasized that they did not concern aviation safety. In that topic, as the Council knew, a delay of five years or more was certainly unacceptable and may, in fact, risk lives. Moreover, none dealt with a situation where the Claimant was seeking to have a State punish private individuals.

28. Ms. McManus stressed that the Council must make its determination based upon an evaluation of the specific facts of the present case – both the period of the delay and the resulting prejudice. The fact that some cases found no prescription for lapses significantly longer than ten years was not relevant – the Council must look to the circumstances of this case. She affirmed that a five-year delay to send an NOI was undue delay, and that a nine-year delay in notifying the United States of a potential claim under the Chicago Convention was also undue. Ms. McManus noted that the regular practice was to send NOIs promptly so that potential hazards may be quickly remedied.

29. In addition, Ms. McManus noted that the Chicago Convention contemplated that administrative proceedings of this type were to be carried out under the domestic law of each country, and the ICAO *Safety Management Manual (SMM)* (Doc 9859) recognized that private parties in such procedures should be afforded fair treatment and an adequate opportunity to defend themselves, also known as due process. In this context, national laws that impose a limitations period were a standard part of a regulatory framework and also supported the requirement that NOIs be promptly provided.

30. It was recalled by Ms. McManus that Brazil argued that its delay was justified by its own enforcement actions, but a review of the record showed that Brazil had no justification for waiting five years. CENIPA's official accident investigation report, which included NTSB comments, had been completed and published by December 2008. And Brazilian authorities had filed criminal charges against the said US air crew almost immediately after the accident. Further, according to Brazil's timeline, in 2009 it had felt that it had sufficient information to include the lack of an LOA and the deactivation of the transponder in criminal charges. It was clear that Brazil had had enough information to send the NOIs very early on.

31. Brazil would argue that it needed to complete all of its internal processes first, before providing NOIs asking the United States to pursue administrative action, but Ms. McManus asserted that that cannot be a reason to wait in those circumstances. Brazil had known, or should have known, about the alleged violations it later included in the NOIs by 2007 or 2008 at the latest, and so it could have sent the NOIs then. Further, given that Brazil had its own statute of limitations governing when it could bring administrative action for failure to comply with regulations, it should not have been any surprise that the United States had a similar time-bar provision such that timely notification would be important.

32. Ms. McManus reiterated that the United States had taken immediate action to investigate the conduct of the US airmen and had decided enforcement action was not appropriate. The FAA had concluded that the deactivation of the transponder and TCAS had been inadvertent and that the lack of an LOA had not warranted punishment, since both the air crew and the aircraft had been qualified to operate in RVSM airspace. Brazil had known of the United States' decision not to impose punitive measures on the airmen, certainly by 2008, given that the NTSB annexes to the CENIPA accident investigation report stated the FAA's conclusions in that regard. Additionally, even when Brazil had sent the NOIs, that had not been notice to the United States that Brazil thought it had a claim under Article 12 of the Chicago Convention and was considering bringing proceedings under Article 84 thereof. Brazil had been silent on its view that the Convention had been violated until 2015, nine years after the accident.

33. The issues raised in Brazil's case related to punitive measures against individuals, as well as to aviation safety. It was clear that, under the circumstances of the present case, a five-year delay in sending NOIs after the accident, a nine-year delay in notifying the United States of a potential claim under

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the Chicago Convention, and a ten-year delay in seeking Council review of the United States' response to the said accident each constituted undue delay. Ms. McManus thus asserted that the first element for prescription was met.

34. Ms. McManus affirmed that the second element was also met: the United States had suffered a disadvantage as a result of the said delay. Indeed, it had suffered *significant* prejudice.

35. In noting that Brazil was asking the Council to find that the United States' conduct in investigating this accident, and its decision in 2007 not to impose punitive measures against the US airmen, violated the Chicago Convention, Ms. McManus underscored that that would require the Council to review the specific evidence considered by the FAA, make factual findings as to the conduct of the US airmen, and second guess the outcome of an agency regulatory process that had occurred ten years ago.

36. Ms. McManus underscored that the delay in bringing this case made it difficult for the United States to proffer proof of the adequacy of its processes and the accuracy of the facts in dispute. The United States had submitted declarations demonstrating that, where an FAA investigation resulted in the conclusion that enforcement action was not warranted, the case files on such investigations were not maintained for long periods of time. Thus, because of the passage of time, records documenting the regulatory investigation were unavailable, and people with relevant information had memories that were limited and less detailed.

37. Ms. McManus noted, for example, that a thorough search of the United States' records had located no documents from the regulatory investigation that the FAA had conducted immediately after the accident. They would have been destroyed under the FAA's regular document-retention policies. She emphasized that, contrary to Brazil's claim that those were the type of documents that a country should be reasonably expected to have ten years after the accident, the type of records developed by the FAA in reaching a decision as to whether to bring an enforcement action were working documents which were appropriately disposed of a reasonable time after a decision was made not to go forward with enforcement. Therefore, the United States would not be able to provide the Council with *all* of the factual information needed for the United States to properly defend itself against Brazil's claim and for the Council to accurately reach a conclusion as to what actions had been taken and what facts had been evaluated ten years ago. While the United States had taken steps to locate and interview various employees or former employees of the FAA who remembered some details about the accident, as one of the United States' declarants, Ronald Hughes, the head of the FAA office that had conducted the investigation, had explained, they recalled much less than they would have ten years ago.

38. Another highly relevant factor to prejudice was the legal remedy sought. The United States believed that no legal remedy would be appropriate, but Brazil's delays in presenting its claims had also resulted in prejudice in this regard as it was no longer possible for the United States to take the action Brazil sought – enforcement action against the US airmen. The United States had a statute of limitations applicable to violations of aviation rules. The “stale complaint rule” was a NTSB regulation which barred the FAA from bringing enforcement action for an incident that was more than six months old, although that rule may be waived on occasion for reasons, including good cause and the public interest. Furthermore, a federal statute imposed an absolute five-year statute of limitations for punitive enforcement action. Thus, even if there were grounds for imposing penalties, the United States could not do so now and could not have done so when Brazil had sent the NOIs, the first of which had been dated less than two weeks before the five-year statute of limitations had run out. Notably, domestic statutes of limitations were relevant here. ICAO Members applied their domestic law to implement and enforce the Chicago Convention. The United States was not alone in having a statute of limitations on actions against airmen for violations of aviation regulations.

39. Ms. McManus underscored that the United States had clearly demonstrated, based upon the application of the law to the facts of the present case, that the Council should dismiss Brazil's claim at this Preliminary Objection stage.

40. Ms. McManus noted that prescription goes to the admissibility of a claim, and in this case presented issues separate from the merits. Admissibility claims had been considered at the preliminary objection phase by both the ICAO Council [*Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States (2000) regarding European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999* ("Hushkits")] and the ICJ. She affirmed that it would be proper for the Council to apply that doctrine in the present case.

#### Policy arguments

41. Finally, beyond the legal justification for the United States' position that she had developed in detail, Ms. McManus wished to identify some of the broader implications that the Council should consider in determining whether to dismiss the claim due to Brazil's delay. Such policy reasons were particularly significant in the present situation, where a political and technical body was entrusted to answer a question of law. By taking Brazil's claim, the Council would turn itself into a court of appeal, second-guessing the facts and judgment of investigators and the outcome of agency regulatory proceedings long after the fact. Further, proceeding to consider Brazil's claim on its merits would detract from the other work of the Council on aviation safety issues – by encouraging adjudication of bilateral disputes over specific incidents that had occurred years ago.

42. Ms. McManus emphasized that the Council's decision on the United States' Preliminary Objection should send a message that it will not take up stale, outdated cases brought by one Member State to challenge another Member State's administrative actions taken years earlier. Additionally, if the Council granted the United States' Preliminary Objection, that would not foreclose a review of the meaning of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention by the Council on its own accord, at any time.

#### Conclusion

43. Ms. McManus noted that while she had not been able to address every point made by Brazil given time constraints, she would nevertheless be happy to respond to any questions in that regard.

44. In concluding her opening statement Ms. McManus indicated that the Government of the United States stood behind its response to the tragic mid-air collision of 29 September 2006 as appropriate and fully consistent with Article 12 of the Chicago Convention. It considered that the Applicant's long delay in bringing its claim should lead the Council to dismiss this proceeding as time-barred under the generally accepted international law principle of extinctive prescription.

#### ***Presentation by the Authorized Agent of Brazil***

45. Mr. Olyntho Vieira then addressed the Council in his capacity as Authorized Agent for the Federative Republic of Brazil in the proceedings related to the disagreement submitted by his Government regarding the failure of the United States of America, hereinafter the Respondent, to apply Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, as well as Standard 3.1.1 of its Annex 2 – *Rules of the Air*, after the mid-air collision, on 29 September 2006, of air carrier Boeing 737-8EH registered in Brazil as PR-GTD, operating regular flight GLO 1907, and air jet Legacy EMB-135BJ, Embraer, registered in the United States of America as N600XL, operating flight by ExcelAire Services Inc.

46. Mr. Vieira recalled that all of the 154 occupants on board the Boeing air carrier had been killed in the accident. The Legacy had landed safely, with its seven occupants, including the two US pilots,

all unscathed. The relevant institutions in Brazil had undertaken administrative and criminal investigations on the conduct of the Brazilian Air Traffic Controllers and the US pilots. Criminally, both the Air Traffic Controllers and the pilots had been found guilty and had been convicted. Administratively, it had been determined that the US airmen had violated three important regulations of the air applicable in Brazil, all of which directly related to air safety.

47. Mr. Vieira noted that the Respondent alleged that it had conducted an investigation in the aftermath of the accident which had determined that no enforcement action regarding the US pilots was warranted. What Brazil had been claiming for years now, and claimed in the disagreement now before the Council, was that such alleged investigation did not meet the requirements of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, according to which Member States must “insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations applicable”. Although there was room for debate on what it took to comply with the said provision, it was extremely difficult to sustain that whatever action the Respondent had taken in 2006/2007 amounted to insuring the prosecution of violators. Mr. Vieira added that it was an uncontested fact that the US pilots had violated important air safety regulations of another Member State; furthermore, they had lacked documentation, the importance of which went far beyond the realm of a simple bureaucratic requirement; and they had operated for about an hour without noticing that mandatory equipment, the TCAS and the transponder, that were key to avoiding collisions, were switched off. Those were only some of the several errors committed before and during the flight. Having allegedly examined such serious misconduct, the Respondent had concluded that no enforcement action whatsoever, not even a letter of warning, had been warranted. If one added the fact that no formal report of such alleged investigation had ever been provided to Brazil, how could one possibly believe that such a proceeding satisfied the obligation to “insure the prosecution” of violators, as per Article 12 of the Chicago Convention? Mr. Vieira compared the present case with the FAA investigation and its determination, mentioned in Brazil’s Application, regarding the pilot who had failed to contact the Air Traffic Control Center in the United States and had over-flown the airport where he had been supposed to land the aircraft, which was mentioned in Brazil’s Application (cf. memorandum SG 2343/16 dated 12 December 2016, p. A-17, second paragraph, and Attachment No. 5). In that specific case, where no casualties had occurred, the FAA had considered that the pilot did not have the necessary qualifications to hold an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate and had revoked it.

48. In making one very important correction, Mr. Vieira underscored that, contrary to what the Respondent had asserted in its Statement of Preliminary Objection, Brazil did not claim that Member States must “impose penal sanctions under every circumstance, or that Member States are permitted no discretion in administering their compliance and enforcement programs” (cf. memorandum SG 2360/17 dated 10 April 2017, Attachment, p. 4, footnote 2). Domestic proceedings – be they criminal or administrative – that were consistent with Article 12 of the Chicago Convention may or may not impose sanctions on airmen. That was for the proceedings to determine. What Brazil claimed was that, in the 2006 accident in question, the Respondent had failed to apply the said provision.

49. Although those issues were key, they pertained to the merits of the dispute between Brazil and the United States and were to be discussed in due time. Today, under Article 5(4) of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782), the Council “shall decide” the Preliminary Objection by the Respondent to Brazil’s claim. The object of the Council’s current deliberations was only the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection.

50. Therefore, today’s discussion was legal in nature and not related to the technical aspects of the accident, its circumstances or its causes. Neither was it financial in nature or purpose. Mr. Vieira stressed, in this regard, that Brazil did not seek any kind of compensation for itself or anyone else, the families of the deceased having already been granted compensation through the Brazilian judicial system or by settlement with the Brazilian airline concerned. Thus, this was a dispute under international public law



between two Member States regarding the application and interpretation of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, and there was no reference to compensation among the remedies requested by Brazil in its Application.

51. As Brazil understood it, the essence of the Respondent's Preliminary Objection was as follows: the lapse of ten years between the accident and the submission of the claim would constitute an undue delay on the part of Brazil, a delay for which there would be no reasonable explanation and one that would cause unfair prejudice to the defense of the Respondent, mainly due to the alleged difficulty in assembling evidence, in particular records, and its ability to invoke remedies. Under those circumstances, the claim would be untimely and inadmissible, according to the principle of extinctive prescription. In addition, the Respondent argued that admitting the claim would bring uncertainty to the work of ICAO, the Chicago Convention and civil aviation.

52. Mr. Vieira affirmed that the Respondent's Preliminary Objection was unfounded: it applied the wrong legal standard to an inaccurate set of facts, as he would now explain in a manner as clear and abridged as possible.

53. Neither the Chicago Convention nor the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) set any statutory time limit for bringing a case. Therefore Brazil's Application must not be barred under such instruments.

54. As recognized by the ICJ, the passage of time may affect the admissibility of a claim, even in the absence of any applicable treaty. However, the decision of barring claims by lapse of time had been applied with extreme caution, on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the specific circumstances of each and every case.

55. According to such jurisprudence: passage of time is not a reason *per se* for prescription; there is no fixed time after which a claim becomes stale; and ten years is not a long period by any means. In every case where prescription was accepted in international fora, the time lapses were all much longer than ten years. Examples: Nauru case – 24 years; Williams case – 26 years; Tagliaferro case – 31 years; Giacopini case – 32 years.

56. Also based on the jurisprudence, a fundamental aspect in determining whether passage of time rendered a claim inadmissible was whether there was silence or inaction on the part of the Claimant during the time elapsed. That was important because the sole purpose of prescription in international disputes was to preserve the stability of a factual situation that had not been challenged or questioned. The clearest example was the possession of territories. If a given territory had been under the jurisdiction of a State without being challenged or questioned, the law would tend to protect such unchallenged possession in the name of stability and legal security. It followed that, when a situation was not considered pacified, i.e. when there has been challenge, prescription does not apply. In the case before the Council, Brazil had not been inactive or silent, the situation had not been pacified and therefore prescription must not apply.

#### Examination of the facts

57. From 2006 to 2011, the Brazilian State had collected evidence needed in a case that the Respondent itself considered very complex: it had conducted the Annex 13 investigation on the causes of the accident; federal police had conducted its investigation; the federal prosecutor had indicted the two US pilots; Justice had condemned the pilots; and Brazil's National Agency for Civil Aviation (ANAC) had determined the responsibilities of the pilots and had issued them three NOIs.

58. Mr. Vieira noted that all of those actions had ascertained the culpability of the two US pilots and had pointed to the need for a proper investigation of their conduct. All of them had either had the participation of the Respondent (Annex 13 accident investigation) or had been of specific knowledge of the Respondent (the prosecution of pilots, the administrative enforcement action by Brazil's ANAC, the report commissioned to an expert by the relatives and friends of the victims) or had been of public knowledge. The Respondent had also received requests from the relatives and friends of the victims that a proper investigation be undertaken.

59. From June 2010 onwards, there had been repeated official and unofficial communications, and diplomatic and political *démarches* by Brazil in order to obtain from the Respondent compliance with Article 12 of the Chicago Convention and avoid a dispute, as all States were called upon to do. Such lapse of time cannot be considered as "undue delay" either legally or otherwise.

60. Mr. Vieira affirmed that nothing in Brazil's conduct could be considered as implying a decision to leave this case to rest. Quite to the contrary, the case had never been dormant, as demonstrated by the facts.

61. Ten years of: a) administrative and criminal proceedings to establish the causes of the accident and determine responsibilities; b) bilateral discussions; c) repeated formal and informal requests for the Respondent to comply with Article 12 cannot and must not be considered pacified. In other words, there was not a situation of factual or legal stability to protect by means of prescription. Consequently, the Respondent cannot possibly claim the right to repose.

#### Argument by the Respondent

62. Mr. Vieira then turned to the Respondent's argument that the alleged undue delay on the part of Brazil prejudiced its ability to defend itself as records and other relevant information had no longer been available.

63. There was considerable authority to affirm that a claim cannot be barred, for instance, if the Respondent State had a contemporary record of the facts or may reasonably be expected to possess records relevant to the claim. That was precisely the case here.

64. It was more than reasonable to expect that the Respondent would possess the records: it was inconceivable not to expect it, given that the case involved the death of 154 persons and that, as acknowledged by the Respondent itself, there had been indications, in the very aftermath of the accident, of misconduct by the two US pilots, which had later been confirmed by ANAC's administrative proceeding. The Respondent had been perfectly aware of the ongoing investigations and the diligences undertaken by Brazil. In light of its obligations under the ICAO Chicago Convention, the Respondent should therefore have kept all of the records.

65. Mr. Vieira recalled that the issue of knowledge of wrongdoing had been discussed in the Tagliaferro Case. Thirty-one years had elapsed before the presentation of the claim and yet the arbitrators had recognized that the "responsible authorities knew all the time of the wrongdoing ...", and therefore should have kept records. Although Venezuela had insisted upon prescription as a sufficient defense, the Umpire had denied it (cf. memorandum SG 2364/17 dated 24 May 2017, p. 31, third paragraph).

66. Mr. Vieira affirmed that that was the case here. As mentioned before, the Respondent had had indications, in the very aftermath of the accident, of the wrongdoing of the pilots. Even if its alleged investigation had concluded that there had been no basis to take action against them, "records must exist to demonstrate that", as the Umpire had decided in the Tagliaferro Case (cf. memorandum SG 2364/17 dated

24 May 2017, p. 31, fourth paragraph).

67. In addition, the Respondent informed in its Preliminary Objection that, under FAA Order 1350.15C (Record Order), records pertaining to alleged investigations where no legal enforcement action was deemed warranted, have to be destroyed within 90 days after such determination, even in the one allegedly conducted in the present case. The conclusion, therefore, was that the records relevant to this case would have been destroyed sometime in 2007, pursuant to FAA Order 1350.15C. Therefore, if there was any prejudice to the Respondent's defense for alleged lack of records, it was caused by the Respondent and not by Brazil.

68. It was emphasized by Mr. Vieira that accepting the argument that Brazil's alleged undue delay had caused the alleged lack of records would not only be unfair but also would expose all Member States to a grave risk. In an investigation by the Respondent that determined that no enforcement action had been warranted, any Member State could be prevented from exercising its rights under the Chicago Convention 91 days after such determination, as the Respondent could claim prejudice in its defense on the grounds that records had been destroyed in such a short period. Brazil did not and must not suppose that the Council wanted to take that perilous road.

69. The Respondent had also invoked its six-month statute of limitations for the FAA to resort to any kind of remedy, thus rendering void the recourse to the Council. Mr. Vieira recalled that the preliminary proceedings under Article 5 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) were not the proper place to address the scope of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, as that matter pertained to the merits of the dispute itself. To the extent, however, that the Council decided to examine the arguments put forward by the Respondent in that regard, it should recall that it was well established that the domestic statutes of limitations were inapposite to international claims. The 1969 *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, international customary law and the jurisprudence were unequivocal in that regard.

70. In addition, Mr. Vieira highlighted that acceptance of a six-month statute of limitations would lead to absurd results, both legally and in practice. With the United States being able to claim that it could not take action after the six-month FAA statute of limitations, all ICAO Member States would be forced to investigate, issue NOIs and submit a claim in less than six months in order to be in a position to seek compliance by the Respondent with its international obligation. That would basically deprive the Chicago Convention of any meaning.

71. Finally, the Respondent argued that admission of the claim would bring uncertainty as it would open up the Council to reviewing old closed cases. Brazil strongly opposed that view. Nothing in the factual accounts of the present dispute gave grounds to the Respondent's contention that, in admitting Brazil's claim, the Council would be reopening a "ten-year-old case". A case that was consistently and diligently pursued through several means, as well as amply documented throughout the years, was simply neither old nor closed. Actually, the Respondent had never opened as investigation that met the requirement of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention.

72. As had emerged clearly from the records of the present case, from 2006 to 2016 the Brazilian State had undertaken numerous actions in order to gather the evidence needed to establish the causes of the very complex accident and to determine responsibilities. It had also sought to obtain that the Respondent comply with Article 12 and made a sustained effort to avoid a dispute.

73. The accurate and complete factual background, combined with the proper legal standard regarding prescription, could only lead to the conclusion that the Respondent's Preliminary Objection was unfounded and must be dismissed.

### Conclusion

74. At the heart of Brazil's claim was the key issue of air safety, one that was of the *utmost* importance for all Member States. Preventing the Council from considering Brazil's claim would not serve the interests of civil aviation, but rather unwarrantedly miss the opportunity to strengthen it.

75. Examining the merits of Brazil's claim would certainly help clarify the scope of the obligation contained in Article 12 of the Chicago Convention to the benefit of all ICAO Member States and air safety. Therefore where Brazil did see grave prejudice was in preventing the Council from even discussing the matter. That – and not the admission of the claim – would bring uncertainty as it would send the message that pilots of a Member State were allowed to violate air safety rules of any other Member State and not even be subject to any proceedings that met the requirements of Article 12.

76. For the reasons set forth above, Brazil respectfully requested that the Council: reject the propositions in the Respondent's Preliminary Objection and reaffirm the Council's competence to consider Brazil's Application and Memorial; and order that the period given to the Respondent for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, which was interrupted by the filing of the Preliminary Objection, shall begin to run again immediately following the Council's rejection of the Preliminary Objection.

77. Should the Council reject the Preliminary Objection and order the filing of the Counter-Memorial, the President and all Council Members could rest assured that Brazil would be ready and willing to positively consider whatever actions the Council saw fit under Article 6 of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782).

78. The President of the Council then offered each Party the opportunity to make a five-minute rebuttal to the other Party's arguments.

### ***Response by the Authorized Agent of the United States***

79. Ms. McManus focussed her rebuttal on five of the issues raised by Mr. Vieira during his presentation. First, to the extent that the Council believed that there was an interest in deciding the appropriate interpretation and application of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, she affirmed that the present case was not the appropriate vehicle therefor. Ms. McManus considered that it would be better to decide and examine those matters in a less contentious setting and not when looking at a specific case where experts had disagreed for ten years as to the facts and the appropriate remedies.

80. Secondly, Ms. McManus noted that the Brazilian argument did recognize that this was supposed to be a case-by-case determination and that the passage of time rendering a claim inadmissible was not set by other cases. She underscored that the cases that had been cited by Mr. Vieira as having a lapse of from 25 to 32 years between the infliction of damage and the bringing of the claim were factually very different from the case now before the Council. The present case dealt with aviation safety, whereas many of the cases cited dealt with territorial and border disputes which were recognized as going on for decades. Ms. McManus indicated that the important question for the Council was whether it believed that aviation safety issues could wait between 25 to 30+ years to be resolved.

81. The third point that Ms. McManus wished to make related to the numerous steps which Mr. Vieira had indicated had been taken by Brazil in seeking to resolve this dispute. In emphasizing that many of those steps had instead sought to impose significant penalties on the two US pilots, she noted that they were the criminal proceedings, the civil cases and the administrative proceedings in Brazil brought against the pilots. As the United States Government had not been a party to any of those proceedings, they could not be considered as having put it on notice that the United States was going to face a claim that it had failed to apply Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, as well as Standard 3.1.1 of its Annex 2 – *Rules of the*

*Air.*

82. Another point that Ms. McManus wished to make was that Mr. Vieira had misstated the duration of the United States' statute of limitations as being six months. She reiterated that the "stale complaint rule" was a NTSB regulation which barred the FAA from bringing enforcement action for an incident that was more than six months old. The statute of limitations which would bar the United States' action was an absolute five-year statute of limitations for punitive enforcement action. Ms. McManus noted that in its Statement of Preliminary Objection the United States had cited a number of other Council Member States that had statutes of limitations that were that long or shorter.

83. The last point that Ms. McManus wished to make was that Mr. Vieira's assertion that the United States had not taken any steps to investigate and address safety issues in response to a major aviation accident involving US pilots was unwarranted and simply not credible. Recalling, in this regard, the repeated references made by Mr. Vieira to the United States' "alleged" investigation, Ms. McManus underscored that that assertion had been rebutted by the declaration of the responsible FAA official that had been submitted with the United States' Statement of Preliminary Objection (cf. Attachment A to memorandum SG 2360/17 dated 10 April 2017) and by the remedial actions ordered by the FAA. She indicated that the Council could also evaluate, given its experience with the United States' commitment to aviation safety, whether it was credible that the United States Government would not investigate the circumstances of such an accident, including the pilot's conduct.

84. In concluding, Ms. McManus strongly defended the steps that the United States had taken. In reiterating that there was prejudice in this long delay, she emphasized that the idea that that prejudice could be remedied by the Council, at this late date, making a factual and legal determinations on a stale record was not a wise course. Therefore, as the elements of extinctive prescription had been met in the present case, Ms. McManus urged the Council to grant the United States' Preliminary Objection.

***Response by Mr. Norberto Moretti on behalf of the Authorized Agent of Brazil***

85. In his rebuttal, Mr. Moretti concentrated on five of the issues that had been raised by Ms. McManus. Recalling that she had cited undue delay as being one of the key elements for determining extinctive prescription and had claimed that Brazil had been tardy in taking measures, he underscored that that had not been the case: as reflected in the timeline provided in Brazil's Comments in response to the United States' Preliminary Objection, Brazil had been constant in investigating this very complex case diligently and seriously, which had taken time. While Ms. McManus had mentioned Brazil's lack of agility in many instances, Mr. Moretti emphasized that it was not credible that such a complex case could be investigated and NOIs issued within six months.

86. Secondly, as Mr. Vieira had highlighted at the beginning of his presentation, this was mainly a legal discussion. What the law provided for, and jurisprudence supported, was not limitations on the right of the Claimant to present its claim but rather protection of the Respondent from being prejudiced by the time taken by the Claimant in so doing. One of the key issues raised was prejudice to the United States' right, as the Respondent, to prepare its defense, with it being claimed that there was a lack of records with which to do so. Recalling that Mr. Vieira had already addressed that issue, Mr. Moretti reiterated that Brazil could not be held responsible for the decision of another Member State to institute a policy requiring the destruction of documents within 90 days of a determination that no enforcement action was warranted. He thus affirmed that there was no prejudice caused by Brazil in the present case.

87. Observing that Ms. McManus had taken issue with the references made to the United States "alleged" investigation, Mr. Moretti emphasized that it had in no way been done out of disrespect.

It had arisen from the fact that, as Brazil had long claimed, it had never been provided with any indications that an investigation consistent with Article 12 of the Chicago Convention had ever been conducted by the United States. That related to the merits of the case, which the Council would discuss in due course. At this point in time, the Respondent could not, as a preliminary objection, say that it had conducted an investigation, the records of which had apparently been destroyed pursuant to FAA Order 1350.15C (Record Order), and then claim a prejudice in defending its case. That claim was not to be accepted by the Council.

88. Noting that another important point raised by Ms. McManus was that the United States had not been a party to any of the punitive measures taken against the two US pilots referred to in Brazil's timeline, Mr. Moretti emphasized that Brazil had made it very clear in its documents that the United States had been a part of the Annex 13 accident investigation and that all of the actions taken by Brazil had been of the United States' specific knowledge or had been of public knowledge. Consequently, the United States was not in a position to expect that Brazil would not bring a case before the Council. Recalling that Ms. McManus had highlighted the fact that the NOIs had not mentioned a violation by the United States of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention, Mr. Moretti underscored that in the Notes sent by the Brazilian Embassy to the Department of State and letters addressed by Brazil's ANAC to the FAA after the issuance of the NOIs there had been repeated references to the United States being requested to comply with Article 12. Thus it was not accurate to say that the United States had only been notified in 2015 about the possibility of an Article 12-related dispute being brought before the Council.

89. Mr. Moretti reiterated that it was very difficult to sustain that an investigation on which no reports had ever been provided to Brazil (apparently as they had been destroyed or had never existed) and which had concluded that there had not been any neglect on the part of the two US pilots when all evidence had suggested the contrary and they had actually been convicted in Brazil for neglectful conduct, complied with Article 12 of the Chicago Convention. Although as Mr. Vieira had indicated Brazil was not seeking compensation for the families of the deceased, the issue of the nature of the investigation that the United States had conducted, or had allegedly conducted, and that Brazil believed did not conform to, and was not consistent with, Article 12, did require the Council to allow this discussion to move on as, contrary to what Ms. McManus had claimed, the present dispute was a vehicle for establishing clearly what was required to comply with Article 12. Mr. Moretti emphasized, in this regard, that as was the case in many organizations, disputes not only addressed issues of prejudice and damage, but also clarified positive law.

90. All of the preceding oral arguments were duly noted and recorded for the minutes of the meeting.

91. In the absence of any direct questions to the Authorized Agents, the Council proceeded to deliberate, during which time both Parties remained in attendance.

### ***Deliberations***

92. Observing that a number of the statements and arguments made by the United States in its Preliminary Objection and reiterated during the present meeting appeared to go beyond the narrow question of jurisdiction which the Council had been requested to consider, the Representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the need to ensure that a rejection by the Council of the Preliminary Objection would not imply that those statements and arguments, in particular those relating to the question of extinctive prescription, were also rejected and would thus not be taken into account by the Council when subsequently examining the merits of the case. He noted that Article 5(4) of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) only indicated that the Council shall decide on the Preliminary Objection and did not state the range of decisions that it could take. By contrast, Article 79, paragraph 9, of the ICJ's *Rules of Court* specified that

“... the Court shall give its decision in the form of a judgment, by which it shall either uphold the objection, reject it, or declare that the objection does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character ...”. The Representative of the United Kingdom suggested that, given the breadth of the issues raised, the Council decide that the said statements and arguments made by the United States in its Preliminary Objection did not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character and that they may be joined to the merits of the case.

93. In confirming that the Council could take such a decision, if it so desired, the Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs and External Relations (D/LEB) recalled that it had taken similar action in the case *Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States (2000) regarding European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 (“Hushkits”): Preliminary Objections*, when it had decided that “The third preliminary objection, not being preliminary in nature but related to the merits, shall be joined to the merits.” (cf. Council Resolution/Decision adopted on 16 November 2000, Operative Clause 3; [C-DEC 161/6](#)).

94. Noting that his State’s position on the admissibility of the Preliminary Objection was conditional on the joining of the said statements and arguments made by the United States to the merits of the case at hand, the Representative of the United Kingdom suggested that the Council consider that question prior to considering whether or not to accept the Preliminary Objection as it would provide a greater guarantee regarding the conduct of the future stages of the proceedings.

95. The Representative of Cuba expressed appreciation for the excellent presentations made by both Parties. She noted that her State considered that the Council did have jurisdiction to consider the Application and Memorial filed by Brazil on 2 December 2016 for the settlement, under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 2 of the said *Rules*, of the disagreement with the United States regarding the application of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention and Standard 3.1.1 of its Annex 2 – *Rules of the Air*. Cuba was of the view that the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection, presented on the basis of extinctive prescription, was not sustainable, neither by the Chicago Convention nor by the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782). It considered that passage of time per se was not sufficient reason to deny the Council’s jurisdiction. Cuba firmly supported multilateralism and in that context defended the legitimate right of Member States, always in strict compliance with established rules, to make pronouncements, in a transparent manner, on matters of interest to all. Ensuring the safety of international civil aviation was the highest priority of the Council and of each of its Members, and preventing the Council from considering the merits of the present case would be inconsistent therewith. For these reasons, Cuba did not support the Preliminary Objection and considered that the proceedings should continue on the basis of the Council’s jurisdiction and the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782). Its position regarding the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection did not in any way prejudice Cuba’s position regarding the merits of the case.

96. In the absence of further comments, the Council agreed to decide on the Preliminary Objection first and thereafter, if relevant, to consider the question raised by the Representative of the United Kingdom of whether the statements and arguments made in the Preliminary Objection may be joined to the merits of the case. That question was subsequently rephrased by the President of the Council to refer to whether the statements and arguments made by the Respondent in the Preliminary Objection and by the Applicant in its Comments in response may be joined to the merits of the case.

97. On a proposal then made by the Representative of the United Arab Emirates and supported by the Representatives of Turkey, the Russian Federation, Ecuador, Argentina, Congo, France, Nigeria, Cabo Verde, Egypt, China, Spain, Algeria, Mexico, the United Republic of Tanzania, Sweden, Australia, Canada, India and Malaysia, constituting the majority of Representatives, the Council proceeded to a vote by secret ballot, pursuant to Article 50 of the *Rules of Procedure for the*

*Council* (Doc 7559), on the question “Do you accept the Preliminary Objection of the United States?”. Under Article 52 of the Chicago Convention, decisions by the Council required approval by a majority of its Members. As the Council comprised 36 Members, acceptance of the Preliminary Objection required 19 positive votes. Brazil and the United States were not entitled to vote under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and Article 15 (5) of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782), which specified that “No Member of the Council shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to which it is a Party”. Following the completion of the secret ballot, the three Vice-Presidents of the Council, namely, the Representatives of the United Arab Emirates, Sweden and Colombia, monitored and scrutinized the tallying of all of the votes cast for the purpose of ensuring its accuracy.

98. The result of the secret ballot on the question whether to accept the Preliminary Objection of the United States, in which 34 votes were cast by the Council Members eligible to vote, was as follows:

In favour	4 votes
Against	19 votes
Abstentions	11 votes

There were no invalid ballots or blank votes.

99. Based on this result, the President declared that the Statement of Preliminary Objection filed by the United States, as Respondent, was not accepted by the Council.

100. During the ensuing discussion of the question of joining the statements and arguments made in the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection and in the Applicant’s Comments in response to the merits of the case, the Representative of the Russian Federation noted that the Representative of the United Kingdom’s concerns were addressed by Article 9 of the said Rules, according to which “If the Parties should desire to produce evidence in addition to any evidence produced with the pleadings, such evidence, including testimony of witnesses and experts, shall be submitted in writing, within a time-limit fixed by the Council ...”. In sharing this view, the Representatives of Uruguay and Cabo Verde both averred that the said question was thus moot. Noting that under Article 4(1) of the Rules, the Respondent could present any additional facts and supporting data, as well as statements of law, in its Counter-Memorial, the Representative of the Russian Federation enquired whether it was the intention of the United States to submit a Counter-Memorial.

101. The Representative of the United Kingdom reiterated the need to ensure, by whatever appropriate means, that despite the Council’s rejection of the United States’ Preliminary Objection, the statements and arguments made therein were readmissible as part of any further evidence being submitted relating to the merits of the case.

102. Speaking along the same lines, the Representative of Argentina suggested that the Parties first discuss amongst themselves what evidence they wished to submit and that only in the event they disagreed that the Council proceed to take a decision on the matter.

103. While noting that adequate provision was made in Article 9 of the said Rules for the submission by the Parties of any additional evidence they saw fit to defend their respective cases, the President suggested that the Council nevertheless take a decision on the joining of the statements and arguments made in the Preliminary Objection and in the Comments in response to the merits of the case in order to provide the necessary clarity for the future proceedings.

104. Further to a suggestion by the Representative of France, the President sought the views of the two Parties thereon.



105. Ms. McManus, the Authorized Agent of the United States, indicated that the United States would welcome the opportunity to have the statements and arguments made in its Preliminary Objection also available for consideration by the Council in examining the merits of the case. It was her understanding, from the Council's deliberations prior to the vote, that some Representatives had assumed that that would be the case even if they voted to reject the Preliminary Objection. Ms. McManus highlighted that both the case *Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States (2000) regarding European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 ("Hushkits")*: *Preliminary Objections*, and an ICJ case provided precedents for joining the statements and arguments made in both the Respondent's Preliminary Objection and the Applicant's Comments in response to the merits of the case.

106. Speaking on behalf of the Authorized Agent of Brazil, the Representative of Brazil underscored that as sovereign States the United States and Brazil could include any evidence they saw fit in their respective Counter-Memorial and pleading in reply.

107. In light of the discussion, the Council unanimously decided that as the statements and arguments made in the Respondent's Preliminary Objection and in the Applicant's Comments in response did not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character, they may be joined to the merits of the case and included in the Respondent's Counter-Memorial and any additional pleadings. The President underscored that it was the prerogative of the two Parties to take such action.

108. In seeking additional time for the submission of the Counter-Memorial, the Authorized Agent of the United States requested that the time-limit therefor be set at two weeks from the Respondent's receipt of the verbatim transcript of the proceedings provided for in Article 30(2) of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) in order to afford it sufficient time in which to prepare its response to the various points raised during the present meeting. The President clarified, in this regard, that it was the Council-approved minutes, prepared on the basis of the verbatim transcript, which constituted the official record of the oral proceedings on the Preliminary Objection.

109. Responding to a query by the President, the Representative of Brazil indicated that the Authorized Agent of Brazil did not have any objection to the proposed extension of the original time-limit, in principle, and recognized that it was a matter for the Council to decide under Article 28(2) of the said Rules.

110. Notwithstanding that 11 calendar days remained for the submission of the Respondent's Counter-Memorial under the original time-limit established therefor under Article 3 (1) (c) of the said Rules, the Council, further to the said request by the Authorized Agent of the United States for additional time, unanimously decided to set the time-limit for the submission of the Counter-Memorial at two weeks from the Respondent's receipt of the Council-approved minutes of the present meeting, which constituted the official record of the oral proceedings on the Preliminary Objection. It was noted that the Applicant (Brazil) could also take advantage of the said minutes, and that it may, in accordance with the said Rules, file a pleading in reply to the Counter-Memorial to provide comments in response.

111. The Representative of Japan enquired whether either Party was seeking a diplomatic solution to the disagreement through bilateral negotiations.

112. Noting that she had the same question, the Representative of Sweden indicated that it was not clear to her that there had been negotiations between Brazil and the United States to resolve their disagreement and that those negotiations had failed, which was a condition for the application of Article 84 of the Chicago Convention under which the Council would take a decision on the matter.

113. The Representative of Saudi Arabia queried whether it was possible for the President to provide his good offices as Conciliator to further any negotiations between the Parties and to report on the outcome thereof to the Council.

114. Replying in the affirmative, the President noted that Article 14(3) of the said Rules stated that “Subject to the consent of the Parties concerned, the Council may render any assistance likely to further the negotiations, including the designation of any individual or a group of individuals to act as Conciliator during the negotiations”.

115. Responding to a procedural point raised by the Representative of India and supported by the Representative of Sweden, the President clarified that under Article 14(1) of the Rules, “The Council may, at any time during the proceedings and prior to the meeting at which the decision is rendered . . . , invite the Parties to the dispute to engage in direct negotiations, if the Council deems that the possibilities of settling the dispute or narrowing the issues through negotiations have not been exhausted.” He further indicated that, pursuant to Article 14(2), “If the Parties accept the invitation to negotiate, the Council may set a time-limit for the completion of such negotiations, during which other proceedings on the merits shall be suspended”.

116. Ms. McManus, the Authorized Agent of the United States, noted that prior to the present meeting both Parties had discussed the issue of continuing negotiations and that both were willing to do so and to accept the assistance of the President of the Council if he was willing to work with them, or of any other individual he might appoint whom they found to be mutually-acceptable. While welcoming such assistance, Ms. McManus was uncertain regarding the establishment of a time-limit for the completion of such negotiations since it was a long-standing disagreement. Given the time-limit for the submission of the Counter-Memorial, she assumed that the next time the matter would come before the Council would be during its 212th Session in October/November 2017. Ms. McManus indicated that while there was thus a reasonable amount of time in which to begin the negotiations, she would have to consult further with her Delegation regarding the establishment, at the outset, of a time-limit for their completion.

117. Mr. Moretti, speaking on behalf of the Authorized Agent of Brazil, reiterated that Brazil was willing to work with the President of the Council, if he decided to make himself available, or any other individual he might appoint whom the Parties found to be mutually-acceptable. He underscored the importance of ensuring that any time-limit that might be set for the completion of the negotiations was not too short as to render it difficult for the Parties to settle their disagreement and that the Council would have the opportunity to be informed by the Parties of the status of their negotiations. Mr. Moretti further emphasized that any such time-limit should be after the date of submission of the United States’ Counter-Memorial.

118. In expressing pleasure that both Parties were willing to renew their negotiations, the Representative of Turkey noted that it was the common wish of all Representatives that they find a satisfactory solution to their disagreement. Agreeing that it could prove difficult to complete the negotiations by a set time-limit, he indicated that it would be sufficient if the Council were informed from time to time on the status of the negotiations. The Representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Spain, Singapore, Australia, Japan, Uruguay, Nigeria, Canada, the United Republic of Tanzania and France endorsed these comments.

119. The Representatives of Egypt, Spain, Singapore, Australia, Japan, Uruguay, Nigeria, Canada, the United Republic of Tanzania and France also encouraged the President of the Council to provide his good offices as Conciliator during the negotiations to facilitate an amicable settlement of the Parties’ disagreement.

120. The Representatives of the Russian Federation and Spain underscored that a positive outcome of the negotiations would enable the Council to terminate the proceedings pursuant to Article 20 of the said Rules. In addition, the Representative of Spain emphasized that even if no explicit time-limit were set for the completion of the negotiations, the implicit time-limit therefor was the next (212th) session in October/November 2017 when it was envisaged that the Council would consider the merits of the case. The Representatives of Japan, Uruguay, Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanzania shared this view.

121. The President of the Council observed, from the discussion, that: the two Parties were desirous of continuing their negotiations and welcomed his support in that process as Conciliator; and that many Representatives welcomed the Parties' statements to that effect and wished to be apprised of the progress of the negotiations. He emphasized that, pursuant to Article 14 (2) of the said Rules, while the negotiations were underway no date should be established for the Council to examine the merits of the case as the disagreement might be resolved in the interim.

122. Mr. Moretti indicated that, without prejudice to the time and the efforts that the two Parties would expend in their negotiations, Brazil agreed with those Representatives who had stated that it would be useful for the Council to review the matter. Recalling that in its Resolution relating to the case *Settlement of Differences: United States and 15 European States (2000) regarding European Council Regulation (EC) No. 925/1999 ("Hushkits"): Preliminary Objections*, the Council had decided to further review the Parties' continued negotiations (cf. Operative Clause 6), he indicated that the Council could similarly decide, in the present case, to review at its next (212th) session any progress that might have been made by the two Parties through their renewed negotiations.

123. The President clarified that such a review would be carried out on the basis of a progress report on the status of the negotiations which would be presented at the Council's upcoming session. He reiterated that while the negotiations were underway no date should be established for the Council's consideration of the merits of the case.

124. In indicating that that was his understanding, Mr. Moretti recalled that in accordance with Article 14 (4) of the said Rules, the Council would examine the merits of the case in the event that, if so indicated by one or both Parties, no solution was found to the disagreement through the Parties' renewed negotiations.

125. In light of the discussion, the Council unanimously decided to invite the two Parties to engage in direct negotiations pursuant to Article 14 (1) of the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782) with a view to achieving a satisfactory resolution of their disagreement. Ms. McManus and Mr. Moretti accepted this invitation on behalf of the Governments of the United States and Brazil, respectively.

126. In addition, the Council unanimously decided to invite the President to be available to provide his good offices as Conciliator during the Parties' renewed negotiations.

127. Furthermore, the Council unanimously decided not to set a time-limit for the completion of the negotiations in order to give both Parties full opportunity to successfully resolve their disagreement, on the understanding that a progress report on the status of the negotiations would be presented for its consideration during its next (212th) session in October/November 2017.

128. On behalf of the Council, the President expressed appreciation to both Parties for their spirit of compromise, and their willingness to resolve their disagreement amicably.

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129. It was noted that, on the basis of the Council's above deliberations, the President would prepare and circulate the draft text of the Council's decision in the Preliminary Objection stage of the case *Settlement of Differences: Brazil and the United States* (2016), which would be tabled for the Council's consideration and approval at its next meeting (211/10) on Friday, 23 June 2017.

130. The meeting adjourned at 1350 hours.

— END —

Exhibit 3

First Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 23 November 2013

### **First Riyadh Agreement**

On Saturday, 19/1/1435 (Hijri Calendar, November 2013), the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdel Aziz Al-Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, and his brother His Highness Sheikh Sabbah Al-Ahmad Al-Jabber Al-Sabbah, the Prince of Kuwait, and his brother His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the prince of Qatar, met in Riyadh.

They held extensive deliberations in which they conducted a full revision of what taints the relations between the [Gulf Cooperation] Council states, the challenges facing its security and stability, and means to abolish whatever muddies the relations.

Due to the importance of laying the foundation for a new phase of collective work between the Council's states, in order to guarantee it operating within a unified political framework based on the principles included in the main system of the Cooperation Council, the following has been agreed upon: (here there three signature)

1. No interference in the internal affairs of the Council's states, whether directly or indirectly. Not to give harbor or naturalize any citizen of the Council states that has an activity which opposes his country's regimes, except with the approval of his country; no support to deviant groups that oppose their states; and no support for antagonistic media.
2. No support to the Muslim Brotherhood or any of the organizations, groups or individuals that threaten the security and stability of the Council states through direct security work or through political influence.
3. Not to present any support to any faction in Yemen that could pose a threat to countries neighboring Yemen.

[Signatures]

Official Arabic Text

First Riyadh Agreement

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

إنه في يوم السبت الموافق ١٩٣٥ / ١ / ١٩ هـ قد  
اجتمع خادم الحرمين الشريفين الملك عبد العزيز  
آل سعود مع الملكة لويستة سعودية ، وأخيه  
صاحب السمو الشيخ صباح الزهد الجابر الصباح أمير دولة  
الكويت وأخيه صاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن عبد الله  
آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر في الرياض .

وقد تم عقد مباحثات متفصلة ثم خلافاً  
اجراء مباحثات عامة لما يتواءم العلاقات  
بين دول الخليج والتحديات التي تواجه  
أمنك واستقرارها ، والسبل الكفيلة لادارة  
العلاقات بين العلاقات بيننا .

وللهجة تأسيح مرحلة جديدة في العمل  
الجماعي بين دول الخليج بما يخلق حيزاً من  
الاطمئنان مما يسهل موحدة تقدم على الامور  
التي تم تفضيلها في النظام السياسي لمجلس  
التعاون فقد تم الاتفاق على ما يلي

التتي  
الدكتور خالد العبد  
الشيخ صباح خالد الصباح

- ١- عدم التمكن من الشؤون الداخلية لذي من دول المجلس بكل مباشر أو غير مباشر وعدم الوارد أو تجنيس أي من مواطني دول المجلس من نشاط يتعارض مع أنظمة دولته الداخلية حال حصول موافقة دولته ، وعدم دعم الفئات البارزة المعارضة للإسلام ، وعدم دعم الإعلام المعادي .
- ٢- عدم دعم الشؤون المالية أو أي من المنظمات أو المنظمات أو الأفراد الذين يهددون أمن واستقرار دول المجلس عند طرحه العمل الوطني المباشر أو عند طرحه محاولة التأثير السياسي .
- ٣- عدم قيام أي من دول مجلس التعاون بتقديم الدعم لذي فئة حائز في اليمن ممن تطوره خطراً على الدول المجاورة لليمن . والله الموفق .

صاحب السرد الشيخ تميم بن محمد بن خليفة آل ثاني  
أمير دولة قطر

صاحب السرد الشيخ صباح الأحمد  
الخابر الصباح  
أمير دولة الكويت

عبدالله



Exhibit 4

Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 2014

## **Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement**

### **Top Secret**

Having the Foreign Ministers of the Cooperation Council Countries considered the Agreement signed in Riyadh on 19/1/1435 AH corresponding to 23/11/2013 AD by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, his brother his Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jabir Al-Sabah Emir of Kuwait and his brother his Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani Emir of Qatar. Having the Agreement been considered and signed by His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa King of Bahrain, His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Saeed the Sultan of Oman and His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces.

Given the importance of the signed Agreement that never before had any similar agreement been signed, out of the leaders' realization to the importance of its content, and for the urgency of the matter that calls for taking the necessary executive procedures to enforce its content. An agreement has been reached to set a mechanism that shall guarantee implementation of the same according to the following:

#### **Firstly: The concerned party to monitor the implementation of the Agreement:**

##### **Foreign Ministers of the GCC Countries:**

Foreign ministers of the GCC Countries shall hold private meeting on the margins of annual periodic meetings of the ministerial council wherein violations and complaints reported by any member country of the Council against any member country of the Council shall be reviewed by the foreign ministers to consider, and raise them to leaders. With the emphasis that the first task the Council shall conduct, according to the mentioned mechanism, is to make sure of the implementation of all content, mentioned above, within Riyadh Agreement, consider its content a basis to the security and stability of the GCC Countries and its unity, either with regard to those issues of internal affairs, external political aspects or internal security; and ensuring that no country neglects or omits the group orientation of the GCC, and shall coordinate with all members of the GCC; and emphasizing that no support is being made to any currents that pose threats to any member country of the Council.

#### **Secondly: Decision-making body:**

##### **Leaders of the GCC Countries:**

The leaders shall take the appropriate action towards what the Ministers of Foreign Affairs raise to them regarding any country that has not complied with the signed agreement by the GCC Countries.

#### **Thirdly: Compliance procedures:**

This Agreement shall be implemented by the following procedures:

**1. With Regard to GCC Countries Internal Affairs:**

- Commit that any media channels owned or supported by any GCC country should not discuss any disrespectful subjects to any GCC Country, directly or indirectly. The GCC Countries shall set a list by these media channels, and the list shall be periodically updated.
- All member countries shall commit that they will not grant citizens of other GCC Countries a citizenship who have been proven to practice opposition activity against their governments. Every country shall inform the other countries on the names of the opposition figures residing in such country in order to prevent their violative activities and take the appropriate actions against them.
- Take the necessary actions that would guarantee no interference in any GCC Country internal affairs, including, but not limited to:
  - a. Governmental organizations, community organizations, individuals and activists shall not support opposition figures with money or via media.
  - b. Not to shelter, accept, support, encourage or make its country an incubator to the activities of GCC citizens or other figures who are proven oppositionists to any country of GCC.
  - c. Ban the existence of any external organizations, groups or parties, who target GCC Countries and their peoples; nor provide foothold for their hostile activities against the GCC Countries.
  - d. Not to fund or support external organizations, groups or parties, that have hostile positions and incitements against the GCC Countries.

**2. With regard to the foreign policy:**

Commit to the group orientation of the GCC Countries, coordinate with other GCC countries and shall not support any entities or currents that pose threats to the GCC Countries, including:

- a. Not to support Muslim Brotherhood with money or via media in the GCC Countries or outside.
- b. Approve the exit of Muslim Brotherhood figures, who are not citizens, within a time limit to be agreed upon. The GCC Countries shall coordinate with each other on the lists of those figures.
- c. Not to support external gatherings or groups in Yemen, Syria or any destabilized area, which pose a threat to the security and stability of GCC Countries.

- d. Not to support or shelter whoever perform opposition activities against any GCC country, being current officials, former officials or others; and shall not give them any foothold inside their countries or allow them to act against any of the GCC Countries.
- e. Close any academies, establishments or centres that train and qualify individuals from GCC citizens to work against their governments.

**3. With regard to the internal security of the GCC Countries:**

In the event of any pending security files that need further clarification and are directly connected to the security matters of the competent security agencies in any GCC country, immediate meetings shall be held among security specialists with their counterparts to discuss the details of these subjects and find out their objectives.

**If any country of the GCC Countries failed to comply with this mechanism, the other GCC Countries shall have the right to take any appropriate action to protect their security and stability.**

**Allah is the grantor of success,,,**

[signature]

His Highness Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of United Arab Emirates

[signature]

His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al Faisal, Foreign Minister of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

[signature]

His Excellency Dr. Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, Foreign Minister of State of Qatar

[signature]

His Excellency Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Foreign Minister of Kingdom of Bahrain

[signature]

His Excellency Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs of Sultanate of Oman

[signature]

His Excellency Sheikh Sabah Al-Khalid Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of State of Kuwait

Exhibit 5

The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Riyadh, 16 November 2014

## The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement

### Top Secret

In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful

1. Based on a generous invitation by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, the following have met in Riyadh today, Sunday, 23/1/1436 (Hijri Calendar), 16/11/2014 (Gregorian Calendar): His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabbah, the Prince of Kuwait, His Majesty King Hamad Bin Eissa Al-Khalifa, King of Bahrain; His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamd Bin Khalifa Al-Thani , Prince of Qatar; His Highness Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashed Al-Maktom, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and the Governor of Dubai; and His Highness Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the deputy Commander of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates. This was to cement the spirit of sincere cooperation and to emphasize the joint fate and the aspirations of the Citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council for a strong bond and solid rapprochement.
2. After discussing the commitments stemming from the Riyadh Agreement signed 19/1/1435 (Hijri) – 23/11/2013 and its executive mechanism ; reviewing the reports of the committee following the execution mechanism and the results of the joint follow-up [operation] room; and reviewing the conclusions of the report of the follow-up room signed on 10/1/1436 (Hijri) – 3/11/2014 (Gregorian) by the intelligence chiefs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the state of Qatar.
3. The following has been reached:
  - a) Stressing that non-committing to any of the articles of the Riyadh Agreement and its executive mechanism amounts to a violation of the entirety of them.
  - b) What the intelligence chiefs have reached in the aforementioned report is considered a step forward to implement Riyadh agreement and its executive mechanism, with the necessity of the full commitment to implementing everything stated in them within the period of one month from the date of the agreement.
  - c) Not to give refuge, employ, or support whether directly or indirectly, whether domestically or abroad, to any person or a media apparatus that harbors inclinations harmful to any Gulf Cooperation Council state. Every state is committed to taking all the regulatory, legal and judicial measures against anyone who [commits] any encroachment against Gulf Cooperation Council states, including putting him on trial and announcing it in the media.
  - d) All countries are committed to the Gulf Cooperation Council discourse to support the Arab Republic of Egypt, and contributing to its security, stability and its financial support; and ceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt in all media platforms, whether directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcasted on Al-jazeera, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media.

4. Accordingly, it has been decided that the Riyadh Agreement, and its executive mechanism, and the components of this supplementary agreement, requires the full commitment to its implementation. The leaders have tasked the intelligence chiefs to follow up on the implementation of the results of this supplementary agreement and to report regularly to the leaders, in order to take the measures they deem necessary to protect the security and stability of their countries.
5. It has been agreed that implementing the aforementioned commitments contributes towards the unity of the Council states and their interests and the future of their peoples, and signals a new page that will be a strong base to advance the path of joint work and moving towards a strong Gulf entity.

[Signatures]

Note that the UAE has 2 signatures on this page one for His Highness Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashed Al-Maktom, the Vice president and Prime Minister of the UAE and the Ruler of Dubai; and another one by His Highness Mohamed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and the deputy Commander of the Armed Forces of the UAE.

**APPENDIX**

**The Supplementary Riyadh Agreement**



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

"سري للغاية"


"اتفاق الرياض التكميلي"

بناءً على دعوة كريمة من خادم الحرمين الشريفين الملك عبدالله بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود ملك المملكة العربية السعودية فقد اجتمع هذا اليوم الأحد ١٤٣٦/١/٢٣ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٤/١١/١٦ م في مدينة الرياض لدى خادم الحرمين الشريفين - حفظه الله - صاحب السمو الشيخ صباح الأحمد الجابر الصباح أمير دولة الكويت، وصاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة ملك مملكة البحرين، وصاحب السمو الشيخ تميم بن حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر، وصاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم نائب رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة ورئيس مجلس الوزراء حاكم دبي، وصاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن زايد آل نهيان ولي عهد أبوظبي نائب القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة بدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، وذلك لترسيخ روح التعاون الصادق والتأكيد على المصير المشترك وما يتطلع إليه أبناء دول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية من ألفة متينة وتقارب وثيق.

وبعد مناقشة الالتزامات المنبثقة عن اتفاق الرياض الموقع بتاريخ ١٤٣٥/١/١٩ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٣/١١/٢٣ م، وآلياته التنفيذية، والأطراف على تقارير لجنة متابعة تنفيذ الآلية ونتائج غرفة المتابعة المشتركة، واستعراض ما خرج به محضر نتائج غرفة المتابعة الموقع بتاريخ ١٤٣٦/١/١٠ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٤/١١/٣ م من قبل رؤساء الأجهزة الاستخباراتية في كل من المملكة العربية السعودية، ودولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة، ومملكة البحرين، ودولة قطر.

لقد تم التوصل إلى الآتي:

أولاً: التأكيد على أن عدم الالتزام بأي بند من بنود اتفاق الرياض وآلياته التنفيذية يعد إخلالاً بكامل ما ورد فيهما.



ثانياً، أن ما توصل إليه رؤساء الأجهزة الاستخباراتية في محضرهم المشار إليه أعلاه يعدّ تقدماً لإنفاذ اتفاق الرياض وآلية التنفيذ، مع ضرورة الالتزام الكامل بتنفيذ جميع ما ورد فيهما في مدة لا تتجاوز شهر من تاريخ هذا الاتفاق.

ثالثاً، عدم إيواء أو توظيف أو دعم - بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر - في الداخل أو الخارج أي شخص أو أي وسيلة إعلامية ممن له توجهات تسيء إلى أي دولة من دول مجلس التعاون، وتلتزم كل دولة باتخاذ كافة الإجراءات النظامية والقانونية والقضائية بحق من يصدر عن هؤلاء أي تجاوز ضد أي دولة أخرى من دول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية، بما في ذلك محاكمته، وأن يتم الإعلان عن ذلك في وسائل الإعلام.

رابعاً، التزام كافة الدول بنهج سياسة مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية لدعم جمهورية مصر العربية والإسهام في أمنها واستقرارها والمساهمة في دعمها اقتصادياً، وإيقاف كافة النشاطات الإعلامية الموجهة ضد جمهورية مصر العربية في جميع وسائل الإعلام بصفة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة بما في ذلك ما يبث من إساءات على قنوات الجزيرة وقناة مصر مباشر، والسعي لإيقاف ما ينشر من إساءات في الإعلام المصري.

وبناء على ما سبق، فقد تقرر أن مقتضى اتفاق الرياض، وآلية التنفيذ، وما ورد في هذا الاتفاق التكميلي، يتطلب الالتزام الكامل بتنفيذها. وقد كلف القادة رؤساء الأجهزة الاستخباراتية بمتابعة إنفاذ ما تم التوصل إليه في هذا الاتفاق التكميلي، وأن يتم الرفع عن ذلك بشكل دوري للقادة لاتخاذ ما يرونه من التدابير والإجراءات المناسبة لحماية أمن دولهم واستقرارها.

كما تم الاتفاق على أن تنفيذ ما ذكر أعلاه من التزامات يصعب في وحدة دول المجلس ومصلحتها ومستقبل شعوبها، ويعدّ إيدئناً بفتح صفحة جديدة ستكون بإذن الله مركزاً قوياً لدفع مسيرة العمل المشترك والانطلاق بها نحو كيان خليجي قوي ومتماسك.

والله ولي التوفيق.







صاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم	صاحب السمو الشيخ محمد بن زايد آل نهيان
	
نائب رئيس دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة ورئيس مجلس الوزراء حاكم دبي	ولي عهد أبوظبي نائب القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة بمملكة الإمارات العربية المتحدة
صاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة	
	
ملك مملكة البحرين	
صاحب السمو الشيخ تميم بن حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني	
	
أمير دولة قطر	
صاحب السمو الشيخ صباح الاحمد الجابر الصباح	
	
أمير دولة الكويت	
	
خادم الحرمين الشريفين الملك عبدالله بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود	
ملك المملكة العربية السعودية	

Exhibit 6

Declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 4 June 2017

### **Declaration of Arab Republic of Egypt**

The Egyptian government decided to cease all diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar. That came due to the insistence of the Qatari regime on adopting a hostile approach to Egypt, and the failure of all trials to deter its support to the terrorist organizations, topped by the terrorist group of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qatari regime sheltered its leaders, who have received judicial rulings in terrorist operations targeted the safety and security of Egypt, in addition to promoting the doctrine of Al-Qaeda and ISIL, as well as supporting the terrorist operations in Sinai. Qatar has been insisting on interfering in the internal affairs of Egypt and the countries of the region, in a way that threatens the Arab national security and boosts the feelings of schism and fission inside the Arab communities, according to well-planned schemes targeting the unity of the Arab nation and its interests.

The Arab Republic of Egypt announces closing its air and maritime ports before all Qatari transportation means in a pursuit to protect the national Egyptian security. Egypt will address the sister and friendly country, and the international and Arab companies to act accordingly and apply this action related to their flights and vessels moving to Doha.

## بيان جمهورية مصر العربية

قررت الحكومة المصرية قطع العلاقات الدبلوماسية مع دولة قطر في ظل اصرار الحكم القطري على اتخاذ مسلك معادي لمصر، وفشل كافة المحاولات لاثناؤه عن دعم التنظيمات الارهابية، وعلى رأسها تنظيم الاخوان الارهابي، وايواء قياداته الصادر بحقهم احكام قضائية في عمليات إرهابية أستهدفت امن وسلامة مصر، بالإضافة الى ترويج فكر تنظيم القاعدة وداعش ودعم العمليات الارهابية في سيناء، فضلا عن اصرار قطر على التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لمصر ودول المنطقة بصورة تهدد الامن القومي العربي وتعزز من بذور الفتنة والانقسام داخل المجتمعات العربية وفق مخطط مدروس يستهدف وحده الأمة العربية ومصالحها.

كما تعلن جمهورية مصر العربية غلق أجواءها وموانئها البحرية أمام كافة وسائل النقل القطرية حرصاً على الأمن القومي المصري، وستتقدم بالاجراءات اللازمة لمخاطبة الدول الصديقة والشقيقة والشركات العربية والدولية للعمل بذات الاجراء الخاص بوسائل نقلهم المتجهة الى الدوحة.

Exhibit 7

Declaration of the Kingdom of Bahrain, 5 June 2017

### **Declaration of the Kingdom of Bahrain**

“Based on the persistence of the State of Qatar in regard to its pursuit to destabilize the security of the Kingdom of Bahrain, its interference in Bahrain’s affairs and the continuous escalation and instigation in media, as well as its ongoing support to the terrorist armed activities and financing the groups affiliated with Iran in order to sabotage Bahrain and spread chaos in the country, which are considered acts violating all the covenants and international conventions and law principles, without considering values, law, morale or concepts of good neighborhood and Gulf countries relations since it denied all its previous commitments.

Hence, the Kingdom of Bahrain ceases all the diplomatic relations with State of Qatar in order to protect its national security. The Government of Bahrain will withdraw all the diplomatic mission in Doha and will give the delegates a grace of 48 hours to leave the country while proceeding with the other required procedures.

The Kingdom also announces closure of its air space and maritime ports as well as regional water before the Qatari navigation in 24 hours after this declaration.

Kingdom of Bahrain bans its citizens from travelling to Qatar or staying in the country, however, with sorrow it will also ban all Qatari citizens from entering to or passing through the lands of the Kingdom to avoid any trials or violent activities that might exploit the current situation despite the high confidence and appreciation to our brothers from Qatar and their interest in their second country-Bahrain.

The Qatari grave practices did not include Bahrain only, but also several sister countries which well aware of these practices that embody a very dangerous pattern that cannot be acceptable or denied, but it must be confronted and combated fiercely.

Despite the sorrow expressed by Bahrain when issuing this resolution taken to protect its security and stability, it confirms that it considers the safety of the Qatari people who realize the suffering endured by Bahrain when we witness many terrorist operations leaving people dead in the country because of the insistence of their government to support the terrorism on all levels in order to topple the legitimate regime in Bahrain.”



## بيان مملكة البحرين

"استنادا الى اصرار دولة قطر على المضي في زعزعة الامن والاستقرار في مملكة البحرين والتدخل في شؤونها والاستمرار في التصعيد والتحريض الاعلامي ودعم الانشطة الارهابية المسلحة وتمويل الجماعات المرتبطة بأيران للقيام بالتخريب ونشر الفوضى في البحرين في انتهاك صارخ لكل الاتفاقات والمواثيق ومبادئ القانون الدولي دون ادنى مراعاة لقيم او قانون او اخلاق او اعتبار لمبادئ حسن الجوار او التزام بثوابت العلاقات الخليجية والتنكر لجميع التعهدات السابقة.

فان مملكة البحرين تعلن قطع العلاقات الدبلوماسية مع دولة قطر حفاظا على امنها الوطني وسحب البعثة الدبلوماسية البحرينية من الدوحة وامهال جميع افراد البعثة الدبلوماسية القطرية 48 ساعة لمغادرة البلاد مع استكمال تطبيق الاجراءات اللازمة

كما تعلن غلق الاجواء امام حركة الطيران واقفال الموانئ والمياه الاقليمية امام الملاحة من والى قطر خلال 24 ساعة من اعلان البيان.

واذ تمنع حكومة مملكة البحرين مواطنيها من السفر الى قطر او الإقامة فيها فانها تأسف لعدم السماح للمواطنين القطريين من الدخول الى اراضيها اوالممر عبرها كما تمنح المقيمين والزائرين القطريين مهلة 14 يوما لمغادرة اراضي المملكة تحرزا من اي محاولات ونشاطات عدائية تستغل الوضع رغم الاعتزاز والثقة العالية في اخواننا من الشعب القطري وغيرتهم على بلدهم الثاني. ان الممارسات القطرية الخطيرة لم يقتصر شرها على مملكة البحرين فقط .. انما تعدته الى دول شقيقة احيطت علما بهذه الممارسات التي تجسد نمطا شديدا للخطورة لايمكن الصمت عليه او القبول به وانما يستوجب ضرورة التصدي له بكل قوة وحزم.

ومع اسف مملكة البحرين لهذا القرار الذي اتخذته صيانة لأمنها وحفاظا لاستقرارها فانها تؤكد حرصها على الشعب القطري الشقيق الذي يدرك معاناتنا وهو يشهد مع كل عملية ارهابية سقوط ضحايا من اخوانه واهله في البحرين بسبب استمرار حكومته في دعم الارهاب على جميع المستويات والعمل على اسقاط النظام الشرعي في البحرين."

Exhibit 8

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Exhibit 9

Declaration of the United Arab Emirates, 5 June 2017

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## NEWS

[Home](#) > [Media Center](#) > [News](#) > UAE supports statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar.

# UAE supports statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar.

6/5/2017

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وزارة الخارجية  
والتعاون الدولي  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
& INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The United Arab Emirates has issued the following statement:

"The UAE affirms its complete commitment and support to the Gulf Cooperation Council and to the security and stability of the GCC States. Within this framework, and based on the insistence of the State of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and stability of

the region and its failure to honour international commitments and agreements, it has been decided to take the following measures that are necessary for safeguarding the interests of the GCC States in general and those of the brotherly Qatari people in particular:

1-In support of the statements issued by the sisterly Kingdom of Bahrain and sisterly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates severs all relations with the State of Qatar, including breaking off diplomatic relations, and gives Qatari diplomats 48 hours to leave the UAE.

2-Preventing Qatari nationals from entering the UAE or crossing its points of entry, giving Qatari residents and visitors in the UAE 14 days to leave the country for precautionary security reasons. The UAE nationals are likewise banned from traveling to or staying in Qatar or transiting through its territories.

3-Closure of UAE airspace and seaports for all Qataris in 24 hours and banning all Qatari means of transportation, coming to or leaving the UAE, from crossing, entering or leaving the UAE territories, and taking all legal measures in collaboration with friendly countries and international companies with regards to Qataris using the UAE airspace and territorial waters, from and to Qatar, for national security considerations.

The UAE is taking these decisive measures as a result of the Qatari authorities' failure to abide by the Riyadh Agreement on returning GCC diplomats to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in 2014, and Qatar's continued support, funding and hosting of terror groups, primarily Islamic Brotherhood, and its sustained endeavours to promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al Qaeda across its direct and indirect media in addition to Qatar's violation of the statement issued at the US-Islamic Summit in Riyadh on May 21st, 2017 on countering terrorism in the region and considering Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. The UAE measures are taken as well based on Qatari authorities' hosting of terrorist elements and meddling in the affairs of other countries as well as their support of terror groups – policies which are likely to push the region into a stage of unpredictable consequences.

While regretting the policies taken by the State of Qatar that sow seeds of sedition and discord among the region's countries, the UAE affirms its full respect and appreciation for the brotherly Qatari people on account of the profound historical, religious and fraternal ties and kin relations binding UAE and Qatari peoples."

Exhibit 10

Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, United Nations Security Council, 7962nd Meeting, S/PV.7932, 8 June 2017

United Nations

S/PV.7962



# Security Council

Seventy-second year

Provisional

## 7962<sup>nd</sup> meeting

Thursday, 8 June 2017, 10 a.m.  
New York

*President:* Mr. Llorentty Solíz . . . . . (Bolivia (Plurinational State of))

*Members:*

China . . . . .	Mr. Wu Haitao
Egypt . . . . .	Mr. Moustafa
Ethiopia . . . . .	Mr. Alemu
France . . . . .	Mr. Delattre
Italy . . . . .	Mr. Lambertini
Japan . . . . .	Mr. Kawamura
Kazakhstan . . . . .	Mr. Sadykov
Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Zagaynov
Senegal . . . . .	Mr. Ciss
Sweden . . . . .	Ms. Schoulgin Nyoni
Ukraine . . . . .	Mr. Yelchenko
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Mr. Rycroft
United States of America . . . . .	Ms. Sison
Uruguay . . . . .	Mrs. Carrión

## Agenda

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2017/467)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).

17-16188 (E)



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*The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

#### **Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2017/467)**

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2017/467, which contains the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.

I give the floor to Mr. Feltman.

**Mr. Feltman:** At the outset, I would like to reiterate, on behalf of the Secretary-General, my solidarity with the people and the Governments of Iraq, Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Egypt and Iran following the recent terrorist attacks on their cities. I call on all Member States to redouble their efforts to strengthen international cooperation to address terrorism and violent extremism, and bring those responsible for these despicable attacks to justice.

I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2017/467).

The report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions

Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and other relevant entities.

Since January 2016, the four previous reports to the Security Council on the threat posed by ISIL have focused on the global landscape; South-East Asia; Yemen and East Africa; Libya and Afghanistan; and Europe, North Africa and West Africa. This fifth report has taken a global approach, with a focus on the financing of terrorism.

The report stresses that ISIL, despite continuous military pressure, continues to resist, particularly in Mosul and Raqqa. At the same time, ISIL has reorganized its military structure, giving more power to local commanders, and is more focused than ever before on enabling and inspiring attacks outside of conflict zones.

The threat from ISIL has been intensified by its use of the Internet and social media to disseminate propaganda online to a wide international audience. Although the volume of such messages has declined over the past 16 months, the threat persists as supporters outside Syria and Iraq collect and redistribute that propaganda.

In Europe, ISIL has used its online presence to encourage supporters to mount attacks in their countries of residence. That has led to multiple attacks, including in Belgium, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Some attacks were carried out by foreign terrorist fighter returnees, while others were conducted by individuals who had not travelled to conflict zones. Investigations demonstrate that the perpetrators, despite being sometimes labelled as lone actors, often received support or resources from facilitators and, in a number of cases, were in direct contact with ISIL enablers.

The report notes a decrease in the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and in the overall number of ISIL fighters during the past 16 months. However, returnees and the relocation of fighters from the conflict zones to other regions now present a considerable threat to international security.



Although ISIL's financial situation has steadily declined over the past 16 months, it continues to rely chiefly on the same two revenue streams, namely, sales of hydrocarbons and extortion/taxation, which may amount to tens of millions of dollars per month. ISIL has also drawn income from antiquities smuggling, agricultural products, the sale of electricity, exploitation of mineral resources such as phosphates and sulfuric acid, external donations, kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking. As ISIL loses its control on population centres and its forces continue to dwindle, it will also have substantially lower costs. Despite growing liquidity shortages, ISIL may be able to stretch further its existing resources.

ISIL continues to fund affiliates, while urging them to become more self-sufficient and proactive in developing internal revenue streams. Money services, including exchange houses and money couriers, continue to be a preferred method for ISIL and its supporters to move funds across borders. As Member States consider efforts to counter ISIL financing, a key concern is how to allow reconstruction and stabilization funds to flow into liberated areas, including by reconnecting international financial structures, without also enabling ISIL remnants to abuse those structures and exploit that new liquidity.

With regard to ISIL's evolving threat outside of Syria and Iraq, ISIL-affiliated groups in North Africa have shown considerable resilience and pose a serious danger. For example, while ISIL in Libya has been weakened after losing a significant portion of the territory it controlled, its threat persists in Libya and in neighbouring countries. In West Africa, ISIL is challenging established Al-Qaida affiliates. In East Africa, emerging ISIL affiliates operating in Puntland and parts of southern Somalia compound the threat posed by Al-Qaida's affiliates. Al-Shabaab, ISIL in Somalia and ISIL in Yemen represent an increasing menace. ISIL in Afghanistan is shifting its focus to the north of the country. The threat level has intensified in South-East Asia, with ISIL directing more of its attention, including its propaganda, at the region.

I welcome the efforts of the Council over the past months to adopt resolutions on countering terrorist narratives; protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks; stemming the destruction, looting and smuggling of cultural heritage sites and artefacts, as well as their illicit trade and trafficking carried out by terrorist groups or in a context of armed conflict;

and addressing the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad basin region.

Member States, the United Nations and international, regional and subregional organizations continue to strengthen existing tools while also developing new ones to address the rapidly evolving threat posed by ISIL, including the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters. In that context, the report highlights some points that deserve attention.

First, since the adoption of resolution 2253 (2015), 11 associated individuals have been listed in the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list. Among them, eight are listed as financiers or financial facilitators.

Secondly, Member States are making substantial progress on adapting their legal and operational frameworks to the requirements of Security Council resolutions in order to address the terrorist financing and foreign terrorist fighter threats. Notwithstanding that, more work needs to be done with regard to the implementation of those norms and mechanisms, including in the context of terrorist asset-freezing, cross-border movement of cash, and human rights-compliant travel measures to address the foreign terrorist fighter threat.

Thirdly, the efforts of United Nations entities, as well as those of other key actors, such as INTERPOL and the Financial Action Task Force, have helped strengthen regional and national frameworks to counter terrorism financing and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Other examples in the report include CTED's assessments and identification of good practices, and the capacity-building initiatives of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, including on the legal and judicial aspects of terrorism financing, kidnapping for ransom and asset freezing, and border security and management.

The CTITF office and CTED recently concluded the second iteration of the Security Council-mandated all-of-United Nations capacity-building implementation plan to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. While the projects and the plan continue to address the entire life-cycle of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, the updated version focuses on the tail end of the life-cycle, with a number of projects related to prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration to support Member States in their efforts to address returnees. A

number of projects have now been completed or are well under way. The plan now includes 50 projects, submitted by 13 entities, with a total budget of \$107 million over five years. Forty-one per cent of the total budget is funded.

Fourthly, the United Nations is assisting Member States and regions most at risk and where United Nations support can bring added value. For example, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, as mandated by resolution 2195 (2015) and presidential statement S/PRST/2015/24, and in collaboration with other CTITF entities, is developing a regional all-of-United Nations integrated assistance for countering terrorism initiative for the Group of Five (G-5) Sahel countries, as well as a national initiative for Mali.

As mentioned in the report, the United Nations engagement in the Sahel will evolve in response to the continued threats posed by terrorism, violent extremism, transnational organized crime and illicit trans-border trafficking. Partnerships between the United Nations system and regional stakeholders need to be strengthened to effectively support G-5 countries' efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. The United Nations is renewing its engagement in the region, following an independent review of the Integrated Strategy for the Sahel.

Since the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015), ISIL and its affiliates have remained under continuous military pressure and experienced significant setbacks. At the same time, ISIL is becoming an increasingly transnational threat, which severely undermines international peace and security. Consequently, the Secretary-General welcomes the focus that the Security Council has put on this matter and urges it to enhance multilateral cooperation to address the threats and challenges he has reported on.

The Secretary-General considers countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism to be one of the highest priorities of the Organization. That is why, in his report contained in document A/71/858, currently being considered by the General Assembly, he recommends the establishment of a new office of counter-terrorism headed by an Under-Secretary-General. I am convinced that the new office will provide stronger leadership to our counter-terrorism efforts, enhance United Nations coordination and increase the impact of our assistance to Member States.

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

**Ms. Sison** (United States of America): I thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman for his briefing.

Defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) is an urgent priority. As noted in the report (S/2017/467) of the Secretary-General, the international community has made notable progress in degrading ISIS, but we have a long road ahead to ultimately defeat it. Thanks to the efforts of the United States-led global coalition, ISIS has not retaken any territory in Iraq and Syria from coalition forces since May 2015. Overall, with the support of the coalition, local ground forces have liberated more than 4 million people — 2.7 million in Iraq and 1.4 million in Syria. They have retaken more than 55,000 square kilometres of territory from ISIS, about 66 per cent of the populated territory ISIS once held in Iraq, and 47 per cent of the populated territory it once held in Syria. That is real progress.

While ISIS is losing territory and the ability to fund itself, we must stay vigilant to counter the evolving threat that it poses across the globe. We need to maintain pressure on regional and local safehavens. To advance that work, I should like to emphasize today three lines of effort: first, cracking down on ISIS's finances; secondly, addressing the threat posed by its foreign terrorist fighters; and thirdly, countering ISIS's terrorist messaging.

Isolating ISIS from the international financial system remains essential. The United States, since 2014, has sanctioned eight ISIS branches, along with more than 70 senior ISIS leaders, operatives, financial facilitators, recruiters and affiliated money-service businesses. We have also proposed that the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designate senior ISIS leaders, financiers, facilitators and affiliates for sanctions. The Committee's list must continually adapt to the evolving threat, such as by designating money-service businesses, as well as ISIS affiliates and their leaders.

When the Security Council starts its regular review this month of the ISIS and Al-Qaida sanctions, we will support any necessary modifications to make

sure that the sanctions are adapted to this evolving terrorist threat. Adapting our approach has been key to preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. This has been and must continue to be a major part of our effort to defeat ISIS. Through diplomatic engagement and the global implementation of important Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 2178 (2014), we have seen significant progress, and that must continue.

INTERPOL has been essential to this effort. In the past four years, there has been a thousand-fold increase in the amount of information on foreign fighters shared with INTERPOL. INTERPOL now hold the details of more than 15,000 individuals provided by more than 60 countries, and that number continues to grow. Strengthening this shared resource empowers global law enforcement authorities, helping them to identify and disrupt foreign terrorist fighter transit networks.

We are concerned as highlighted by the Secretary-General in his report (S/2017/467), about the increasing number of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin or going to third countries. Addressing this issue requires a truly global approach, and that should begin with improving information-sharing and cooperation at the international, regional and subregional levels. We all must get better at identifying foreign fighter returnees. Also, all countries must enact legislation, as required by resolution 2178 (2014), to strengthen their ability to prosecute related crimes.

We also must respond to ISIS's stepped up efforts to radicalize and recruit others to violence. To do so, we are working closely with our partners to combat ISIS's messaging and poisonous narrative. We commend the work of the Global Coalition Communications Working Group, which is led by the United States, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. The Working Group regularly brings together over 30 countries with media and tech companies to share information and strategies to counter violent extremist messages online and present positive alternative narratives.

We also applaud private-sector efforts to police ISIS-related content. Twitter has suspended more than 635,000 ISIS-related or ISIS-affiliated accounts since 2015. Facebook and YouTube are similarly removing ISIS-related content from their platforms that violate their terms of service. Meanwhile, Google is putting in place new and innovative ideas to redirect those who search for ISIS content to other content.

In closing, the United States, working in concert with our partners, will take aggressive action to defeat ISIS and adapt to changing threats. We call on the United Nations to do the same, helping Member States to strengthen their ability to counter ISIS, to adapt and to prevent the next terrorist threat from emerging.

**Ms. Schoulgin Nyoni** (Sweden): I should like to thank Under-Secretary-General Feltman for his comprehensive briefing. We also welcome the timely and relevant report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/467), which underscores a number of the significant features of the threat we face.

The attacks over the past weeks in Manchester, Kabul, Baghdad, London and Tehran are a stark reminder, if one were needed, of the continued and shared threat that we all face from terrorist groups. The aim of these acts is clear — to create fear and mistrust within communities and between countries. The attackers targeted women and children in Baghdad who were breaking their Ramadan fast with a treat of ice cream. In Manchester, they targeted young children seeing their favourite singer perform.

However, in the response to these most recent attacks, we have seen the opposite of fear and division. In fact, rather than fear, there were acts of courage and incredible bravery on the part of ordinary individuals. Rather than division, all sections of society across many countries came together in solidarity for vigils and marches that sent a message of unity and peace.

Since our last briefing in February (see S/PV.7877), our capital, Stockholm, was the target of an attack that is being investigated as a terrorist attack. The perpetrator is suspected of being a sympathizer or member of Da'esh. In response, thousands of Swedes gathered in Stockholm's central square to mourn the dead, but also in a show of defiance — showing, as our Prime Minister said, “that there is a strength in Sweden that nobody can take away from us”.

Responding to the threat of terrorism requires solidarity not only within countries, but also between countries. In March, Sweden hosted the first Nordic Regional Meeting of Security Services, which included the participation of the Monitoring Team. As noted in the trip report, the terrorist threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in the Nordic countries is rising, in particular with regard to foreign terrorist fighters returning from conflict zones.

In order to counter and prevent the threat, we have introduced legislation specifically targeting foreign terrorist fighters and returnees. We have increased national inter-agency cooperation and taken steps to ensure that local actors are involved in the effort to prevent terrorism and violent extremism. Sweden now makes an assessment of each returnee, seeking to identify individuals who are deemed to pose a risk or suspected of crimes. If they are found to pose such a risk, they are monitored, investigated and tried.

As part of our strong focus on prevention, we are putting in place mechanisms aimed at safeguarding vulnerable individuals, targeting in particular those at risk of radicalization. In addition, rehabilitation and support for defectors requires a broad spectrum of interventions at all levels — municipal, regional and national. We stress the importance of strengthening the fight against impunity for terrorist acts, including by holding the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of terrorist attacks responsible. All measures against terrorism must be taken in compliance with international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law.

We must all make every effort possible to cut off the supply of financing to terrorist organizations. Domestically, we have revised the offence of terrorist financing in line with the updated international standards mentioned in the report. Even though we had successfully prosecuted and convicted individuals for terrorist financing before these revisions, we believe that the updated legislation will provide our law enforcement authorities with new possibilities for prosecuting terrorist financing, in line with relevant Security Council resolutions and other international obligations.

We agree that information-sharing on risks, as stated in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the report, is an essential tool in the fight against terrorist financing. The more the authorities and the private sector know about the means through which terrorists attempt to finance their activities, the better our opportunities to put an end to it. Our ultimate goal in this regard must be to detect and stop attacks before they take place.

We encourage the Secretary-General to apply an integrated gender perspective in future reports, as mandated in resolution 2242 (2015). Among Swedish foreign terrorist fighters, several have been women. We

want to reiterate the multiple roles played by women in relation to terrorism, including those of perpetrator, supporter, facilitator, victim and preventer. Each of these roles requires different approaches and strategies as part of our fight against terrorism.

The attacks we have witnessed over the last three weeks will not be the last. However, with a common will and collective action future attacks need not be inevitable. The message from those who have stood up with courage and dignity in the face of terrorist attacks is this: the resilience of the human spirit means that those who seek to sow terror will never truly succeed.

**Mrs. Carrión** (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank the Deputy Secretary-General for his briefing on the Secretary-General's report on the evolution of the Da'esh threat to international peace and security (S/2017/467). The report also gives an account of the United Nations activities in support of Member States for the purposes of combating this threat.

The report refers to the geographical presence of this terrorist group and its affiliates, its growing transnational character, its constant adaptation to new circumstances, and the variety of methods it uses to perpetrate its attacks. It also refers to the initiatives carried out by the United Nations, its Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to deal with the rapid evolution of the threat posed by Da'esh.

However, the recent attacks in Tehran, London, Kabul, Adwa, Baghdad, Manila, Manchester and Paris indicate that everything that is being done is not enough to protect innocent civilians from the barbarism of Da'esh and its affiliates. Uruguay views with concern the systematic execution of terrorist acts and reaffirms its absolute rejection of the use of violence against the civilian population, the use of intimidation aimed at disrupting the way of life of societies, shattering their basic principles and values, and undermining freedom and respect for the fundamental human rights that underpin peaceful coexistence.

We are aware of and thankful for the unceasing work of the United Nations through its bodies to prevent and combat terrorism in various key areas, as well as the work of many States and regional and subregional organizations. We would like to highlight some elements that we consider fundamental to succeeding in the fight against terrorism, which the international community must continue to strengthen and bring together.

The first of the elements is cooperation. More and better cooperation is needed. There is no doubt that cooperation and coordinated action in different areas and levels are necessary to combat the multiple facets of this complex terrorist phenomenon. This includes greater interaction between public and private actors and different sectors of civil society.

A second element we wish to mention is the primary responsibility of States to combat terrorism and the political will they must unambiguously have to achieve that goal. The development of national counter-terrorism strategies, while respecting the obligations of the United Nations Charter and international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, is a fundamental aspect of this commitment, particularly in the countries most concerned.

A third element to highlight is technical assistance. It is essential that countries lacking the necessary capacities to prevent or combat such a complex and changing phenomenon, and particularly those most affected, can receive technical and financial assistance.

A fourth and last element that we wish to emphasize is prevention. In this regard, I would like to mention the recent resolution 2354 (2017), on a comprehensive international framework to counteract the discourse of terrorist groups, reflecting an effort to prevent and combat violent extremism that can lead to radicalization and terrorism. This element is part of the struggle in the field of ideas to which Uruguay attaches particular importance, and for whose sake it is necessary to seek and foster channels of dialogue between Governments and various non-State actors.

In addition, promoting tolerance and peaceful coexistence and bolstering respect for international law, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, human rights and fundamental freedoms are the responsibility of States as members of the international community and contribute to preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism.

**Mr. Zagaynov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We should like to extend our gratitude to Mr. Feltman for his detailed and comprehensive briefing.

Given present-day conditions, as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is morphing through the changing situation on the ground, the Secretary-General's strategic analysis is especially important. The

group's significant losses notwithstanding, members of ISIL are managing to put up a military resistance in Mosul and are holding their grip on Raqqa. The group continues to spread its influence in various parts of the world. Against this backdrop, we see an ongoing reorganization of its structures and an adaptation to new conditions in the conduct of hostilities. The leadership of ISIL is curbing expenditures, funnelling money for the procurement of weapons and making regional units self-sufficient. ISIL continues to use the heinous and inhumane tactic of terrorist attacks. Yesterday, in Iran, tragedy struck once again. We extend our solidarity to the people and the Government of Iran and other States that have suffered at the hands of terrorists.

The Secretary-General's latest report (S/2017/467) on resolution 2253 (2015) contains an overall conclusion that terrorist revenue is gradually dwindling on the whole. At first glance, it might appear that Security Council mechanisms to combat terrorism financing are finally beginning to function at full capacity. However, such an assessment would be far too optimistic. Unfortunately, not all States conscientiously uphold their obligations in this sphere. Clearly, it is past time to stiffen the Security Council's sanctions mechanisms with a focus on the full financial and economic asphyxiation of ISIL.

For the moment, the reduction or curbing of revenue, as was repeatedly stressed by the Secretary-General in the report, is chiefly attributable to military losses incurred by terrorists, and yet the sources of the expansion of ISIL's budget have not significantly changed with time. Key sources — trade in hydrocarbons and extortion from populations in the territories held by the terrorists — remain. According to the information at our disposal, ISIL's proceeds from the sale of oil has dropped to between \$12 million and \$20 million per month, which is nearly three times less than what we saw in 2015. The achievement of such results has been possible thanks to the effective actions of the Russian Air Force during the counter-terrorism campaign in Syria. According to recent independent information, some 4,000 tankers have been destroyed, which has put 206 oil- and gas-producing facilities out of commission.

We have previously drawn the attention of the sponsors of the report to the need to avoid selectivity in assessing developments in the context of the struggle against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. For reasons unknown, the document fails to refer to the repeated liberation

of Palmyra, but highlights the fact that Manbij was liberated, which happened way back in the summer of 2016. The report further fails to mention information about civilian casualties during the operations of the so-called coalition to liberate Mosul.

We are closely tracking new sources of financing for ISIL and sharing the relevant information with partners abroad and specialized organizations, particularly the Financial Action Task Force. For example, recently ISIL is increasingly resorting to human organ trafficking. It is also participating in the transport of refugees to Europe and engaging in kidnapping for ransom.

In the struggle against terrorism financing, it is important to work in regional formats, including the Eurasian Group on Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. We welcome the fact that the role of this organization is stressed in the report.

Terrorists have mastered all the nuances of Internet and social-network use for the recruitment of fighters and for the financing of their operations. We concur with the conclusions of the report, namely, that the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and Russia were the result of the large-scale proliferation of ISIL propaganda via online platforms. In a number of cases, instructions for carrying out terrorist attacks were delivered through mobile applications that used encryption.

An important step in countering terrorist propaganda was the adoption of resolution 2354 (2017), which set forth a comprehensive international framework in this realm. We consider the framework to be a solid foundation for further expansion of the Council's mechanisms in countering terrorist ideology, including by strengthening sanctions and law enforcement measures.

Despite the rivalry among the pro-Al-Qaida structures and the resistance of State bodies, ISIL continues to penetrate deep into the African continent. Recently, the level of the terrorist threat has risen in South-East Asia, including as a result of the active work of ISIL's propaganda centres. We agree with the assessment of the ISIL threat in northern Afghanistan, contained in the report. Despite the enduring impressive international presence in the country, we believe it is premature to refer to the allegedly weakened influence of Afghan factions of ISIL. This is especially true in the light of the recent tragic events in Kabul.

Evidently, the threat of the radicalization of the population, the actions of lone-wolf fighters, the creation of sleeper cells and full operational branches of large terrorist organizations have affected every State. It will be possible to stop the territorial spread of ISIL is possible only if we establish a single counter-terrorist front that defends our common values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

**Mr. Rycroft** (United Kingdom): I thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing just now.

At the outset, let me express my condolences to the Government and the people of Iran following the terrible attacks yesterday. In recent weeks, the United Kingdom has stood firm through senseless terrorist atrocities that targeted innocent people in Manchester and London. These attacks show the worst of humankind. They seek to intimidate us, to divide us and to undermine our resolve. They fail every time. In response, ordinary people show the best of humankind. In the United Kingdom, we witnessed the men and women of our emergency services, as well as members of the public, show the greatest courage, even risking their own lives to protect others from attack.

The Council has a duty now to show the same courage, the same resolve as those ordinary men and women in the face of such brutality. That is why the United Kingdom is playing a leading role in the Global Coalition to Counter Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Our collective efforts are bearing fruit. Da'esh has lost over two-thirds of the ground it once occupied in Iraq and nearly half of that held in Syria. More than 2.5 million people have now been freed from their tyrannical rule.

Make no mistake — we are defeating Da'esh on the ground. In Iraq, Mosul will soon be liberated. The Iraqi security forces, with the support of the Coalition, have successfully isolated Da'esh to a final holdout in west Mosul. Thanks to the valiant efforts of the Iraqi security forces, people are already starting to return to their homes in liberated areas. In Syria, operations against Raqqa have now begun. It is only a matter of time before Da'esh loses its so-called capital.

But, ultimately, degrading Da'esh effectively will take time, patience and sustained effort from the international community, including the Council. It is an effort that goes far beyond military support and that is why the Global Coalition is supporting the

Government of Iraq to restore security, governance and basic services across Iraq. Helping people rebuild their lives is the first step to winning the peace. To counter the longer-term threat of Da'esh, Iraqis need political reconciliation and reform, and in Syria, we need to see a long-overdue national political settlement and a transition to a Government for all Syrians.

The threat we face is changing. As we successfully degrade Da'esh in Syria and Iraq, we have seen its propaganda promote attacks elsewhere across the world. We have seen individuals inspired by these calls carry out careless attacks in the name of Da'esh. As it loses its caliphates, we are seeing its fighters flee. We must work together to deprive Da'esh of safe spaces across the world, tackling the threat of foreign fighters travelling to new havens or returning to home countries.

We must also bring an end to their havens online. The pervasive spread of Islamist extremism online has gone on for too long. As one of the leads on the counter-Da'esh communications effort and, in partnership with Coalition countries, the United Kingdom has successfully diminished the quantity, but also the quality and the impact of that hateful propaganda. We are working with the industry so that, together, we take a more proactive approach to terrorist and extremist content online. Engagement so far has resulted in companies strengthening their terms and conditions and the announcement of a shared database that will catalogue known terrorist content from the Internet. We have also seen a public commitment from Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft to look at options for establishing an international industry-led forum focused on this issue. There is much more to be done, so let us call on industry to do the right thing and remove hateful extremist content from its platforms.

Finally, if we are to defeat Da'esh, we must hold it to account for its actions, whether online or in the real world, and seek justice for all Da'esh victims around the world. That is why the United Kingdom has launched a United Nations-led global campaign to bring Da'esh to justice that will show that Da'esh cannot act with impunity. It will act as a deterrent, both now and in the future, and help to strengthen global security. Time is of the essence. It is vital that we act now. We must start gathering evidence before it is lost or destroyed on the battlefield.

I therefore welcome the discussions we have had with the Government of Iraq on this issue and the

significant statement by Prime Minister Al Abadi calling, at the end of March, for “the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to prosecute Da'esh's crimes against civilians”. We believe the United Kingdom's proposal is the clear way forward for the Council to answer Prime Minister Al Abadi's call and we look forward to working with our Iraqi colleagues so that the proposal can be finalized as soon as possible.

**Mr. Kawamura (Japan):** I would like to begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for his detailed briefing. Japan takes note and pays particular attention to the three points included in the briefing: first, that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faces financial difficulty; secondly, that the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Iraq and Syria has slowed; and, thirdly, that the number of ISIL fighters has significantly decreased.

These are positive developments, however, since the last report in February (S/2017/97), we have witnessed a number of terrorist attacks throughout the world, including in the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Australia, Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, France, Sweden, Russia, Syria, Iraq and now in Iran. On this occasion, I would like to express again my deepest sympathy and condolences to the families of those victims and all the affected Governments. Now, as the Under-Secretary-General said, the threat posed by ISIL is evolving globally. While ISIL is experiencing military setbacks, foreign terrorist fighters are returning to their countries of origin or relocating to other regions.

As the report (S/2017/467) notes, the threat level has intensified in South-East Asia. Returnees to that region continue to pose a significant concern, as they could increase the military capabilities of local terrorist networks. Relocators from Iraq and Syria, who are not nationals of South-East Asian States, are another source of concern, as they are most likely unknown to the local authorities. We are alarmed by ISIL's evolving tactics, which include diversifying financial sources, disseminating propaganda through social media, exploiting encrypted applications and using broken travel. We have heard reports of the use of bitcoin and drones. ISIL employs those evolving tactics and we must be responsive to the counterterrorism resolutions and enhance our capabilities.

The Council has recently adopted resolutions on aviation security with resolution 2309 (2016);

international judicial cooperation with resolution 2322 (2016); the protection of critical infrastructure with resolution 2341 (2017); and counter-narratives with resolution 2354 (2017). The adoption of those resolutions is noteworthy, but their implementation is equally vital. Japan has implemented them and has also developed new measures. For example, we recently enacted laws to prevent terrorists from using bitcoin and virtual currencies, and to prohibit drones from flying over critical facilities, embassies, and nuclear plants.

The terrorist threat is global, and we must extend assistance to those in need as part of our collective response. Japan, for example, provided \$35 million in March, mainly to South-East Asia, in the light of the increasing threat in that region. Those funds will be used to facilitate the implementation of relevant resolutions through concrete projects, including on advance passenger information, international judicial cooperation, INTERPOL databases and counter-propaganda.

Last week, a briefing was held by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force on the Capacity Building Implementation Plan for Countering the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, which was established by PRST/2015/11. While the plan was proposed two years ago, only eight Member States and two organizations have contributed thus far and only 41 per cent of budgetary demands have been met. Japan has contributed \$12.5 million — that is, 12 per cent of the total budget. Japan invites all Member States to consider contributing to that plan as well, given the importance of implementation and impact.

The new office of counter-terrorism is expected to better coordinate our contributions and, consequently, to enhance counter-terrorism measures in all Member States. We must not lose that momentum. We must unite to fight against ISIL and other terrorist groups by implementing Council resolutions and developing our counter-terrorism measures.

**Mr. Lambertini (Italy):** At the outset, I should like to thank the Secretary-General for his clear and exhaustive report (S/2017/467) and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for his comprehensive briefing. Some issues are worth highlighting for today's discussion.

Daily brutal violent acts affecting civilians continue to occur. In that regard, we strongly condemn the most recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, in

London and Manchester of the United Kingdom, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the Philippines, Iraq, Egypt and France. It is a long list of attacks that occurred in a relatively short period of time and, while we want to express our deepest condolences to the families of the victims and our solidarity to the affected Governments, we also want to highlight that this is the most evident proof of the level of threat that we face.

We are also aware that the threat is increasing via hate propaganda. Security Council resolution 2354 (2017) raised awareness within the international community that strictly military counter-terrorism operations or attempts to block terrorist revenue sources are not enough. It is crucial that the credibility of their distorted interpretation of religion be undermined by effective and widely shared information and education through solid and durable cooperation with the private sector, internet service providers and social media platforms.

We also recognize the importance of the private sectors in fighting financial flows to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We therefore welcome the report's emphasis on ongoing efforts aimed at strengthening multilateral frameworks to combat the financing of terrorism in national legislation and acknowledging the importance of providing the most explosive countries with technical assistance and training programmes.

We share the concern highlighted in the Secretary-General's report over trafficking in human beings and cultural property as a means of funding terrorist activities. Resolution 2347 (2017) on the illicit trade and trafficking of cultural property, as well as resolution 2331 (2016), which condemns all forms of human trafficking undertaken by Da'esh and other criminal groups, are milestones of paramount importance in that challenge. In that regard, I want to reiterate our strong condemnation of the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking that continues to endanger the lives of thousands of people along the journey through Africa and the Mediterranean Sea — made more appealing by its possible contribution to the financing of terrorism. I want to reiterate that in its ongoing efforts to combine security and solidarity, my country remains committed to rescuing and assisting the thousands of migrants who reach our shore.

We acknowledge that Da'esh will long remain the most serious threat to the security of our country. While



its military defeat in Iraq and Syria is only a matter of time, the international community must remain vigilant by helping to stabilize liberated areas and by countering and preventing the lingering global threats. The stabilization of liberated areas in Iraq, together with reforms and reconciliation are the strongest antidotes to the resurgence of a terrorist threat.

As for Syria, only a genuine political transition can bring about the conditions for completely uprooting ISIL and other extremist and terrorist actors from the country. In Libya, outstanding results have been achieved in the fight against Da'esh. Nevertheless, counter terrorism must remain a strategic priority. In order to make it more effective, we continue to support a solution based on a unified security force under the control of the Presidency Council. That will strengthen the legitimate institutional framework underpinned by the Libyan Political Agreement and the Security Council.

In time, Da'esh may turn into a more traditional terrorist and criminal organization with unique appeal and capabilities. The more the would-be caliphate disappears from the map, the more it might try to raise the profile through additional terrorist attacks in our homeland. In that regard, we welcome the report's emphasis on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters. Indeed, regardless of the size of flows, we share the concern over the risk of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin or relocating to a third country.

Still, with respect to returnees, we appreciate the report's focus on legal aspects — stressing the centrality of the judicial response to terrorist criminal activity and the respect for the rule of law. We therefore believe that the most effective countries should receive technical and legal assistance in a timely and effective manner. Moreover, the experience gained in the Lake Chad basin highlighted in resolution 2341 (2017) should be considered a model for the larger-scale development of a strategy for the return, rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighters.

We welcome the report's reference to a human rights-compliant approach in countering Da'esh, which must remain central to the international community's counter-terrorism strategy. We cannot expect to build an effective and credible counter narrative without a crystal-clear record of upholding human rights and promoting fundamental freedoms, including when

it comes to monitoring terrorists' exploitation of information and communications technology.

Finally, international cooperation is crucial to countering terrorism. The United Nations must continue to play a leading role in fostering law enforcement and judicial cooperation, including through its agencies and offices, to strengthen responses to ISIL at the regional and global levels. We therefore fully support the proposal to establish a new counter terrorism office in order to increase the effectiveness of United Nations assistance to Member States through enhanced coordination and streamlining. Likewise, Italy is closely following the implementation of resolution 2322 (2016) adopted on 12 December. The 8 May Arria Formula meeting, dedicated to the role of national central authorities, represents one of Italy's specific contributions in that regard.

**Mr. Delattre** (France) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, let me warmly thank Jeffrey Feltman for his illuminating presentation of the Secretary-General's report on the threat posed by Da'esh. I also convey, on behalf of France, my most heartfelt condolences to all of our partners who have suffered from the terrorist attacks of the last two weeks.

Nothing can justify the targeting of civilian populations and cowardly attacking innocent people, as occurred in Manchester, Baghdad, Kabul, Manila, London, and, yesterday, in Tehran — to cite just the most recent examples. More than ever before, we must be completely committed to fighting terrorism and to curbing the barbarism of Da'esh. The President of the French Republic, Mr. Emmanuel Macron, has strongly reaffirmed that this fight is a priority and has announced that France will step up its efforts in that area, in particular by establishing a coordination unit that would report directly to him.

The Secretary-General's report (S/2017/467) clearly points out that Da'esh has continued to suffer major defeats in Iraq and Syria, due in particular to the efforts of the international coalition. We must continue to fight Da'esh terrorists in their strongholds in Syria and Iraq and prevent them from extending their control over other areas in the Middle East, Libya and, importantly, the Sahel. In that regard, the start of the battle to retake Raqqa, which has led to the planning of attacks to be carried out in France and Europe, is a major issue and a top priority for my country.

But above and beyond our military efforts, I would like to emphasize three areas in which we can and must do better.

First of all, the fight against the financing of terrorism must remain a top priority, in line with resolution 2253 (2015). Although it cannot be denied that Da'esh is facing financial difficulties, we should not underestimate the ability of the group and its supporters to adapt and diversify their sources of income. We must therefore remain fully committed to drying up the sources of Da'esh financing. That will require specific and concerted efforts to monitor suspicious funds and transactions, reduce anonymity, limit the use of cash in the economy and strengthen cooperation among all institutions concerned.

Secondly, the dynamic flows of foreign terrorist fighters must compel us to constantly adapt our legislation and systems. Apart from the need to continue to prevent radicalization and stop people from leaving, we must anticipate the risks posed by those who might return and by fighters who decide to remain in a third country. That would mean improving our detection tools, strengthening information-sharing and devising an appropriate response when fighters and their entourage seek to return to our countries. It is an extremely complex exercise because every situation is different. In the case of France in particular, there are many women and children to be taken into consideration. We must be able to respond to that challenge; we are working on to address it.

Finally, we must continue and step up the fight against ideas. Since terrorists use digital technology to their advantage, we must also change the way we respond. Combating Da'esh via the Internet is a new element in our fight. We must therefore continue to have frank discussions with major Internet groups on ways to counter deadly Da'esh propaganda. Above and beyond the commitment from Governments, the effectiveness of our efforts also depends on the participation of civil society. The contradictions espoused by terrorist groups must be explained on the ground.

To counter those who wish to destroy our way of life, freedom and democracy, let us all be resolute in our multi-pronged fight, while maintaining respect for our values and the law. That will show that the United Nations is also engaged in the fight against terrorism and Da'esh.

**Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia):** I would like to express appreciation to Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing, which was based on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2017/467). We found the report very comprehensive and informative.

ISIL has indeed been under continuous military pressure, facing several setbacks on the battlefield, but what remains of serious concern is the fact that the group continues to inspire a range of attacks outside of the conflict zone. Returnees and fighters who relocated from conflict zones to other regions now pose a considerable threat to international security. Let me say in parenthesis that that has been a major problem in our region for a very long time — long before it was drawn to the attention of the Security Council.

With regard to East Africa, we already see ISIL cells in Somalia. The report acknowledges emerging ISIL affiliates operating in Puntland and in parts of southern Somalia. That certainly complicates the challenge of the terrorist threat posed by Al Qa'ida's affiliate Al-Shabaab, which remains a major threat to the region and beyond, as the report has quite rightly noted. There are also interesting reports by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which reinforce those findings and provide useful insights.

ISIL has found a foothold in North Africa in reaction to the continuous pressure in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and has also become a source of concern in that region. As Under-Secretary-General Feltman stated, although ISIL in Libya has weakened after losing a significant portion of the territory it controlled, the threat persists in that country and the wider region. It is impossible to state that the trajectory is promising. The organization of Al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and factions of Al Qa'ida affiliates, such as Boko Haram and the number of terrorist attacks attributed to them show how ISIL is expanding in the wider region.

Restoring peace and stability in Libya, Mali and the Lake Chad basin is indeed critical to denying ISIL safe haven. What complicates the challenge in West Africa and North Africa is the link between terrorist groups and organized criminal networks involved in trafficking, in particular of weapons and related

material. That is why there should be renewed efforts to develop concrete regional and international cooperation to counter the threat posed by ISIL in those regions.

Enhancing the capacity of countries of the Lake Chad basin region, will continue to be very significant in countering ISIL and its affiliates operating in the wider region. In that regard, we reiterate our appreciation to the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force in assisting countries of the region to develop a counter-terrorism strategy and enhance their counter-terrorism capacity.

ISIL in Yemen continues to conduct deadly extensive multi-pronged attacks. ISIL in Afghanistan has also been trying to establish itself in a number of areas. The rise of ISIL groups in South East Asia has been of growing concern. The latest attack, in Tehran, which we condemn most vehemently, underscores the extent of the common danger that the world faces: terrorist-financing risks, the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and returnees, terrorist exploitation of information and communication technologies and social media and the internet. They are the new frontiers, as the representative of France pointed out. Vulnerabilities in certain sectors, including non-profit organizations and money remitters, remain serious challenges.

Such a huge challenge ought to compel the United Nations, Member States and regional, subregional and international organizations to forge meaningful cooperation, strengthen existing tools and develop new ones to address the rapidly evolving threat posed by ISIL and other terrorist organizations and their affiliates. One thing cannot be denied, namely, the world has yet to agree in a transparent manner on making the fight against terror a common top priority. We are not there yet. We should not kid ourselves on that point. Without a doubt, the case at hand is one of not putting one's money where one's mouth is.

In that connection, on 22 June, Ethiopia, together with Italy, will organize an Arria Formula meeting on the theme "Preventing terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa — enhancing partnership for regional efforts". We hope that the meeting will help enhance awareness about efforts being made in the prevention of, and the fight against, terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa and strengthen cooperation and collaboration among the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the

United Nations and other partners. We look forward to the members' active participation.

**Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for briefing us on the findings of the Secretary-General's report (S/2017/467) on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We are pleased that the Secretary-General has resumed the practice of providing a comprehensive review of this terrorist organization's presence throughout the world, which is important for a better understanding of an evolving threat posed by ISIL and its affiliates.

I join others in noting encouraging signs that resolute international efforts have become detrimental for ISIL. It is continually losing ground in Iraq and Syria due to heightened military pressure. I want to commend the Iraqi security forces and the international counter-ISIL coalition for their efforts to bring the liberation of Mosul to a successful conclusion. The crackdown on the terrorist stronghold in Raqqa, Syria, is the next decisive step towards ensuring the waning of ISIL's influence.

Ongoing problems in generating revenue have forced ISIL to cut support to its affiliates, thereby downscaling their abilities to expand their presence and to carry out massive attacks. Their attempts to move funds abroad open up opportunities for the international community to further deplete its financial resources by intercepting couriers and money transfers. A decrease in the numbers of foreign terrorist fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria and a diminished capability by ISIL to control its fighters have become tendencies that limit its manpower. Many States have started to review their national counter-terrorism legislation, including their respective strategies, the mobilization of resources and the establishment of specialized counter-terrorism units.

I would now also like to address a number of points of particular concern for us.

On the evolution of the threat, recent terrorist attacks across the world reveal a new trend, that is, to inspire rather than send fighters to carry out impromptu attacks in their own countries on behalf of ISIL. Such attacks are extremely hard to prevent. It is known that ISIL has established online groups to recruit and indoctrinate, as well as to disseminate operational strategies through private channels. How can we counter such threats?

First, we can eliminate drivers fuelling radicalization and by promoting social cohesion, which will allow States to greatly complicate terrorist tasks. Secondly, the development of counter-narratives will curb terrorist recruiters' efficiency in attracting new followers. Thirdly, fostering close contacts with local communities will go a long way in helping to identify radicalized elements early and to take necessary actions in order to disrupt terrorist plots.

With regard to terrorist financing, the Secretary-General's report indicates that there has been a significant decrease in ISIL's revenues from the illicit trade in hydrocarbons, largely due to military operations targeting related infrastructure. Yet the smuggling of natural resources continues and we lack information on the overall effectiveness of neighbouring countries' efforts to arrest vendors and identify buyers who contribute to financing terrorist activities. We would appreciate it if the Secretary-General could expand on that issue in his next reports.

As to returning foreign terrorist fighters, returnees undoubtedly pose a real threat, as they possess lethal skills and can put them to use with dire consequences. Therefore, there is a growing need to ensure a wider criminalization of foreign terrorist fighters and conduct an exchange of evidence of their crimes. Otherwise, they could be released and be free to travel. Another worrying fact is that some States deport foreign terrorist fighters to their countries of origin without informing the latter.

Rapid information-sharing, especially of the biometric data of foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the effective use of respective Interpol databases, should become a priority if we are to stem the flows of such fighters. Their abuse of asylum systems also constitutes a major problem at a time when the huge waves of migrants arrive from conflict zones in order to find shelter. It is time to take a more thorough look at that very serious and, at the same time, human rights-sensitive issue.

Recently, ISIL has suffered numerous setbacks and defeats on the battlefield. However, we are still far from completely eradicating ISIL. The terrorist organization has demonstrated its ability to regenerate and change shape, moving underground and resorting to asymmetric attacks when it is weakened. Therefore, the international community has to draw lessons from this and develop a viable "day after" strategy that will

address and resolve the root causes that instigated ISIL's creation in order to prevent its resurrection.

**Mr. Wu Haitao** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China thanks Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing.

China welcomes the Secretary-General's report (S/2017/467) on the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to international peace and security.

Recently, Egypt, Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, France and Iran suffered terrorist attacks. The attacks caused enormous civilian casualties and significant property losses. Terrorism is a common enemy of humankind and its impact goes beyond borders. No country can respond to terrorism singlehandedly or insulate itself from the scourge. The international community should embrace the concept of a community bound by a common destiny, identify new trends and patterns in the evolution of terrorism, enhance cooperation and work collectively to respond to the threat.

First, we must garner international consensus on the fight against terrorism. Terrorism represents a threat to humankind. The international community should uphold unified standards, adopt a zero-tolerance approach without any distinction. Regardless of a terrorist's location, their pretexts, which country they are targeting or which tactics they use, terrorism must be fought with resolve. International counter-terrorism efforts must respect the sovereignty of the countries concerned, which bear the primary responsibility of fighting terrorism. Those efforts must also defer to the leading role of the United Nations and the Security Council and abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Terrorism shall not be associated with any specific ethnicity or religion.

Secondly, we must eliminate breeding grounds of terrorism. At present the major terrorist elements and forces are entrenched in conflict zones, including Iraq and Syria, benefiting from regional turmoil, launching terrorist attacks in regions beyond conflict zones and threatening regional and international peace and security. The international community should address regional hotspots with a heightened sense of urgency, encourage the relevant parties to resolve regional conflicts through political processes and dialogue, maintain regional peace, stability and development, and eradicate the causes of terrorism at an early date.

Thirdly, we must disrupt the terrorist transit network. With continuous progress being made in international counter-terrorism efforts, terrorist fighters are travelling to or returning to other countries in the relevant regions and beyond, seriously threatening the security of countries of destination, transit and origin. The countries concerned must enhance cooperation in the fields of border control and law enforcement, share information and intelligence, disrupt terrorist transit networks and respond collectively to the threat posed by returning terrorists.

Fourthly, we must cut off the financing channels for terrorist activities. These are increasingly diversified and include the plundering of natural resources; narcotics and human trafficking; and the smuggling of cultural relics, with the funds raised being used for terrorist activities. The international community must take countermeasures and implement the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015); enhance financial regulations and enforcement cooperation; and crack down on all forms of financing by terrorist organizations.

Fifthly, it is important to suppress the use of the Internet by terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations are using the Internet and social media as a platform to spread their violent and extremist ideologies and to disseminate terrorist propaganda as well as engage in financing, recruitment and the incitement and planning of terrorist activities. All States must fully implement the relevant Security Council resolutions and enhance cyber legislation, enforcement and regulation. The United Nations should play a coordinating role in the international community's efforts to carry out pragmatic cooperation and collectively crack down on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

China is an important member of the international force against terrorism. In recent years China has participated in meaningful ways in multilateral counter-terrorism mechanisms, including the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Global Counterterrorism Forum. China will continue to participate and to promote multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, enhance the sharing of counter-terrorism intelligence, and provide counter-terrorism supplies and capacity-building to developing countries to the extent of our ability.

China stands ready to work with all countries to respond collectively to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism and to maintain international peace and stability.

**Mr. Awad (Egypt)** (*spoke in Arabic*): I should like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for his briefing.

The fifth report of the Secretary-General on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (S/2017/467) covers many important aspects related to international counter-terrorism efforts. It includes specific proposals, but also reflects the existence of a number of gaps that should be focused on in future. We call on the Secretariat and the members of the Council to pay attention to them.

Allow me to summarize these gaps through a number of queries and observations.

First, paragraph 5 of the report notes that the flow of foreign terrorist fighters from many regions to Iraq and Syria has slowed and that the return and relocation of foreign terrorist fighters from conflict zones to other regions poses a threat to international security. We would like to have greater elaboration and more detail on these two points, in particular, how do foreign terrorist fighters still manage to reach Syria and Iraq? Which routes do they follow to get there, and how do they go from Syria and Iraq to other countries or regions? These are questions that should be answered.

Secondly, in the context of the problem of foreign terrorist fighters, paragraph 48 mentions that transit States are facing a challenge as they cannot detain, prosecute or extradite suspected foreign terrorist fighters on their territory in the absence of sufficient legal grounds and admissible evidence, and that there is therefore a risk that foreign terrorist fighters stopped in transit States will remain free to travel to other places.

The question here is, how can the Security Council address these security and legal gaps in its counter-terrorism efforts? We look forward to receiving specific proposals from the Secretary-General and the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Thirdly, paragraph 6 of the report refers to the use by ISIL of the Internet and social media for terrorist purposes. There is also a general recommendation in paragraph 61 on the importance of effectively monitoring the exploitation by terrorists of information and communications technologies. In this respect, there

should be specific recommendations to stem the flow of terrorists and stop the capacity of terrorists to recruit.

Fourthly, the report also indicates that although ISIL's financial situation has steadily declined over the past 16 months, it continues to rely on the same two revenue streams, in particular hydrocarbons and taxation. If ISIL is continuing to trade in hydrocarbons, who is consuming this oil? What are the means of moving oil from Syria and Iraq to the consumer or the buyer? We would also like information on the nature of financial transactions related to these activities.

Fifthly, pursuant to Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2161 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015), all Member States have an obligation to prevent terrorists from benefiting, directly or indirectly, from ransom payments or from political concessions. In that vein, it is everywhere in the news that Qatar paid up to \$1 billion dollars to a terrorist group active in Iraq in order to obtain the release of members of its royal family who had been kidnapped and detained in Iraq by that group while they were on a hunting trip. If proved to be correct, that alleged violation of Security Council resolutions will definitely have a negative bearing on counter-terrorism efforts on the ground. It represents clear support for terrorists. We therefore would like to know the Secretariat's view on the matter, namely, a Da'esh-linked group gaining access to such a sum of money at a time when efforts are being undertaken to liberate Mosul. We also want to know how the Security Council will respond to such flagrant violations of its resolutions. We propose that the Council launch a comprehensive investigation into the incident and other similar incidents. We look forward to incorporating the results of such investigations into the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the efforts to counter Da'esh.

Finally, my delegation wishes to see greater accuracy in the use of terms and concepts that have been heard recently at the United Nations. One term that has not appeared in our documents is "Islamic extremism". We hope that everyone realizes that there is no such thing as Islamic extremism. Islam is a religion that does not know extremism. There are individuals who use religion — the religion of Islam, or any other religion — as a cover for the terrorist ideology they wish to espouse. We therefore believe that the Council has taken a very important step in countering such ideology through the adoption of resolution 2354 (2017) and the Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives.

**Mr. Sadykov** (Kazakhstan): Joining previous speakers, I wish to offer Kazakhstan's deepest condolences to the Government and the people of Iran for the horrific terrorist attack that took place in Tehran on 7 June. We extend our sympathies to the bereaved families of the victims and wish a speedy recovery to the injured.

I thank the Bolivian presidency for convening today's briefing, and Secretary-General Guterres for his comprehensive report (S/2017/467) on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), Al-Qaida and their associates. I also wish to express appreciation to Under-Secretary-General Feltman for his insightful remarks. My delegation would like to make the following observations and recommendations.

Terrorism today has become one of the main threats to international peace and security. While the military pressure in Syria and Iraq may have somewhat reduced the strength and numbers of militants in centralized locations and caused their financial revenues to diminish, ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida have intensified their terrorist activities across the world. The most recent terrorist acts have been as widespread in Europe — Saint Petersburg, Stockholm, London — as in Africa, with the attack in Alexandria, in Asia, with the attacks in Kabul, Manila and Tehran, and in Oceania, with the attack in Melbourne. They have all caused unspeakable human suffering and resulted in appallingly high losses of life.

Kazakhstan condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We reiterate that all acts of terrorism — wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed — are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation. We therefore call for rigorous concerted action to control and prevent such brutal acts. We call for the breaking up of terrorist networks and the bringing to justice of the perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of such violence.

We are seeing members of terrorist groups relocating to the different parts of the world, including to the Sahel region, South-East Asia and Afghanistan. We are also seeing closer interaction and cooperation among terrorist groups with different ideological platforms. The recent tragic events show that, at an increasing rate, foreign terrorist fighters are going from hot spots to other States or returning to their homeland. More challenging are the perpetrators who, without ever leaving their home countries, have become self-

radicalized as “lone wolves” or have made contact with terrorist facilitators and have copied scenarios they have found on the Internet.

We fully support Secretary-General Guterres’ vision of giving priority to a preventive agenda and taking comprehensive measures at international, regional and national levels to prevent the dissemination of radical ideology and thereby effectively counter terrorism. We are convinced that the establishment of a single United Nations structure for countering terrorism will give a new impetus for a systematic approach and increase the effectiveness of United Nations activities in this area.

In his policy address to the United Nations entitled “Kazakhstan’s Concept and Vision on Sustaining Global Partnerships for a Secure, Just and Prosperous World”, dated 10 January 2017, the President of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Mr. Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, underlined that countering terrorism is one of the priority axes of Kazakhstan’s membership in the Security Council. He called for unity among Member States and the establishment of a global anti-terrorist coalition under the auspices of the United Nations.

Soon after the adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, Central Asia was the first region to develop a joint plan of action for its implementation, which was a good model for cooperation and one that could be applied in other parts of the world. We have successfully completed phases I and II of our plan of action and are going to launch phase III at the High-level Dialogue on the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Central Asia, to be held on 13 June in Ashgabat. We are honoured to welcome the presence of Secretary-General Guterres at that event. As of today, Kazakhstan has donated \$300,000 to support activities of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Centre in Central Asia, which is more than 10 per cent of the funding for the project. We are therefore both a sponsor of the Strategy and the leading donor country in the region.

It is crucial to mobilize the United Nations and all stakeholders, including intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as international, regional and private banks, in consolidating, integrating and exchanging information on early-warning signals, financial intelligence, movements of terrorists and the financing of terrorism. Equally important is taking further comprehensive measures to shut down the channels of illegal

transportation of hydrocarbons and the smuggling of artefacts and other valuables from Syria and Iraq. It is also crucially important to fully implement Security Council sanctions resolutions and regimes.

To that end, inter-State cooperation is most essential. We appreciate the noble efforts of the United Nations system in that regard. Along with monitoring progress on resolution 2253 (2015), it is equally important to monitor progress in the implementation of related resolutions, namely, resolution 2341 (2017), on protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, resolution 2347 (2017), on the destruction and trafficking of cultural heritage by terrorist groups in situations of armed conflicts, and resolution 2354 (2017), on countering extremist narratives.

We need to deter the increasing number of sympathizers of terrorism, who are lured by false propaganda utilizing sophisticated digital technologies and social media. The challenge is not only to achieve a true balance between the rights and duties of citizens, but to halt such influences. The use of military action alone will be ineffective. Through interpersonal interactions and online communication, new revised and inspiring messages must be presented to the younger generation. That calls for working with parliamentarians, religious leaders, educators, the private sector, civil society and the media. Much work has to be done in families, schools, communities and prisons, the latter being a fertile environment for radicalization. Partnering with deradicalized extremists, who after conversion can become powerful allies and agents of change, will improve public diplomacy.

Kazakhstan is fully committed to being a most engaged partner in the multilateral action to combat terrorism through the effective implementation of resolution 2253 (2015).

**Mr. Ciss** (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, allow me to commend the Bolivian presidency for organizing this important meeting. I should also like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for his comprehensive briefing of the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (S/2017/467).

It appears that significant progress has been achieved in the struggle against ISIL, in particular in Iraq, Syria and Libya. That reflects the significant efforts undertaken by Member States to contain the terrorist threat with a view to ultimately stamping it

out. Clearly, the contribution of the United Nations Secretariat to that progress has been decisive, thanks in particular to the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team aimed at bolstering international cooperation in counter-terrorism.

However, as is underscored in the report, the challenges posed by international terrorism remain concerning. That was tragically underscored in the attacks that took place recently. The Senegalese delegation would therefore like to reaffirm its firm condemnation of the terrorist attacks that recently took place through the world, in particular in London, Kabul and Tehran. Those acts reveal the perpetrators' enduring capacity to cause harm and only heighten our concerns with regard to the consequences of the use of international organized crime for the financing of terrorist activity. It also reflects the degree to which it is critical to implement resolution 2195 (2014) and 2347 (2017).

The persistence of the challenge of international terrorism is a further reminder of the overriding need to redouble efforts to counter the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, whose return poses a grave threat to international peace and security, especially in areas of conflict where the State is struggling to assert its authority. The persistent challenge of terrorism furthermore requires an urgent establishment of peace, security and stability within countries and regions in crises, which have become safe havens for terrorists.

With regard to the African continent, the situation in Libya has been marked by a deadlock in the political process, which, more than ever before, remains troubling in the light of the threat being posed throughout the Sahelo-Saharan strip. The same applies to the Lake Chad basin, which remains unstable despite significant progress reported in combating Boko Haram. However, in Somalia, Al-Shabaab remains a major threat to peace and security throughout the Horn of Africa.

All of that is to say that we must undertake even greater efforts in countering terrorism financing, in particular by seeking better cooperation with regard to financial intelligence in counter-terrorism strategies. In that regard, I welcome the cooperation of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team with Senegal, which has led to the holding, in Dakar in December 2016, of the second meeting of intelligence service

directors of West Africa, Central Africa and North Africa with a view to strengthening their coordination.

It is also critical to adopt reintegration strategies for former foreign terrorist fighters in order to put an end to the phenomenon of violent extremism, which is a real phenomenon and exists even in prisons. In that regard, the recent adoption by the Council of resolution 2354 (2017) is an important tool to stamp out extremist rhetoric and discourse and a decisive step forward in the right direction. Likewise, the joint briefing (see S/PV.7936) held last month by the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) is an important example of a synergy of action in a context punctuated by the pressing need to step up international cooperation to prevent and combat the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations, but also to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks. In that regard, I would like to reiterate Senegal's firm condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and recall the need to conduct the necessary investigations in order to ensure accountability for the perpetrators.

In conclusion, I commend the ongoing commitment of States members of the Council to combat terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate the firm determination of Senegal to remaining steadfastly engaged in this common cause.

**The President** (*spoke in Spanish*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Plurinational State of Bolivia.

Bolivia wishes to thank Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing on the fifth report (S/2017/467) of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Da'esh to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat. As I was listening, I heard many of us remembering the areas that have been targets of terrorist attacks in recent months: Berlin, Istanbul, Kabul, Baghdad, Melbourne, Mogadishu, Saint Petersburg, Stockholm, Alexandria, Manchester, Paris, Manila, London and Tehran. Remembering the places in which hundreds of people have lost their lives and others have been injured reminds us of the fact that we are facing a global threat that requires a global response. The briefing by Under-Secretary-General Feltman, which showed that ISIL



has suffered setbacks in many areas of conflict, was very timely.

Bolivia is increasingly alarmed about the new ways in which ISIL/Da'esh is developing in terms of how it is carrying out its attacks and the countries in which it is doing so, above all with regard to financing. We must remember that ISIL/Da'esh has used its propaganda and information technology in order to attract sympathizers and to mount attacks in countries where it resides, focusing on methodologies to develop improvised explosive devices. The finances of Da'esh have been reduced somewhat, but they have compensated by imposing additional taxes over the populations it controls and via trafficking in smuggled antiquities and agricultural products, selling electricity, extracting minerals, "foreign donations" and kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking, in addition to selling hydrocarbons.

We also condemn the destruction of, and trafficking in, cultural heritage — directly or indirectly — as well as, among others, the destruction of archeological sites, museums and libraries, which generates income for this terrorist group's recruitment and strengthening. It is all the more worrying that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict has documented cases of "selling, gifting and trading" of women and children among fighters. We therefore urge Council members to join efforts to combat that human scourge.

We welcome the fact that United Nations Member States and regional, subregional and international organizations are continuing to develop and strengthen new tools to improve the response to those rapidly evolving threats from ISIL/Da'esh and from foreign terrorist fighters. However, we believe that is not enough. We urge that States provide adequate humanitarian protection and assistance to refugees fleeing from conflict zones, including support in connection with the increase in migratory flows owing to the impact of ISIL/Da'esh in such areas.

Finally, Bolivia supports the various initiatives put forward at this meeting, in particular those relating to cutting off financing for terrorism. In that connection, we highlight the fact that there is a need to focus on investigations into the use of financial safe havens for the funding of terrorism. In addition, we should take effective measures with regard to returning foreign terrorist fighters, as well as on countering terrorist propaganda.

At the same time, however, we think it is crucial that we not forget some of the structural causes of terrorism and the evolution, in this instance, of ISIL/Da'esh. Interventionist and regime-change policies are among the causes behind the wave of terror we are experiencing in many countries today.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

*The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.*

Exhibit 11

‘Arab states release list of Qatar-supported terror financiers’, Saudi Gazette, 9 June 2017

## Arab states release list of Qatar-supported terror financiers

Arab states release list of Qatar-supported terror financiers

🕒 263 days ago



*Qatar Charity*

**RIYADH** — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain have jointly named 59 individuals and 12 groups that have financed terrorist organizations and received support from Qatar in the past, according to a joint statement.

The statement said, the four countries released the names in “light of their commitment to fight terrorism, drying up their sources of funding, combating extremist ideology and its dissemination and promotion, and working together to exterminate it and protect all communities.”

<http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/180172/Arab-states-release-list-of-Qatar-supported-terror...> 2/27/2018

Due to the continued violation by the authorities in Doha of the obligations and agreements signed by them, including the pledge not to support or harbor elements or organizations that threaten the security of states and to ignore the repeated contacts that they called upon to fulfill what they had signed in the Riyadh Agreement of 2013, its implementing mechanism and the supplementary agreement in 2014; the government of Qatar has undermined the national security of our Four States and exposed each state to threats, subversion, and the spread of instability by individuals and terrorist organizations operating from Qatar and or supported by it.

“Thus, the four States have agreed to classify 59 individuals and 12 entities on their prohibited lists of terrorists, which will be updated in succession and announced,” the statement added.

“The majority of those entities sanctioned are linked to Qatar and are a manifestation of a Qatari government policy of duplicity — one that calls for combating terrorism, whilst simultaneously overseeing the financing, supporting and harboring a vast array of terrorist groups and terrorist financing networks,” the statement said.

“The four states renew their commitment to enhance all efforts to counter terrorism and to lay the foundations for security and stability in the region. Each reaffirms their respective commitment to pursue individuals and groups perpetuating acts of terror, regionally and globally,” the statement said.

“Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain will continue to work with partners around the world towards finding solutions to counter terrorist organizations and extremist groups,” the statement added.

In making this statement , the four states, while appreciating partner states for their support to counter terrorism, extremism and violence, call for continued and renewed efforts and cooperation in defeating the scourge of terrorism. — SPA

**List of designated individuals:**

1. Khalifa Mohammed Turki al-Subaie - Qatari
2. Abdelmalek Mohammed Yousef Abdel Salam - Jordanian
3. Ashraf Mohammed Yusuf Othman Abdel Salam - Jordanian
4. Ibrahim Eissa Al-Hajji Mohammed Al-Baker - Qatari
5. Abdulaziz Bin Khalifa al-Attayah - Qatari
6. Salem Hassan Khalifa Rashid al-Kawari - Qatari
7. Abdullah Ghanem Muslim al-Khawar - Qatari
8. Saad Bin Saad Mohammed al-Kaabi - Qatari

9. Abdullatif bin Abdullah al-Kawari - Qatari
10. Mohammed Saeed Bin Helwan al-Sakhtari - Qatari
11. Abdul Rahman bin Omair al-Nuaimi - Qatari
12. Abdul Wahab Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Hmeikani - Yemeni
13. Khalifa bin Mohammed al-Rabban - Qatari
14. Abdullah Bin Khalid al-Thani - Qatari
15. Abdul Rahim Ahmad al-Haram - Qatari
16. Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammed al-Ajmi - Kuwaiti
17. Mubarak Mohammed al-Ajji - Qatari
18. Jaber bin Nasser al-Marri - Qatari
19. Youssef Abdullah al-Qaradawi - Egyptian
20. Mohammed Jassim al-Sulaiti - Qatari
21. Ali bin Abdullah al-Suwaidi - Qatari
22. Hashem Saleh Abdullah al-Awadhi - Qatari
23. Ali Mohammed Mohammed al-Salabi - Libyan
24. Abdelhakim Belhadj - Libyan
25. Mahdi Harati - Libyan
26. Ismail Muhammad Mohammed al-Salabi - Libyan
27. Al-Sadiq Abdulrahman Ali al-Ghuryani - Libyan
28. Hamad Abdullah Al-Futtais al-Marri - Qatar
29. Mohamed Ahmed Shawky Islambouli - Egyptian
30. Tariq Abdelmawgoud Ibrahim al-Zomor - Egyptian
31. Mohamed Abdelmaksoud Mohamed Afifi - Egyptian
32. Mohamed el-Saghir Abdel Rahim Mohamed - Egyptian
33. Wajdi Abdelhamid Mohamed Ghoneim - Egyptian
34. Hassan Ahmed Hassan Mohammed Al Dokki Al Houti - UAE
35. Hakem Obeisan al-Humaidi al-Mutairi - Saudi / Kuwaiti
36. Abdullah Mohammed Sulaiman al-Moheiseni - Saudi
37. Hamed Abdullah Ahmed al-Ali - Kuwaiti
38. Ayman Ahmed Abdel Ghani Hassanein - Egyptian
39. Assem Abdel-Maged Mohamed Madi - Egyptian
40. Yahya Aqil Salman Aqeel - Egyptian
41. Mohamed Hamada el-Sayed Ibrahim - Egyptian
42. Abdel Rahman Mohamed Shokry Abdel Rahman - Egyptian
43. Hussein Mohamed Reza Ibrahim Youssef - Egyptian
44. Ahmed Abdelhafiz Mahmoud Abdelhady - Egyptian
45. Muslim Fouad Tafran - Egyptian
46. Ayman Mahmoud Sadeq Rifat - Egyptian
47. Mohamed Saad Abdel-Naim Ahmed - Egyptian

48. Mohamed Saad Abdel Muttalib Abdo Al-Razki - Egyptian
49. Ahmed Fouad Ahmed Gad Beltagy - Egyptian
50. Ahmed Ragab Ragab Soliman - Egyptian
51. Karim Mohamed Mohamed Abdel Aziz - Egyptian
52. Ali Zaki Mohammed Ali - Egyptian
53. Naji Ibrahim Ezzouli - Egyptian
54. Shehata Fathi Hafez Mohammed Suleiman - Egyptian
55. Muhammad Muharram Fahmi Abu Zeid - Egyptian
56. Amr Abdel Nasser Abdelhak Abdel-Barry - Egyptian
57. Ali Hassan Ibrahim Abdel-Zaher - Egyptian
58. Murtada Majeed al-Sindi - Bahraini
59. Ahmed Al-Hassan al-Daski - Bahraini

List of entities:

1. Qatar Volunteer Center - Qatar
2. Doha Apple Company (Internet and Technology Support Company) - Qatar
3. Qatar Charity - Qatar
4. Sheikh Eid al-Thani Charity Foundation (Eid Charity) - Qatar
5. Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services - Qatar
6. Saraya Defend Benghazi - Libya
7. Saraya al-Ashtar - Bahrain
8. February 14 Coalition - Bahrain
9. The Resistance Brigades - Bahrain
10. Hezbollah Bahrain - Bahrain
11. Saraya al-Mukhtar - Bahrain
12. Harakat Ahrar Bahrain - Bahrain Movement

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Exhibit 12

'Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain issue terror list', 9 June 2017

Tue 27 Feb 2018

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
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## Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain issue terror list

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01 : 57 AM - 09/06/2017

Manama, June 9 (BNA): The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain have listed 59 individuals and 12 entities as banned terrorists.

The list will be updated, the four countries said in a joint statement to announce the names and to stress their commitment to fighting terrorism.

The list was drawn up in light of the shared commitment of the four countries to the fight against terrorism and its funding sources and to the combat against extremist ideology and means of promoting it as well as to their joint action to eliminate the two phenomena and to shield societies from them, the statement added.

The list is also the result of "the continued violation by the authorities in Doha of its signed commitments and agreements that included a pledge not to support or harbour elements or organisations that threatened the security of states."

Qatar ignored the repeated contacts that called it to honour the Riyadh Agreement and its executive mechanism it signed in 2013 and its 2014 complementary agreement, the statement added.

Such attitudes put the national security of the four countries at risk as targets for acts of sabotage and chaos by members of terrorist organisations that Qatar either hosts or supports them.

This list is linked to Qatar and serves suspicious agendas in an indication of Qatar's double standard policy that announces it is fighting terrorism while at the same time it is financing, supporting and harbouring various terrorist organisations.

The four countries reaffirmed in the statement their commitment to consolidating all efforts to combat terrorism and to strengthen the pillars of security and stability in the region.

They also reaffirmed that they will be relentless in pursuing the individuals and groups on the list, will resort to all means in this context at the regional and international levels and will continue to combat terrorist activities and to target the financing of terrorism regardless of its source.

The four countries aid they would continue to work with partners around the world to effectively reduce the activities of terrorist and extremist organizations and groups that should not be tolerated by any state.

"The states that have issued this statement reiterate their thanks to the countries that support them in their actions in the fight against terrorism, extremism and violence and upon which they rely to continue their efforts and cooperation to eradicate this phenomenon which has affected the world and harmed humanity."

The list:

Individuals:

1. Khalifa Mohammed Turki Al Subai - Qatar
2. Abdulmalik Mohammed Yousuf Abdulsalam – Jordan
3. Ashraf Mohammed Yousuf Othman Abdulsalam – Jordan
4. Ibrahim IsaAl Hajji Mohammed Al Baker – Qatar
5. Abdulaziz bin Khalifa Al Attiya – Qatar
6. Salem Hasan Khalifa Rashid Al Kawari – Qatar
7. Abdullah Ghanim Musallam Al Khawar – Qatar
8. Saeed bin Saad Mohammed Al Kaabi – Qatar
9. Abdullateef bin Abdullah Al Kawari – Qatar
10. Mohammed Saeed bin Halwan Al Saqtari – Qatar
11. Abdulrahman bin Omair Al Nuaimi – Qatar
12. Abdulwahab Mohammed Abdulrahman Al Humaiqani – Yemen
13. Khalifa bin Mohammed Al Rabban – Qatar
14. Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani – Qatar



15. Abdullaheem Ahmed Al Haram – Qatar
16. Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammed Al Ajmi – Kuwait
17. Mubarak Mohammed Al Aji – Qatar
18. Jaber bin Nasser Al Merri – Qatar
19. Yousuf Abdullah Al Qaradawi – Egypt
20. Mohammed Jassem Al Sulaiti – Qatar
21. Ali bin Abdullah Al Suwaidi – Qatar
22. Hashem Saleh Abdullah Al Awadhi – Qatar
23. Ali Mohammed Mohammed Al Salabi – Libya
24. Abdulhakim Belhaj – Libya
25. Al Mahdi Harati – Libya
26. Ismail Mohammed Mohammed Al Salabi – Libya
27. Al Sadiq Abdulrahman Ali Al Gharyani – Libya
28. Hamad Abdullaj Al Fatees Al Merri – Qatar
29. Mohammed Ahmed Shawqi Al Islambouli – Egypt
30. Tariq Abdulmawjood Ibrahim Al Zembr – Egypt
31. Mohammed Abdulmaqsood Mohammed Afifi – Egypt
32. Mohammed Al Sagheer Abdullaheem Mohammed – Egypt
33. Wajdi Abdulhameed Mohammed Ghaim – Egypt
34. Hassan Ahmed Hassan Mohammed Al Daqi Al Hooti – UAE
35. Hakem Abaisan Al Humaidi Al Mutairi – Saudi / Kuwaiti
36. Abdullah Mohammed Sulaiman Al Muhaisni – Saudi
37. Hamed Abdullaj Ahmed Al Ali – Kuwait
38. Ayman Ahmed Abdulghani Husainain – Egypt
39. Asem Abdulmajed Mohammed Madhi – Egypt
40. Yahya Aqeel Saalman Aqeel – Egypt
41. Mohammed Hamada Al Sayyed Ibrahim – Egypt
42. Abdulrahman Mohammed Shokri Abdulrahman – Egypt
43. Hussain Mohammed Ridha Ibrhim Yousuf – Egypt
44. Ahmed Abdulhafedh Mahmood Abdulhadi – Egypt
45. Muslim Fuad Tarfan – Egypt
46. Ayman Mahmood Sadiq Riffat – Egypt
47. Mohammed Saad Abdulnaim Ahmed – Egypt
48. Mohammed Saad Abdulmuttalib Abdah Al Razqi – Egypt
49. Ahmed Fuad Ahmed Jad Baltaji – Egypt
50. Ahmed Rajab Rajab Sulaiman – Egypt
51. Kareem Mohammed Mohammed Abdulaziz – Egypt
52. Ali Zaki Mohammed Ali – Egypt
53. Naji Ibrahim Al Azooli – Egypt
54. Shahata Fathi Hafedh Mohammed Sulaiman – Egypt
55. Mohammed Muharram Fahmi Abuzaid – Egypt
56. Amr Abdunasser Abdulhaq Abdulbari – Egypt
57. Ali Hassan Ibrahim Abdul DHaher – Egypt
58. Murtadha Majeed Al Sindi – Bahrain
59. Ahmed Al Hassan Al Daaski - Bahrain

Entities:

1. Qatar Centre for Volunteer Work – Qatar
2. Doha Apple Company (Internet and IT support) – Qatar
3. Qatar Charity – Qatar
4. Shaikh Eid Al Thani Charity Foundation - Qatar
5. Shaikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services - Qatar
6. Benghazi Defence Brigade - Libya
7. Saraya Al Ashtar - Bahrain
8. February 14 Coalition - Bahrain
9. The Resistance Brigades - Bahrain

- 10. Hezbollah Bahrain - Bahrain
- 11. Al Mukhtar Brigade- Bahrain
- 12. Bahrain Freedom Movement - Bahrain

**Number of readings : 3859    Last updated : 08 : 51 AM - 09/06/2017**

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Exhibit 13

Letter from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain to the UN Secretary General, UN/SG/Qatar/257, 16 June 2017



UN/SG/Qatar/257

16 June 2017

Excellency:


We have the honor to transmit an official statement from the Governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain, conveying a list of designated terrorist individuals and entities, as of June 09, 2017.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hayfa A. Matar

  
Charge d'Affaires

Abdallah Y. Al-Mouallimi

  
Permanent Representative

Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta

  
Permanent Representative

Lana Nusseibeh

  
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. Antonio Guterres  
U.N. Secretary General  
United Nations, New York

Encs: as stated

**Statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain**

Jeddah, Ramadan 14, 1438, Jun 9, 2017, SPA --

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain are unified in their ongoing commitment to combatting terrorism, drying up the sources of its funding, countering extremist ideology and the tools of its dissemination and promotion, and to working together to defeat terrorism and protect all societies from its impact. The continuous and ongoing violations of the Authorities in Doha of Qatar's commitments and obligations, enshrined in agreements to which it is a signatory, have necessitated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain to act to update their respective lists of designated terrorist organizations and individuals. As a result (59) individuals and (12) entities have been designated by each of the four countries.

Qatar's actions in contravention of its commitments include supporting and harboring elements and organizations that threaten the National security of other States. The repeated ignoring of calls for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and its associated Implementation Mechanisms, and in addition the Comprehensive Agreement of 2014. As a result, the Government of Qatar has undermined the national security of our Four States and exposed each State to threats, subversion, and the spread of instability by individuals and terrorist organizations operating from Qatar and or supported by it.

The majority of those entities sanctioned are linked to Qatar and are a manifestation of a Qatari Government policy of duplicity. One that calls for combating terrorism, whilst simultaneously overseeing the financing, supporting and harboring a vast array of terrorist groups and terrorist financing networks.

The four States renew their commitment to their responsibilities in enhancing all efforts to counter terrorism and to laying the foundations for security and stability in the region. Each reaffirms their respective commitment to the pursuit of individuals and groups perpetuating acts of terror, regionally and globally.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain will continue to work with partners around the world towards finding solutions to countering terrorist organizations and extremist groups whose activities must not and cannot be ignored by any State.

In declaring this statement, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the Kingdom of Bahrain reaffirm their appreciation of partner States that have supported efforts to counter terrorism, extremism and violence, and call for continued and renewed efforts and cooperation in defeating the scourge of terrorism and its terrible impact on the global community.

The full list of designated terrorist individuals:

- 1- Khalifa Mohammed Turki Al-Subaie, Qatari.
- 2- Abdulmalik Mohammed Yousef Abdulsalam, Jordanian.
- 3- Ashraf Mohammed Youssef Othman Abdulsalam, Jordanian.
- 4- Ibrahim Issa Al-Hajji Mohammed Al-Baker, Qatari.
- 5- Abdulaziz bin Khalifa Al-Attiyah, Qatari.
- 6- Salem Hassan Khalifa Rashid Al-Kuwari, Qatari.
- 7- Abdullah Ghanim Muslim Al-Khawar, Qatari.
- 8- Saad bin Saad Mohammed Al-Kaabi, Qatari.
- 9- Abdullatif bin Abdullah Al-Kuwari, Qatari.
- 10- Mohammed Saeed bin Helwan Al-Saqatri, Qatari.
- 11- Abdulrahman bin Omair Al-Nuaimi, Qatari.
- 12- Abdulwahab Mohammed Abdulrahman Al-Humaiqani, Yemeni.
- 13- Khalifa bin Mohammed Al-Rabban, Qatari.
- 14- Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani, Qatari.
- 15- Abdulrahim Ahmad Al-Haram, Qatari.
- 16- Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammed Al-Ajmi, Kuwaiti.
- 17- Mubarak Mohammed Al-Ajji, Qatari.
- 18- Jaber bin Nasser Al-Marri, Qatari.
- 19- Youssef Abdullah Al-Qaradawi, Egyptian.
- 20- Mohammed Jassim Al-Sulaiti, Qatari.
- 21- Ali bin Abdullah Al-Suwaidi, Qatari.
- 22- Hashem Saleh Abdullah Al-Awadhi, Qatari.
- 23- Ali Mohammed Mohammed Al-Salabi, Libyan.
- 24- Abdulhakim Belhadj, Libyan.
- 25- Al-Mahdi Harati, Libyan.
- 26- Ismail Mohammed Mohammed Al-Salabi, Libyan.
- 27- Al-Sadiq Abdulrahman Ali Al-Gharyani, Libyan.
- 28- Hamad Abdullah Al-Fattis Al-Mari, Qatari.
- 29- Mohamed Ahmed Shawqi Al-Islambouli, Egyptian.
- 30- Tarik Abdulmaujood Ibrahim Al-Zomor, Egyptian.
- 31- Mohammed Abdulmaqsoud Mohammed Afifi, Egyptian.
- 32- Mohammed Al-Saghir Abdulrahim Mohammed, Egyptian.
- 33- Wajdi Abdulhamid Mohammed Ghonaim, Egyptian.
- 34- Hassan Ahmed Hassan Mohammed Al-Doqi Al-Houti, Emirati.
- 35- Hakim Ubaisan Al-Hamed Al-Mutairi, Saudi/Kuwaiti.
- 36- Abdullah Mohammed Sulaiman Al-Muhaisni, Saudi.
- 37- Hamed Abdullah Ahmed Al-Ali, Kuwaiti.
- 38- Ayman Ahmed Abdulghani Hassanein, Egyptian.
- 39- Assem Abdulmaged Mohamed Madi, Egyptian.
- 40- Yahya Aqeel Salman Aqeel, Egyptian.
- 41- Mohammed Hamada Al-Sayed Ibrahim, Egyptian.
- 42- Abdulrahman Mohammed Shukri Abdulrahman, Egyptian.

- 43- Hussein Mohamed Reza Ibrahim Youssef, Egyptian.
- 44- Ahmed Abdulhafiz Mahmoud Abdulhady, Egyptian.
- 45- Muslim Fouad Tafran, Egyptian.
- 46- Ayman Mahmoud Sadeq Rifat, Egyptian.
- 47- Mohammed Saad Abdalnaim Ahmed, Egyptian.
- 48- Mohammed Saad Abdulmuttalib Abdo Al-Razaki, Egyptian.
- 49- Ahmed Fouad Ahmed Jad Beltajy, Egyptian.
- 50- Ahmed Ragab Ragab Soliman, Egyptian.
- 51- Karim Mohammed Mohammed Abdulaziz, Egyptian.
- 52- Ali Zaki Mohammed Ali, Egyptian.
- 53- Naji Ibrahim Al-Azouli, Egyptian.
- 54- Shehata Fathi Hafez Mohammed Soliman, Egyptian.
- 55- Mohammed Muharram Fahmi Abu Zeid, Egyptian.
- 56- Amr Abdunnasser Abdulhaq Abdulbari, Egyptian.
- 57- Ali Hassan Ibrahim Abduldhafer, Egyptian.
- 58- Murtadha Majeed Al-Sindi, Bahraini.
- 59- Ahmad Al-Hassan Al-Daski, Bahraini.

The full list of designated terrorist entities:

- 1- Qatar Volunteer Center, Qatar.
- 2- Doha Apple Company (Internet and Technology Support Company), Qatar.
- 3- Qatar Charity, Qatar.
- 4- Sheikh Eid Al Thani Charity Foundation, Qatar.
- 5- Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services, Qatar.
- 6- Saraya Defend Benghazi, Libya.
- 7- Saraya Al-Ashtar, Bahrain.
- 8- February 14 Coalition, Bahrain.
- 9- The Resistance Brigades, Bahrain.
- 10- Hezbollah Bahrain, Bahrain.
- 11- Saraya Al-Mukhtar, Bahrain.
- 12- Harakat Ahrar Bahrain, Bahrain.

Exhibit 14

UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, Anti-terror quartet adds two entities, 11 individuals to terrorism lists, 23 November 2017



## NEWS

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# Anti-terror quartet adds two entities, 11 individuals to terrorism lists.

11/23/2017



## وزارة الخارجية والتعاون الدولي MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Arab Republic of Egypt have extended their terror lists, adding two entities and 11 individuals over ties to terrorism.

The quartet has issued the following statement: "In line with their commitment to fight terrorism, dry up its sources, and combat extremist ideologies and their promotion, and as part of their concerted action to end terrorism and shield

communities against it in collaboration with their partners, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Arab Republic of Egypt announce the addition of two entities and 11 individuals to their designated lists of terror as follows: -

Entities 1-The International Islamic Council.

2- The International Union for Muslim Scholars.

-Individuals:

1-Khalid Nazim Diab.

2-Salim Jaber Omar Ali Sultan Fathallah Jaber.

3-Maisar Ali Mousa Abdullah Al Jubouri.

4-Mohamed Ali Saeed Atm.

5-Hassan Ali Mohamed Goma' Sultan.

6-Mohamed Soliman Haider Mohamed Al Haider.

7-Mohamed Gamal Ahmed Heshmat Abdul Hamid.

8-Al Sayed Mohamed Izzet Ibrahim Issa.

9-Yahia Al Sayed Ibrahim Mohamed Mousa.

10-Qadri Mohamed Fahmi Mahmoud Al Sheikh.

11-Alaa Ali Ali Mohamed Al Samahi.

The added entities are terror organisations working for promoting terrorism by spreading hate speech under the cloak of Islam to facilitate different terrorist activities. The individuals have perpetrated different acts of terror directly funded by Qatar at various levels, including using Qatari passports and working under the cover of Qatari charitable organisations to facilitate their activities.

The four countries confirm that the Qatari authorities continue to support, sponsor and finance terrorism, encourage extremism and spread hate speech.

Based on the quartet's monitoring mechanisms, the Qatari authorities have not

taken any practical measures to cease terrorist activities.

The four countries reiterate their commitment to consolidating efforts aimed at countering terrorism and reinforcing pillars of security and stability in the region.

They also reaffirm that they will show no complacency in pursuing terrorist individuals and groups and will leverage all regional and international endeavours in this respect. They will continue to fight terrorist acts and target sources of terrorism funding - whatever its origin. They will also maintain the effective work with their partners across the world to contain activities of terrorist and extremist groups. No state should remain tight-lipped about these activities.

The four countries also thank all the nations which support their efforts to counter terrorism, extremism and violence and build on them in sustaining efforts and cooperation to eradicate the scourge whose evil harms all corners of the world and the humanity at large."

Exhibit 15

Narrative Summary: QDi.253 Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al-Subaiy, United Nations sanctions list issued by the Security Council Commission pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh) Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities, last updated 3 February 2016

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**SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS  
 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) AND 2253 (2015) CONCERNING ISIL  
 (DA'ESH) AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS GROUPS  
 UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTITIES**

## NARRATIVE SUMMARIES OF REASONS FOR LISTING

In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

### QDi.253 KHALIFA MUHAMMAD TURKI AL-SUBAIY

**Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:** 09 March 2009

**Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:** 19 February 2015  
 15 June 2015  
 03 February 2016

#### Reason for listing:

Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy was listed on 10 October 2008 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1822 (2008) as being associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of", "recruiting for" and "otherwise supporting the acts or activities of" Al-Qaida and its senior leadership.

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#### Additional information:

Khalifa Muhammad Turki al-Subaiy is a Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator who has provided financial support to, and acted on behalf of, the senior leadership of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). From the mid-2000s, he has provided financial support to Al-Qaida senior leadership in South Asia. He has also worked with Al-Qaida senior facilitators to move extremist recruits to Al-Qaida training camps in South Asia and has assisted in providing funds to them. He has also served as an envoy and communications link between Al-Qaida and third parties in the Middle East.

On 3 October 2007, along with four other individuals, Al-Subaiy was charged in absentia by the General Prosecutor in Bahrain that in 2006 and 2007 he had knowingly provided support and financing to terrorist groups.

On 16 January 2008, Al-Subaiy was convicted in absentia by the Bahrain High Criminal Court for financing terrorism and facilitating the travel of others abroad to receive terrorist training. He was arrested in Qatar in March 2008 and served a six-month sentence of imprisonment in Qatar. After his release, Al-Subaiy reconnected with Al-Qaida financiers and facilitators in the Middle East and resumed organizing funds in support of Al-Qaida. His involvement with Iran based facilitators continued in 2009, 2011 and throughout 2012 with money flowing to Al-Qaida leaders in Pakistan. As of early 2011, Al-Subaiy provided thousands of dollars intended for senior Al-Qaida officials in Pakistan and his funding activities in support of Al-Qaida continued into 2013.

### **Related listed individuals and entities:**

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001

Ashraf Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam (QDi.343), listed on 23 January 2015

'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman 'Abd al-Salam (QDi.346), listed on 23 January 2015

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Exhibit 16

Narrative Summary: QDi.334 ‘Abd al-Rahman bin ‘Umayr al-Nu’aymi, United Nations sanctions list issued by the Security Council Commission pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh) Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals Groups Undertakings and Entities, last updated 13 May 2016

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## SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) AND 2253 (2015) CONCERNING ISIL (DA'ESH) AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS GROUPS UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTITIES

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## NARRATIVE SUMMARIES OF REASONS FOR LISTING

In accordance with paragraph 36 of resolution 2161 (2014), the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

### QDi.334 'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Umayr al-Nu'aymi

**Date on which the narrative summary became available on the Committee's website:** 23 September 2014

**Date(s) on which the narrative summary was updated:** 13 May 2016

#### Reason for listing:

'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Umayr al-Nu'aymi was listed on 23 September 2014 pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4 of resolution 2161 (2014) as being associated with Al-Qaida for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of" and "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

#### Additional information:

In 2013, 'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Umayr al-Nu'aymi ordered the transfer of nearly \$600,000 to Al-Qaida (QDe.004) via an Al-Qaida representative in Syria, Abu-Khalid al-Suri (deceased), and intended to transfer nearly \$50,000 more.

Al-Nu'aymi has facilitated significant financial support to Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115), and served as an interlocutor between AQI leaders and Qatar-based donors. Al-Nu'aymi reportedly oversaw the transfer of over \$2 million

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AQI for a period of time.

In mid-2012, Al-Nu'aymi provided approximately \$250,000 for distribution to Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidiin leaders Hassan Dahir Aweys (QDi.042) and Mukhtar Robow (not listed), and intended to provide additional funding.

**Related listed individuals and entities:**

Al-Qaida (QDe.004), listed on 6 October 2001


Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), listed on 18 October 2004

Hassan Dahir Aweys (QDi.042), listed on 9 November 2001

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Exhibit 17

Joby Warrick & Tik Root, Islamic Charity Officials Gave Millions to Al-Qaeda, U.S. Says,  
Washington Post, 22 December 2013



National Security

# Islamic charity officials gave millions to al-Qaeda, U.S. says

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By **Joby Warrick and Tik Root** December 22, 2013

When Qatar's royal family was looking for advice on charitable giving, it turned to a well-regarded professor named Abd al-Rahman al-Nu'aymi. The 59-year-old educator had a stellar résumé that included extensive fundraising experience and years of work with international human rights groups.

But one apparent accomplishment was omitted from the list: According to U.S. officials, Nu'aymi also was working secretly as a financier for al-Qaeda, funneling millions of dollars to the terrorist group's affiliates in Syria and Iraq even as he led campaigns in Europe for greater freedoms for Muslims.

Nu'aymi was one of two men identified by Treasury Department officials last week as major financial backers of al-Qaeda and its regional chapters across the Middle East. Although U.S. officials routinely announce steps to disrupt terrorist financing networks, the individuals named in the latest case are far from ordinary. Both men have served as advisers to government-backed foundations in Qatar and have held high-profile positions with international human rights groups. The second man, a Yemeni, is heavily involved in his country's U.S.-backed political transition.

Their alleged dual roles — promoting humanitarian causes and civil rights while simultaneously supporting extremist groups — reflect a growing challenge for counterterrorism officials attempting to monitor the torrents of cash flowing to Islamist rebel groups in Syria, current and former U.S. officials say.

“Individuals with one foot in the legitimate world and another in the realm of terrorist financing provide al-Qaeda with a cloak of legitimacy,” said Juan Zarate, a former Treasury Department official and author of “Treasury’s Wars,” a book that describes U.S. efforts to penetrate terrorist financial networks. Zarate said such cases greatly complicate the “financial diplomacy” involved in attempting to disrupt terrorist support networks, especially private funding from wealthy Persian Gulf donors seeking to help Syria’s rebels.

Despite attempts by gulf states to crack down on jihadist financial networks, former and current U.S. officials have described a surge in private support for Islamist extremists in Syria, particularly in Qatar and Kuwait.

The Obama administration has repeatedly urged both countries to rein in private donations to jihadists, while acknowledging that new tactics, including the widespread use of Twitter and other social media, make fundraising more difficult to track.

“It is essential for countries to take proactive steps to disrupt terrorist financing, especially where al-Qaeda and its affiliates are concerned,” David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said in announcing financial restrictions against Nu’aymi and the Yemeni national, Abd al-Wahhab al-Humayqani. Cohen said the Obama administration would continue to work with the gulf region’s capitals to “ensure that charitable donations are not used to support violence.”

The administration’s action last week named both men as “specially designated global terrorists,” a determination that allows U.S. officials to freeze their financial assets and bar American citizens and companies from doing business with them. Treasury Department documents alleged that both men used their charity work to conceal efforts to raise millions of dollars for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, from Syria to the Horn of Africa.

The naming of the two officials raised eyebrows in Qatar and Yemen, where supporters viewed the allegations as politically motivated. Both men have been prominent critics of U.S. counterterrorism policies, particularly the use of drone strikes against terrorism suspects.

Nu’aymi, a Qatar University professor and former president of the Qatar Football Association, was a founding member of a prominent charity — the Sheik Eid bin Mohammad al-Thani Charitable Foundation, named for a member of the country’s ruling family. In recent years, Nu’aymi had gained renown as an international activist, serving as president of Alkarama, a Geneva-based human rights organization that works closely with the United Nations and major international activist groups to advocate for Muslims’ civil rights.

Alkarama lobbies on behalf of Islamist detainees around the world, and it accuses Western and Arab governments of suppressing the rights of political groups that promote Islamic rule for the Middle East. Recently, the group has spoken out against U.S. drone strikes. Some of the group’s former clients are linked to Islamist militias seeking to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Humayqani is an Alkarama founding member and onetime adviser to Qatar on charitable giving, according to his résumé. He is a founding member of Yemen’s conservative Rashad Union party and has served on the country’s National Dialogue Conference, a group established in the wake of the Arab Spring uprising to advise the government on political and economic reforms. The U.S. government strongly backs the National Dialogue with political and financial support.


Nu’aymi, in a response posted on Twitter last week, said the U.S. allegations were in retaliation for his criticism of American policies, including drone strikes in Yemen and U.S. support for the recent overthrow of Egypt’s democratically elected government. He said the U.S. claims about his fundraising work were “far from the truth.”

Humayqani was traveling and could not be reached for comment. A statement released by his Rashad Union party condemned what it called “false accusations” by the United States and urged Yemen’s government to rally to his defense.

The allegations against Nu'aymi come at a time of increasing U.S. concern about the role of Qatari individuals and charities in supporting extreme elements within Syria's rebel alliance. One charity, Madid Ahl al-Sham, was cited by Jabhat al-Nusra in August as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group, which has pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Root reported from Sanaa, Yemen.

 **201 Comments**

Joby Warrick joined The Washington Post's national staff in 1996. He has covered national security, the environment and the Middle East and writes about terrorism. He is the author of two books, including 2015's "Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS," which was awarded a 2016 Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction.  Follow @jobywarrick

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Exhibit 18

Joyce Karam, Terror designation lists highlight Qatar's failure to tackle extremist funding, The National, 13 July 2017

2/28/2018

Terror designation lists highlight Qatar's failure to tackle extremist funding - The National

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2/28/2018

Terror designation lists highlight Qatar's failure to tackle extremist funding - The National



Secretary of state Rex Tillerson and the Qatari foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman sign a memorandum of understanding in Doha on countering terror financing. Alexander W. Riedel/US State Department

An agreement signed by the US and Qatar to combat terrorism financing is another testament to the centrality of the issue in the current dispute between Doha and four of its Arab neighbours.

The memorandum signed on Tuesday came a month after the quartet boycotting Doha published a list of 59 individuals and 12 entities in or related to Qatar that support terror groups. The agreement signed with the US highlights a festering problem with the Gulf state in the area of financing terrorism.

Among the GCC states, Qatar has made the least progress in choking off financing for terrorist groups, according to former US officials and experts in Washington. In 2014, Qatar was accused by the US treasury department of having "permissive jurisdictions" that allow "soliciting donations to fund extremist insurgents," David Cohen, the then Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said. "The recipients of these funds are often terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Al Nusra Front, and ISIL," Mr Cohen added.

Three years on, the US treasury department has not upgraded Qatar from the "permissive jurisdiction" status. Mr Cohen, who is no longer working for the government, sees no reason to change that classification. At an event hosted by the Gulf States Institute in Washington last week, Mr Cohen was asked if Qatar is worse than others in the GCC when it comes to terror financing.

The former US official said: "Qatar is not much worse than Kuwait, but worse than others in the GCC." Mr Cohen went a step further in accusing Qatar of "knowing very well" who is doing the funding but not going to the full extent in curbing it.

Mr Cohen made reference to previous American and Saudi attempts to curb Qatar's links with extremists. He recalled efforts that the US took during his six years at the US treasury between 2009 and 2015 to pressure Qatar. "We tried to work Saudis in trilateral fashion... to put pressure on those in Qatar, it didn't work out" Mr Cohen said.

Donald Trump took a shot across the bow of Qatar on June 9 calling it a "funder of terrorism at a very high level". A US state department official told *The National* that "more needs to be done by Doha" to tackle this issue. However, the official also noted that the problem was more complex, including the need to "recognise the efforts Qatar has made to try and stop the financing of terrorist groups".

Without singling out Doha, the US official outlined measures that Qatar and others in the Gulf region can take. They include additional counterterrorism laws, enhanced financial controls on funding to charities, monitoring and regulating the charitable sector and compiling and releasing official financial intelligence reports.

Over the last 15 years, terror financiers in Doha or those linked to the country, have been placed on the terror sanctions lists of the US treasury, state department and the UN.

The individuals on the lists are mostly those involved in facilitating funding to extremist groups across the region, especially Al Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Al Nusra, now known as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham.

Those lists overlap with the one issued by the four Arab states at the outset of the Qatar crisis. Eleven names on the US lists are included on the list from the Arab quartet, and six with the UN lists.

**Those names are:**

**1 Khalifa Muhammad Turki Al Siba'iy. Qatari terrorist financier and facilitator accused of supporting senior leadership of Al Qaeda.**

What the UN says (<http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11790.doc.htm>) | What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1011.aspx>)

**2 Abd Al Malik Muhammad Yusif Abd Al Salam. Provided financial and material support to Al Qaeda in Syria and Pakistan**

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What the UN says (<https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11750.doc.htm>) | What the US treasury says (<http://https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140924.aspx>)

**3 Ashraf Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthamn 'Abd Al Salam. Al Qaeda militant based in Syria.**

What the UN says (<https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11750.doc.htm>) | What the US treasury say (<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140924.aspx>)

**4 Ibrahim Isa Hajji Muhammad Al Bakr. A Qatari providing financial support to Al Qaeda**

What the UN says (<https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11750.doc.htm>) | What the US treasury says (<http://https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2651.aspx>)

**5 Abd Al Latif bin Abdullah Al Kawari. Qatar-based Al Qaeda financier.**

What the UN says (<https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12053.doc.htm>) | What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0143.aspx>)

**6 Abd Al Rahman bin Umayr Al Nuaimi. Qatar-based financier of Al Qaeda in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.**

What the UN says ([https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list/summaries/individual/%27abd-al-rahman-bin-%27umayr-al-nu%27aymi](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/%27abd-al-rahman-bin-%27umayr-al-nu%27aymi)) | What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx>)

**7 Saad bin Saad Mohammed Al Kaabi. Qatar-based fundraiser for Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria**

What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0143.aspx>)

**8 Salim Hassan Khalifa Rashid Al Kuwari. Provides financial and logistical support to Al Qaeda.**

What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1261.aspx>)

**9 Abdul Wahab Mohammed Abdul Rahman Al Hmeikani. Fundraiser for Al Qaeda in Yemen.**

What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx>)

**10 Murtada Majeed Al Sindi. Responsible for attacks in Bahrain**

What the US state dempartment says (<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/268504.htm>)

**11 Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammed Al Ajmi. Funnelled money to Jabhat Al Nusra**

What the US treasury says (<https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2605.aspx>)

Of the names that do not overlap, many are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by the four Arab States.

Experts point to a host of issues impeding progress on understanding Qatar's enduring terror financing problem. Katherine Bauer, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former treasury official who served as the department's financial attaché in Jerusalem and the Gulf, said: "It is unclear what Qatar has done and it seems to lend itself to questioning if they have done anything."

"We know from US reports they have done things" to crack down on fundraising "but it is an incomplete picture," she added.

However, Ms Bauer, who follows the designations on a case by case basis, said Qatar, "needs to act on UN designated individuals, that continue to operate in Qatar, with some that are prosecuted."

The expert mentioned the case of Khalifa Al Subaiy, a Qatari on the UN, US and the quartet's list, accused of funding Al Qaeda. Subaiy was convicted by Bahrain, served six months in prison and was released, said Ms Bauer. He has since re-engaged in terror support according to the UN.

She has also highlighted other examples that show Doha's reluctance when it comes to cracking down on those on the lists.

In 2014, the state department credited Qatar with shutting down *Madad Ahl Al Sham*, the online fundraising platform run by Saad Al Kaabi, a Qatari financier of Al Qaeda in Syria.

At least a year later a subsequent treasury sanctions designation noted Al Kaabi was still actively involved in financing the group, Ms Bauer said.

Ms Bauer said another issue where Qatar has stumbled has been the prosecution of terrorism financiers in Qatari courts. Many of the names were acquitted, tried in absentia, or released to be reportedly under surveillance.

"The nature of that surveillance is a matter of debate, however," Ms Bauer co-wrote in a recent paper on Qatar. "In the case of Subaiy, the UN committee on Al Qaeda sanctions reported that he resumed terrorist financing activities after his release from prison, when he was purportedly under surveillance."

David Weinberg, a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the designations are evidence, "that the Qatari line is wrong."

"The Qatari foreign minister keeps insisting that the allegations are totally baseless but the list [from the quartet] and particularly its overlap with the names on the UN and US lists- tells us there is at least something there."

Asked about other GCC states accused of privately funding terror, Mr Weinberg said "while terrorist financing still flows from some private individuals in Saudi or through Kuwait, Riyadh has taken strides in convicting hundreds of these financiers, while Qatar hasn't."

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Qatar's problems are defined by "providing impunity for terror financiers, becoming a safe haven for internationally banned terrorist groups, and allegedly paying multi-million dollar ransoms to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda," he said.

Qatar taking new measures to enact a more robust counterterror approach or put together its own designations, could be a potential opportunity from this dispute, Ms Bauer said.


**More on the Qatar crisis:**

> Latest news - UAE wants resolution, not alleviation of Qatar problem (<https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/uae-wants-resolution-not-alleviation-of-qatar-problem-1.568763>)

> UAE: Al Jazeera has gone beyond incitement to hostility and violence (<https://www.thenational.ae/world/uae-al-jazeera-has-gone-beyond-incitement-to-hostility-and-violence-1.530768>)

> Revealed: the secret pledges Qatar made — and then broke (<https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/revealed-the-secret-pledges-qatar-made-and-then-broke-1.484155>)


> Editorial: Al Jazeera charts an irresponsible course (<https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/editorial/al-jazeera-charts-an-irresponsible-course-1.580216>)



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Exhibit 19

Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on 'Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing', 3 April 2014

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**Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on "Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing"**

3/4/2014

*As prepared for delivery*

I am grateful to be invited to speak here at the Center for a New American Security. In just a few years, CNAS has established itself as a leader in fostering thoughtful discussion and cutting-edge scholarship on critical security issues confronting the United States, and I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to that conversation this evening.

Before I turn to the focus of my remarks, let me say a few words about the situation in Ukraine. We are deeply concerned and are closely monitoring ongoing developments in Ukraine.

As the President has said, Russia's clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity is a breach of international law. In the coming days, we will continue to monitor Russian actions in Ukraine and respond appropriately. We are looking into a wide range of options, including sanctions and ways to increase Russia's political and economic isolation.

We are also working to assist the Government of Ukraine. In fact, Secretary Lew announced earlier today that we have been working with international partners to develop an assistance package that will help the Ukrainian government implement the reforms needed to restore financial stability and return to economic growth. We are working with Congress and our international partners on \$1 billion in loan guarantees aimed at helping insulate vulnerable Ukrainians from the effects of reduced energy subsidies. As part of this package, we also hope Congress approves IMF reforms, which would support the Fund's capacity to lend additional resources to Ukraine. Of note, Ukraine has identified combatting corruption and recovering stolen assets as a pressing need and our assistance package seeks to support this goal, among others.

**Introduction**

The focus of my remarks this evening will be the evolving landscape of terrorist financing, the challenges we face, and the steps we are taking to meet these challenges.

As this audience knows, since the attacks of September 11, the United States has undertaken an unprecedented effort to protect the homeland and our interests and allies abroad from the scourge of terrorism, and as part of this effort has focused as never before on detecting, disrupting, and dismantling the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations.

Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) has been at the forefront of this effort. By developing and deploying innovative financial tools, and marshaling the support of the domestic and international private sectors, multilateral fora, foreign regulators, and foreign ministries, we have made it harder than ever for terrorists to raise, move, store, and use funds.

There is no doubt that we have made significant progress over the past 12 years. Most dramatically, al-Qa'ida today is far less well-funded than it was a dozen years ago. But I am not here to recount our successes; rather, I want to describe the new challenges we face and open a dialogue on how we should adapt to address them. Because despite our progress, one need only open a newspaper to see that terrorist threats and, more specifically, terrorist *financing* threats, persist.

**The Dollars and Cents of Terrorist Financing**

Just as we are focused on undermining the financial wherewithal of terrorist organizations, terrorists, of course, also remain focused on their finances.

Recently discovered documents belonging to al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) perfectly illustrate the almost mundane financial reality for many of these groups. Among the documents found were receipts, scribbled on post-it notes: \$6,800 for "workshops," \$330 for ammunition and \$1.80 for a bar of soap. Documents recovered during the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan illustrate the same reality. Meticulously kept records detailed expenditures on everything from salaries for fighters and their families to floppy disks, and even included receipts for explosives.

A focus on finances has also provided propaganda value for terrorists. In 2010, the English language magazine of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) featured a cover image with the figure "\$4,200" superimposed over a UPS plane, the target of a failed plot to use bombs concealed in printer cartridges to destroy the aircraft in U.S. airspace.

## Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before... Page 2 of 6

The message AQAP was trying to send was clear: By its accounting, attacking the United States could cost as little \$4,200.

On one level, that message is borne out in reality. The recent attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi reportedly cost less than \$5,000 to execute, and the materials used in the Boston Marathon bombings last spring reportedly cost about \$500.

But while organizing a single terrorist attack may be relatively inexpensive, managing a terrorist organization capable of conducting an attack – particularly a sophisticated, mass casualty attack on the scale of 9/11 or the Westgate Mall – remains costly, complex, and bureaucratic.

Substantial funds are required to finance each component of the terrorist life cycle: communications, logistics, recruitment, salaries, training, travel, safe havens, bribes, weapons acquisition, payments to the families of the deceased fighters, and support to other groups. This is especially true for terrorists who aspire to strike from a distance, and even more so to strike targets that are well-defended. Their sizable operating budgets and global supply chains create vulnerabilities for even the most nimble and methodical terrorist group.

We focus our efforts on exploiting these vulnerabilities by severing terrorist financing and support. To do so effectively requires a nuanced understanding of the different methods terrorists use to raise and move funds so that we can best tailor our efforts, and try to stay one step ahead of our adversaries.

#### **From Global to Local: How Terrorists Raise Funds Today**

##### ***Externally Generated Capital: State Sponsors, Deep Pocket Donors, and Charities***

Now traditionally, terrorist groups relied on a variety of external funding sources to meet their needs and had comparatively easy access to the global financial system to move and store their funds. It was a rather simple system: Terrorist groups, appealing to the misbegotten sympathy of foreign states, organizations, and individuals alike, collected contributions to fund their activities, and then placed those funds into the financial system, taking advantage of unwitting and poorly defended financial institutions.

Over the past decade, powerful financial sanctions at the national and international levels, coupled with close cooperation among governments and the private sector, have helped combat these traditional methods of terrorist financing. Focusing on the potent combination of legal risk and reputational risk has proven particularly effective.

Efforts to enhance financial transparency have also made it harder than ever for terrorists and other illicit actors to exploit the international financial system. At the core of these efforts is the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body that sets the international standards for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) safeguards and works for their global adoption and implementation. Through a peer review process to evaluate compliance with its AML/CFT standards, the FATF has been extraordinarily successful in improving global capacity to combat the full range of illicit financial activity, including terrorist financing.

Turned away by banks and other reputable financial institutions, terrorist groups have increasingly turned to less regulated channels – including hawaladars, exchange houses, and cash couriers – to transfer funds. None of this is new, of course, but these channels are decidedly less effective than transacting through the global financial system. Using these alternative transfer mechanisms carries greater transaction costs; higher risk of loss and theft; logistical complications – cash is bulky and heavy; and its own legal risk, as terrorists are forced to navigate border controls to transfer funds. These mechanisms also require terrorist groups to rely on more people and larger networks than simple wire transfers, making these financing channels and the terrorists who stand to benefit from them more vulnerable to discovery.

While improved international counter-terrorism cooperation and steadily improving implementation of financial transparency standards have forced terrorist groups to alter their funds transfer patterns and diversify their revenue sources, some of the traditional fundraising and transfer practices persist and still require our attention.

First, it should come as no surprise to anyone that states continue to fund terrorism.

Iran remains the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism, planning terrorist attacks, providing lethal aid, and delivering hundreds of millions of dollars per year in support to extremist groups across the globe. Hizballah, for example, has received significant monetary payments from Iran to fund the group's activities in support of the brutal Assad regime. And during the past several years, Iranian weapons shipments, reportedly destined for Shia militants in Bahrain and Huthi rebels in Yemen, have been interdicted by local authorities.

It is worth noting that while we continue our negotiations with the Iranians concerning their nuclear program, we will not let up one iota in our efforts to disrupt Iran's support for terrorism. Just a few weeks ago, we announced designations of several entities and individuals tied to Iranian terrorist activity, including a number of Qods Force officers operating in Afghanistan.

In fact, the success of our unprecedented Iranian sanctions regime – including sanctions on Iranian financial institutions and Iran's ability to sell its oil – has had the collateral benefit of squeezing Tehran's ability to fund terrorist groups such as Hizballah. So as we continue to vigorously enforce our nuclear-related sanctions over the next six months, we expect the financial screws on Iran to tighten even more.

But, distressingly, Iran is not the only state that provides financial support for terrorist organizations.

Most notably, Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas, a group that continues to undermine regional stability. Press reports indicate that the Qatari government is also supporting extremist groups operating in Syria. To say the least, this threatens to aggravate an already volatile situation in a particularly dangerous and unwelcome manner.

With new leadership in Doha, we remain hopeful that Qatar – a country that in other respects has been a constructive partner in countering terrorism – will continue to work closely with us to oppose and combat those who adhere to the warped and murderous ideology of Hamas and al-Qa'ida.

Meanwhile, other traditional means of funding terrorist groups, such as deep-pocket donors and charitable organizations, have experienced a resurgence of late.

## Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before... Page 3 of 6

Al-Qa'ida still looks to these tried and true methods to raise funds. Since early 2012, senior al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan have raised millions of dollars from deep pocket donors. They receive the majority of their funds from Gulf-based sympathizers, followed by supporters based in Pakistan and Turkey.

Nevertheless, al-Qa'ida is currently experiencing financial hardship. The death of several key religious and financial leaders in Pakistan along with increased scrutiny of the group's Iran-based facilitation network – another target of our recent designation activity – have degraded its ability to move and manage funds.

Al-Qa'ida's financial strain is also the result of critical bilateral cooperation. Our partner Saudi Arabia has made great progress in stamping out al-Qa'ida funding sources within its borders. Still, we have more work to do with the Saudis to prevent other groups, such as the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), from accessing sympathetic donors in the Kingdom.

Traditional terrorist financing sources have also helped fuel the ongoing conflict in Syria. Over the past few years, charitable fundraising networks in the Gulf have collected hundreds of millions of dollars through regular fundraising events held at homes or mosques and through social media pleas. These networks then use couriers, wire transfers, hawalas, and exchange houses to move those funds to Syria, often to extremists.

Certainly much of the private fundraising in the Gulf related to Syria is motivated by a sincere and admirable desire to ease suffering, and the funds are used for legitimate humanitarian purposes. The Assad regime's ongoing brutality in Syria has led to a dire humanitarian crisis – certainly the most pressing in the world today – and the need for humanitarian relief is undeniable.

But a number of fundraisers operating in more permissive jurisdictions – particularly in Kuwait and Qatar – are soliciting donations to fund extremist insurgents, not to meet legitimate humanitarian needs. The recipients of these funds are often terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida's Syrian affiliate, al-Nusrah Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the group formerly known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI).

The influx of funds to these groups in Syria poses a serious challenge. Apart from their highly destabilizing role in the ongoing conflict there, these well-funded and well-equipped groups may soon turn their attention to attacks outside of Syria, particularly as scores of newly radicalized and freshly trained foreign recruits return from Syria to their home countries.

To confront this challenge, we are closely tracking the movement of funds to Syria, especially – but not only – funds coming out of the Gulf. And we have already targeted and applied sanctions against several key fundraisers, extremist leaders, and terrorist organizations. We are also actively supporting our partners throughout the region, including the Saudis and the Turks, in their efforts to stem the tide of funding to extremists operating in Syria.

But there are countries in the region that could be doing much more. Our ally Kuwait has become the epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria. A number of Kuwaiti fundraisers exploit the charitable impulses of unwitting donors by soliciting humanitarian donations from both inside and outside the country, cloaking their efforts in humanitarian garb, but diverting those funds to extremist groups in Syria. Meanwhile, donors who already harbor sympathies for Syrian extremists have found in Kuwait fundraisers who openly advertise their ability to move funds to fighters in Syria.

While we congratulate the Kuwaiti Government on steps it has taken recently to enhance its capacity to combat illicit finance, such as enacting a new law outlawing terrorist financing, we urge the Kuwaitis to do more to effectively stem the flow of money to terrorists.

There have been some encouraging conversations recently, but the appointment of Nayef al-Ajmi to be both Minister of Justice and Minister of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) and Islamic Affairs is a step in the wrong direction. Al-Ajmi has a history of promoting jihad in Syria. In fact, his image has been featured on fundraising posters for a prominent al-Nusrah Front financier. And following his appointment, the Ministry of Awqaf announced it would allow non-profit organizations and charities to collect donations for the Syrian people at Kuwaiti mosques, a measure we believe can be easily exploited by Kuwait-based terrorist fundraisers.

As the Kuwaitis have been reminded recently, we are committed to helping them redouble their efforts to counter those collecting funds for terrorists while ensuring that legitimate charitable donations ease the suffering of the Syrian people. But the Kuwaitis must understand that the unregulated funding of extremists does more to destabilize the situation in Syria than to help the Syrian people.

Constraining this flow of funds is particularly challenging in an era when social media allows anyone with an Internet connection to set himself up as an international terrorist financier. We see this activity most prominently in Kuwait and Qatar, where fundraisers aggressively solicit donations online from supporters in other countries, notably Saudi Arabia, which have banned unauthorized fundraising campaigns for Syria.

Private fundraising networks in Qatar, for instance, increasingly rely upon social media to solicit donations for terrorists and to communicate with both donors and recipient radicals on the battlefield. This method has become so lucrative, and Qatar has become such a permissive terrorist financing environment, that several major Qatar-based fundraisers act as local representatives for larger terrorist fundraising networks that are based in Kuwait.

There should be no doubt that while we remain committed to working with countries such as Kuwait and Qatar to confront ongoing terrorist financing, the U.S. will not hesitate to act on its own to disrupt these terrorist financing networks. The long list of designated al-Qa'ida-linked fundraisers, financiers, and functionaries is proof of that.

In that vein, Treasury recently designated prominent terrorist financiers Abd al-Rahman bin 'Umayr al-Nu'aymi (Nu'aymi) and Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani (Humayqani). Nu'aymi is a Qatar-based financier who secured funds and provided material support for al-Qa'ida and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen. Humayqani is a Yemen-based fundraiser who used his status in the charitable community as a cover for funneling financial support to AQAP.

#### ***Self-Generated Capital: Criminal Activity, Kidnapping for Ransom, Territorial Control***

During the past few years, a diminished al-Qa'ida "core" has spawned numerous affiliates that recruit their own jihadists, organize their own operations, and raise their own funds. Other terrorist groups, with loose or no affiliation to al-Qa'ida, have also emerged, including, for example, the recently designated terrorist organizations Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi, Darnah, and Tunisia.

## Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before... Page 4 of 6

Many of these groups generate capital locally, often in areas subject to little if any governmental control. The funds that are raised often stay essentially where they started. Without the need to move money, terrorists can avoid key international controls and, in so doing, limit governments' ability to track and disrupt their funding flows.

These groups also increasingly have turned away from the traditional "donor" model of fundraising and rely more on criminal activity for their financial support.

Just like their longstanding reliance on less-regulated channels for transferring funds, terrorists profiting from criminal activity is hardly new. From Hizballah's cigarette smuggling to the Taliban's drug trafficking to the Haqqani network's mafia-like extortion schemes, terrorist groups have long turned to crime in their quest for funding.

And while the growing terrorist reliance on garden-variety crime poses certain challenges, it has a potentially perverse upside too: Terrorist funding networks that rely on criminal activity tend to alienate the populations where they operate, draw the attention of traditional law enforcement authorities, and are vulnerable to detection by well-designed, well-implemented, and well-resourced AML/CFT programs.

Even so, the magnitude and scale of this crime-terror nexus has reached new heights with the spread of kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) as a fundraising strategy.

Apart from state sponsorship, KFR is today's greatest source of terrorist funding and the most challenging terrorist financing threat. Groups such as AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab continue to collect tens of millions of dollars from ransoms. And they are putting that money to work.

AQAP used ransom money it received for the return of European hostages to finance its over \$20 million campaign to seize territory in Yemen between mid-2011 and mid-2012.

AQIM, which has provided funding for other terrorist groups including Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, is believed to have obtained a €30 million ransom payment in October 2013 for the release of four French hostages who worked for the French government-owned nuclear firm Areva. The French government has denied that any public funds were involved in the ransom payment.

And in July 2013, al-Shabaab elements netted an approximately \$5 million ransom in exchange for the release of two Spanish hostages who were kidnapped in Kenya in October 2011.

Meanwhile, other terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram and its offshoot, Ansaru, also are increasingly turning to KFR to finance their operations.

If we are going to successfully combat terrorist financing – especially in North Africa and Yemen – we must do a better job of preventing terrorist groups from successfully using kidnapping to raise money. We have a multi-faceted approach to do this.

First is prevention. We are working closely with international counterparts to develop and implement best practices for governments and companies to reduce the risk that their citizens and employees are kidnapped in the first place. Some kidnappings could be prevented if relatively easy precautions were taken to, in effect, harden the target. We are exploring whether the structure and terms of insurance for businesses operating in high-risk areas could be modified to create additional incentives to implement these best practices.

We know, however, that even the best efforts at prevention are not failsafe. So we are also working to reduce the underlying incentive to take hostages by encouraging governments to refrain from making concessions to terrorists. Refusing to pay ransoms or to accede to other terrorist demands is the surest way to convince potential hostage-takers that they will not be rewarded for their crime.

This has been U.S. policy for many years. The U.S. government will not pay ransoms or make other concessions to hostage-takers. Although this may appear to be cold-hearted and is often agonizingly difficult to sustain in practice, plain logic and long experience demonstrate that this policy has led to fewer Americans being taken hostage, which protects the safety and security of our citizens around the world. We are not alone in this approach; the UK, for example, also steadfastly adheres to a no-concessions policy. Yet, despite the evidence indicating that kidnapers prefer not to take hostages who are citizens of countries that refuse to pay ransoms, not all countries have adopted this position.

We are working to change that and we are making some progress. In its June 2013 Communiqué, the G-8 leaders, for the first time ever, unequivocally rejected the payment of ransoms to terrorists. And just a few weeks ago, the United Nations Security Council definitively expressed its determination to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions. As our position continues to gain traction internationally, we will work hard to translate this emerging consensus from paper to practice.

When ransoms are paid, our final line of defense is to deny the terrorist kidnapers the benefits of their crime. We work with governments and the private sector to identify, arrest, and prosecute hostage takers, and, when possible, to locate, freeze, and seize their assets. This can be difficult because of geography and the often limited resources of the jurisdictions where terrorist kidnapping activity is most prevalent. But there have been some notable successes.

In 2012, for example, Nigerian authorities arrested an accountant for Boko Haram after he made several money transfers that aroused the suspicion of bank officials. Those officials alerted security agents, who took both the accountant and an associate into custody. At the time of his arrest, the accountant is reported to have been carrying nearly \$30,000 in cash, which he was in the process of transferring.

Terrorist groups that control territory have employed yet another self-generated revenue source – "taxing" local populations. Pioneered by groups such as Hamas and al-Shabaab, this form of pseudo-sovereignty-based fundraising has spread to other un- or under-governed territories around the world.

For example, despite losing control of the port of Kismayo, which was its key revenue source, al-Shabaab continues to generate at least hundreds of thousands of dollars per month, primarily through taxation and extortion, in its remaining strongholds in southern Somalia.



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Newer groups are also translating territorial control into revenue. ISIL generates a portion of its extortion-derived proceeds from Iraqi and Syrian oil resources, while its al-Qa'ida-linked rival, al-Nusra Front, has also exploited local natural resources to raise funds. Similarly, in 2012, prior to the French intervention in Mali, AQIM taxed local residents in northern Mali to meet their funding needs.

Attacking locally-derived financial flows that largely avoid the regulated financial system is, to be sure, a real challenge. While we continue to utilize our tools and authorities to expose and isolate many of these terrorist groups and their facilitators, and while we continue our efforts to bring transparency to those corners of the financial system that remain susceptible to abuse, combatting locally-sourced capital requires some new approaches as well.

Coercing funding out of local populations often foments bitterness within the very populations on which terrorist organizations rely. While capitalizing on this "rejection" dynamic is complex, we should use every tool available – from continuing to highlight the way terrorists exploit local populations to focusing aid efforts to compete with the services terrorist organizations provide – to turn this resentment into financial strain for the occupying terrorist groups and to deny them any mantle of legitimacy. We should also continue to provide robust technical assistance and training to willing countries worldwide to increase international financial transparency and improve global capacity to disrupt illicit finance.

#### **The Critical Contribution of the Private Sector**

As terrorist financing practices evolve, our tactics and approaches to combat terrorist financing also must evolve. But one constant will be our need for collaboration with the private sector.

At first glance, the increasing use by terrorist groups of less-regulated, local, and criminal means to raise and move funds might seem to imply a less prominent role for financial institutions in combatting terrorist financing.

But the opposite is true. The clues may be better masked and the footprints fainter, but terrorist groups still systematically intersect with the international financial system – albeit in more remote and obscured ways. Complicit hawaladars still send wire transfers and dispense cash to extremists with the aid of regulated financial institutions. Corrupted exchange houses still maintain bank accounts to launder illicit funds. And terrorist groups and their supporters still establish front companies to "layer" their financial transactions and avoid detection.

Our recent actions directed at the Lebanese financial sector – beginning with our action against the Lebanese Canadian Bank in 2011 and continuing with our actions against two Lebanon-based exchange houses last year – illustrate well how terrorists still depend on the international financial system, and how we can contest their access.

Hizbullah benefitted from the money laundering scheme that was the focus of these actions. The scheme spanned several continents and involved the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds. The perpetrators used bulk cash shipments, deposits into exchange houses with accounts at Lebanese banks, and a trade-based money laundering scheme involving wire transfers into the United States to purchase used-cars for export to West Africa. At its core, this operation relied upon the international financial system, including U.S. banks.

So, even in this new era of terrorist financing, banks must continue to be vigilant partners in protecting the global financial system from being infiltrated by terrorist groups and their facilitators. They can and must continue to be force multipliers, including by helping us as we work to identify new typologies of abuse, sharing that knowledge with their colleagues and the government, and implementing effective risk management strategies to address current and forthcoming terrorist financing threats.

We are looking to do our part to improve this sharing of information by exploring changes to the rules governing information sharing among financial institutions and between financial institutions and the government.

In particular, we are exploring ways to expand the use of Section 314 (a) and 314 (b) of the USA PATRIOT Act to enhance the flow of information from the government to financial institutions, and between financial institutions themselves on the full spectrum of illicit financial threats. The constantly evolving nature of terrorist financing necessitates that we all have the most current and complete understanding of the threat, without which threats could go unidentified. The better the flow of information with respect to these threats among institutions, and between governments and financial institutions, the better our ability to address them collectively.

#### **Confronting Morphing Tactics in Terrorist Financing**

Perhaps the most important lesson gleaned over the past 12 years is that terrorist financiers are consummate opportunists. And, if the past is any indication, we can expect to see further adaptation and evolution in how terrorists raise and move capital over the next few years.

Innovations in traditional modes of terrorist fundraising, particularly through the use of social media, will continue to pose new challenges. As we have seen in the context of Syria, fundraisers can now use social media handles instead of face-to-face solicitations, and sympathetic donors can bypass a risky rendezvous in favor of a simple and remote hashtag search.

While social media already has helped terrorists raise funds, the emergence of so-called "crypto-currencies" or "virtual currencies" could conceivably help terrorists move and spend funds. But like any other form of value transfer, well-designed, well-implemented, and well-enforced regulation can combat the abuse of these new payment methods. Guidance issued by Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on virtual currencies is a good first step in ensuring transparency in this rapidly developing field. We will, of course, continue to monitor developments and adjust our regulatory framework accordingly. We will also continue to encourage our international partners to do the same in order to stave off the illicit finance threats of new, web-based value-transfer mechanisms.

Back in the tangible world, terrorist groups continue to forge new alliances and revamp old approaches, and our efforts need to take account of this as well.

Established terrorist groups are increasingly acting as financial incubators for the next generation of extremists by providing capital to newer groups. This malignant form of mentorship can be seen in the tens of thousands of dollars that the Egypt-based Muhammad Jamal Network received from AQAP in 2012, and the over \$100,000 sent to the Gaza-based Mujahidin Shura Council by AQIM in the past year.

And following the model of LeT, Hamas, and Hizbullah, we are also witnessing some terrorist groups complementing their traditional splashy attacks with a "hearts and minds" appeal to gain popular support.

Ansar al-Shari'a groups in Tunisia and Libya, and AQIM in Mali, for example, have expended greater effort toward winning over local populations. Recent press reports have highlighted AQIM receipts of \$4 for medicine "for a Shiite with a sick child" and \$100 in financial aid for a man's wedding. In Syria, al-Nusra Front is currying local favor by providing civilians with essential items like food, water, and blankets. Leveraging social media to boost social capital, the terrorist group showcased these efforts in an online video featuring fighters delivering candy to young children and infant formula to new mothers.

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The need to counter these disingenuous groups cannot be minimized. Even legitimate charitable activity that benefits a terrorist organization strengthens that organization; this is why they do it. Although some of our international partners may disagree with us, we must not allow terrorist organizations to use the cover of seemingly legitimate charitable activity to mask and advance their broader violent objectives.

Rather than focusing their efforts locally, some other groups and individuals have aimed their charm offensive at international audiences to provide a cloak of legitimacy for their terrorist ambitions. Nu'aymi, the recently designated terrorist financier, embodied this duplicity as he promoted humanitarian causes in European capitals while surreptitiously providing money and material support to al-Qa'ida and its affiliates in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen.

Despite his extensive terrorist financing record, Nu'aymi has maintained his position as president of the Swiss-based organization, Alkarama. We strongly urge Alkarama and other organizations that have a relationship, directly or indirectly, with Nu'aymi to distance themselves from this disgraced terrorist financier. Benign neglect cannot provide cover for those advocating for human rights while underwriting terror.

**Conclusion**

The dynamic nature of terrorist financing presents new challenges, but also new opportunities. As we confront those challenges and exploit those opportunities, we remain as dedicated as ever to deploy our tools – astutely crafted, surgically targeted, and aggressively implemented – to protect our country from those who would do us harm.

Thank you, again, to CNAS for inviting me to speak this evening.

Exhibit 20

United States Office of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated  
Nationals and Blocked Persons List, 20 February 2018

United States Office of Foreign Assets Control Specially Designated Nationals List

The United States has further sanctioned the following individuals of Qatari nationality or with ties to Qatar.

1. *'Abd Al-Salam, 'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusuf 'Uthman, Jordanian (with an identity card issued by Qatar)*
2. *Ashraf Muhammad Yusif Abd Al-Salam, Jordanian (with an identity card issued by Qatar)*
3. *Salem Hassan Khalifa Rashid Al Kuwari, Qatari*
4. *Abdelrahman Imer al Jaber Al Naimeh, Qatari*
5. *Hamad Hamid Al-'Ali, Qatari*
6. *Ibrahim Issa Al Hajji Mohammed Al Baker, Qatari*
7. *Nayef Salam Muhammad Ujaym Al-Hababi, Saudi and Qatari*
8. *Sa'd al-Sharyan Al-Ka'bi, Qatari*
9. *Abdullatif bin Abdullah Al Kuwari*
10. *Abdullah Ghalib Mahfuz Muslim Al-Khawar, Qatari*
11. *Abdulrahman bin Omair Al Nuaimi, Qatari*
12. *Khalifa Mohammed Turki Al Subaie, Qatari*

Exhibit 21

List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267/1989/2253, 22  
February 2018

Res. 1267/1989/2253 List



The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253

Generated on: 27 February 2018

"Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee's website."

### Composition of the List

The list consists of the two sections specified below:

#### A. Individuals

#### B. Entities and other groups

Information about de-listing may be found at:

<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson> (for res. 1267)

<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/delisting> (for other Committees)

<https://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml> (for res. 2231)

#### A. Individuals

**QDi.400 Name:** 1: IYAD 2: NAZMI 3: SALIH 4: KHALIL

**Name (original script):** إياد نظمي صالح خليل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1974 **POB:** Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ayyad Nazmi Salih Khalil b) Eyad Nazmi Saleh Khalil **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Iyad al-Toubasi b) Iyad al-Tubasi c) Abu al-Darda' d) Abu-Julaybib al-Urduni e) Abu-Julaybib **Nationality:** Jordan **Passport no.:** a) Jordan 654781 (approximately issued in 2009) b) Jordan 286062 (issued on 5 April 1999 at Zarqa, Jordan, expired on 4 April 2004) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (Coastal area of. Location as of April 2016) **Listed on:** 22 Feb. 2017 **Other information:** Leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) for coastal area of Syrian Arab Republic since March 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6013286> [click here](#)

**QDi.346 Name:** 1: 'ABD AL-MALIK 2: MUHAMMAD 3: YUSUF 4: 'UTHMAN 'ABD AL-SALAM

**Name (original script):** عبدالملك محمد يوسف عثمان عبد السلام

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Jul. 1989 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** 'Abd al-Malik Muhammad Yusif 'Abd-al-Salam **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) 'Umar al-Qatari b) 'Umar al-Tayyar **Nationality:** Jordan **Passport no.:** number K475336, issued on 31 Aug. 2009, issued in Jordan (expired on 30 Aug. 2014) **National identification no.:** Qatar 28940000602, issued in Qatar **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Jan. 2015 **Other information:** Facilitator who provides financial, material, and technological support for Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5843243> [click here](#)

**QDi.343 Name:** 1: ASHRAF 2: MUHAMMAD 3: YUSUF 4: 'UTHMAN 'ABD AL-SALAM

**Name (original script):** اشرف محمد يوسف عثمان عبد السلام

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1984 **POB:** Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ashraf Muhammad Yusif 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Salam b) Ashraf Muhammad Yusif 'Abd-al-Salam c) Ashraf Muhammad Yusif 'Abd al-Salam **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Khattab b) Ibn al-Khattab **Nationality:** Jordan **Passport no.:** a) K048787, issued in Jordan b) 486298, issued in Jordan **National identification no.:** Qatar 28440000526, issued in Qatar **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Dec. 2014) **Listed on:** 23 Jan. 2015 **Other information:** A member of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) as of 2012 and a fighter in the Syrian Arab Republic since early 2014. Provided financial, material, and technological support for Al-Qaida, Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5843240> [click here](#)

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**QDi.012 Name:** 1: NASHWAN 2: ABD AL-RAZZAQ 3: ABD AL-BAQI 4: na**Name (original script):** نشوان عبد الرزاق عبد الباقي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1961 **POB:** Mosul, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdal Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi b) Abd Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi c) Omar Uthman Mohammed d) Abdul Hadi Arif Ali **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Abdallah b) Abdul Hadi al-Taweel c) Abd al-Hadi al-Ansari d) Abd al-Muhayman e) Abu Ayub **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Ration Card no 0094195 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 (amended on 14 May 2007, 27 Jul. 2007, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Joined Al-Qaida in 1996 and was at that time an important liaison to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Received money from Ansar al-Islam (QDe.098) in order to conduct attacks in Kirkuk and Ninveh in Iraq during spring and summer of 2005. Al-Qaida senior official. In custody of the United States of America, as of Aug. 2014. Father's name: Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi. Mother's name: Nadira Ayoub Asaad. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1475995> [click here](#)

**QDi.192 Name:** 1: ABD ALLAH 2: MOHAMED 3: RAGAB 4: ABDEL RAHMAN**Name (original script):** عبد الله محمد رجب عبد الرحمن

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Nov. 1957 **POB:** Kafr Al-Shaykh, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Al-Khayr b) Ahmad Hasan c) Abu Jihad **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** (Believed to be in Pakistan or Afghanistan) **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2005 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4493165> [click here](#)

**QDi.054 Name:** 1: MAJEED 2: ABDUL CHAUDHRY 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 15 Apr. 1939 b) 1938 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Majeed, Abdul b) Majeed Chaudhry Abdul c) Majid, Abdul **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 24 Dec. 2001 **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1422960> [click here](#)

**QDi.018 Name:** 1: ABDUL MANAN AGHA 2: na 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد المنان آغا

**Title:** Haji **Designation:** na **DOB:** na **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abdul Manan **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Man'am Saiyid b) Saiyid Abd al-Man (formerly listed as) **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 26 Jun. 2013) **Other information:** Pakistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010.

**QDi.295 Name:** 1: MUHAMMAD 2: JIBRIL 3: ABDUL RAHMAN 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 28 May 1984 b) 3 Dec. 1979 c) 3 Mar. 1979 (from false passport) **POB:** East Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohammad Jibril Abdurrahman b) Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman c) Mohammad Jibril Abdurrahman d) Muhamad Ricky Ardhan born 8 Aug. 1980 (appears in false Indonesian passport number S335026) e) Muhammad Ricky Ardhan bin Muhammad Iqbal f) Muhammad Ricky Ardhan bin Abu Jibril **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Yunus b) Heris Syah **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** a) Indonesian national identity card number 3219222002.2181558 b) Identification number 2181558 **Address:** a) Jalan M. Saidi RT 010 RW 001 Pesanggrahan, South Petukangan, South Jakarta, Indonesia b) Jalan Nakula of Witana Harja Complex Block C, Pamulang, Banten, Indonesia **Listed on:** 12 Aug. 2011 **Other information:** Senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) directly involved in obtaining funding for terrorist attacks. Sentenced in Indonesia to five years in prison on 29 Jun. 2010. Father's name is Mohamad Iqbal Abdurrahman (QDi.086). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4555825> [click here](#)

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**QDi.229 Name:** 1: ALY 2: SOLIMAN 3: MASSOUD 4: ABDUL SAYED

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1969 **POB:** Tripoli, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ibn El Qaim b) Mohamed Osman **Low quality a.k.a.:** Adam **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no.:** Libya Libyan Passport No. 96/184442 **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Ghout El Shamal, Tripoli, Libya **Listed on:** 8 Jun. 2007 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (QDe.011). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 24 Nov. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1479979> [click here](#)

**QDi.309 Name:** 1: ABDUR REHMAN 2: na 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد الرحمن

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Oct. 1965 **POB:** Mirpur Khas, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Rehman; Abd Ur-Rehman; Abdur Rahman b) عبد الرحمن السبدي (Abdul Rehman Sindhi; Abdul Rehman al-Sindhi; Abdur Rahman al-Sindhi; Abdur Rehman Sindhi; Abdurahman Sindhi) c) عبدالله السبدي (Abdullah Sindhi) **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abdur Rehman Muhammad Yamin **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no.:** Pakistan CV9157521, issued on 8 Sep. 2008 (expires on 7 Sep. 2013) **National identification no.:** national identity card number 44103-5251752-5 **Address:** Karachi, Pakistan **Listed on:** 14 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Has provided facilitation and financial services to Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Associated with Harakatul Jihad Islami (QDe.130), Jaish-I-Mohammed (QDe.019), and Al-Akhtar Trust International (QDe.121). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5040885> [click here](#)

**QDi.363 Name:** 1: MAGHOMED 2: MAGHOMEDZAKIROVICH 3: ABDURAKHMANOV 4: na**Name (original script):** Абдурахманов Магомед Магомедзакирович

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 24 Nov. 1974 **POB:** Khadzalmahi Village, Levashinskiy District, Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Banat (original script: Абу Банат) b) Abu al Banat (original script: Абу аль Банат) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no.:** Russian foreign travel passport number 515458008 (expires 30 May 2017) **National identification no.:** national passport number 8200203535 **Address:** a) Turkey (possible location) b) Syrian Arab Republic (previous confirmed location since Sep. 2012) **Listed on:** 2 Oct. 2015 **Other information:** As at Aug. 2015, leader of Jamaat Abu Banat terrorist group, which forms part of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), and operates on the outskirts of Syrian Arab Republic cities Aleppo and Idlib, extorting funds from and carrying out kidnappings and public executions of local Syrians. Physical description: eye colour brown, hair colour: dark, build: strong, straight nose, height: 180-185 cm, speaks Russian, English, Arabic. Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes committed in its territory. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5899816> [click here](#)

**QDi.086 Name:** 1: MOHAMAD 2: IQBAL 3: ABDURRAHMAN 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Aug. 1957 **POB:** a) Korleko-Lombok Timur, Indonesia b) Tirpas-Selong Village, East Lombok, Indonesia c) Korleko-Lombok Timur, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Rahman, Mohamad Iqbal b) A Rahman, Mohamad Iqbal c) Abu Jibril Abdurrahman d) Fikiruddin Muqti e) Fahiruddin Muqti f) Abdul Rahman, Mohamad Iqbal **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** 3603251708570001 **Address:** Jalan Nakula, Komplek Witana Harja III Blok C 106-107, Tangerang, Indonesia **Listed on:** 28 Jan. 2003 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 16 May 2011, 10 Jun. 2011) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1422958> [click here](#)

**QDi.304 Name:** 1: MOCHAMMAD 2: ACHWAN 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 4 May 1948 b) 4 May 1946 **POB:** Tulungagung, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Achwan b) Muhammad Akhwan c) Mochtar Achwan d) Mochtar Akhwan e) Mochtar Akwan **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** National Identity Card 3573010405480001 (under name Mochammad Achwan) **Address:** Jalan Ir. H. Juanda 8/10, RT/RW 002/001, Jodipan, Blimbing, Malang, Indonesia **Listed on:** 12 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Acting emir of Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) (QDe.133). Associated with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (QDi.217), Abdul Rahim Ba'asyir (QDi.293) and Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681453> [click here](#)



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**QDi.316 Name:** 1: IYAD 2: AG GHALI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** اباد اغ غالي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1958 **POB:** Abeibara, Kidal Region, Mali **Good quality a.k.a.:** Sidi Mohamed Arhali born 1 Jan. 1958 in Bouressa, Bourem Region, Mali **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Mali **Passport no:** Mali A1037434, issued on 10 Aug. 2001 (expires on 31 Dec. 2014) **National identification no:** Birth certificate 012546 **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 25 Feb. 2013 (amended on 23 Sep. 2014) **Other information:** Founder and leader of Ansar Eddine (QDe.135). Member of the Tuareg Ifogas tribe. Linked to the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Name of father is Ag Bobacer Arhali, name of mother is Rhiachatou Wallet Sidi. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5278332> [click here](#)

**QDi.203 Name:** 1: FARHAD 2: KANABI 3: AHMAD 4: na**Name (original script):** فرهاد كنابي أحمد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jul. 1971 **POB:** Arbil, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Kawa Omar Achmed b) Kawa Hamawandi (previously listed as) c) Kawa Omar Ahmed **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** German travel document ("Reiseausweis") A 0139243 (revoked as at Sep. 2012) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Arbil – Qushtuba – house no. SH 11, alley 5380, Iraq **Listed on:** 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 31 Jul. 2006, 25 Jan. 2010, 13 Dec. 2011, 15 Nov. 2012, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Mother's name: Farida Hussein Khadir. Released from custody in Germany on 10 Dec. 2010 and relocated to Iraq on 6 Dec. 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 5 Oct. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423935> [click here](#)

**QDi.226 Name:** 1: NAJMUDDIN 2: FARAJ 3: AHMAD 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 7 Jul. 1956 b) 17 Jun. 1963 **POB:** Oqlaqoo Sharbajer, Al-Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mullah Krekar b) Fateh Najm Eddine Farraj c) Faraj Ahmad Najmuddin **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Ration card no. 0075258 **Address:** Heimdalsgate 36-V, Oslo, 0578, Norway **Listed on:** 7 Dec. 2006 (amended on 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Mother's name: Masouma Abd al-Rahman. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1453897> [click here](#)

**QDi.391 Name:** 1: TURKI 2: MUBARAK 3: ABDULLAH 4: AHMAD AL-BINALI

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Sep. 1984 **POB:** Al Muharraq, Bahrain **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Turki Mubarak Abdullah Al Binali b) Turki Mubarak al-Binali c) Turki al-Benali d) Turki al-Binali **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Human Bakr ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Athari b) Abu Bakr al-Athari c) Abu Hazm al-Salafi d) Abu Hudhayfa al-Bahrayni e) Abu Khuzayma al-Mudari f) Abu Sufyan al-Sulami g) Abu Dergham h) Abu Human al-Athari **Nationality:** Bahrain (citizenship revoked in Jan. 2015) **Passport no:** a) Bahrain number 2231616, issued on 2 Jan. 2013 (expires on 2 Jan. 2023) b) Bahrain number 1272611, issued on 1 Apr. 2003 (previous) **National identification no:** 840901356 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Apr. 2016 **Other information:** Head of religious compliance police and a recruiter of foreign terrorist fighters for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), as of mid-May 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5943047> [click here](#)

**QDi.237 Name:** 1: JABER 2: ABDALLAH 3: JABER 4: AHMAD AL-JALAHMAH**Name (original script):** جابر عبد الله جابر أحمد الجلاهمة

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 24 Sep. 1959 **POB:** Al-Khitan area, Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Jaber Al-Jalahmah b) Abu Muhammad Al-Jalahmah c) Jabir Abdallah Jabir Ahmad Jalahmah d) Jabir 'Abdallah Jabir Ahmad Al-Jalahmah e) Jabir Al-Jalhami **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul-Ghani b) Abu Muhammad **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** a) 101423404 b) Kuwait number 2541451 (valid until 16 Feb. 2017) c) Kuwait number 002327881 **National identification no:** 259092401188 **Address:** Kuwait (residence as at March 2009 and at December 2013) **Listed on:** 3 Jan. 2014 **Other information:** Previously listed between 16 Jan. 2008 and 3 Jan. 2014 (amended on 1 Jul. 2008, 23 Jul. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 14 Sep. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1518755> [click here](#)

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**QDi.014 Name:** 1: TARIQ 2: ANWAR 3: EL SAYED 4: AHMED**Name (original script):** طارق أنور السيد احمد**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Mar. 1963 **POB:** Alexandria, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hamdi Ahmad Farag b) Amr Al-Fatih Fathi c) Tarek Anwar El Sayed Ahmad **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 18 Jul. 2007, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Reportedly deceased in October 2001. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 29 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4493067> [click here](#)**QDi.193 Name:** 1: ZAKI 2: EZAT 3: ZAKI 4: AHMED**Name (original script):** زكي عزت زكي احمد**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 21 Apr. 1960 **POB:** a) Sharqiyah, Egypt b) Zaqaziq, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Rifat Salim b) Abu Usama **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** (May be on the Pakistani-Afghan border) **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2005 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Father's name is Ahmed Ezat Zaki. Member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4514888> [click here](#)**QDi.313 Name:** 1: DJAMEL 2: AKKACHA 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** جمال عكاشة**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 9 May 1978 **POB:** Rouiba, Algiers, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Yahia Abou el Hoummam b) Yahia Abou el Hammam **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 5 Feb. 2013 **Other information:** Father's name is Slimane. Mother's name is Akrouf Khadidja. Coordinator of groups associated with The Organisation of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) in northern Mali. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5224629> [click here](#)**QDi.325 Name:** 1: ABOU 2: MOHAMED 3: AL ADNANI 4: na**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1977 **POB:** Binnish, Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Yaser Khalaf Nazzal Alrawi b) Jaber Taha Falah c) Abou Khattab d) Abou Sadeq Alrawi e) Tah al Binchi f) Abu Mohammed al-Adnani g) Taha Sobhi Falaha h) Yasser Khalaf Hussein Nazal al-Rawi i) Abu Baker al-Khatat j) Abu Sadek al-Rawi k) Taha al-Banshi l) Abu Mohamed al-Adnani m) Abu-Mohammad al-Adnani al-Shami n) Hajj Ibrahim **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Aug. 2014 **Other information:** Official spokesman of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), and emir of ISIL in Syria, closely associated with Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani (QDi.317) and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, listed as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QDi.299). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5809950> [click here](#)**QDi.328 Name:** 1: HAJJAJ 2: BIN 3: FAHD 4: AL AJMI**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 10 Aug. 1987 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hijaj Fahid Hijaj Muhammad Sahib al-Ajmi b) Hicac Fehid Hicac Muhammed Sebib al-Acmi c) Hajjaj bin-Fahad al-Ajmi d) Sheikh Hajaj al-Ajami e) Hajaj al-Ajami f) Ajaj Ajami **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Aug. 2014 **Other information:** A Kuwait-based facilitator in charge of the 'committee of zakat' and financier for Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5809968> [click here](#)**QDi.324 Name:** 1: ABDUL MOHSEN 2: ABDALLAH 3: IBRAHIM 4: AL CHAREKH**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Jul. 1985 **POB:** Saqra, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Sharikh b) Sanafi al Nasr **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Aug. 2014 **Other information:** A long time facilitator and financier for Al-Qaida (QDe.004), appointed as a regional leader of Jabhat al-Nusrah, listed as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5809944> [click here](#)

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**QDi.228 Name:** 1: MOHAMMED 2: AL GHABRA 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jun. 1980 **POB:** Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohammed El' Ghabra b) Danial Adam **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** British number 094629366 **National identification no:** na **Address:** East London, United Kingdom **Listed on:** 12 Dec. 2006 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 20 Jul. 2015) **Other information:** Father's name is Mohamed Ayman Ghabra. Mother's name is Dalal. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 5 Oct. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1475981> [click here](#)

**QDi.327 Name:** 1: ABDELRAHMAN 2: MOUHAMAD ZAFIR 3: AL DABIDI 4: AL JAHANI

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 4 Dec. 1971 b) 1977 **POB:** Kharj, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir Al-Dubaysi Al-Juhni b) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Jahni c) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Jahani d) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Juhani e) Abdurhman Mohammed D. Aljahani f) Abu al-Wafa' g) Abu Anas h) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dabisi al-Jahani i) Abu Wafa al-Saudi j) Abu al-Wafa k) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Thafir al-Jahni l) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Juhani m) ) Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabissi Juhani n) Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabissi Juhani **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abou Wafa al Saoudi **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** F508591 **National identification no:** 1027508157 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Aug. 2014 **Other information:** A member and regional commander of Jabhat al-Nusrah, listed as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) and a facilitator of foreign recruits for that group. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5809958> [click here](#)

**QDi.361 Name:** 1: AMRU 2: AL-ABSI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1979 **POB:** Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Amr al Absi b) Abu al Athir Amr al Absi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu al-Athir b) Abu al-Asir c) Abu Asir d) Abu Amr al Shami e) Abu al-Athir al-Shami f) Abu-Umar al-Absi **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Homs, Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Shura council member of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115) and in charge of ISIL's media arm. ISIL's provincial leader for Homs, Syrian Arab Republic as of mid-2014. Dubbed as the ISIL's "kidnapper-in-chief". INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5896778> [click here](#)

**QDi.338 Name:** 1: SHAFI 2: SULTAN 3: MOHAMMED 4: AL-AJMI

**Title:** Doctor **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jan. 1973 **POB:** Warah, Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Shafi al-Ajmi b) Sheikh Shafi al-Ajmi **Low quality a.k.a.:** Shaykh Abu-Sultan **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** 0216155930 **National identification no:** na **Address:** Area 3, Street 327, Building 41, Al-Uqaylah, Kuwait **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Fundraiser for Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818220> [click here](#)

**QDi.236 Name:** 1: HAMID 2: ABDALLAH 3: AHMAD 4: AL-ALI**Name (original script):** حامد عبد الله أحمد العلي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Jan. 1960 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Dr. Hamed Abdullah Al-Ali b) Hamed Al-'Ali c) Hamed bin 'Abdallah Al-'Ali d) Hamid 'Abdallah Al-'Ali e) Hamid 'Abdallah Ahmad Al-'Ali f) Hamid bin Abdallah Ahmed Al-Ali g) Hamid Abdallah Ahmed Al-Ali **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Salim **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** Kuwait number 1739010, issued on 26 May 2003, issued in Kuwait (and expired on 25 May 2008) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Kuwait (residence as at Mar. 2009) **Listed on:** 16 Jan. 2008 (amended on 1 Jul. 2008, 23 Jul. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 14 Sep. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1518790> [click here](#)

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**QDi.092 Name:** 1: MEHREZ 2: BEN MAHMOUD 3: BEN SASSI 4: AL-AMDOUNI**Name (original script):** محرز بن محمود بن ساسي العمدوني

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 18 Dec. 1969 **POB:** Asima-Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Fabio Fusco born 25 May 1968 in Naples, Italy b) Fabio Fusco born 18 Dec. 1968 in Tunisia c) Fabio Fusco born 25 May 1968 in Algeria d) Mohamed Hassan e) Meherez Hamdouni f) Amdouni Mehrez ben Tah born 14 Jul. 1969 in Tunisia g) Meherez ben Ahdoud ben Amdouni **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Thale **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisian G737411, issued on 24 Oct. 1990 (expired on 20 Sep. 1997) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Italy **Listed on:** 25 Jun. 2003 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 17 Oct. 2007, 16 Sep. 2008, 24 Mar. 2009, 12 Jul. 2010, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Father's name is Mahmoud ben Sasi. Mother's name is Maryam bint al-Tijani. Inadmissible to the Schengen area. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1416963> [click here](#)

**QDi.389 Name:** 1: ABU UBAYDAH 2: YUSUF 3: AL-ANABI 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 7 Feb. 1969 **POB:** Annaba, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abou Obeida Youssef Al-Annabi b) Abu-Ubaydah Yusuf Al-Inabi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Mebrak Yazid b) Youcef Abu Obeida c) Mibrak Yazid d) Yousif Abu Obayda Yazid e) Yazid Mebrak f) Yazid Mabrak g) Yusuf Abu Ubaydah h) Abou Youcef **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** A leader of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014). Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930738> [click here](#)

**QDi.060 Name:** 1: MOHAMED 2: BEN BELGACEM 3: BEN ABDALLAH 4: AL-AOUADI**Name (original script):** محمد بن بلقاسم بن عبد الله العوادي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Dec. 1974 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohamed Ben Belkacem Aouadi b) Fathi Hannachi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** (Tunisian passport number L 191609 issued on 28 Feb. 1996, expired on 27 Feb. 2001) **National identification no:** a) (04643632 issued on 18 Jun. 1999) b) (Italian Fiscal Code: DAOMMD74T11Z352Z) na **Address:** 50th Street, Number 23, Zehrouni, Tunis, Tunisia **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 10 Apr. 2003, 26 Nov. 2004, 9 Sep. 2005, 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 7 Jun. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010, 24 Nov. 2014, 23 Feb. 2016) **Other information:** Head of security wing of Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) (QDe.143). Mother's name is Ourida Bint Mohamed. Departed from Italy to Tunisia on 1 Dec. 2004. Arrested in Tunisia in Aug. 2013. Imprisoned in the civilian prison of Burj al-Amiri on 13 Sep. 2013. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1122314> [click here](#)

**QDi.291 Name:** 1: IBRAHIM 2: HASSAN 3: TALI 4: AL-ASIRI**Name (original script):** ابراهيم حسن طالع العسيري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 19 Apr. 1982 b) 18 Apr. 1982 c) (24/06/1402 (Hijri Calendar)) **POB:** Riyadh, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ibrahim Hassan Tali Asiri (ابراهيم حسن طالع عسيري) b) Ibrahim Hasan Talea Aseeri c) Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri d) Ibrahim Hasan Tali Asiri e) Ibrahim Hassan Tali Assiri f) Ibrahim Hasan Tali'A 'Asiri g) Ibrahim Hasan Tali al-'Asiri h) Ibrahim al-'Asiri i) Ibrahim Hassan Al Asiri **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Saleh b) Abosslah c) Abu-Salaah **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** Saudi Arabia F654645, issued on 30 Apr. 2005 (expired on 7 Mar. 2010. Issue date in Hijri Calendar 24/06/1426. Expiry date in Hijri Calendar 21/03/1431.) **National identification no:** civil identification number 1028745097 **Address:** Yemen **Listed on:** 24 Mar. 2011 (amended on 15 Apr. 2014, 15 Jun. 2015) **Other information:** Operative and principal bomb maker of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Believed to be hiding in Yemen as at Mar. 2011. Wanted by Saudi Arabia. Also associated with Nasir 'abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-Wahishi (QDi.274), Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi (QDi.282), and Anwar Nasser Abdulla Al-Aulaqi (QDi.283). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4471886> [click here](#)

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**QDi.283 Name:** 1: ANWAR 2: NASSER 3: ABDULLA 4: AL-AULAQI**Name (original script):** انور ناصر عبدالله العولقي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 21 Apr. 1971 b) 22 Apr. 1971 **POB:** Las Cruces, New Mexico, United States of America **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Anwar al-Aulaqi b) Anwar al-Awlaki c) Anwar al-Awlaqi d) Anwar Nasser Aulaqi e) Anwar Nasser Abdullah Aulaqi f) Anwar Nasser Abdulla Aulaqi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** a) United States of America b) Yemeni **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2010 (amended on 30 Nov. 2011) **Other information:** Confirmed to have died on 30 Sep. 2011 in Yemen. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1621291> [click here](#)

**QDi.344 Name:** 1: IBRAHIM 2: 'ISA HAJJI 3: MUHAMMAD 4: AL-BAKR**Name (original script):** ابراهيم عيسى حاجي محمد البكر

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 12 Jul. 1977 **POB:** Qatar **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ibrahim 'Issa Haji Muhammad al-Bakar b) Ibrahim 'Isa Haji al-Bakr c) Ibrahim Issa Hijji Mohd Albaker d) Ibrahim Issa Hijji Muhammad al-Baker e) Ibrahim 'Issa al-Bakar f) Ibrahim al-Bakr **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu-Khalil **Nationality:** Qatar **Passport no:** number 01016646, issued in Qatar **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Jan. 2015 **Other information:** Facilitator who provides financial support for and financial services to and in support of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5843241> [click here](#)

**QDi.138 Name:** 1: SAID 2: BEN ABDELHAKIM 3: BEN OMAR 4: AL-CHERIF**Name (original script):** سعيد بن عبد الحكيم بن عمر الشريف

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 25 Jan. 1970 **POB:** Manzil Tmim, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Cherif Said born 25 Jan. 1970 in Tunisia b) Binhamoda Hokri born 25 Jan. 1970 in Sosa, Tunisia c) Hcrif Ataf born 25 Jan. 1971 in Solisse, Tunisia d) Bin Homoda Chokri born 25 Jan. 1970 in Tunis, Tunisia e) Atef Cherif born 12 Dec. 1973 in Algeria f) Sherif Ataf born 12 Dec. 1973 in Aras, Algeria g) Ataf Cherif Said born 12 Dec. 1973 in Tunis, Tunisia h) Cherif Said born 25 Jan. 1970 in Tunis, Tunisia i) Cherif Said born 12 Dec. 1973 in Algeria **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Djallal b) Youcef c) Abou Salman d) Said Tmimi **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia M307968, issued on 8 Sep. 2001 (expired on 7 Sep. 2006) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Corso Lodi 59, Milan, Italy **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 30 Jan. 2009, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Mother's name is Radhiyah Makki. Sentenced to eight years and ten months of imprisonment for membership of a terrorist association by the Appeal Court of Milan, Italy, on 7 Feb. 2008. Sentence confirmed by the Italian Supreme Court on 15 Jan. 2009, which became definitive as of Feb. 2008. Subject to expulsion from Italy to Tunisia after serving the sentence. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 6 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418798> [click here](#)

**QDi.231 Name:** 1: SALEM 2: NOR ELDIN 3: AMOHAMED 4: AL-DABSKI**Name (original script):** سالم نور الدين امحمد الديبسي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1963 **POB:** Tripoli, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Al-Ward b) Abdullah Ragab **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Naim b) Abdallah al- Masri **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no:** a) Libya number 1990/345751 b) Libya number 345751 **National identification no:** national identification 220334 **Address:** Bab Ben Ghasheer, Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya **Listed on:** 8 Jun. 2007 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Mother's name is Kalthoum Abdul Salam al-Shaftari. Senior member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (QDe.011) and member of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 24 Nov. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1480002> [click here](#)

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**QDi.278 Name:** 1: MUTHANNA 2: HARITH 3: AL-DARI 4: na**Name (original script):** مثنى حارث الصاري

**Title:** Doctor **Designation:** na **DOB:** 16 Jun. 1969 **POB:** Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Dr. Muthanna Al Dari b) Muthana Harith Al Dari c) Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dari d) Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dhari e) Muthanna Hareth Al-Dhari f) Muthana Haris Al-Dhari g) Doctor Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al Dari Al-Zawba' h) Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dari Al-Zobai i) Muthanna Harith Sulayman Al-Dari al-Zawba'i j) Muthanna Hareth al-Dari k) Muthana Haris al-Dari l) Doctor Muthanna al-Dari m) Dr. Muthanna Harith al-Dari al-Zowbai **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Ration card number: 1729765 **Address:** a) Amman, Jordan b) Khan Dari, Iraq (previous) c) Asas Village, Abu Ghurayb, Iraq (previous) d) Egypt (previous) **Listed on:** 25 Mar. 2010 (amended on 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Mother's name: Heba Khamis Dari. Provided operational guidance financial support and other services to or in support of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115). Involved in oil smuggling. Wanted by the Iraqi security forces. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1605628> [click here](#)

**QDi.149 Name:** 1: NOUREDDINE 2: BEN ALI 3: BEN BELKASSEM 4: AL-DRISSI**Name (original script):** نور الدين بن علي بن بلقاسم الدريسي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 30 Apr. 1964 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Drissi Nouredine **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abou Ali b) Faycal **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisian L851940, issued on 9 Sep. 1998 (expired on 8 Sep. 2003) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Via Plebiscito 3, Cermona, Italy **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 21 Dec. 2007, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Under administrative control measure in Italy until 5 May 2010. Inadmissible to the Schengen area. Mother's name is Khadijah al-Drissi. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418845> [click here](#)

**QDi.379 Name:** 1: ABD AL-AZIZ 2: ADAY 3: ZIMIN 4: AL-FADHIL**Name (original script):** عبدالعزيز عدي زمين الفضيل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 27 Aug. 1981 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd al-Aziz Udai Samin al-Fadhli b) Abd al-Aziz Udai Samin al-Fadhli c) Abd al-Aziz Adhay Zimin al-Fadhli d) Abdalaziz Ad'ai Samin Fadhli al-Fadhali **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 281082701081 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 21 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Kuwait-based facilitator who provides financial services to, or in support of, Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5896797> [click here](#)

**QDi.059 Name:** 1: KHALID 2: ABD AL-RAHMAN 3: HAMD 4: AL-FAWAZ**Name (original script):** خالد عبد الرحمن حمد الفواز

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 24 Aug. 1962 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Khaled Al-Fauwaz b) Khaled A. Al-Fauwaz c) Khalid Al-Fawwaz d) Khalik Al Fawwaz e) Khaled Al-Fawwaz f) Khaled Al Fawwaz g) Khalid Abdulrahman H. Al Fawaz **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** 456682, issued on 6 Nov. 1990 (expired on 13 Sep. 1995) **National identification no:** na **Address:** United States of America **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 23 Apr. 2007, 21 Oct. 2010, 4 Aug. 2014) **Other information:** Extradited from the United Kingdom to the United States of America on 5 Oct. 2012. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423210> [click here](#)

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**QDi.292 Name:** 1: OTHMAN 2: AHMED 3: OTHMAN 4: AL-GHAMDI**Name (original script):** عثمان أحمد عثمان الغامدي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 27 May 1979 **POB:** Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Othman al-Ghamdi born 27 May 1979 in Saudi Arabia b) Uthman al-Ghamdi born 27 May 1979 in Saudi Arabia c) Uthman al-Ghamidi born 27 May 1979 in Saudi Arabia d) Othman bin Ahmed bin Othman Alghamdi e) Othman Ahmed Othman Al Omairah (born in 1973 in Shabwa, Yemen, nationality: Yemeni) f) Uthman Ahmad Uthman al-Ghamdi g) Othman Ahmed Othman al-Omirah **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Al Umairah al-Ghamdi b) Othman Bin Ahmed Bin Othman **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** National Identification Number 1089516791 **Address:** Yemen **Listed on:** 16 Jun. 2011 (amended on 15 Apr. 2014) **Other information:** Operational commander of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Has been involved in raising funds and stockpiling arms for AQAP operations and activities in Yemen. Known associate of Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi (QDi.282) and Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso (deceased). Father's name is Ahmed Othman Al Omirah. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4556107> [click here](#)

**QDi.332 Name:** 1: IBRAHIM 2: SULEIMAN 3: HAMAD 4: AL-HABLAIN

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Dec. 1984 **POB:** Buraidah, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Barahim Suliman H. al Hblain **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Jabal b) Abu-Jabal **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** Saudi Arabia F800691 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Explosives expert and operative for the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) (QDe.144). Wanted by the Saudi Arabian Government for terrorism. Physical description: eye colour: dark; hair colour: dark; complexion: olive. Speaks Arabic. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5817981> [click here](#)

**QDi.160 Name:** 1: FETHI 2: BEN HASSEN 3: BEN SALEM 4: AL-HADDAD**Name (original script):** فتحى بن حسن بن سالم الحداد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 28 Jun. 1963 b) 28 Mar. 1963 **POB:** Tataouene, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Fethi ben Assen Haddad b) Fathy Hassan al Haddad **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisian L183017, issued on 14 Feb. 1996 (expired on 13 Feb. 2001) **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Number 184 Via Fulvio Testi – Cinisello Balsamo (MI), Italy b) Number 1 Via Porte Giove – Mortara (PV), Italy (Domicile) **Listed on:** 17 Mar. 2004 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 25 Jan. 2010, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal Code: HDDFTH63H28Z352V. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1417054> [click here](#)

**QDi.140 Name:** 1: KAMAL 2: BEN MAOELDI 3: BEN HASSAN 4: AL-HAMRAOUI**Name (original script):** كمال بن المولدي بن حسن الحمراوي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 21 Oct. 1977 **POB:** Beja, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hamroui Kamel ben Mouldi b) Hamraoui Kamel born 21 Nov. 1977 in Morocco c) Hamraoui Kamel born 21 Nov. 1977 in Tunisia d) Hamraoui Kamel born 21 Oct. 1977 in Tunisia **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Kamel b) Kimo **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisian P229856, issued on 1 Nov. 2002 (expires on 31 Oct. 2007) **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Via Bertesi Number 27, Cremona, Italy b) Via Plebiscito Number 3, Cremona, Italy **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 21 Dec. 2007, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Mother's name is Khamisah al-Kathiri. Subject to a decree of expulsion, suspended on 17 Apr. 2007 by the European Court of Human Rights. Re-arrested in Italy on 20 May 2008. Inadmissible to the Schengen area. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 6 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418954> [click here](#)

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**QDi.399 Name:** 1: BASSAM 2: AHMAD 3: AL-HASRI 4: na**Name (original script):** بسام أحمد الحصري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 Jan. 1969 b) Approximately 1971 **POB:** a) Qalamun, Damascus Province, Syrian Arab Republic b) Ghutah, Damascus Province, Syrian Arab Republic c) Tadamon, Rif Dimashq, Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** Bassam Ahmad Husari **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Ahmad Akhlaq b) Abu Ahmad al-Shami **Nationality:** a) Syrian Arab Republic b) State of Palestine **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (Southern. Location as of July 2016) **Listed on:** 22 Feb. 2017 **Other information:** Leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) for southern Syrian Arab Republic since July 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6013284> [click here](#)

**QDi.176 Name:** 1: IMAD 2: BEN BECHIR 3: BEN HAMDA 4: AL-JAMMALI**Name (original script):** عماد بن البشير بن حمدا الجمالي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 25 Jan. 1968 **POB:** Manzal Tmim, Nabal, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisian K693812, issued on 23 Apr. 1999 (expired on 22 Apr. 2004) **National identification no:** 01846592 **Address:** 4 Al-Habib Thamir Street, Manzal Tmim, Nabal, Tunisia (home address) **Listed on:** 23 Jun. 2004 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 17 Oct. 2007, 13 Dec. 2011, 23 Feb. 2016) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal Code: JMM MDI 68A25 Z352D. Italian Judicial Authorities have issued a warrant of arrest against him, which had not been executed as of Sep. 2007. Imprisoned in Sousse Prison on 28 Jul. 2002 and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment and administrative supervision. Released on 31 Jan. 2011 under a general amnesty. Mother's name is Jamilah. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 9 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1272790> [click here](#)

**QDi.317 Name:** 1: ABU MOHAMMED 2: AL-JAWLANI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** أبو محمد الجولاني

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Between 1975 and 1979 **POB:** Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Mohamed al-Jawlani (Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, Abu Muhammad al-Golani, Abu Muhammad Aljawlani, Muhammad al-Jawlani (transliterations of original script name)) b) Amjad Muzaffar Hussein Ali al-Naimi born 1980 in Syrian Arab Republic ((Mother's name: Fatma Ali Majour. Address: Mosul, Souq al-Nabi Yunis) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) الفاتح ، شيخ الفاتح ، (transliterations: Shaykh al-Fatih; Al Fatih ) (Translation: The Conqueror) (Nom de guerre) b) Abu Ashraf **Nationality:** Syrian Arab Republic **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** (Active in Syria as at Jun. 2013) **Listed on:** 24 Jul. 2013 (amended on 2 Jun. 2014, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Description: Dark complexion. Height: 1.70 m. Since Jan. 2012, he is the Leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137), a Syria-based group listed in May 2014, and previously listed as an alias of Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115) between 30 May 2013 and 13 May 2014. Associated with Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006). Wanted by the Iraqi security forces. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5513535> [click here](#)

**QDi.337 Name:** 1: MAYSAR ALI 2: MUSA 3: ABDALLAH 4: AL-JUBURI

**Title:** Amir **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jun. 1976 **POB:** a) Al-Shura, Mosul, Iraq b) Harara, Ninawa Province, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muyassir al-Jiburi b) Muyassir Harara c) Muyassir al-Shammari d) Muhammad Khalid Hassan **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Al-Shammari b) Mus'ab al-Qahtani c) Abu Maria al-Qatani **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Sharia amir of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) as of early 2014. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818218> [click here](#)

**QDi.382 Name:** 1: SA'D 2: BIN SA'D 3: MUHAMMAD SHARIYAN 4: AL-KA'BI**Name (original script):** سعد بن سعد محمد شريان الكعبي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Feb. 1972 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shiryan al-Ka'bi b) Sa'd Sa'd Muhammad Shiryan al-Ka'bi c) Sa'd al-Sharyan al-Ka'bi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Hazza' b) Abu Hazza' c) Umar al-Afghani d) Abu Sa'd e) Abu Suad **Nationality:** Qatar **Passport no:** Qatar 00966737 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 21 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Qatar-based facilitator who provides financial services to, or in support of, Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5896810> [click here](#)



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**QDi.318 Name:** 1: MUHAMMAD 2: JAMAL 3: ABD-AL RAHIM AHMAD 4: AL-KASHIF**Name (original script):** محمد جمال عبدالرحيم أحمد الكاشف

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 Jan. 1964 b) 1 Feb. 1964 **POB:** Cairo, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Jamal Abdo Al-Kashif b) Muhammad Jamal Abdo Al Kashef c) Muhammad Jamal Abd-Al Rahim Ahmad Al-Kashif d) Muhammad Jamal Abd-Al Rahim Al-Kashif e) Muhammad Jamal Abdu f) Muhammad Jamal **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Jamal Abu Ahmad (nom de guerre) b) Abu Ahmad (nom de guerre) c) Abu Jamal (nom de guerre) d) Muhammad Gamal Abu Ahmed e) Mohammad Jamal Abdo Ahmed (nom de guerre) f) Muhammad Jamal Abduh (nom de guerre) g) Muhammad Jamal Ahmad Abdu (nom de guerre) h) Riyadh (nom de guerre) **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no.:** a) Egypt number 6487, issued on 30 Jan. 1986 (issued under name Muhammad Jamal Abdu) b) Egypt (issued in 1993, under name Muhammad Jamal Abd-Al Rahim Ahmad Al-Kashif) c) Yemen number 388181 (issued under name Muhammad Jamal Abd-Al Rahim Ahmad Al-Kashif) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Egypt **Listed on:** 21 Oct. 2013 **Other information:** Trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) to make bombs. Former top military commander of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003). Since 2011, established Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) (QDe.136) and terrorist training camps in Egypt and Libya. Conducted MJN's terrorist activities with support from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Reported to be involved in the attack on the United States Mission in Benghazi, Libya, on 11 Sep. 2012. Headed Nasr City terrorist cell in Egypt in 2012. Linked to Aiman al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) and the leadership of AQAP and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014). Arrested and imprisoned multiple times by Egyptian authorities since ca. 2000. Released in 2011 but re-arrested by Egyptian authorities in Nov. 2012. Imprisoned in Egypt pending trial as of Sep. 2013. Wife's name is Samah 'Ali Al-Dahabani (Yemeni national). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5719795> [click here](#)

**QDi.380 Name:** 1: ABD AL-LATIF 2: BIN ABDALLAH 3: SALIH MUHAMMAD 4: AL-KAWARI**Name (original script):** عبداللطيف بن عبدالله صالح محمد الكواري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 28 Sep. 1973 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah Salih al-Kawari b) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah Salih al-Kuwari c) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah al-Kawwari d) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah al-Kawari e) Abu Ali al-Kawari **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Qatar **Passport no.:** a) Qatar number 01020802 b) Qatar number 00754833, issued on 20 May 2007 c) Qatar number 00490327, issued on 28 Jul. 2001 **National identification no.:** 27363400684 **Address:** Al-Laqtah, Qatar **Listed on:** 21 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Qatar-based facilitator who provides financial services to, or in support of, Al-Qaida (QDe.004). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5896805> [click here](#)

**QDi.177 Name:** 1: HABIB 2: BEN 3: AHMED 4: AL-LOUBIRI**Name (original script):** حبيب بن احمد اللويزيري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Nov. 1961 **POB:** Manzal Tmim, Nabal, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Al-Habib ben Ahmad ben al-Tayib al-Lubiri **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no.:** Tunisian M788439, issued on 20 Oct. 2001 (expires on 19 Oct. 2006) **National identification no.:** 01817002 **Address:** Salam Marnaq Ben Arous district, Sidi Mesoud, Tunisia **Listed on:** 23 Jun. 2004 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 17 Oct. 2007, 10 Aug. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011, 23 Feb. 2016) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal Code: LBR HBB 61S17 Z352F. In detention in Tunisia as at Dec. 2009. Mother's name is Fatima al-Galasi. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 9 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418944> [click here](#)

**QDi.074 Name:** 1: TAREK 2: BEN HABIB 3: BEN AL-TOUMI 4: AL-MAAROUFI**Name (original script):** طارق بن الحبيب بن التومي المعروفي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 23 Nov. 1965 **POB:** Ghardimaou, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Ismail b) Abou Ismail el Jendoubi c) Abou Ismail Al Djoundoubi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no.:** Tunisian E590976, issued on 19 Jun. 1987 (expired on 18 Jun. 1992) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Rue Léon Théodore Number 107/1, 1090 Jette, Brussels, Belgium **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 3 Jul. 2007, 10 Aug. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Belgian nationality withdrawn on 26 Jan. 2009. In detention in Nivelles, Belgium, as of Oct. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418920> [click here](#)

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**QDi.320 Name:** 1: ABD-AL-HAMID 2: AL-MASLI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبدالحميد المصلي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1976 **POB:** a) Darnah, Libya b) Danar, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad Abd-al-Hamid Al-Masli b) Abd-al-Hamid Musalli c) Hamid Masli **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Hamza al-Darnawi b) Hamzah al-Darnawi c) Hamza Darnawi d) Hamzah Darnawi e) Hamzah Dirnawi f) Hamza Darnavi g) Hamza al-Darnavi h) Abdullah Darnawi i) Abu-Hamzah al-Darnawi **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** (Reportedly located in Waziristan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan) **Listed on:** 26 Nov. 2013 **Other information:** Leader and trainer of an Al-Qaida electronics and explosives workshop producing improvised explosive device components. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5757961> [click here](#)

**QDi.330 Name:** 1: AZZAM 2: ABDULLAH 3: ZUREIK 4: AL-MAULID AL-SUBHI

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 12 Apr. 1976 **POB:** Al Baraka, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mansur al-Harbi b) Azzam al-Subhi c) Azam Abdallah Razeeq al Mouled Alsbhua d) Abu Muslem al-Maky e) Abu Suliman al-Harbi f) Abu Abdalla al-Harbi g) Azam A.R. Alsbhua **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** Saudi Arabia C389664, issued on 15 Sep. 2000 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Has ties to numerous senior Al-Qaida (QDe.004) leaders. Wanted by the Saudi Arabian Government for terrorism. Father's name is Abdullah Razeeq al Mouled al Sbhua. Physical description: eye colour: dark; hair colour: dark; complexion: dark. Speaks Arabic. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5817930> [click here](#)

**QDi.276 Name:** 1: AKRAM 2: TURKI 3: HISHAN 4: AL-MAZIDIH**Name (original script):** أكرم تركي هاشم المزيد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1974 b) 1975 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** Akram Turki Al-Hishan **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Jarrah b) Abu Akram **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Deir ez-Zor Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic b) Iraq **Listed on:** 11 Mar. 2010 (amended on 15 Jan. 2016, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Other possible date of birth: 1979. He is a cousin of Ghazy Fezza Hishan Al Mazidih (QDi.277). Financial facilitator of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115) as of 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1605607> [click here](#)

**QDi.277 Name:** 1: GHAZY 2: FEZZA 3: HISHAN 4: AL-MAZIDIH**Name (original script):** غاري فيزا هاشم المزيد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1974 b) 1975 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ghazy Fezzaa Hishan b) Mushari Abd Aziz Saleh Shlash **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Faysal b) Abu Ghazzy **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic b) Iraq **Listed on:** 11 Mar. 2010 (amended on 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** He is a cousin of Akram Turki Hishan Al Mazidih (QDi.276). Terrorist attack organizer for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115) as of 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1516793> [click here](#)

**QDi.377 Name:** 1: MUHANNAD 2: AL-NAJDI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 May 1984 **POB:** al-Duwadmi, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** 'Ali Manahi 'Ali al-Mahaydali al-Utaybi **Low quality a.k.a.:** Ghassan al-Tajiki **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Syria-based Al-Qaida (QDe.004) facilitator. Involved in the development of improvised explosive devices for use in Afghanistan and Syrian Arab Republic since at least 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930722> [click here](#)

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**QDi.334 Name:** 1: 'ABD AL-RAHMAN 2: BIN 'UMAYR 3: AL-NU'AYMI 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1954 **POB:** Doha, Qatar **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd al-Rahman bin 'Amir al-Na'imi b) 'Abd al-Rahman al-Nu'a'imi c) 'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Amir al-Nu'imi d) 'Abd al-Rahman bin 'Amir al-Nu'aymi e) 'Abdallah Muhammad al-Nu'aymi f) 'Abd al-Rahman al-Nua'yami g) A. Rahman al-Naimi h) Abdelrahman Imer al Jaber al Naimeh i) A. Rahman Omair J Alnaimi j) Abdulrahman Omair al Neaimi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Qatar **Passport no:** Qatari passport number 00868774 (expired on 27 Apr. 2014) **National identification no:** Qatari identification number 25463401784 (expires on 6 Dec. 2019) **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 15 Feb. 2017) **Other information:** Financier and facilitator for Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5817985> [click here](#)

**QDi.273 Name:** 1: FAZEEL-A-TUL 2: SHAYKH ABU MOHAMMED 3: AMEEN 4: AL-PESHAWARI  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) Approximately 1967 b) Approximately 1961 c) Approximately 1973 **POB:** Shunkrai village, Sarkani District, Konar Province, Afghanistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Shaykh Aminullah b) Sheik Aminullah c) Abu Mohammad Aminullah Peshawari d) Abu Mohammad Amin Bishawri e) Abu Mohammad Shaykh Aminullah Al-Bishauri f) Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen al-Peshawari g) Shaykh Aminullah Al-Peshawari **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Afghan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Ganj District, Peshawar, Pakistan **Listed on:** 29 Jun. 2009 (amended on 24 Jul. 2013) **Other information:** Associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Head of Ganj madrasa, a.k.a. Madrasa Jamia Taleemul Quran wal Hadith, a.k.a. Madrasa Taleemul Quran wal Sunnah, located at the Ganj Gate, Phandu Road, Peshawar, Pakistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1578086> [click here](#)

**QDi.339 Name:** 1: 'ABD AL-RAHMAN 2: MUHAMMAD 3: MUSTAFA 4: AL-QADULI  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1959 b) 1957 **POB:** Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) 'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Mustafa Shaykhlari b) Umar Muhammad Khalil Mustafa c) Abdul Rahman Muhammad al-Bayati d) Tahir Muhammad Khalil Mustafa al-Bayati e) Aliazra Ra'ad Ahmad **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu-Shuayb b) Hajji Iman c) Abu Iman d) Abu Ala e) Abu Hasan f) Abu Muhammad g) Abu Zayna **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Senior Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115), official. Previously served as a representative of AQI to Al-Qaida (QDe.004) senior leadership in Pakistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818223> [click here](#)

**QDi.402 Name:** 1: NAYIF 2: SALIH 3: SALIM 4: AL-QAYSI  
**Name (original script):** نايف صالح سالم القيسي  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1983 **POB:** Al Baydah Governorate, Yemen **Good quality a.k.a.:** Naif Saleh Salem al Qaisi **Low quality a.k.a.:** Nayif al-Ghaysi **Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no:** Yemen 04796738 **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Al-Baydah Governorate, Yemen b) Sana'a, Yemen (previous location) **Listed on:** 22 Feb. 2017 **Other information:** Senior official and a financial supporter of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Facilitated the expansion of AQAP in al-Bayda Governorate, Yemen. Involved in planning AQAP's militant operations in Yemen and financed AQAP training camps in 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6013291> [click here](#)

**QDi.282 Name:** 1: QASIM 2: MOHAMED 3: MAHDI 4: AL-RIMI  
**Name (original script):** قاسم محمد مهدي الريمي  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Jun. 1978 **POB:** Raymah village, Sanaa Governorate (ريمة), Yemen **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Qasim Al-Rimi b) Qasim al-Raymi c) Qassim al-Raymi d) Qasim al-Rami e) Qasim Mohammed Mahdi Al Remi f) Qassim Mohammad Mahdi Al Rimi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Qasim Yahya Mahdi 'Abd al-Rimi b) Abu Hurayyah al-Sana'ai c) Abu 'Ammar d) Abu Hurayrah **Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no:** Yemeni 00344994, issued on 3 Jul. 1999, issued in Sanaa **National identification no:** Yemeni national identification number 973406, issued on 3 Jul. 1996 **Address:** Yemen **Listed on:** 11 May 2010 (amended on 15 Apr. 2014, 24 Jun. 2016) **Other information:** Mother's name: Fatima Muthanna Yahya. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (QDe.129) since Jun. 2015, pledged loyalty to Aiman al-Zawahiri (QDi.006). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4470245> [click here](#)

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**QDi.369 Name:** 1: MU'TASSIM 2: YAHYA 3: 'ALI 4: AL-RUMAYSH

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Jan. 1973 **POB:** Jeddah, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Rayhanah b) Abu-Rayhanah c) Handalah d) Abu-Rayhanah al-'Ansari al-Jeddawi **Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no.:** Yemen 01055336 **National identification no.:** alien registration number 2054275397, issued on 22 Jul. 1998 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Financial and foreign fighter facilitator for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Member of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129) since at least Jun. 2014. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897317> [click here](#)

**QDi.381 Name:** 1: HAMAD 2: AWAD 3: DAHI SARHAN 4: AL-SHAMMARI**Name (original script):** حمد عوض ضاحي سرحان الشمري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 31 Jan. 1984 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Uqlah al-Kuwaiti **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no.:** Kuwait 155454275 **National identification no.:** identity card 284013101406 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 21 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Kuwait-based facilitator who provides financial services to, or in support of, Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5896809> [click here](#)

**QDi.384 Name:** 1: ALI MUSA 2: AL-SHAWAKH 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1973 **POB:** Sahl Village, Raqqa Province, Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) 'Ali Musa al-Shawagh b) 'Ali Musa al-Shawagh c) Ali al-Hamoud al-Shawakh d) Ibrahim al-Shawwakh e) Muhammad 'Ali al-Shawakh **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Luqman b) Ali Hammud c) Abdullah Shuwar al-Aujayd d) Ali Awas e) 'Ali Derwish f) 'Ali al-Hamud g) Abu Luqman al-Sahl h) Abu Luqman al-Suri i) Abu Ayyub **Nationality:** Syrian Arab Republic **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** A leader of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). As of Jun, 2015, al-Shawakh was the ISIL governor of Aleppo. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930729> [click here](#)

**QDi.385 Name:** 1: HASAN 2: AL-SALAHAYN 3: SALIH 4: AL-SHA'ARI

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1975 **POB:** Derna, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** Husayn al-Salihin Salih al-Sha'iri **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Habib al-Libi b) Hasan Abu Habib **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no.:** Libya 542858 **National identification no.:** Libya national identification number 55252, issued in Derna, Libya **Address:** Libya **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Facilitator for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930734> [click here](#)

**QDi.253 Name:** 1: KHALIFA 2: MUHAMMAD 3: TURKI 4: AL-SUBAIY**Name (original script):** خليفة محمد تركي السبيعي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jan. 1965 **POB:** Doha, Qatar **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Khalifa Mohd Turki Alsubaie b) Khalifa Mohd Turki al-Subaie c) Khalifa Al-Subayi d) Khalifa Turki bin Muhammad bin al-Suayi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Mohammed al-Qatari b) Katrina **Nationality:** Qatar **Passport no.:** Qatar 00685868, issued on 5 Feb. 2006, issued in Doha (expiring on 4 Feb. 2011) **National identification no.:** 26563400140 **Address:** Doha, Qatar **Listed on:** 10 Oct. 2008 (amended on 25 Jan. 2010, 15 Nov. 2012, 19 Feb. 2015) **Other information:** Qatar-based terrorist financier and facilitator who has provided financial support to, and acted on behalf of, the senior leadership of Al-Qaida (QDe.004), including moving recruits to Al-Qaida training camps in South Asia. In Jan. 2008, convicted in absentia by the Bahraini High Criminal Court for financing terrorism, undergoing terrorist training, facilitating the travel of others to receive terrorist training abroad, and for membership in a terrorist organization. Arrested in Qatar in Mar. 2008. Served his sentence in Qatar and has been released from detention. Mother's name is Hamdah Ahmad Haidoos. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5834918> [click here](#)

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**QDi.151 Name:** 1: MOURAD 2: BEN ALI 3: BEN AL-BASHEER 4: AL-TRABELSI**Name (original script):** مراد بن علي بن البشير الطرابلسي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 May 1969 **POB:** Manzil Tmim, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Aboue Chiba Brahim born 2 Sep. 1966 in Libya b) Arouri Taoufik born 2 Sep. 1964 in Tunisia c) Ben Salah Adnan born 2 Apr. 1966 in Tunisia d) Sassi Adel born 2 Sep. 1966 in Tunisia e) Salam Kamel born 2 Feb. 1963 in Tunisia f) Salah Adnan born 4 Feb. 1965 in Algeria g) Arouri Faisel born 2 Mar. 1965 in Tunisia h) Bentaib Amour born 9 Feb. 1965 in Morocco i) Adnan Salah born 1 Apr. 1966 in Tunisia j) Hasnaoui Mellit (born in 1972 in Morocco) k) Arouri Taoufik ben Taieb born 9 Feb. 1964 in Tunisia l) Abouechiba Brahim born 2 Sep. 1966 in Lebanon m) Farid Arouri born 2 Jun. 1964 in Tunisia n) Ben Magid born 2 Jun. 1966 in Lebanon o) Maci Ssassi born 2 Jun. 1972 in Libya p) Salah ben Anan born 2 Apr. 1966 in Tunisia q) Hasnau Mellit (born in 1972 in Morocco) **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abou Djarrh **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia G827238, issued on 1 Jun. 1996 (expired on 31 May 2001) **National identification no:** 05093588 **Address:** Libya Street Number 9, Manzil Tmim, Nabeul, Tunisia **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 10 Aug. 2009, 16 May 2011, 23 Feb. 2016) **Other information:** Extradited from Italy to Tunisia on 13 Dec. 2008. Imprisoned in Mornaguia Prison on 29 Nov. 2011 pursuant to an order issued by the Court of First Instance of Grombalia for excavation of artefacts without a licence (case No. 12680/2011). Released on 27 Dec. 2011 after charges against him were dismissed. Inadmissible to the Schengen area. Mother's name is Mabrukah al-Yazidi. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418911> [click here](#)

**QDi.172 Name:** 1: HASSAN 2: ABDULLAH 3: HERSI 4: AL-TURKI**Name (original script):** حسن عبد الله حرسى التركي

**Title:** a) Sheikh b) Colonel **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1944 **POB:** Region V (the Ogaden Region in eastern Ethiopia), Ethiopia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hassan Turki b) Hassen Abdelle Fihye c) Sheikh Hassan Abdullah Fahaih d) Hassan Al-Turki e) Hassan Abdillahi Hersi Turki f) Sheikh Hassan Turki g) Xasan Cabdilaahi Xirsi h) Xasan Cabdulle Xirsi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Somalia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** (Reported to be active in Southern Somalia, lower Juba near Kismayo, mainly in Jilibe and Burgabo as of Nov. 2012) **Listed on:** 6 Jul. 2004 (amended on 25 Jul. 2006, 21 Dec. 2007, 12 Apr. 2010, 11 May 2010, 13 Dec. 2011, 18 Mar. 2013) **Other information:** Family Background: From the Ogaden clan, Reer - Abdille subclan. Part of the Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) (QDe.002) leadership. Believed to have been involved in the attacks on the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. Also subject to the sanctions measures set out in Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (see <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751>). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5950576> [click here](#)

**QDi.015 Name:** 1: MAHFOUZ 2: OULD 3: AL-WALID 4: na**Name (original script):** محفوظ ولد الوليد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jan. 1975 **POB:** Mauritania **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Hafis the Mauritanian b) Khalid Al-Shanqiti c) Mafouz Walad Al-Walid **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Mauritania **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 (amended on 1 Jun. 2007, 10 Jun. 2011) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423438> [click here](#)

**QDi.329 Name:** 1: AHMED 2: ABDULLAH 3: SALEH AL-KHAZMARI 4: AL-ZHRANI

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Sep. 1978 **POB:** Dammam, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Maryam al-Zahrani b) Abu Maryam al-Saudi c) Ahmed Abdullah S al-Zahrani d) Ahmad Abdullah Salih al-Zahrani e) Abu Maryam al-Azadi f) Ahmed bin Abdullah Saleh bin al-Zahrani g) Ahmed Abdullah Saleh al-Zahrani al-Khozmi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** Saudi Arabia E126785, issued on 27 May 2002 (expired on 3 Apr. 2007) **National identification no:** na **Address:** (Located in Syria) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Senior member of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Wanted by the Saudi Arabian Government for terrorism. Father's name is Abdullah Saleh al Zahrani. Physical description: eye colour: dark; hair colour: dark; complexion: olive. Speaks Arabic. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5817663> [click here](#)

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**QDi.392 Name:** 1: FAYSAL 2: AHMAD 3: BIN ALI 4: AL-ZAHRANI**Name (original script):** فيصل احمد بن علي الزهراني**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Jan. 1986 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** Faisal Ahmed Ali Alzahrani **Low****quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Sarah al-Saudi b) Abu Sara Zahrani **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no.:** a) Saudi Arabia number K142736, issued on 14 Jul. 2011, issued in Al-Khafji, Saudi Arabia b) Saudi Arabia number G579315**National identification no.:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 20 Apr. 2016 **Other information:** Was the lead oil and gas division official of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), for Al Barakah Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic, as of May 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5943051> [click here](#)**QDi.401 Name:** 1: GHALIB 2: ABDULLAH 3: AL-ZAIDI 4: na**Name (original script):** غالب عبدالله الزيدي**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1975 b) 1970 **POB:** Raqqah Region, Marib Governorate, Yemen **Good****quality a.k.a.:** a) Ghalib Abdallah al-Zaydi b) Ghalib Abdallah Ali al-Zaydi **Low quality a.k.a.:** Ghalib al Zaydi**Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 22 Feb. 2017 **Other****information:** A leader of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129) in Marib Governorate, Yemen since 2015. Provided AQAP with weapons, funding and recruits. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6013288> [click here](#)**QDi.006 Name:** 1: AIMAN 2: MUHAMMED 3: RABI 4: AL-ZAWAHIRI**Name (original script):** أيمن محمد ربيع الطواهري**Title:** a) Doctor b) Dr. **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Jun. 1951 **POB:** Giza, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ayman**Al-Zawahiri b) Ahmed Fuad Salim c) Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Rabi Abdel Muaz d) Al Zawahiri Ayman e) Abdul****Qader Abdul Aziz Abdul Moez Al Doctor f) Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Rabi g) Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Rabie****h) Al Zawahry Aiman Mohamed Robi i) Dhawahri Ayman j) Eddaouahiri Ayman k) Nur Al Deen Abu Mohammed****l) Ayman Al Zawahiri m) Ahmad Fuad Salim Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Fatma b) Abu Mohammed **Nationality:****Egypt Passport no.:** a) Egypt number 1084010 b) 19820215 **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na**Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2001 (amended on 2 Jul. 2007, 18 Jul. 2007, 13 Aug. 2007, 16 Dec. 2010, 22 May 2015)**Other information:** Leader of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Former operational and military leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003), was a close associate of Usama Bin Laden (deceased). Believed to be in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4487197> [click here](#)**QDi.156 Name:** 1: ABD-AL-MAJID 2: AZIZ 3: AL-ZINDANI 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد المجيد عزيز الزنداني**Title:** Sheikh **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1950 **POB:** Yemen **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdelmajid Al-Zindani b)**Shaykh 'Abd Al-Majid Al-Zindani c) Sheikh Abd Al-Meguid Al-Zandani Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Yemen**Passport no.:** Yemen A005487, issued on 13 Aug. 1995 **National identification no.:** na **Address:** P.O. Box 8096,**Sana'a, Yemen Listed on:** 27 Feb. 2004 (amended on 25 Jul. 2006, 10 Jun. 2011) **Other information:** Review**pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 2 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:** <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423688> [click here](#)**QDi.326 Name:** 1: HAMID 2: HAMAD 3: HAMID 4: AL-'ALI**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Nov. 1960 **POB:** a) Kuwait b) Qatar **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality****a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no.:** a) Kuwait number 001714467 b) Kuwait number 101505554 **National****identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Aug. 2014 **Other information:** A Kuwait-based financier,**recruiter and facilitator for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), and Jabhat al-****Nusrah, listed as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). Associated with Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim****Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QDi.299) and Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani (QDi.317). INTERPOL-UN Security Council****Special Notice web link:** <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5809955> [click here](#)

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**QDi.335 Name:** 1: 'ABD AL-RAHMAN 2: KHALAF 3: 'UBAYD JUDAY' 4: AL-'ANIZI

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Mar. 1973 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) 'Abd al-Rahman Khalaf al-Anizi b) 'Abd al-Rahman Khalaf al-'Anzi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Usamah al-Rahman b) Abu Shaima' Kuwaiti c) Abu Usamah al-Kuwaiti d) Abu Usama e) Yusuf **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (located in since 2013) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 15 Feb. 2017) **Other information:** Provides support to Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115), in Syria and Iraq. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818202> [click here](#)

**QDi.154 Name:** 1: SULAIMAN 2: JASSEM 3: SULAIMAN 4: ALI ABO GHAITH**Name (original script):** سليمان جاسم سليمان علي أبوغيث

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 14 Dec. 1965 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abo Ghaith **Nationality:** Kuwaiti citizenship withdrawn in 2002 **Passport no:** Kuwaiti number 849594, issued on 27 Nov. 1998, issued in Kuwait (and expired on 24 Jun. 2003) **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 16 Jan. 2004 (amended on 23 Jul. 2008, 10 Jun. 2011) **Other information:** Left Kuwait for Pakistan in June 2001. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4487587> [click here](#)

**QDi.299 Name:** 1: IBRAHIM 2: AWWAD 3: IBRAHIM 4: ALI AL-BADRI AL-SAMARRAI**Name (original script):** إبراهيم عواد إبراهيم علي البدرى السامرائى

**Title:** Dr. **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1971 **POB:** Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** Dr. Ibrahim 'Awwad Ibrahim 'Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai' (born in 1971 in Samarra, Iraq (Ibrahim 'Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai; Ibrahim 'Awad Ibrahim al-Samarrai'; Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Samarrai')) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) أبو دعاء ((Abu Du'a; Abu Duaa) prominently known by this nom de guerre) b) Dr. Ibrahim c) أبو بكر البغدادي الحسيني القرشي (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husayni al-Quraishi; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Ration card number: 0134852 **Address:** a) Iraq b) Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 5 Oct. 2011 (amended on 20 Jul. 2012, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Description: Height: 1.65 m. Weight: 85 kg. Black hair and eyes. White skin. Leader of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115). Currently based in Iraq and Syria. Declared himself "caliph" in Mosul in 2014. Responsible for managing and directing AQI large scale operations. Wife's name: Saja Hamid al-Dulaimi. Wife's name: Asma Fawzi Mohammed al-Kubaissi. Wanted by the Iraqi security forces. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4654685> [click here](#)

**QDi.296 Name:** 1: MATI UR-REHMAN 2: ALI MUHAMMAD 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** مطيع الرحمن على محمد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1977 **POB:** Chak number 36/DNB, Rajkan, Madina Colony, Bahawalpur District, Punjab Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mati-ur Rehman b) Mati ur Rehman c) Matiur Rahman d) Matiur Rehman e) Matti al-Rehman f) Abdul Samad g) Samad Sial h) Abdul Samad Sial i) Ustad Talha j) Qari Mushtaq **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Tariq b) Hussain **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 22 Aug. 2011 (amended on 10 May 2012, 17 Oct. 2013) **Other information:** Physical description: 5 feet 2 inches; 157,4 cm. Name of father: Ali Muhammad. Mati ur-Rehman is the chief operational commander of Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (QDe.096). Associated with Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QDe.130). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4674457> [click here](#)

**QDi.370 Name:** 1: TARAD 2: MOHAMMAD 3: ALJARBA 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Nov. 1979 **POB:** Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** Tarad Aljarba **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu-Muhammad al-Shimali **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** E704088, issued on 26 Aug. 2003 (expired on 2 Jul. 2008) **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Border emir of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) as of Apr. 2015, and ISIL's leader for operations outside of the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq as of mid-2014. Facilitated the travel from Turkey to the Syrian Arab Republic of prospective ISIL fighters from Australia, Europe, and the Middle East. Managed ISIL's guesthouse in Azaz, Syrian Arabic Republic as of 2014. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897318> [click here](#)

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**QDi.076 Name:** 1: ISAM 2: ALI 3: MOHAMED 4: ALOUCHE**Name (original script):** عصام علي محمد علوش

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1972 b) 21 Mar. 1974 **POB:** Baghdad, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** Mansour Thaer born 21 Mar. 1974 in Baghdad, Iraq **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Jordan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2002 (amended on 18 Aug. 2006, 30 Jan. 2009) **Other information:** Was deported from Germany to Jordan in Feb. 2005. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424781> [click here](#)

**QDi.152 Name:** 1: SAIFI 2: AMMARI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** سيفي عماري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 Jan. 1968 b) 24 Apr. 1968 **POB:** a) Kef Rih, Algeria b) Guelma, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) El Para (combat name) b) Abderrezak Le Para (combat name) c) Abou Haidara d) El Ourassi e) Abderrezak Zaimeche f) Abdul Rasak ammane Abu Haidra g) Abdalarak **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 4 Dec. 2003 (amended on 7 Apr. 2008, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** In detention in Algeria since Oct. 2004. Former member of the GSPC listed as The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 27 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4530148> [click here](#)

**QDi.216 Name:** 1: ABDULLAH 2: ANSHORI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1958 **POB:** Pacitan, East Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Fathi b) Thoyib, Ibnu c) Toyib, Ibnu d) Abu Fathi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 21 Apr. 2006 **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1429180> [click here](#)

**QDi.323 Name:** 1: SAID 2: ARIF 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 25 Jun. 1964 b) 5 Dec. 1965 **POB:** Oran, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Said Mohamed Arif b) Omar Gharib c) Abderahmane d) Abdallah al-Jazairi e) Slimane Chabani f) Souleiman **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Aug. 2014 **Other information:** A veteran member of the 'Chechen Network' (not listed) and other terrorist groups. He was convicted of his role and membership in the 'Chechen Network' in France in 2006. Joined Jabhat al-Nusrah, listed as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) in October 2013. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5809733> [click here](#)

**QDi.398 Name:** 1: RUSTAM 2: MAGOMEDOVICH 3: ASELDEROV 4: na**Name (original script):** Рустам Магомедович Асельдеров

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 9 Mar. 1981 **POB:** Iki-Burul Village, Iki-Burulskiy District, Republic of Kalmykia, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Muhammad (original script: Абу Мухаммад) b) Abu Muhammad Al-Kadari (original script: Абу Мухаммад Аль-Кадари) c) Muhamadmuhtar (original script: Мухамадмухтар) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** Russian passport number 8208 No. 555627 (issued by Leninskiy Office, Directorate of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation for the Republic of Dagestan) **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 12 Dec. 2016 (amended on 9 Aug. 2017) **Other information:** Led a group of over 160 terrorist fighters, which operates in the Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, Russian Federation. Killed on 3 December 2016 in Makhachkala, the Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5993047> [click here](#)



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**QDi.184 Name:** 1: MUHSIN 2: FADHIL 3: AYED 4: ASHOUR AL-FADHLI**Name (original script):** محسن فاضل عايد عاشور الفضلي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 24 Apr. 1981 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhsin Fadhil 'Ayyid al Fadhli b) Muhsin Fadil Ayid Ashur al Fadhli c) Abu Majid Samiyah d) Abu Samia **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no.:** a) Kuwait number 106261543 b) Kuwait number 1420529, issued in Kuwait (and expired on 31 Mar. 2006) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Block Four, Street 13, House #179 , Kuwait City, Al-Riqqa area, Kuwait **Listed on:** 17 Feb. 2005 (amended on 23 Jul. 2008, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Wanted by the Kuwaiti Security Authorities. Wanted by the Saudi security forces. Fugitive as of Jul. 2008. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4484905> [click here](#)

**QDi.265 Name:** 1: HAJI 2: MUHAMMAD 3: ASHRAF 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 Mar. 1965 b) 1955 **POB:** Faisalabad, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Haji M. Ashraf b) Muhammad Ashraf Manshah c) Muhammad Ashraf Munsha **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no.:** a) Pakistani number AT0712501, issued on 12 Mar. 2008 (expired 11 Mar 2013) b) Pakistani number A-374184 **National identification no.:** a) 6110125312507 b) 24492025390 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 10 Dec. 2008 (amended on 17 Jul. 2009, 24 Jul. 2013) **Other information:** Chief of finance of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). His father's name is Noor Muhammad. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1543491> [click here](#)

**QDi.364 Name:** 1: ISLAM 2: SEIT-UMAROVICH 3: ATABIEV 4: na**Name (original script):** Ислам Сеит-Умарович Атабиев

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 29 Sep. 1983 **POB:** Ust-Dzheguta, Republic of Karachayevo- Cherkessia, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Jihad (original script: Абу Джихад) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no.:** Russian foreign travel passport number 620169661 **National identification no.:** national passport 9103314932, issued on 15 Aug. 2003 (issued by Department of the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation for the Republic Karachayevo-Cherkessia) **Address:** a) Moscovskiy Microrayon 6, App. 96, Ust- Dzheguta, Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Russian Federation b) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Aug. 2015) c) Iraq (possible alternative location as at Aug. 2015) **Listed on:** 2 Oct. 2015 **Other information:** As at Aug. 2015, emir of Russian-speaking militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Controls the Syrian Arab Republic cities of Al Dana and Idlib as an ISIL chief. Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes committed in its territory. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5899821> [click here](#)

**QDi.042 Name:** 1: HASSAN 2: DAHIR 3: AWEYS 4: na**Name (original script):** حسن ظاهر عويس

**Title:** a) Sheikh b) Colonel **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1935 **POB:** Somalia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ali, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys b) Awes, Shaykh Hassan Dahir c) Hassen Dahir Aweyes d) Ahmed Dahir Aweys e) Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim f) Aweys Hassan Dahir g) Hassan Tahir Oais h) Hassan Tahir Uways i) Hassan Dahir Awes **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Sheikh Aweys b) Sheikh Hassan c) Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys **Nationality:** Somalia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** a) (Active in Southern Somalia as of Nov. 2012.) b) (Also reported to be in Eritrea as of Nov. 2007.) **Listed on:** 9 Nov. 2001 (amended on 21 Dec. 2007, 11 May 2010, 16 May 2011, 18 Mar. 2013) **Other information:** Family background: from the Hawiye's Habergidir, Ayr clan. Senior leader of Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) (QDe.002) and Hizbul Islam in Somalia. Since 12 April 2010, also subject to the sanctions measures set out in Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (see <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751>). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5950653> [click here](#)

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**QDi.248 Name:** 1: RICARDO 2: PEREZ 3: AYERAS 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Sep. 1973 **POB:** 24 Paraiso Street, Barangay Poblacion, Mandaluyong City, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Kareem Ayeras b) Abdul Karim Ayeras **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Ricky Ayeras b) Jimboy c) Isaac Jay Galang Perez d) Abdul Mujib **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Barangay Mangayao, Tagkawayan, Quezon, Philippines b) Barangay Tigib, Ayungon, Negros Oriental, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128). Arrested by the Philippines authorities on 14 Mar. 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1523036> [click here](#)

**QDi.371 Name:** 1: ABD AL-BASET 2: AZZOUZ 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 7 Feb. 1966 **POB:** Doma, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdelbasset Azouz b) Abdul Baset Azouz **Low quality a.k.a.:** AA (initials) **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no:** a) Libya number 223611 b) British passport number C00146605 **National identification no:** na **Address:** Libya (last known location) **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Key operative in Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Under the direction of Airman al-Zawahiri (QDi.006), recruited 200 militants in the eastern part of Libya. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930719> [click here](#)

**QDi.404 Name:** 1: Muhammad 2: Bahrum 3: Naim 4: Anggih Tamtomo

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Sep. 1983 **POB:** a) Surakarta, Indonesia b) Pekalongan, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Bahrun Naim b) Anggih Tamtomo **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Rayyan b) Abu Rayan c) Abu Aisyah **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic b) Raqqa, Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Syrian-based Indonesian national who has served in a variety of roles supporting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6116575> [click here](#)

**QDi.305 Name:** 1: ABDUL 2: ROSYID 3: RIDHO 4: BA'ASYIR

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 31 Jan. 1974 **POB:** Sukoharjo, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Rosyid Ridho Bashir b) Rashid Rida Ba'aysir c) Rashid Rida Bashir **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** (Indonesian National Identity Card number 1127083101740003 under name Abdul Rosyid Ridho Ba'asyir) na **Address:** Podok Pesantren AL Wayain Ngrandu, Sumber Agung Magetan, East Java, Indonesia **Listed on:** 12 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Father's name is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (QDi.217). Brother of Abdul Rahim Ba'aysir (QDi.293). Belongs to the leadership of and is involved in recruitment and fundraising for Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) (QDe.133) Associated with Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4682206> [click here](#)

**QDi.217 Name:** 1: ABU BAKAR 2: BA'ASYIR 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Aug. 1938 **POB:** Jombang, East Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Bakar Baasyir born 17 Aug. 1938 in Jombang, East Java, Indonesia b) Abu Bakar Bashir born 17 Aug. 1938 in Jombang, East Java, Indonesia c) Abdus Samad d) Abdus Somad **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Indonesia (in prison) **Listed on:** 21 Apr. 2006 (amended on 14 Oct. 2015) **Other information:** Formed Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) (QDe.133) in 2008. In 2010, arrested for incitement to commit terrorism and fundraising with respect to a training camp in Aceh, Indonesia and sentenced to 15 years in 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1428633> [click here](#)

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**QDi.293 Name:** 1: ABDUL RAHIM 2: BA'AYSIR 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 16 Nov. 1977 b) 16 Nov. 1974 **POB:** a) Solo, Indonesia b) Sukoharjo, Central Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Rahim Bashir b) 'Abd Al-Rahim Ba'asyir c) 'Abd Al-Rahim Bashir d) Abdurrahim Ba'asyir e) Abdurrahim Bashir f) Abdul Rachim Ba'asyir g) Abdul Rachim Bashir h) Abdul Rochim Ba'asyir i) Abdul Rochim Bashir j) Abdurochim Ba'asyir k) Abdurochim Bashir l) Abdurrochim Ba'asyir m) Abdurrochim Bashir n) Abdurrahman Ba'asyir o) Abdurrahman Bashir **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Indonesia **Listed on:** 19 Jul. 2011 **Other information:** Senior Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092.) leader. Father's name is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (QDi.217). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4173405> [click here](#)

**QDi.080 Name:** 1: SAID 2: BAHAJI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** سعيد باهاجى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Jul. 1975 **POB:** Haselünne, Lower Saxony, Germany **Good quality a.k.a.:** Zouheir Al Maghribi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohamed Abbattay b) Abderrahmane Al Maghribi **Nationality:** a) Germany b) Morocco **Passport no:** a) Germany number Provisional passport No.: 28642163, issued in Hamburg b) Morocco number 954242, issued on 28 Jun. 1995, issued in Meknas, Morocco (expired) **National identification no:** Identity document ("Bundespersonalausweis") 1336597587 **Address:** Bunatwiete 23, Hamburg, 21073, Germany (formerly resident at) **Listed on:** 30 Sep. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 9 Sep. 2005, 2 Jul. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010, 9 Sep. 2014) **Other information:** Deputy head of the media committee of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) as at Apr. 2010. German authorities issued an arrest warrant for him on 21 Sep. 2001. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. Reportedly deceased in September 2013 in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4517705> [click here](#)

**QDi.266 Name:** 1: MAHMOUD 2: MOHAMMAD 3: AHMED 4: BHAZIQ

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 17 Aug. 1943 b) 1943 c) 1944 **POB:** India **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Bahaziq Mahmoud b) Abu Abd al-'Aziz c) Abu Abdul Aziz d) Shaykh Sahib **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Saudi Arabia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 4-6032-0048-1 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 10 Dec. 2008 **Other information:** Financier of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (listed under permanent reference number QDe.118). Has served as the leader of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Saudi Arabia. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1543496> [click here](#)

**QDi.311 Name:** 1: AYYUB 2: BASHIR 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** ايوب بشير

**Title:** a) Qari b) Alhaj **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1966 b) 1964 c) 1969 d) 1971 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Alhaj Qari Ayub Bashar b) Qari Muhammad Ayub **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** a) Uzbekistan b) Afghanistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mir Ali, North Waziristan Agency, Federal Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan **Listed on:** 18 Oct. 2012 **Other information:** Member of leadership council as of early 2010 and head of finance for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010). Coordinated financial and logistical support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2009-2012. Transferred and delivered funds to Fazal Rahim (QDi.303). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5741655> [click here](#)

**QDi.055 Name:** 1: MAHMOOD 2: SULTAN 3: BASHIR-UD-DIN 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1937 b) 1938 c) 1939 d) 1940 e) 1941 f) 1942 g) 1943 h) 1944 i) 1945 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mahmood, Sultan Bashiruddin b) Mehmood, Dr. Bashir Uddin c) Mekmud, Sultan Baishiruddin **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Street 13, Wazir Akbar Khan, Kabul, Afghanistan **Listed on:** 24 Dec. 2001 **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423754> [click here](#)

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**QDi.345 Name:** 1: TARKHAN 2: TAYUMURAZOVICH 3: BATIRASHVILI 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 11 Jan. 1986 b) 1982 **POB:** Akhmeta, Village Birkiani, Georgia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batyrashvili b) Tarkhan Batirashvili **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Omar Shishani b) Umar Shishani c) Abu Umar al-Shishani d) Omar al-Shishani e) Chechen Omar f) Omar the Chechen g) Omer the Chechen h) Umar the Chechen i) Abu Umar j) Abu Hudhayfah **Nationality:** Georgia **Passport no:** number 09AL14455, issued in Georgia (expires on 26 Jun. 2019) **National identification no:** Georgia 08001007864, issued in Georgia **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Dec. 2014) **Listed on:** 23 Jan. 2015 **Other information:** As of mid-2014, Syria-based senior military commander and shura council member of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115). Led approximately 1,000 foreign fighters for ISIL and committed a number of attacks in northern Syria. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5843242> [click here](#)

**QDi.279 Name:** 1: MOHAMED 2: BELKALEM 3: na 4: na  
**Name (original script):** محمد بلكلام  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Dec. 1969 **POB:** Hussein Dey, Algiers, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdelali Abou Dher (عبد العالي ابو ذر) b) El Harrachi (الحراشي) **Nationality:** Algerian **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 22 Apr. 2010 (amended on 15 Apr. 2014) **Other information:** Convicted in absentia by Algerian tribunal on 28 Mar. 1996. Algerian international arrest warrant number 03/09 of 6 Jun. 2009 issued by the Tribunal of Sidi Mhamed, Algiers, Algeria. Algerian extradition request number 2307/09 of 3 Sep. 2009, presented to Malian authorities. Father's name is Ali Belkalem. Mother's name is Fatma Saadoudi. Member of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4478325> [click here](#)

**QDi.136 Name:** 1: MOKHTAR 2: BELMOKHTAR 3: na 4: na  
**Name (original script):** مختار بلمختار  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jun. 1972 **POB:** Ghardaia, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abou Abbes Khaled b) Belaouar Khaled Abou El Abass c) Belaouer Khaled Abou El Abass d) Belmokhtar Khaled Abou El Abes e) Khaled Abou El Abass f) Khaled Abou El Abbes g) Khaled Abou El Abes h) Khaled Abulabbas Na Oor i) Mukhtar Belmukhtar **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Belaoua b) Belaour **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 11 Nov. 2003 (amended on 12 Apr. 2006, 2 Jul. 2007, 7 Apr. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010, 16 May 2011, 9 Sep. 2014) **Other information:** Father's name is Mohamed. Mother's name is Zohra Chemkha. Member of the Council of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) (AQIM). Head of Al Mouakaoune Biddam (QDe.139), Al Moulathamoun (QDe.140) and Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4488665> [click here](#)

**QDi.375 Name:** 1: BOUBAKER 2: BEN HABIB 3: BEN AL-HAKIM 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Aug. 1983 **POB:** Paris, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Boubakeur el-Hakim b) Boubaker el Hakim **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abou al Moukatel b) Abou Mouqatel c) Abu-Muqatil al-Tunisi d) El Hakim Boubakeur **Nationality:** a) France b) Tunisia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 (amended on 24 Jun. 2016) **Other information:** French-Tunisian foreign terrorist fighter for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897328> [click here](#)

**QDi.355 Name:** 1: SOFIANE 2: BEN GOUMO 3: na 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 26 Jun. 1959 **POB:** Derna, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** Sufyan bin Qumu **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abou Fares al Libi **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Libya **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Leader of Ansar al Charia Derna (QDe.145). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5893103> [click here](#)

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**QDi.333 Name:** 1: SEIFALLAH 2: BEN OMAR 3: BEN MOHAMED 4: BEN HASSINE**Name (original script):** سيف الله بن عمر بن محمد بنحسين

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 8 Nov. 1965 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Seif Allah ben Hocine b) Saifallah ben Hassine c) Sayf Allah 'Umar bin Hassayn d) Seifallah ben Amor ben Hassine e) Sayf Allah bin Hussayn **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Iyyadh al-Tunisi b) Abou Iyadh el-Tounsi c) Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi d) Abou Aayadh e) Abou Iyadh **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia G557170, issued on 16 Nov. 1989 **National identification no:** National Identification Card 05054425, issued on 3 May 2011 (issued in Hammam Lif) **Address:** a) 60 Rue de la Libye, Hammam Lif, Ben Arous, Tunisia b) Libya (possible location as at Jul. 2017) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 15 Feb. 2017, 26 Dec. 2017) **Other information:** Founder of the Tunisian Combatant Group (QDe.090) and leader of Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) (QDe.143). Arrest warrant issued by Tunisian Court of First Instance on 23 Aug. 2013. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5817982> [click here](#)

**QDi.386 Name:** 1: MOUNIR 2: BEN DHAOU 3: BEN BRAHIM 4: BEN HELAL

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 10 May 1983 **POB:** Ben Guerdane, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Mounir Helel b) Mounir Hilel c) Abu Rahmah d) Abu Maryam al-Tunisi **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter facilitator experienced in establishing and securing travel routes. Deeply involved in providing material support to the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) in North Africa. Assisted foreign terrorist fighters' travel throughout North Africa and to Syrian Arab Republic to join Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930735> [click here](#)

**QDi.388 Name:** 1: SALIM 2: BENGHALEM 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Jul. 1980 **POB:** Bourg la Reine, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** France **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Syria-based French violent extremist and member of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Subject to a European Arrest Warrant. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930707> [click here](#)

**QDi.307 Name:** 1: HAFIZ 2: ABDUL SALAM 3: BHUTTAVI 4: na

**Title:** a) Maulavi b) Mullah **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1940 **POB:** Gujranwala, Punjab Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hafiz Abdul Salam Bhattvi b) Hafiz Abdusalam Budvi c) Hafiz Abdussalaam Bhutvi d) Abdul Salam Budvi e) Abdul Salam Bhattwi f) Abdul Salam Bhutvi g) Mullah Abdul Salaam Bhattvi h) Molvi Abdursalam Bhattvi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 14 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Founding member of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118) and deputy to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (QDi.263). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4815206> [click here](#)

**QDi.009 Name:** 1: BILAL 2: BIN MARWAN 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** بلال بن مروان

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1947 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2001 **Other information:** Senior lieutenant of UBL. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423806> [click here](#)

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**QDi.081 Name:** 1: RAMZI 2: MOHAMED 3: ABDULLAH 4: BINALSHIBH**Name (original script):** رمزي محمد عبد الله بن الشيبه

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 May 1972 b) 16 Sep. 1973 **POB:** a) Gheil Bawazir, Hadramawt, Yemen b) Khartoum, Sudan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Binalsheidah, Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah b) Bin Al Shihb, Ramzi c) Omar, Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah d) Mohamed Ali Abdullah Bawazir e) Binalshibh Ramzi Mohammed Abdullah f) Ramzi Binalshibh g) Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah Omar Hassan Alassiri h) Binalshibh Ramsi Mohamed Abdullah i) Abu Ubaydah j) 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdallah Ba' Amar **Low quality a.k.a.:** Ramzi Omar **Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no:** number 00085243, issued on 17 Nov. 1997, issued in Sanaa, Yemen **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 30 Sep. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 25 Jul. 2006, 2 Jul. 2007, 27 Jul. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, 30 Sep. 2002. In custody of the United States of America, as of May 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4518125> [click here](#)

**QDi.063 Name:** 1: AL-MOKHTAR 2: BEN MOHAMED 3: BEN AL-MOKHTAR 4: BOUCHOUCHA**Name (original script):** المختار بن محمد بن المختار بوشوشة

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Oct. 1969 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Bushusha, Mokhtar **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisian K754050, issued on 26 May 1999 (expired on 25 May 2004) **National identification no:** 04756904, issued on 14 Sep. 1984 **Address:** Via Milano Number 38, Spinadesco, (CR), Italy **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 10 Apr. 2003, 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 7 Jun. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal Code: BCHMHT69R13Z352T. Mother's name is Hedia Bannour. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418916> [click here](#)

**QDi.188 Name:** 1: FAYCAL 2: BOUGHANEMI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** فيصل بوغانمي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 28 Oct. 1966 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Faical Boughanmi b) Faysal al-Bughanemi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Number 5/B viale Cambonino, Cremona, Italy **Listed on:** 29 Jul. 2005 (amended on 7 Jun. 2007, 10 Aug. 2009, 1 Sep. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal code: BGHFCL66R28Z352G. Sentenced to 7 years imprisonment in Italy on 29 Jun. 2007 by the Brescia Second Appeals Court. In detention in Italy as at Jun. 2009. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423839> [click here](#)

**QDi.058 Name:** 1: BOUBEKEUR 2: BOULGHITI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Feb. 1970 **POB:** Rouiba, Algiers, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Boubakeur Boulghit **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Bakr al-Jaziri (Previously listed as. In Arabic: أبو بكر الجزائري) b) Abou Bakr Al Djazairi c) Abou Yasser El Djazairi d) Yasir Al-Jazari e) Abou Yasser Al-Jaziri **Nationality:** a) Algeria b) Palestinian **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 11 Jan. 2002 (amended on 18 Jul. 2007, 1 Feb. 2008, 16 May 2011, 20 Jun. 2017) **Other information:** Finance chief of the Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069). Al-Qaida (QDe.004) facilitator and communication expert. Believed to be in Algeria as at Apr. 2010. Son of Mohamed and Fatma Aribi. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6104674> [click here](#)

**QDi.143 Name:** 1: HAMADI 2: BEN ABDUL AZIZ 3: BEN ALI 4: BOUYEHIA**Name (original script):** حمادي بن عبد العزيز بن علي بويحيى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 29 May 1966 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Gamel Mohamed born 25 May 1966 in Morocco b) Abd el Wanis Abd Gawwad Abd el Latif Bahaa born 9 May 1986 in Egypt c) Mahmoud Hamid **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** (Tunisian passport number L723315, issued on 5 May 1998, expired on 4 May 2003) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Corso XXII Marzo Number 39, Milan, Italy **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 30 Jan. 2009, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** In prison in Italy until 28 Jul. 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418921> [click here](#)

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**QDi.396 Name:** 1: ASLAN 2: AVGAZAROVICH 3: BYUTUKAEV 4: na**Name (original script):** Аслан Авгазарович Бютукаев**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 22 Oct. 1974 **POB:** Kitaevka, Novoselitskiy District, Stavropol Region, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Amir Khazmat (original script: Амир Хазмат) b) Abubakar (original script: Абубакар) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Akharkho Street, 11, Katyr-Yurt, Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District, Republic of Chechnya, Russian Federation **Listed on:** 3 Aug. 2016 **Other information:** Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes. Commands a suicide battalion of Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) (QDe.100). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5966084> [click here](#)**QDi.405 Name:** 1: Malik 2: Ruslanovich 3: Barkhanoev 4: na**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 14 Mar. 1992 **POB:** Ordzhonikidzevskaya village, Sunzhenskiy district, Ingushetia, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Saifuddin b) Saifuddin al-Ingushi c) Saifuddin Ingushi **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mosul, Iraq **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Joined the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) in September 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6116563> [click here](#)**QDi.365 Name:** 1: AKHMED 2: RAJAPOVICH 3: CHATAEV 4: na**Name (original script):** Ахмед Ражапович Чатаев**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Jul. 1980 **POB:** Vedeno Village, Vedenskiy District, Republic of Chechnya, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Akhmad Shishani (original script: Ахмад Шишани) b) David Mayer (original script: Давид Майер) c) Elmir Sene (original script: Эльмир Сене) **Low quality a.k.a.:** Odnorukiyy (original script: Оdnорукий) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Russian Federation national passport 9600133195, issued in Vedenskiy District, Republic of Chechnya, Russian Federation (issued by Department of Internal Affairs) **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Aug. 2015) b) Iraq (possible alternative location as at Aug. 2015) **Listed on:** 2 Oct. 2015 (amended on 30 Dec. 2015, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** As at Aug. 2015, one of the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), commanding directly 130 militants. Physical description: eye colour: brown, hair colour: black, build: solid; distinguishing marks: oval face, beard, missing a right hand and left leg, speaks Russian, Chechen and possibly German and Arabic. Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes committed in its territory. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5899829> [click here](#)**QDi.312 Name:** 1: AAMIR 2: ALI 3: CHAUDHRY 4: na**Name (original script):** عامر علی چوہدری**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Aug. 1986 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Aamir Ali Chaudary b) Aamir Ali Choudry c) Amir Ali Chaudry **Low quality a.k.a.:** Huzaifa **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** Pakistani BN 4196361, issued on 28 Oct. 2008 (expiring 27 Oct. 2013) **National identification no:** 33202-7126636-9 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 18 Oct. 2012 **Other information:** Electronics and explosives expert for Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QDe.132). Involved in attack planning for TTP. Provided financial and logistical support for TTP and participated in TTP-sponsored militant training. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5741575> [click here](#)**QDi.070 Name:** 1: YASSINE 2: CHEKKOURI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** ياسين شكوري**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Oct. 1966 **POB:** Safi, Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Morocco **Passport no:** Moroccan F46947 **National identification no:** H-135467 **Address:** 7th Street, Number 7, Hay Anas Safi, Morocco **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2002 (amended on 7 Jun. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Mother's name is Feue Hlima Bent Barka and father's name is Abderrahmane Mohammed Ben Azzouz. Deported from Italy to Morocco on 26 Feb. 2004. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423804> [click here](#)

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**QDi.376 Name:** 1: PETER 2: CHERIF 3: na 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 26 Aug. 1982 **POB:** Paris, 20th district, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** France **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Al Mukalla, Hadramawt province, Yemen **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 (amended on 24 Jun. 2016) **Other information:** Member of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Convicted in absentia to five years in prison in France in 2012. Wanted by French authorities as of 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897329> [click here](#)

**QDi.300 Name:** 1: MONIR 2: CHOUKA 3: na 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 30 Jul. 1981 **POB:** Bonn, Germany **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Adam **Nationality:** a) Germany b) Morocco **Passport no.:** Germany number 5208323009, issued on 2 Feb. 2007, issued in Stadt Bonn, Germany (expires on 1 Feb. 2012) **National identification no.:** Germany National Identification Number 5209530116, issued on 21 Jun. 2006, issued in Stadt Bonn, Germany (expired on 20 Jun. 2011) **Address:** Ungartenstraße 6, Bonn, 53229, Germany (previous) **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2012 **Other information:** Associated with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010). Brother of Yassin Chouka (QDi.301) Arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge of the German Federal Court of Justice on 5 Oct. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4555858> [click here](#)

**QDi.301 Name:** 1: YASSIN 2: CHOUKA 3: na 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Dec. 1984 **POB:** Bonn, Germany **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Ibraheem **Nationality:** a) Germany b) Morocco **Passport no.:** Germany number 5204893014, issued on 5 Oct. 2000, issued in Stadt Bonn, Germany (expired on 5 Oct. 2005) **National identification no.:** Germany National Identification Number 5209445304, issued on 5 Sep. 2005, issued in Stadt Bonn, Germany (expired on 4 Sep. 2010) **Address:** Karl-Barth-Straße 14, Bonn, 53129, Germany (previous) **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2012 **Other information:** Associated with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010). Brother of Monir Chouka (QDi.300). Arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge of the German Federal Court of Justice on 5 Oct. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4555865> [click here](#)

**QDi.141 Name:** 1: MAXAMED 2: CABDULLAAH 3: CIISE 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 8 Oct. 1974 **POB:** Kismaayo, Somalia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Maxamed Cabdullaahi Ciise b) Maxammed Cabdullaahi c) Cabdullah Mayamed Ciise **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Somalia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 30 Jan. 2009, 20 Apr. 2009, 21 Oct. 2010, 17 Aug. 2015) **Other information:** Present in Somalia as of Apr. 2009 following transfer from United Kingdom. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5950651> [click here](#)

**QDi.410 Name:** 1: SHANE 2: DOMINIC 3: CRAWFORD 4: na  
**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 22 Feb. 1986 **POB:** Mount Hope, Trinidad and Tobago **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Asadullah b) Abu Sa'd at-Trinidad c) Asad **Nationality:** Trinidad and Tobago **Passport no.:** a) Trinidad and Tobago number TA959547, issued on 19 Nov. 2013 (issued by Immigration Division of Trinidad and Tobago, expiration date 18 Nov. 2018) b) Trinidad and Tobago number T1071839, issued on 8 Nov. 2004 (issued by Immigration Division of Trinidad and Tobago, expiration date 7 Nov. 2014) **National identification no.:** a) National Identification Card 19860222007, issued on 16 Jun. 2011 (expiration date 16 Jun. 2016) b) Birth Certificate B394445, issued on 23 Jan. 2007 c) Driver's Permit 892124B, issued on 30 Aug. 2007 (expiration date 30 Aug. 2010) **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (as at May 2014) b) Reyhanli, Hatay, Turkey (previous location from Nov. 2013 to May 2014) c) 349 Dass Branch Trace, Dass Trace, Enterprise Chaguanas, Trinidad and Tobago (from birth until 27 Nov. 2013) d) LP# 41 Ballisier Road, Smith Field Lands, Wallerfield, County of St. George East, Trinidad and Tobago (alternative location as at Sep. 2011) **Listed on:** 18 Aug. 2017 **Other information:** English language propagandist for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115). Wanted in Trinidad and Tobago for possession of ammunition and firearms and receiving stolen goods. Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: dark; complexion: light brown; build: medium; height: 174cm; weight: 64kg; speaks English, Arabic. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6123498> [click here](#)



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**QDi.347 Name:** 1: DENIS 2: MAMADOU 3: GERHARD 4: CUSPERT

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 18 Oct. 1975 **POB:** Berlin, Germany **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Talha al-Almani **Nationality:** Germany **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Germany 2550439611, issued in District Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg of Berlin, Germany (issued on 22 Apr. 2010, expires on 21 Apr. 2020) **Address: a)** (Syria/Turkey border area (as at Jan. 2015)) **b)** Karl-Marx-Str. 210, Berlin, 12055, Germany (primary address) **Listed on:** 11 Feb. 2015 **Other information:** Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: black; height: 178cm; Tattoos: BROKEN DREAMS in letters (on back) and landscape of Africa (on right upper arm). Father's name: Richard Luc-Giffard; Mother's name: Sigrid Cuspert. European arrest warrant issued by investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice of Germany, dated 14 May 2014 and 5 Dec. 2014. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5848091> [click here](#)

**QDi.331 Name:** 1: ANDERS 2: CAMEROON 3: OSTENSVIG 4: DALE

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Oct. 1978 **POB:** Oslo, Norway **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Muslim Abu Abdurrahman b) Abu Abdurrahman the Norwegian c) Abu Abdurrahman the Moroccan **Nationality:** Norway **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** Member of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129). Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: brown; height: 185 cm. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5817979> [click here](#)

**QDi.245 Name:** 1: PIO 2: ABOGNE 3: DE VERA 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Dec. 1969 **POB:** Bagac, Bagamanok, Catanduanes, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** Ismael De Vera **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Khalid b) Ismael c) Ismail d) Manex e) Tito Art f) Dave g) Leo **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Concepcion, Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 3 Jun. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128), Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001) and Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Father's name is Honorio Devera. Mother's name is Fausta Abogne. In detention in the Philippines as of May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1315931> [click here](#)

**QDi.252 Name:** 1: AHMED 2: DEGHDEGH 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** أحمد دغداغ

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Jan. 1967 **POB:** Anser, Wilaya (province) of Jijel, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd El Illah b) Abdellillah dit Abdellah Ahmed dit Said **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 24 Mar. 2009, 15 Nov. 2012) **Other information:** Belongs to the leadership and is the finance chief of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Mother's name is Zakia Chebira. Father's name is Lakhdar. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1529228> [click here](#)

**QDi.246 Name:** 1: REDENDO 2: CAIN 3: DELLOSA 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 May 1972 **POB:** Punta, Santa Ana, Manila, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Ilonggo b) Brandon Berusa c) Abu Muadz d) Arnulfo Alvarado e) Habil Ahmad Delloso **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Dodong b) Troy c) Uthman **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** 3111, Ma. Bautista, Punta, Santa Ana, Manila, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 3 Jun. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128) and linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001). Father's name is Fernando Rafael Delloso. Mother's name is Editha Parado Cain. In detention in the Philippines as of Jan. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1320220> [click here](#)

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**QDi.243 Name:** 1: FELICIANO 2: SEMBORIO 3: DELOS REYES JR. 4: na**Name (original script):** فليسيانو سمبوريو ديლოს ريبس الابن**Title:** Ustadz **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Nov. 1963 **POB:** Arco, Lamitan, Basilan, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:****a) Abubakar Abdilllah b) Abdul Abdilllah Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 3 Jun. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011)**Other information:** Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128). Father's name is Feliciano Delos Reyes Sr. Mother's name is Aurea Semborio. In detention in the Philippines as of May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1524294> [click here](#)**QDi.342 Name:** 1: OUMAR 2: DIABY 3: na 4: na**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Aug. 1975 **POB:** Dakar, Senegal **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:****a) Omsen b) Oumar Omsen Nationality:** Senegal **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (located in) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** A leader of an armed group linked to Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) and a key facilitator for a Syrian foreign terrorist fighter network. Active in terrorist propaganda through the Internet. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818238> [click here](#)**QDi.167 Name:** 1: KAMEL 2: DJERMANE 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** كمال جرمان**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 12 Oct. 1965 **POB:** Oum el Bouaghi, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Bilal**b) Adel c) Fodhil d) Abou Abdeljalil Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 3 May 2004 (amended on 7 Apr. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** In detention in Algeria as at April 2010. Arrest warrant issued by the German authorities on 9 Oct. 2003 for involvement in kidnapping. Former member of the Katibat Tarek Ibn Ziad of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 27 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4473245> [click here](#)**QDi.249 Name:** 1: YAHIA 2: DJOUADI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** يحيى جوادي**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Jan. 1967 **POB:** M'Hamid, Wilaya (province) of Sidi Bel Abbes, Algeria**Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Yahia Abou Ammar b) Abou Ala **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 15 Nov. 2012) **Other information:** Belongs to the leadership of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (listed under permanent reference number QDe.014). Located in Northern Mali as of Jun. 2008. Mother's name is Zohra Fares. Father's name is Mohamed. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1274977> [click here](#)**QDi.232 Name:** 1: ABDELMALEK 2: DROUKDEL 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد المالك دروكدال**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Apr. 1970 **POB:** Meftah, Wilaya of Blida, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abou**Mossaab Abdelouadoud Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 27 Aug. 2007 (amended on 7 Apr. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Head of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment in Algeria on 21 March 2007. Father's name is Rabah Droukdel. Mother's name is Z'hour Zdigha. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 4 May 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1489020> [click here](#)

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**QDi.095 Name:** 1: LIONEL 2: DUMONT 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 29 Jan. 1971 **POB:** Roubaix, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Jacques Brougere b) Abu Hamza c) Di Karlo Antonio d) Merlin Oliver Christian Rene e) Arfauni Imad Ben Youssef Hamza f) Imam Ben Yussuf Arfaj g) Abou Hamza h) Arfauni Imad **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Bilal b) Hamza c) Koumkal d) Kumkal e) Merlin f) Tinot g) Brugere h) Dimon **Nationality:** France **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** France **Listed on:** 25 Jun. 2003 (amended on 22 Nov. 2004, 26 Nov. 2004, 2 Jul. 2007, 17 Oct. 2007, 24 Mar. 2009, 6 Aug. 2010, 24 Jun. 2016) **Other information:** In custody in France as of May 2004. Sentenced to 25 years imprisonment in France in 2007. His sentence is due to end on 13 Jul. 2023 and his unconditional detention to end on 13 Aug. 2020. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4531664> [click here](#)

**QDi.111 Name:** 1: AGUS 2: DWIKARNA 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Aug. 1964 **POB:** Makassar, South Sulawesi, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** Indonesia travel document number XD253038 **National identification no:** na **Address:** Indonesia **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 14 May 2014) **Other information:** Arrested 13 Mar. 2002, sentenced 12 July 2002 in the Philippines. Released from custody in the Philippines on 1 Jan. 2014 and subsequently deported to Indonesia. Physical description: height 165 cm. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5950648> [click here](#)

**QDi.019 Name:** 1: ABDULLAH 2: AHMED 3: ABDULLAH 4: EL ALFI**Name (original script):** عبد الله احمد عبدالله الالفى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Jun. 1963 **POB:** Gharbia, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Mariam b) Al-Masri, Abu Mohamed c) Saleh **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004) **Other information:** Afghanistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419387> [click here](#)

**QDi.142 Name:** 1: RADI 2: ABD EL SAMIE 3: ABOU EL YAZID 4: EL AYASHI**Name (original script):** راضى عبد السميع أبوالبزيد العياشى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 2 Jan. 1972 **POB:** El Gharbia Governorate, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Mera'i **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Via Cilea 40, Milan, Italy (Domicile) **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 16 May 2011, 29 Mar. 2017) **Other information:** Sentenced to ten years of imprisonment by the Court of first instance of Milan on 21 Sep. 2006. In custody in Italy. Due for release on 6 Jan. 2012. Subject to expulsion from Italy after serving the sentence. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418994> [click here](#)

**QDi.262 Name:** 1: REDOUANE 2: EL HABHAB 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Dec. 1969 **POB:** Casablanca, Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abdelrahman **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** a) Germany b) Morocco **Passport no:** German number 1005552350, issued on 27 Mar. 2001, issued in Municipality of Kiel, Germany (expired on 26 Mar. 2011) **National identification no:** Germany federal identity card number 1007850441, issued on 27 Mar. 2001, issued in Municipality of Kiel, Germany (expired on 26 Mar. 2011) **Address:** Ittisstrasse 58, 24143 Kiel, Germany (previous address) **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2008 (amended on 30 Jan. 2009, 24 Mar. 2009, 15 Nov. 2012) **Other information:** Released from custody in Germany in Apr. 2012. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4474065> [click here](#)

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**QDi.082 Name:** 1: MOUNIR 2: EL MOTASSADEQ 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** منير المتصدق

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Apr. 1974 **POB:** Marrakesh, Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** Mounir el Moutassadeq **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Morocco **Passport no:** Morocco H 236483 **National identification no:** E-491591 **Address:** (In prison in Germany) **Listed on:** 30 Sep. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 7 Sep. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Arrested on 28 Nov. 2001 and found guilty in Germany of being an accessory to murder and of membership in a terrorist organization and sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment on 8 Jan. 2007. Father's name is Brahim Brik. Mother's name is Habiba Abbes. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423936> [click here](#)

**QDi.065 Name:** 1: ABD EL KADER 2: MAHMOUD 3: MOHAMED 4: EL SAYED**Name (original script):** عبد القادر محمود محمد السيد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 26 Dec. 1962 **POB:** Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Es Sayed, Kader b) Abdel Khader Mahmoud Mohamed el Sayed **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 7 Jun. 2007, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal Code: SSYBLK62T26Z336L. Sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in Italy on 2 February 2004. Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418867> [click here](#)

**QDi.409 Name:** 1: ELSHAFEE 2: EL SHEIKH 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 16 Jul. 1988 **POB:** London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) El Shafee Elsheikh b) Alshafee El-Sheikh **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 801121547, issued on 16 Jun. 2009 (issued by UK Passport Office with expiry date of 16 Jun. 2019, cancelled in Dec. 2014) **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. Physical description: eye colour: dark brown; hair colour: black; complexion: dark. Distinguishing marks: beard. Mother's name: Maha Elgizouli. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6116609> [click here](#)

**QDi.064 Name:** 1: SAMI 2: BEN KHAMIS 3: BEN SALEH 4: ELSSEID**Name (original script):** سامي بن خميس بن صالح الصيد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 10 Feb. 1968 **POB:** Menzel Jemil, Bizerte, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Omar El Mouhajer **Low quality a.k.a.:** Saber **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia K929139, issued on 14 Feb. 1995 (expired on 13 Feb. 2000) **National identification no:** a) 00319547, issued on 8 Dec. 1994 b) SSDSBN68B10Z352F (Italian Fiscal Code) **Address:** Ibn Al-Haythman Street, Number 6, Manubah, Tunis, Tunisia **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 10 Apr. 2003, 26 Nov. 2004, 9 Sep. 2005, 20 Dec. 2005, 7 Jun. 2007, 21 Dec. 2007, 10 Aug. 2009, 23 Dec. 2010, 24 Nov. 2014) **Other information:** Mother's name is Beya Al-Saidani. Deported from Italy to Tunisia on 2 Jun. 2008. Imprisoned in Tunisia in Aug. 2014. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419392> [click here](#)

**QDi.362 Name:** 1: EMRAH 2: ERDOGAN 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 2 Feb. 1988 **POB:** Karliova, Turkey **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Imraan Al-Kurdy b) Imraan c) Imran d) Imran ibn Hassan e) Salahaddin El Kurdy f) Salahaddin Al Kudy g) Salahaddin Al-Kurdy h) Salah Aldin i) Sulaiman j) Ismatollah k) Ismatullah l) Ismatullah Al Kurdy **Nationality:** Germany **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** BPA C700RKL8R4, issued on 18 Feb. 2010 (expires on 17 Feb. 2016) **Address:** Werl prison, Germany (since May 2015) **Listed on:** 30 Nov. 2015 **Other information:** Former foreign terrorist fighter affiliated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) in North Waziristan, Pakistan (2010-2011) and with Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) in Somalia (2011-2012). Convicted to seven years of imprisonment by the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt/Main, Germany in 2014. Physical description: eye colour brown, hair colour brown, build: strong, weight: 92 kg, height: 176 cm, birthmark on right back. Mother's name: Emine Erdogan. Father's name: Sait Erdogan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5911484> [click here](#)

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**QDi.096 Name:** 1: MOUSSA 2: BEN OMAR 3: BEN ALI 4: ESSAADI**Name (original script):** موسى بن عمر بن علي السعدي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Dec. 1964 **POB:** Tabarka, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Dah Dah b) Abdelrahmman c) Bechir **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia number L335915, issued on 8 Nov. 1996, issued in Milan, Italy (expired on 7 Nov. 2001) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Tunisia **Listed on:** 25 Jun. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 17 Oct. 2007, 10 Aug. 2009, 16 May 2011, 20 Jul. 2012) **Other information:** Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities (as of Nov. 2009). Left Sudan to Tunisia in 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419396> [click here](#)

**QDi.083 Name:** 1: ZAKARYA 2: ESSABAR 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** زكريا الصبار

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Apr. 1977 **POB:** Essaouria, Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** Zakariya Essabar **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Morocco **Passport no:** a) Morocco number M 271351, issued on 24 Oct. 2000, issued in Berlin, by the Embassy of Morocco b) Morocco number K-348486 **National identification no:** a) National Identity number E-189935 b) National Identity Card number G-0343089 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 30 Sep. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 10 Jun. 2011) **Other information:** Father's name is Mohamed ben Ahmed. Mother's name is Sfia bent Toubali. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4490645> [click here](#)

**QDi.352 Name:** 1: MAULANA 2: FAZLULLAH 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1974 **POB:** Kuza Bandai village, Swat Valley, Khyber Pakhtunkhawa Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mullah Fazlullah b) Fazal Hayat **Low quality a.k.a.:** Mullah Radio **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** (Afghanistan / Pakistan border region) **Listed on:** 7 Apr. 2015 **Other information:** Commander of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (QDe.132) since 7 Nov. 2013. Led the local TTP in Pakistan's northwest valley of Swat from 2007 to 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5859726> [click here](#)

**QDi.393 Name:** 1: TUAH 2: FEBRIWANSYAH 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 18 Feb. 1968 **POB:** Jakarta, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Tuah Febriwansyah bin Arif Hasrudin b) Tuwah Febriwansah c) Muhammad Fachri d) Muhammad Fachria e) Muhammad Fachry **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 09.5004.180268.0074 **Address:** Jalan Baru LUK, No.1, RT 05/07, Kelurahan Bhakti Jaya, Setu Sub-district, Pamulang District, Tangerang Selatan, Banten Province, Indonesia **Listed on:** 20 Apr. 2016 **Other information:** Leader of an Indonesia-based organization that has publicly sworn allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Provided support to ISIL in the areas of recruitment, fundraising, and travel. Detained in Indonesia by Indonesian authorities as of 21 March 2015 and charged with terrorism offenses. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5943052> [click here](#)

**QDi.251 Name:** 1: SALAH EDDINE 2: GASMI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** صالح قاسمي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Apr. 1971 **POB:** Zeribet El Oued, Wilaya (province) of Biskra, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abou Mohamed Salah **Low quality a.k.a.:** Bounouadher **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 24 Mar. 2009, 15 Nov. 2012, 14 Mar. 2013, 11 Feb. 2016) **Other information:** Belongs to the leadership and is in charge of information committee of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Mother's name is Yamina Soltane. Father's name is Abdelaziz. Associated with Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232). Arrested in Algeria on 16 Dec. 2012. Incarcerated at the El-Harrach prison in Algiers, as of August 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1529206> [click here](#)

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**QDi.366 Name:** 1: TARKHAN 2: ISMAILOVICH 3: GAZIEV 4: na**Name (original script):** Тархан Исмаилович Газиєв

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Nov. 1965 **POB:** Itum-Kale, Itum-Kalinskiy District, Republic of Chechnya, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ramzan Oduєv (original script: Рамзан Одуєв) b) Tarkhan Isаєvich Gaziev (original script: Тархан Исаєвич Газиєв) c) Husan Isаєvich Gaziev (original script: Хусан Исаєвич Газиєв) d) Umar Sulimov (original script: Умар Сулимов) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Wainakh (original script: Вайнах) b) Sever (original script: Север) c) Abu Bilal (original script: Абу-Билал) d) Abu Yasir (original script: Абу Ясир) e) Abu Asim (original script: Абу Ясим) f) Husan (original script: Хусан) g) Ab-Bilal h) Abu-Naser **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Aug. 2015) b) Iraq (possible alternative location as at Aug. 2015) **Listed on:** 2 Oct. 2015 (amended on 10 Dec. 2015, 6 Sep. 2016) **Other information:** As at Aug. 2015, leads Jamaat Tarkhan, a terrorist group that forms part of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes committed in its territory, including through an international arrest warrant. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5899822> [click here](#)

**QDi.028 Name:** 1: AHMED 2: KHALFAN 3: GHAILANI 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 14 Mar. 1974 b) 13 Apr. 1974 c) 14 Apr. 1974 d) 1 Aug. 1970 **POB:** Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ahmad, Abu Bakr b) Ahmed, Abubakar c) Ahmed, Abubakar K. d) Ahmed, Abubakar Khalfan e) Ahmed, Abubakary K. f) Ahmed, Ahmed Khalfan g) Ali, Ahmed Khalfan h) Ghailani, Abubakary Khalfan Ahmed i) Ghailani, Ahmed j) Ghilani, Ahmad Khalafan k) Hussein, Mahafudh Abubakar Ahmed Abdallah l) Khalfan, Ahmed m) Mohammed, Shariff Omar n) Haythem al-Kini **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Ahmed The Tanzanian b) Foopie c) Fupi d) Ahmed, A e) Al Tanzani, Ahmad f) Bakr, Abu g) Khabar, Abu **Nationality:** United Republic of Tanzania **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** United States of America **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 27 Jul. 2007, 21 Oct. 2010) **Other information:** Apprehended in July 2004 and in custody for trial in the United States of America, as at October 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5947737> [click here](#)

**QDi.250 Name:** 1: AMOR 2: MOHAMED 3: GHEDEIR 4: na**Name (original script):** عمر محمد قدير

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1958 **POB:** Deb-Deb, Amenas, Wilaya (province) of Illizi, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdelhamid Abou Zeid b) Youcef Adel c) Abou Abdellah d) Abid Hammadou born 12 Dec. 1965 in Touggourt, Wilaya (province) of Ouargla, Algeria (previously listed as) **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 10 May 2012, 15 Nov. 2012) **Other information:** Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Located in Northern Mali as of Jun. 2008. Mother's name is Benarouba Bachira. Father's name is Mabrouk. He usurped the identity of Abid Hammadou, who allegedly died in Chad in 2004. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1529259> [click here](#)

**QDi.367 Name:** 1: ZAURBEK 2: SALIMOVICH 3: GUCHAEV 4: na**Name (original script):** Заурбек Салимович Гучаєв

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 7 Sep. 1975 **POB:** Chegem-1 Village, Chegemskiy District, Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Bach (original script: Бэч) b) Fackih (original script: Факих) c) Vostochniy (original script: Восточный) d) Muslim (original script: Муслим) e) Aziz (original script: Азиз) f) Abdul Aziz (original script: Абул Азиз) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** Russian foreign travel passport number 622641887 **National identification no:** national passport 8304661431 **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Aug. 2015) b) Iraq (possible alternative location as at Aug. 2015) **Listed on:** 2 Oct. 2015 **Other information:** As at Aug. 2015, one of the leaders of the Army of Emigrants and Supporters (QDe.148). Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes committed in its territory. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5899831> [click here](#)

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**QDi.341 Name:** 1: KEVIN 2: JORDAN 3: AXEL 4: GUIAVARCH

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 12 Mar. 1993 **POB:** Paris, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** France **Passport no:** France 12CP63882.3FRA, issued on 31 Jul. 2012 (valid until 30 Jul. 2022) **National identification no:** national identity card 070275Q007873, issued on 16 Feb. 2007 (valid until 15 Feb. 2017) **Address:** a) Grenoble, France (domicile from 1993 to 2012) b) Syrian Arab Republic (located in between 2012 and 2016) c) Turkey (from Jun. 2016 to Jan. 2017) d) France (in detention since Jan. 2017) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 24 Jun. 2016, 27 Aug. 2017) **Other information:** French terrorist fighter associated with Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Facilitated foreign terrorist fighters travel from France to Syria. Activist in violent propaganda through the Internet. A warrant for his arrest was issued in 2014 by French authorities and executed in Jan. 2017 upon his expulsion from Turkey where he was arrested in Jun. 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818237> [click here](#)

**QDi.218 Name:** 1: GUN GUN 2: RUSMAN 3: GUNAWAN 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 6 Jul. 1977 **POB:** Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Gunawan, Rusman b) Abd Al-Hadi c) Abdul Hadi d) Abdul Karim e) Bukhori f) Bukhory **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 21 Apr. 2006 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Brother of Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin (QDi.087). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1429177> [click here](#)

**QDi.003 Name:** 1: SALIM 2: AHMAD 3: SALIM 4: HAMDAN**Name (original script):** سالم أحمد سالم حمدان

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1965 **POB:** a) Al-Mukalla, Yemen b) Al-Mukala, Yemen **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Saqr Al-Jaddawi (الكتبة صقر الجداوي) b) Saqar Al Jadawi c) Saqar Aljawadi d) Salem Ahmed Salem Hamdan **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no:** Yemen 00385937 **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Shari Tunis, Sana'a, Yemen (previous address) b) (Located in Yemen since Nov. 2008) **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2001 (amended on 25 Jul. 2006, 23 Apr. 2007, 30 Jan. 2009, 17 Jul. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010) **Other information:** Driver and private bodyguard to Usama bin Laden (deceased) from 1996 until 2001. Transferred from United States custody to Yemen in Nov. 2008. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1474175> [click here](#)

**QDi.068 Name:** 1: ADEL 2: BEN AL-AZHAR 3: BEN YOUSSEF 4: HAMD**Name (original script):** عادل بن الأزهر بن يوسف حمدي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 14 Jul. 1970 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Adel ben al- Azhar ben Youssef ben Soltane born 14 Jul. 1970 in Tunis, Tunisia (formerly listed as) **Low quality a.k.a.:** Zakariya **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia M408665, issued on 4 Oct. 2000 (expired 3 Oct. 2005) **National identification no:** a) (Tunisian national identity number W334061 issued on 9 Mar. 2011) b) Italian Fiscal Code: BNSDLA70L14Z352B **Address:** Tunisia **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2002 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 7 Jun. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010, 24 Nov. 2014) **Other information:** Deported from Italy to Tunisia on 28 February 2004. Serving a 12-year prison sentence in Tunisia for membership in a terrorist organization abroad as at Jan. 2010. Arrested in Tunisia in 2013. Legally changed family name from Ben Soltane to Hamdi in 2014. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1418993> [click here](#)

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**QDi.204 Name:** 1: ISNILON 2: TOTONI 3: HAPILON 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 18 Mar. 1966 b) 10 Mar. 1967 **POB:** Bulanza, Lantawan, Basilan, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Isnilon Hapilon b) Isnilon Hapilon c) Tuan Isnilon **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Musab b) Salahudin **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Basilan, Philippines (previous location until 2016) b) Lanao del Sur, Philippines (location since 2016) **Listed on:** 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 4 Oct. 2017) **Other information:** Senior leader of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (QDe.001). Leader of local affiliates of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115), in the southern Philippines as of May 2017. Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: brown; height: 5 feet 6 inches – 168 cm; weight: 120 pounds – 54 kg; build: slim; complexion: light-skinned; has facial birthmarks. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Wanted by the Philippines authorities for terrorist offences and by authorities of the United States of America for involvement in terrorist acts. Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5950661> [click here](#)

**QDi.268 Name:** 1: ABDUL 2: HAQ 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** 阿不都·哈克

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 10 Oct. 1971 **POB:** Hetian Area, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Maimaitiming Maimaiti b) Abdul Heq c) Abudu Hake d) Abdul Heq Jundullah e) 'Abd Al-Haq f) Memetiming Memeti g) Memetiming Aximu h) Memetiming Qekeman i) Maiumaitimin Maimaiti j) Abdul Saimaiti k) Muhammad Ahmed Khaliq **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Maimaiti Iman b) Muhelisi c) Qerman d) Saifuding **Nationality:** China **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 653225197110100533 (Chinese national identity card number) **Address:** a) Afghanistan (current location as at Jul. 2016) b) Pakistan (previous location as at Apr. 2009) **Listed on:** 15 Apr. 2009 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 20 Jun. 2017) **Other information:** Overall leader and commander of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (QDe.088). Involved in fundraising and recruitment for this organization. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1558612> [click here](#)

**QDi.378 Name:** 1: MAXIME 2: HAUCHARD 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Mar. 1992 **POB:** Saint Aubin les Elbeuf, Normandy, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abou Abdallah al Faransi **Nationality:** France **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** French national identity card number 101127200129 (issued by the Sous-Préfecture of Bernay, France and expires 4 Nov. 2020) **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 (amended on 24 Jun. 2016) **Other information:** French foreign terrorist fighter for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). French arrest warrant issued on 20 Jan. 2015 by a magistrate of the anti-terrorism division of the Prosecutor's Office in Paris for murder in connection with a terrorist entity and participation in a terrorist criminal association. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897332> [click here](#)

**QDi.029 Name:** 1: RAED 2: MUHAMMAD HASAN 3: MUHAMMAD 4: HIJAZI**Name (original script):** راند محمد حسن محمد حجازي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 30 Dec. 1968 **POB:** California, United States of America **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Raed M. Hijazi b) Ri'ad Muhammad Hasan Muhammad Hijazi (Previously listed as. In Arabic: رياض محمد حسن محمد الحجازي) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Rashid Al-Maghribi (The Moroccan) b) Abu-Ahmad Al-Amriki (The American) c) Abu-Ahmad Al-Hawen d) Abu-Ahmad Al-Shahid **Nationality:** a) Jordan b) United States of America **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** a) United States Social Security Number: 548-91-5411 b) Jordanian national number: 9681029476 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 10 Apr. 2003, 16 May 2011, 21 Mar. 2017) **Other information:** In custody in Jordan since 26 Feb. 2015 for recruitment and support to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Father's name is Mohammad Hijazi. Mother's name is Sakina. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419275> [click here](#)



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**QDi.221 Name:** 1: JAMAL 2: HOUSNI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** جمال حسني

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 22 Feb. 1983 **POB:** Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Djamel Il marocchino b) Jamal Al Maghrebi c) Hicham **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Via Uccelli di Nemi n. 33, Milan, b) via F. De Lemene n. 50, Milan, **Listed on:** 2 Aug. 2006 (amended on 1 Sep. 2009) **Other information:** He is subject to Tribunale de Milano Custody Order n. 5236/02 R.G.N.R. of 25 Nov. 2003 1511/02 R.G.GIP. Convicted and sentenced on 21 Sep. 2006 to seven years of detention by the Milan Assizes Court, Italy, for belonging to a criminal association with terrorist aims and receiving stolen goods. The sentence was confirmed on 17 Jul. 2007 by the Milan Assizes Appeal Court. In custody as at 16 Jun. 2009. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1441100> [click here](#)

**QDi.359 Name:** 1: OMAR 2: ALI 3: HUSSAIN 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 21 Mar. 1987 **POB:** High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu-Sa'id Al Britani **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 205939411, issued on 21 Jul. 2004 (expired on 21 Apr. 2015) **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (as at Jan. 2014) b) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (previous address until Jan. 2014) **Listed on:** 28 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: brown/black. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897337> [click here](#)

**QDi.144 Name:** 1: MOHAMMAD 2: TAHIR 3: HAMMID 4: HUSSEIN**Name (original script):** محمد طاهر حامد

**Title:** Imam **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Nov. 1975 **POB:** Poshok, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abdelhamid Al Kurdi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Sulaymaniya, Iraq **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 16 May 2011, 10 Dec. 2015) **Other information:** Mother's name: Attia Mohiuddin Taha. A deportation order was issued by the Italian authorities on 18 Oct. 2004. Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities as of Sep. 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424109> [click here](#)

**QDi.067 Name:** 1: MOSTAFA 2: KAMEL 3: MOSTAFA 4: IBRAHIM**Name (original script):** مصطفى كمال مصطفى ابراهيم

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Apr. 1958 **POB:** Alexandria, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mustafa Kamel Mustafa b) Adam Ramsey Eaman c) Kamel Mustapha Mustapha d) Mustapha Kamel Mustapha e) Abu Hamza f) Mostafa Kamel Mostafa **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Hamza Al-Masri b) Abu Hamza c) Abu Hamza Al-Misri **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** United States of America **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 25 Jul. 2006, 14 Mar. 2008, 21 Oct. 2010, 4 Aug. 2014) **Other information:** Extradited from the United Kingdom to the United States of America on 5 Oct. 2012. Convicted on terrorism charges by a court in the United States of America in May 2014. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419422> [click here](#)

**QDi.395 Name:** 1: MUHAMMAD 2: SHOLEH 3: IBRAHIM 4: na

**Title:** Ustad **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1958 (Sep.) **POB:** Demak, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohammad Sholeh Ibrahim b) Muhammad Sholeh Ibrohim c) Muhammad Soleh Ibrahim d) Sholeh Ibrahim e) Muh Sholeh Ibrahim **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Apr. 2016 **Other information:** Has served as the acting emir of Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) (QDe.133) since 2014 and has supported Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5943055> [click here](#)

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**QDi.374 Name:** 1: NUSRET 2: IMAMOVIC 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 26 Sep. 1971 b) 26 Sep. 1977 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** Nusret Sulejman Imamovic **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Bosnia and Herzegovina **Passport no:** a) Bosnia and Herzegovina number 349054 b) Bosnia and Herzegovina number 3490054 **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Believed to be fighting with Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) in Syrian Arab Republic and reported to be a leader in the group as of Apr. 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930702> [click here](#)

**QDi.308 Name:** 1: ZAFAR 2: IQBAL 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Oct. 1953 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Zaffer Iqbal b) Malik Zafar Iqbal Shehbaz c) Malik Zafar Iqbal Shahbaz d) Malik Zafar Iqbal **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry b) Muhammad Zafar Iqbal **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** DG5149481, issued on 22 Aug. 2006 (expired on 21 Aug. 2011, passport booklet number A2815665) **National identification no:** a) 35202- 4135948-7 b) Alternate national identification number 29553654234 **Address:** Masjid al-Qadesia, 4 Lake Road, Lahore, Pakistan **Listed on:** 14 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Senior leader and co-founder of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118) (LeT) who has held various senior leader positions in LeT and its front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) (listed as an alias of LeT). As of 2010, in charge of LeT/JUD finance department, director of its education department and president of its medical wing. Other title: Professor. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5741596> [click here](#)

**QDi.087 Name:** 1: NURJAMAN 2: RIDUAN 3: ISAMUDDIN 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Apr. 1964 **POB:** Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hambali b) Nurjaman c) Isomuddin, Nurjaman Riduan d) Hambali Bin Ending e) Encep Nurjaman (birth name) f) Hambali Ending Hambali g) Isamuddin Riduan h) Isamudin Ridwan **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 28 Jan. 2003 (amended on 2 Jul. 2007, 27 Jul. 2007, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Senior leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Brother of Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan (QDi.218). In custody of the United States of America, as of July 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424139> [click here](#)

**QDi.321 Name:** 1: MALIK 2: MUHAMMAD 3: ISHAQ 4: na**Name (original script):** مالك محمد اسحاق

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1959 **POB:** Rahim Yar Khan, Punjab Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** Malik Ishaq **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Pakistan **Listed on:** 14 Mar. 2014 (amended on 18 Jan. 2017) **Other information:** One of the founders and a current leader of Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (QDe.096). Physical description: heavy build with black eye colour, black hair colour and medium brown complexion with a heavy black beard. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Killed in Pakistan on 28 Jul. 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5778368> [click here](#)

**QDi.368 Name:** 1: SHAMIL 2: MAGOMEDOVICH 3: ISMAILOV 4: na**Name (original script):** Шамиль Магомедович Измаилов

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 29 Oct. 1980 **POB:** Astrakhan, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** Shamil Magomedovich Aliev (original script: Шамиль Магомедович Алиев) **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Hanifa (original script: Абу Ханифа) **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** number Russian foreign travel passport number 514448632, issued on 8 Sep. 2010, issued in Alexandria, Egypt (issued by Consulate General of the Russian Federation) **National identification no:** national passport 1200075689, issued on 15 Dec. 2000 (issued by Russian Federation) **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Aug. 2015) b) Iraq (possible alternative location as at Aug. 2015) **Listed on:** 2 Oct. 2015 **Other information:** As at Aug. 2015, leader of Jamaat Abu Hanifa, a terrorist group that is part of the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). Physical description: eye colour: brown, hair colour: black, build: slim, height 175-180 cm. Distinguishing marks: long face, speech defect. Wanted by the authorities of the Russian Federation for terrorist crimes committed in its territory. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5899833> [click here](#)

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**QDi.099 Name:** 1: KHALIL 2: BEN AHMED 3: BEN MOHAMED 4: JARRAYA**Name (original script):** خليل بن احمد بن محمد جرایة

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 8 Feb. 1969 **POB:** Sfax, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Khalil Yarraya b) Ben Narvan Abdel Aziz born 15 Aug. 1970 in Sereka (former Yugoslavia) c) Abdel Aziz Ben Narvan born 15 Aug. 1970 in Sereka (former Yugoslavia) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Amro b) Omar c) Amrou d) Amr **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no.:** Tunisian number K989895, issued on 26 Jul. 1995, issued in Genoa, Italy (expired on 25 Jul. 2000) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Nuoro, Italy **Listed on:** 25 Jun. 2003 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 17 Oct. 2007, 16 Sep. 2008, 24 Mar. 2009, 10 Aug. 2009, 6 Aug. 2010) **Other information:** Detained in Italy since 9 Aug. 2008 for his implication in a case related to terrorism. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419331> [click here](#)

**QDi.360 Name:** 1: SALLY-ANNE 2: FRANCES 3: JONES 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 17 Nov. 1968 **POB:** Greenwich, Greater London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Umm Hussain al-Britani b) Sakinah Hussain **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no.:** number 519408086, issued on 23 Sep. 2013, issued in United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (expires on 23 Sep. 2023) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (as at 2013) b) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (previous location until 2013) **Listed on:** 28 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Recruiter for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. Sex: female. Husband's name is: Junaid Hussain. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897339> [click here](#)

**QDi.394 Name:** 1: HUSAYN 2: JUAYTHINI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 May 1977 **POB:** Nuseirat Refugee Camp, Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hussein Mohammed Hussein Aljeithni b) Husayn Muhammad al-Juaythini c) Husayn Muhammad Husayn al-Juaythini d) Husayn Muhamad Husayn al-Juaythini e) Husayn Muhammad Husayn Juaythini **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Muath al-Juaitni **Nationality:** Palestinian **Passport no.:** 0363464 (issued by Palestinian Authority) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories **Listed on:** 20 Apr. 2016 **Other information:** Link between Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, listed as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QDi.299), and armed groups in Gaza. Was using money to build an ISIL presence in Gaza. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5943053> [click here](#)

**QDi.114 Name:** 1: SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN 2: JULKIPLI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Jun. 1967 **POB:** Tulay, Jolo Sulu, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Kipli Sali b) Julkipli Salim **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 23 Feb. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** In detention in the Philippines as at May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424269> [click here](#)

**QDi.072 Name:** 1: MEHDI 2: BEN MOHAMED 3: BEN MOHAMED 4: KAMMOUN**Name (original script):** المهدي بن محمد بن محمد كمون

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Apr. 1968 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Salmame **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no.:** Tunisia M307707, issued on 12 Apr. 2000 (expired on 11 Apr. 2005) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Via Masina Number 7, Milan, Italy **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2002 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 7 Jun. 2007, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal Code: KMMMHD68D03Z352N. Deported from Italy to Tunisia on 22 July 2005. Serving an eight-year prison term in Tunisia for membership of a terrorist organization abroad as at Jan. 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419370> [click here](#)

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**QDi.302 Name:** 1: MEVLÜT 2: KAR 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 25 Dec. 1978 **POB:** Ludwigshafen, Germany **Good quality a.k.a.:** Mevluet Kar **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Obaidah b) Obeidah Al Turki c) Al-Turki d) Al Turki Kyosev e) Yanal Yusov f) Abu Udej el-Turki g) Abu Obejd el-Turki h) Abdurrahman Almanci **Nationality:** Turkey **Passport no:** Turkey number TR-M842033, issued on 2 May 2002, issued in Mainz, Germany (by the Turkish Consulate General, expired on 24 Jul. 2007) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Güngören Merkez Mahallesi Toros Sokak 6/5, Istanbul, Turkey (previous as at Aug. 2009) **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2012 **Other information:** Associated with Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119). Arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge of the German Federal Court of Justice on 17 Aug. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4551592> [click here](#)

**QDi.135 Name:** 1: DAWOOD 2: IBRAHIM 3: KASKAR 4: na

**Title:** Sheikh **Designation:** na **DOB:** 26 Dec. 1955 **POB:** Kher, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra, India **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Dawood Ebrahim b) Sheikh Dawood Hassan c) Abdul Hamid Abdul Aziz d) Anis Ibrahim e) Aziz Dilip f) Daud Hasan Shaikh Ibrahim Kaskar g) Daud Ibrahim Memon Kaskar h) Dawood Hasan Ibrahim Kaskar i) Dawood Ibrahim Memon j) Dawood Sabri k) Kaskar Dawood Hasan l) Shaikh Mohd Ismail Abdul Rehman m) Dowood Hassan Shaikh Ibrahim n) Dawood Bhai **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Ibrahim Shaikh Mohd Anis b) Shaikh Ismail Abdul c) Hizrat d) Sheikh Farooqi e) Bada Seth f) Bada Bhai g) Iqbal Bhai h) Mucchad i) Haji Sahab **Nationality:** India **Passport no:** a) India number A-333602, issued on 4 Jun. 1985, issued in Bombay, India (passport subsequently revoked by the Government of India) b) India number M110522, issued on 13 Nov. 1978, issued in Bombay, India c) India number R841697, issued on 26 Nov. 1981, issued in Bombay d) India number F823692, issued on 2 Sep. 1989 ((JEDDAH) issued by CGI in Jeddah) e) India number A501801, issued on 26 Jul. 1985, issued in BOMBAY f) India number K560098, issued on 30 Jul. 1975, issued in BOMBAY g) V57865, issued on 3 Oct. 1983, issued in BOMBAY h) India number P537849, issued on 30 Jul. 1979, issued in BOMBAY i) A717288, issued on 18 Aug. 1985, issued in Dubai (MISUSE) j) Pakistan number G866537, issued on 12 Aug. 1991, issued in Rawalpindi (MISUSE) k) C-267185 (issued in Karachi in Jul.1996) l) H-123259 (issued in Rawalpindi in Jul. 2001) m) G-869537 (issued in Rawalpindi) n) KC-285901 **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Karachi, Pakistan (White House, Near Saudi Mosque, Clifton) b) House Nu 37 - 30th Street - defence, Housing Authority, Karachi, Pakistan c) Palatial bungalow in the hilly area of Noorabad in Karachi, Pakistan **Listed on:** 3 Nov. 2003 (amended on 21 Mar. 2006, 25 Jul. 2006, 2 Jul. 2007, 11 Mar. 2010, 22 Aug. 2016) **Other information:** Father's name is Sheikh Ibrahim Ali Kaskar, mother's name is Amina Bi, wife's name is Mehjabeen Shaikh. International arrest warrant issued by the Government of India. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4520465> [click here](#)

**QDi.372 Name:** 1: GULMUROD 2: KHALIMOV 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 14 May 1975 b) Approximately 1975 **POB:** a) Varzob area, Tajikistan b) Dushanbe, Tajikistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tajikistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Syria-based military expert, member and recruiter of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Wanted by the Government of Tajikistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930721> [click here](#)

**QDi.306 Name:** 1: MUSTAFA 2: HAJJI 3: MUHAMMAD 4: KHAN**Name (original script):** مصطفى حجي محمد خان

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) (Between Aug. and Sep. 1977) b) 1976 **POB:** a) Al-Madinah, Saudi Arabia b) Sangrar, Sindh Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) حسن غول (Hassan Ghul; Hassan Gul; Hasan Gul) b) Khalid Mahmud **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Ahmad Shahji b) Mustafa Muhammad c) Abu Gharib al-Madani d) أبو شيماء (Abu-Shaima; Abu-Shayma) **Nationality:** a) Pakistan b) Saudi Arabian **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 14 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Al-Qaida (QDe.004) facilitator, courier and operative. As of 2010, facilitated activities for senior Pakistan-based Al-Qaida operatives. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5040725> [click here](#)

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**QDi.336 Name:** 1: ANAS 2: HASAN 3: KHATTAB 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 7 Apr. 1986 **POB:** Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** Samir Ahmed al-Khayat **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Hani b) Abu Hamzah c) Abu-Ahmad Hadud **Nationality:** Syrian Arab Republic **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 25 Oct. 2016) **Other information:** Administrative amir of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818211> [click here](#)

**QDi.340 Name:** 1: EMILIE 2: EDWIGE 3: KONIG 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 9 Dec. 1984 **POB:** Ploemeur, France **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Emilie Samra Konig **Nationality:** France **Passport no:** French passport number 05AT521433, issued on 30 Nov. 2005 (issued by the sous-prefecture of police of Lorient, France) **National identification no:** a) French national identity card number 050456101445, issued on 19 May 2005 (issued by the sous-prefecture of police of Lorient, France) b) French identity card number 0205561020089, issued on 30 May 2002 (issued under name Emilie Edwige Konig) **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (located in since 2013) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 (amended on 24 Jun. 2016) **Other information:** French terrorist fighter who travelled to Syria and joined Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) (QDe.115). Active in radicalizing and propagating Al-Qaida's (QDe.004) ideology through the Internet. Incites violent activities against France. French arrest warrant issued on 12 Jun. 2015 by a magistrate of the anti-terrorism division of the Prosecutor's Office in Paris for her participation in a terrorist criminal association. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5818236> [click here](#)

**QDi.408 Name:** 1: ALEXANDA 2: AMON 3: KOTEY 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 13 Dec. 1983 **POB:** London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Alexe Kotey b) Alexandra Kote **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 094477324, issued on 5 Mar. 2005 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. Physical description: eye colour: dark brown; hair colour: black; complexion: dark. Distinguishing marks: beard. Ethnic background: Ghanaian Cypriot. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6116608> [click here](#)

**QDi.383 Name:** 1: MORAD 2: LAABOUDI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 26 Feb. 1993 **POB:** Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Ismail b) Abu Ismail al-Maghribi **Nationality:** Morocco **Passport no:** Morocco UZ6430184 **National identification no:** CD595054 **Address:** Turkey **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Facilitator for travel of foreign terrorist fighters to join Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in Syrian Arab Republic. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930723> [click here](#)

**QDi.190 Name:** 1: ABDELKADER 2: LAAGOUB 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد القادر لاغوب

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 23 Apr. 1966 **POB:** Casablanca, Morocco **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Rachid **Nationality:** Morocco **Passport no:** Morocco D-379312 **National identification no:** (Moroccan national identity card DE- 473900) na **Address:** Number 4, Via Europa, Paderno Ponchielli, Cremona, Italy **Listed on:** 29 Jul. 2005 (amended on 21 Dec. 2007, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Italian Fiscal code: LGBBLK66D23Z330U. Father's name is Mamoune Mohamed. Mother's name is Fatna Ahmed. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4485379> [click here](#)

**QDi.319 Name:** 1: MOHAMED 2: LAHBOUS 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** محمد لحيوس

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1978 **POB:** Mali **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohamed Ennouini b) Hassan c) Hocine **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Mali **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 24 Oct. 2013 **Other information:** Member of the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5720103> [click here](#)

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**QDi.062 Name:** 1: MOHAMED 2: LAKHAL 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** محمد لکحل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Feb. 1970 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Lased Ben Heni born 5 Feb. 1969 in Tripoli, Libya b) Al-As'ad Ben Hani born 5 Feb. 1969 in Tripoli, Libya c) Mohamed Ben Belgacem Awani d) Mohamed Aouani born 5 Feb. 1970 in Tunis, Tunisia (formerly listed as) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohamed Abu Abda b) Abu Obeida **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** W374031, issued on 11 Apr. 2011 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 24 Apr. 2002 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 9 Sep. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 23 Dec. 2010, 24 Nov. 2014) **Other information:** Professor of Chemistry. Deported from Italy to Tunisia on 27 Aug. 2006. Legally changed family name from Aouani to Lakhal in 2014. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Apr. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423715> [click here](#)

**QDi.264 Name:** 1: ZAKI-UR-REHMAN 2: LAKHVI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 30 Dec. 1960 **POB:** Okara, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Zakir Rehman Lakvi b) Zaki Ur-Rehman Lakvi c) Kaki Ur-Rehman d) Zakir Rehman e) Abu Waheed Irshad Ahmad Arshad **Low quality a.k.a.:** Chachajee **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 61101-9618232-1 **Address:** a) Barahkoh, P.O. DO, Tehsil and District Islamabad, Pakistan (location as at May 2008) b) Chak No. 18/IL, Rinala Khurd, Tehsil Rinala Khurd, District Okara, Pakistan (previous location) **Listed on:** 10 Dec. 2008 **Other information:** Chief of operations of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (listed under permanent reference number QDe.118). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1543499> [click here](#)

**QDi.247 Name:** 1: RUBEN 2: PESTANO 3: LAVILLA, JR 4: na

**Title:** Sheik **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Oct. 1972 **POB:** Sitio Banga Maiti, Barangay Tranghawan, Lambunao, Iloilo, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Reuben Lavilla b) Sheik Omar c) Mile D Lavilla d) Reymund Lavilla e) Ramo Lavilla f) Mike de Lavilla g) Abdullah Muddaris h) Ali Omar i) Omar Lavilla j) Omar Labella **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) So b) Eso c) Junjun **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** a) Philippines number MM611523 (2004) b) Philippines number EE947317 (2000-2001) c) Philippines number P421967 (1995-1997) **National identification no:** na **Address:** 10th Avenue, Caloocan City, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 16 Sep. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Spiritual leader of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128). Associated with Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani (QDi.180). In detention in the Philippines as of May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1522921> [click here](#)

**QDi.155 Name:** 1: DJAMEL 2: LOUNICI 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** جمال لونيبي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Feb. 1962 **POB:** Algiers, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Jamal Lounici **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 16 Jan. 2004 (amended on 7 Apr. 2008, 2 Dec. 2008, 30 Jan. 2009, 16 May 2011, 14 Feb. 2018) **Other information:** Father's name is Abdelkader. Mother's name is Johra Birouh. Returned from France to Algeria where he resides since Sep. 2008. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 27 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4525545> [click here](#)

**QDi.356 Name:** 1: AQSA 2: MAHMOOD 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 May 1994 **POB:** Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Umm Layth **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 720134834, issued on 27 Jun. 2012 (expires on 27 Jun. 2022) **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (as at Nov. 2013) b) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (previous address) **Listed on:** 28 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Recruiter for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic, and a key figure in the the Al-Khanssaa brigade, a female ISIL brigade established in Al-Raqqa to enforce ISIL's interpretation of Sharia law. Sex: female. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897334> [click here](#)

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**QDi.206 Name:** 1: IBRAHIM 2: MOHAMED KHALIL 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** ابراهيم محمد خليل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 2 Jul. 1975 **POB:** Dayr Az-Zawr, Syrian Arab Republic **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Khalil Ibrahim Jassem born 2 May 1972 in Baghdad, Iraq b) Khalil Ibrahim Mohammad born 3 Jul. 1975 in Mosul, Iraq c) Khalil Ibrahim Al Zafiri (born 1972) d) Khalil born 2 May 1975 e) Khalil Ibrahim al-Zahiri born 2 Jul. 1975 in Mosul **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Syrian Arab Republic **Passport no.:** Temporary suspension of deportation number T04338017 (issued by Alien's Office of the City of Mainz, expired on 8 May 2013) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Refugee shelter Alte Ziegelei, Mainz, 55128, Germany **Listed on:** 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 25 Jan. 2010, 13 Dec. 2011, 6 Aug. 2013) **Other information:** Sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment in Germany on 6 Dec. 2007. Released on 30 December 2012. Photo and fingerprints available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 5 Oct. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424324> [click here](#)

**QDi.202 Name:** 1: MAZEN 2: SALAH 3: MOHAMMED 4: na**Name (original script):** مازن صلاح محمد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 18 May 1981 **POB:** Arbil, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mazen Ali Hussein born 1 Jan. 1982 in Baghdad, Iraq b) Issa Salah Muhamad born 1 Jan. 1980 **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no.:** German travel document ("Reiseausweis") A 0144378 (revoked as at Sep. 2012) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** 94051 Hauzenberg, Germany **Listed on:** 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 21 Oct. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011, 15 Nov. 2012) **Other information:** Member of Ansar Al-Islam (QDe.098). Released from custody in Germany on 18 May 2012. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423276> [click here](#)

**QDi.126 Name:** 1: YUNOS 2: UMPARA 3: MOKLIS 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 7 Jul. 1966 **POB:** Lanao del Sur, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muklis Yunos b) Mukhlis Yunos (previously listed as) c) Saifullah Mukhlis Yunos d) Saifulla Moklis Yunos **Low quality a.k.a.:** Hadji Onos **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Philippines (remains incarcerated as of May 2017) **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 23 Feb. 2009, 3 Jun. 2009, 16 May 2011, 22 Sep. 2017) **Other information:** Sentenced to life without parole in the Philippines on 23 Jan. 2009 for his involvement in the bombings of 30 Dec. 2000 in Manila, the Philippines. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1427252> [click here](#)

**QDi.147 Name:** 1: MOHAMED 2: AMIN 3: MOSTAFA 4: na**Name (original script):** محمد أمين مصطفى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Oct. 1975 **POB:** Kirkuk, Iraq **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Iraq **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Via della Martinella 132, Parma, Italy (Domicile) **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 7 Jun. 2007, 16 May 2011, 25 Oct. 2016) **Other information:** Under administrative control measure in Italy scheduled to expire on 15 Jan. 2012. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424267> [click here](#)

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**QDi.129 Name:** 1: DJAMEL 2: MOUSTFA 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** جمال مصطفى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 28 Sep. 1973 **POB:** Tiaret, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Kalad Belkasam born 31 Dec. 1979 b) Mostafa Djamel born 31 Dec. 1979 in Maskara, Algeria c) Mostefa Djamel born 26 Sep. 1973 in Mahdia, Algeria d) Mustafa Djamel born 31 Dec. 1979 in Mascara, Algeria e) Balkasam Kalad born 26 Aug. 1973 in Algiers, Algeria f) Bekasam Kalad born 26 Aug. 1973 in Algiers, Algeria g) Belkasam Kalad born 26 Aug. 1973 in Algiers, Algeria h) Damel Mostafa born 31 Dec. 1979 in Algiers, Algeria i) Djamel Mostafa born 31 Dec. 1979 in Maskara, Algeria j) Djamel Mostafa born 10 Jun. 1982 k) Djamel Mostafa born 31 Dec. 1979 in Maskara, Algeria l) Djamel Mostafa born 31 Dec. 1979 in Algiers, Algeria m) Fjamel Moustfa born 28 Sep. 1973 in Tiaret, Algeria n) Djamel Mustafa born 31 Dec. 1979 o) Ali Barkani born 22 Aug. 1973 in Morocco p) Djamel Mustafa born 31 Dec. 1979 in Mascara, Algeria **Low quality a.k.a.:** Mustafa **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** a) Counterfeit Danish driving licence number 20645897 (made out to Ali Barkani, born on 22 Aug. 1973 in Morocco) b) Algeria Birth certificate, issued in Algeria (issued for Djamel Mostefa, born on 25 Sep. 1973 in Mehdiya, Tiaret province, Algeria) **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2003 (amended on 7 Sep. 2007, 7 Apr. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Father's name is Djelalli Moustfa. Mother's name is Kadeja Mansore. Deported from Germany to Algeria in Sep. 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 19 Oct. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424350> [click here](#)

**QDi.238 Name:** 1: MUBARAK 2: MUSHAKHAS 3: SANAD 4: MUBARAK AL-BATHALI**Name (original script):** مبارك مشخص سند مبارك البذالي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1 Oct. 1961 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mubarak Mishkhis Sanad Al-Bathali b) Mubarak Mishkhis Sanad Al-Badhali c) Mubarak Al-Bathali d) Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bathali e) Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bazali f) Mobarak Meshkhas Sanad Al-Bthaly **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abu Abdulrahman **Nationality:** Kuwait **Passport no:** a) Kuwait number 101856740, issued on 12 May 2005 (and expired on 11 May 2007) b) Kuwait number 002955916 **National identification no:** 261122400761 **Address:** Al-Salibekhat area, Kuwait (residence as at Mar. 2009) **Listed on:** 16 Jan. 2008 (amended on 1 Jul. 2008, 23 Jul. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 14 Sep. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1518768> [click here](#)

**QDi.373 Name:** 1: LAVDRIM 2: MUHAXHERI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 3 Dec. 1989 b) Approximately 1987 **POB:** Kaqanik/Kacanic **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Abdullah al Kosova b) Abu Abdullah al-Kosovi c) Abu Abdullah al-Kosovo **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic (location as at Sep. 2015) **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Kosovar Albanian terrorist fighter in Syrian Arab Republic and unit leader of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Wanted by INTERPOL. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5896179> [click here](#)

**QDi.272 Name:** 1: MOHAMMED 2: YAHYA 3: MUJAHID 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 12 Mar. 1961 **POB:** Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** Mohammad Yahya Aziz **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 35404-1577309-9 **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Jun. 2009 **Other information:** Associated with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). In detention as at June 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1578066> [click here](#)

**QDi.119 Name:** 1: ARIS 2: MUNANDAR 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 Jan. 1971 b) Between 1962 and 1968 **POB:** Sambi, Boyolali, Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia (as at Dec. 2003) **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 9 Sep. 2005, 4 Oct. 2006, 12 Dec. 2014) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1446715> [click here](#)



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**QDi.120 Name:** 1: ABDUL HAKIM 2: MURAD 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد الحكيم مراد

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Apr. 1968 **POB:** Kuwait **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Murad, Abdul Hakim Hasim b) Murad, Abdul Hakim Ali Hashim c) Murad, Abdul Hakim al Hashim d) Saeed Akman e) Saeed Ahmed f) Abdul Hakim Ali al-Hashem Murad **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no.:** a) Pakistan number 665334, issued in Kuwait b) Pakistan number 917739, issued on 8 Aug. 1991, issued in Pakistan (expired on 7 Aug. 1996) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Mother's name is Aminah Ahmad Sher al-Baloushi. In custody of the United States. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424401> [click here](#)

**QDi.196 Name:** 1: ALI 2: SAYYID 3: MUHAMED 4: MUSTAFA BAKRI**Name (original script):** على السيد محمد مصطفى بكرى

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 18 Apr. 1966 **POB:** Beni-Suef, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ali Salim b) Abd Al-Aziz al-Masri **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2005 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of the Shura Council of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (QDe.003). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419350> [click here](#)

**QDi.357 Name:** 1: ASEEL 2: MUTHANA 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 22 Nov. 1996 **POB:** Cardiff, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no.:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 516088643, issued on 7 Jan. 2014 (expires on 7 Jan. 2024) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (as at Feb. 2014) b) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (previous address) **Listed on:** 30 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. Wanted by the authorities of the United Kingdom. Physical description: hair colour: brown/black. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897335> [click here](#)

**QDi.358 Name:** 1: NASSER 2: AHMED 3: MUTHANA 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 29 Apr. 1994 **POB:** Heath, Cardiff, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Good quality a.k.a.:** Nasir Muthana **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Muthana b) Abu Muthana c) Abu Al-Yemeni Muthana d) Abu Muthanna **Nationality:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland **Passport no.:** United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 210804241, issued on 27 Jul. 2010 (expires on 27 Jul. 2020) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (as at Nov. 2013) b) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (previous address until Nov. 2013) **Listed on:** 28 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Foreign terrorist fighter with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in the Syrian Arab Republic. Wanted by the authorities of the United Kingdom. Physical description: hair colour: brown/black. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5897336> [click here](#)

**QDi.406 Name:** 1: Murad 2: Iraklievich 3: Margoshvili 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Jan. 1970 **POB:** Grozny, Chechen Republic, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Zurab Iraklievich Margoshvili b) Murad Akhmedovich Madayev c) Lova Madayev d) Abu-Muslim Al-Shishani **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Muslim b) Lava c) John d) George e) Arthur f) Sedoy **Nationality:** a) Russian Federation b) Georgia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Associated with Jabhat al-Nusrah, listed as Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6116583> [click here](#)

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**QDi.280 Name:** 1: TAYEB 2: NAIL 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** الطيب نايل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1972 **POB:** Faidh El Batma, Djelfa, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Djaafar Abou Mohamed (جعفر ابو محمد) b) Abou Mouhadjir (ابو مهاجر) c) Mohamed Ould Ahmed Ould Ali (born in 1976) **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 22 Apr. 2010 (amended on 15 Apr. 2014) **Other information:** Convicted in absentia by Algerian tribunal on 28 Mar. 1996. Algerian international arrest warrant number 04/09 of 6 Jun. 2009 issued by the Tribunal of Sidi Mhamed, Algiers, Algeria. Algerian extradition request number 2307/09 of 3 Sep. 2009, presented to Malian authorities. Father's name was Benazouz Nail. Mother's name is Belkheiri Oum El Kheir. Member of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4483533> [click here](#)

**QDi.314 Name:** 1: ABDERRAHMANE 2: OULD EL AMAR 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد الرحمن ولد العامر

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Between 1977 and 1982 **POB:** Tabankort, Mali **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Ahmed el Tilemsi b) Abderrahmane Ould el Amar Ould Sidahmed Loukbeiti c) Ahmad Ould Amar **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Mali **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Gao, Mali b) Tabankort, Mali c) In Khalil, Mali d) Al Moustarat, Mali **Listed on:** 22 Feb. 2013 **Other information:** Leader of the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Member of The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Arrested in April 2005 in Mauritania, escaped from Nouakchott jail on 26 Apr. 2006. Re-arrested in Sep. 2008 in Mali and released on 15 Apr. 2009. Associated with Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136). Father's name is Leewemere. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5278298> [click here](#)

**QDi.315 Name:** 1: HAMADA 2: OULD MOHAMED EL KHAIRY 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** حماده ولد محمد الخيري

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1970 **POB:** Nouakchott, Mauritania **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hamada Ould Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed el Khairy b) Ould Kheirou c) Hamad el Khairy **Low quality a.k.a.:** Abou QumQum **Nationality:** a) Mauritania b) Mali **Passport no:** Mali A1447120 (expired on 19 Oct. 2011) **National identification no:** na **Address:** Gao, Mali **Listed on:** 22 Feb. 2013 **Other information:** Leader of the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Has provided logistical support to the Sahelian group Al Moulathamine, linked with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). International arrest warrant issued by Mauritania. Mother's name is Tijal Bint Mohamed Dadda. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5278393> [click here](#)

**QDi.298 Name:** 1: ABD AL-RAHMAN 2: OULD MUHAMMAD AL-HUSAYN 3: OULD MUHAMMAD SALIM 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد الرحمن ولد محمد الحسين ولد محمد سليم

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1981 **POB:** Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdarrahmane Ould Mohamed el Houcein Ould Mohamed Salem b) شيخ يونس الموريتاني (Yunis al-Mauritani; Younis al-Mauritani; Sheikh Yunis al-Mauritani; Shaykh Yunis the Mauritanian) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Salih the Mauritanian b) Mohamed Salem c) Youssef Ould Abdel Jelil d) El Hadj Ould Abdel Ghader e) Abdel Khader f) Abou Souleimane g) Chingheity **Nationality:** Mauritania **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 15 Sep. 2011 **Other information:** Pakistan-based senior Al-Qaida (QDe.004) leader also associated with The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Wanted by Mauritanian authorities. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4555823> [click here](#)

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**QDi.353 Name:** 1: ALI 2: BEN TAHER 3: BEN FALEH 4: OUNI HARZI**Name (original script):** علي بن الطاهر بن الفالح العوني الحرزي**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 9 Mar. 1986 **POB:** Ariana, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:**Abou Zoubair **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no.:** Tunisian passport W342058, issued on 14 Mar. 2011 (expires on 13 Mar 2016) **National identification no.:** National Identity Card number 08705184, issued on 24 Feb. 2011**Address:** a) 18 Mediterranean Street, Ariana, Tunisia b) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Mar. 2015) c) Iraq(possible alternative location as at Mar. 2015) d) Libya (previously located in) **Listed on:** 10 Apr. 2015 (amendedon 14 Sep. 2016) **Other information:** Physical description: eye colour: brown; height: 171cm. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Previous occupation: trading agent. A member of Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (QDe.143), active in recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters and arms smuggling. Detained and sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for planning terrorist acts in 2005 in Tunisia. Planned and perpetrated the attack against the Consulate of the United States in Benghazi, Libya on 11 Sep. 2012. Arrest warrant issued by the Tunisian National Guard (as at Mar. 2015). Father's name is Taher Ouni Harzi, mother's name is Borkana Bedairia.

Reportedly killed in an airstrike in Mosul, Iraq, in Jun. 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link:

<https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5860630> [click here](#)**QDi.354 Name:** 1: TARAK 2: BEN TAHER 3: BEN FALEH 4: OUNI HARZI**Name (original script):** طارق بن الطاهر بن الفالح العوني الحرزي**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 May 1982 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:**Abou Omar Al Tounisi **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no.:** Tunisia Z050399, issued on 9 Dec. 2003 (expired on8 Dec. 2008) **National identification no.:** National Identification Number 04711809, issued on 13 Nov. 2003**Address:** a) 18 Mediterranean Street, Ariana, Tunisia b) Syrian Arab Republic (located in as at Mar. 2015) c) Iraq(possible alternative location as at Mar. 2015) d) Libya (previously located in) **Listed on:** 10 Apr. 2015 (amendedon 14 Sep. 2016) **Other information:** Physical description: eye colour: brown; height: 172cm. Photo available forinclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Previous occupation: worker. A dangerous and active member of Al Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) in 2004, also active in facilitating and hosting members of Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (QDe.143) in Syria. Sentenced, in absentia, on 30 October 2007, to 24 years imprisonment for terrorist activities by the Appeals Court of Tunis. Father's name is Taher Ouni Harzi, mother's name is Borkana Bedairia. Reportedly killed in Syria in Jun. 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: [https://](https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5860633)[www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5860633](https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5860633) [click here](#)**QDi.242 Name:** 1: DINNO AMOR 2: ROSALEJOS 3: PAREJA 4: na**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Jul. 1981 **POB:** Cebu City, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Johnny Parejab) Khalil Pareja **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohammad b) Akmad c) Mighty d) Rash **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport****no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Atimonana, Quezon Province, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun.2008 (amended on 3 Jun. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement

(QDe.128). Father's name is Amorsolo Jarabata Pareja. Mother's name is Leonila Cambaya Rosalejos. Review

pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security

Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1523971> [click here](#)**QDi.294 Name:** 1: UMAR 2: PATEK 3: na 4: na**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Jul. 1966 **POB:** Central Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Omar Patekb) Mike Arsalan c) Hisyam Bin Zein d) Anis Alawi Jafar **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Pa'tek b) Pak Taek c) Umar Kecild) Al Abu Syekh Al Zacky e) Umangis Mike **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:**na **Address:** Indonesia **Listed on:** 19 Jul. 2011 (amended on 23 Feb. 2012, 22 Sep. 2017) **Other information:**

Senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) involved in planning and funding multiple terrorist attacks in the

Philippines and Indonesia. Provided training to Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001). Convicted for his role in the 2002

Bali bombings and sentenced to 20 years in prison in Jun. 2012. Remains in custody in Indonesia as at May 2015

Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/>[search/un/4173385](https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4173385) [click here](#)

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**QDi.348 Name:** 1: ANGGA 2: DIMAS 3: PERSHADA 4: na

**Title:** Secretary General (as at mid-2014) **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Mar. 1985 **POB:** Jakarta, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Angga Dimas Persada born 4 Mar. 1985 in Jakarta, Indonesia b) Angga Dimas Persadha born 4 Mar. 1985 in Jakarta, Indonesia c) Angga Dimas Prasondha born 4 Mar. 1985 in Jakarta, Indonesia **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no.:** Indonesian passport W344982 (issued under name Angga Dimas Peshada, born 4 Mar.1985 in Jakarta, Indonesia) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 13 Mar. 2015 **Other information:** Member of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) and leader of Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5854965> [click here](#)

**QDi.271 Name:** 1: ARIF 2: QASMANI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1944 **POB:** Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Arif Qasmani b) Muhammad 'Arif Qasmani c) Mohammad Arif Qasmani d) Arif Umer e) Qasmani Baba f) Memon Baba g) Baba Ji **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** House Number 136, KDA Scheme No. 1, Tipu Sultan Road, Karachi, Pakistan **Listed on:** 29 Jun. 2009 **Other information:** Associated with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118) and Al-Qaida (QDe.004). In detention as at June 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1578017> [click here](#)

**QDi.303 Name:** 1: FAZAL 2: RAHIM 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** فضل رحيم

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 5 Jan. 1974 b) 1977 c) 1975 d) 24 Jan. 1973 **POB:** Kabul, Afghanistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Fazel Rahim; Fazil Rahim b) Fazil Rahman **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Afghanistan **Passport no.:** Afghanistan R512768 **National identification no.:** na **Address:** a) (Afghanistan/Pakistan border region (previous address)) b) (A2, City Computer Plaza, Shar-e-Now, Kabul, Afghanistan (previous address)) c) Microrayan 3rd, Apt. 45, block 21, Kabul, Afghanistan (previous address) **Listed on:** 6 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Was a financial facilitator for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010) and Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Was associated with Tohir Abdulkhalilovich Yuldashev. As of late 2010, in custody of Pakistan authorities. Father's name is Fazal Ahmad. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681481> [click here](#)

**QDi.075 Name:** 1: ABDELHALIM 2: HAFED 3: ABDELFATTAH 4: REMADNA**Name (original script):** عبدالحليم حافظ عبدالفتاح رمادنا

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 2 Apr. 1966 **POB:** Biskra, Algeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abdelhalim Remadna **Low quality a.k.a.:** Jalloul **Nationality:** Algeria **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 3 Sep. 2002 (amended on 12 Apr. 2006, 7 Apr. 2008, 3 Jun. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010, 23 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Deported from Italy to Algeria on 12 Aug. 2006. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Dec. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424786> [click here](#)

**QDi.219 Name:** 1: TAUFIK 2: RIFKI 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Aug. 1974 **POB:** Dacusuman Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Refke, Taufek b) Rifqi, Taufik c) Rifqi, Tawfiq d) Ami Iraq e) Ami Irza f) Amy Erja g) Ammy Erza h) Ammy Izza i) Ami Kusoman j) Abu Obaida k) Abu Obaidah l) Abu Obeida m) Abu Ubaidah n) Obaidah o) Abu Obayda p) Izza Kusoman q) Yacub, Eric **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Philippines **Listed on:** 21 Apr. 2006 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** In detention in the Philippines as at May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1429171> [click here](#)

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**QDi.407 Name:** 1: OMAN 2: ROCHMAN 3: na 4: na

**Title:** Ustadz **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Jan. 1972 **POB:** Sumedang, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Oman Rahman b) Abu Sulaiman Aman Abdurrahman Al-Arkhabiliy c) Aman Abdul Rahman d) Aman Abdurahman e) Aman Abdurrachman f) Oman Abdulrohman g) Oman Abdurrahman h) Aman Abdurrahman **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Pasir Putih Prison, Nusa Kambangan Island, Indonesia **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** De facto leader for all Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), supporters in Indonesia, despite his incarceration in Indonesia since December 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6116589> [click here](#)

**QDi.150 Name:** 1: AL-AZHAR 2: BEN KHALIFA 3: BEN AHMED 4: ROUINE**Name (original script):** الأزهر بن خليفة بن احمد روين

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Nov. 1975 **POB:** Sfax, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Salmane b) Lazhar **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia P182583, issued on 13 Sep. 2003 (expired on 12 Sep. 2007) **National identification no:** 05258253 **Address:** No.2 89th Street Zehrouni, Tunis, Tunisia **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 21 Dec. 2007, 30 Jan. 2009, 16 May 2011, 23 Feb. 2016) **Other information:** Sentenced to six years and ten months of imprisonment for membership of a terrorist association by the Appeal Court of Milan, Italy, on 7 Feb. 2008. Imprisoned in Sfax Prison on 5 June 2007 pursuant to an order issued by the Appeals Tribunal in Tunisia for joining an organization linked to terrorist crimes (case No.9301/207). Sentenced to two years and 15 days' imprisonment and released on 18 June 2008. U Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities as at Jul. 2008. Under administrative control measure in Tunisia as at 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419776> [click here](#)

**QDi.186 Name:** 1: ABU 2: RUSDAN 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 16 Aug. 1960 **POB:** Kudus, Central Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Thoriq b) Rusdjan c) Rusjan d) Rusydan e) Thoriquuddin f) Thoriquiddin g) Thoriquiddin h) Toriquiddin **Nationality:** na **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 16 May 2005 (amended on 12 Dec. 2014) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4680925> [click here](#)

**QDi.403 Name:** 1: FARED 2: SAAL 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 18 Feb. 1989 **POB:** Bonn, Germany **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Luqmaan Al Almani b) Abu Lugmaan **Nationality:** a) Germany b) Algeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** Germany national identity card number 5802098444, issued in Bonn, Germany (on 15 Apr. 2010, expired on 14 Apr. 2016) **Address:** na **Listed on:** 16 Jun. 2017 **Other information:** German foreign terrorist fighter for Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: black; height: 178cm; weight: 80kg. European arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge of the German Federal Supreme Court on 13 Aug. 2014. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/6104049> [click here](#)

**QDi.002 Name:** 1: AMIN 2: MUHAMMAD 3: UL HAQ 4: SAAM KHAN

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1960 **POB:** Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Al-Haq, Amin b) Amin, Muhammad **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Dr. Amin b) Ul-Haq, Dr. Amin **Nationality:** Afghanistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2001 (amended on 18 Jul. 2007, 16 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Security coordinator for Usama bin Laden (deceased). Repatriated to Afghanistan in February 2006. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423229> [click here](#)

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**QDi.020 Name:** 1: MOHAMMAD 2: HAMDI 3: MOHAMMAD 4: SADIQ AL-AHDAL**Name (original script):** محمد حمدي محمد صادق الأهدل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 19 Nov. 1971 **POB:** Medina, Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Al-Hamati, Muhammad b) Muhammad Muhammad Abdullah Al-Ahdal c) Mohamed Mohamed Abdullah Al-Ahdal **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Asim Al-Makki b) Ahmed **Nationality:** Yemen **Passport no:** Yemen number 541939, issued on 31 Jul. 2000, issued in Al-Hudaydah, Yemen (in the name of Muhammad Muhammad Abdullah Al-Ahdal) **National identification no:** Yemeni identity card number 216040 **Address:** Jamal street, Al-Dahima alley, Al-Hudaydah, Yemen **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 30 Jan. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010) **Other information:** Responsible for the finances of Al-Qa'ida (QDe.004) in Yemen. Accused of involvement in the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. Arrested in Yemen in Nov. 2003. Sentenced to three years and one month of imprisonment by the specialized criminal court of first instance in Yemen. Released on 25 Dec. 2006 after the completion of his sentence. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1597333> [click here](#)

**QDi.263 Name:** 1: HAFIZ 2: MUHAMMAD 3: SAEED 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Jun. 1950 **POB:** Sargodha, Punjab, Pakistan **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Hafiz Mohammad Sahib b) Hafiz Mohammad Sayid c) Hafiz Muhammad d) Hafiz Saeed e) Hafez Mohammad Saeed f) Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed g) Tata Mohammad Syeed h) Mohammad Sayed i) Muhammad Saeed **Low quality a.k.a.:** Hafiz Ji **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** 3520025509842-7 **Address:** House No. 116E, Mohalla Johar, Lahore, Tehsil, Lahore City, Lahore District, Pakistan (location as at May 2008) **Listed on:** 10 Dec. 2008 (amended on 17 Jul. 2009) **Other information:** Muhammad Saeed is the leader of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1543488> [click here](#)

**QDi.208 Name:** 1: RADULAN 2: SAHIRON 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1955 **POB:** Kaunayan, Patikul, Jolo Island, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Radullan Sahiron b) Radulan Sahiron c) Radulan Sajirun **Low quality a.k.a.:** Commander Putol **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Sulu region, Philippines (reported location) **Listed on:** 6 Dec. 2005 (amended on 22 Sep. 2017) **Other information:** Physical description: eye colour: black; hair colour: gray; height: 5 feet 6 inches – 168 cm; weight: 140 pounds – 64 kg; build: slight; right arm is amputated above his elbow. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. Wanted by the Philippines authorities for terrorist offences and by authorities of the United States of America for involvement in the kidnapping of its national. Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424857> [click here](#)

**QDi.222 Name:** 1: NESSIM 2: BEN ROMDHANE 3: SAHRAOUI 4: na**Name (original script):** نسيم بن رمضان صحراوي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 3 Aug. 1973 **POB:** Bizerta, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Dass b) Nasim al-Sahrawi **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Tunisia **Listed on:** 2 Aug. 2006 (amended on 1 Sep. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010, 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities and sentenced in absentia to 6 years detention on 20 Nov. 2008. Sentenced in Tunisia to 4 years imprisonment for terrorist activity and in detention in Tunisia as at Jun. 2009. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1440724> [click here](#)

**QDi.387 Name:** 1: MOHAMMED 2: ABDEL-HALIM 3: HEMAIDA 4: SALEH

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 22 Sep. 1988 b) 22 Sep. 1989 **POB:** Alexandria, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Hameida Saleh b) Muhammad Abd-al-Halim Humaydah c) Faris Baluchistan **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Egypt **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Member of Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Involved in recruiting suicide bombers to go to Syrian Arab Republic and planning terrorist activities against targets in Europe. Arrested in Cairo, Egypt in 2013. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5930736> [click here](#)

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**QDi.148 Name:** 1: NESSIM 2: BEN MOHAMED 3: AL-CHERIF BEN MOHAMED 4: SALEH AL-SAAD**Name (original script):** نسيم بن محمد الشريف بن محمد صالح السعدي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 30 Nov. 1974 **POB:** Haidra Al-Qasreen, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Nassim Saadi b) Dia el Haak George born 20 Nov. 1974 in Lebanon c) Diael Haak George born 30 Nov. 1974 in Lebanon d) El Dia Haak George born 30 Nov. 1974 in Algeria **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abou Anis b) Abu Anis **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia M788331, issued on 28 Sep. 2001 (expired 27 Sep. 2006) **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) Via Monte Grappa 15, Arluno (Milan), Italy b) Via Cefalonia 11, Milan, Italy (Domicile, last known address) **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 21 Dec. 2007, 3 Jun. 2009, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Arrested on 9 Oct. 2002. In detention in Italy until 27 Apr. 2012. Sentenced in absentia to 20 years of imprisonment by the Tunis Military Court on 11 May 2005 for membership of a terrorist organization. Father's name is Mohamed Sharif. Mother's name is Fatima. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1419840> [click here](#)

**QDi.244 Name:** 1: HILARION 2: DEL ROSARIO 3: SANTOS 4: na

**Title:** "Amir" **Designation:** na **DOB:** 12 Mar. 1966 **POB:** 686 A. Mabini Street, Sangandaan, Caloocan City, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Akmad Santos b) Ahmed Islam c) Ahmad Islam Santos d) Hilarion Santos, III (third) e) Hilarion Del Rosario Santos, III (third) f) Abu Abdullah Santos g) Faisal Santos **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Lakay b) Aki c) Aqi d) Abu Hamsa **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no:** Philippines AA780554 **National identification no:** na **Address:** 50, Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 25 Oct. 2016, 22 Sep. 2017) **Other information:** Founder and leader of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128) and linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001). In detention in the Philippines as of May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1523805> [click here](#)

**QDi.350 Name:** 1: WIJI 2: JOKO 3: SANTOSO 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 14 Jul. 1975 **POB:** Rembang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Wijijoko Santoso born 14 Jul. 1975 in Rembang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Seif al-Jawi b) Abu Seif **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** Indonesia A2823222, issued on 28 May 2012 (expires 28 May 2017, issued under name Wiji Joko Santoso, born 14 Jul. 1975 in Rembang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia) **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 13 Mar. 2015 **Other information:** Head of the foreign affairs division and key outreach player of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Associated with Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5854971> [click here](#)

**QDi.001 Name:** 1: SAYF-AL ADL 2: na 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** سيف العدل

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 11 Apr. 1963 **POB:** Monufia Governate, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidan (DOB: 11 Apr. 1963. POB: Monufia Governorate, Egypt. Nationality: Egypt. In Arabic: محمد صلاح الدين عبدالحليم زيدان ) b) Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi (DOB: a) 11 Apr. 1960 b) 11 Apr. 1963. POB: Egypt. Nationality: Egypt) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Ibrahim al-Madani b) Saif Al-'Adil c) Seif al Adel **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 25 Jan. 2001 (amended on 16 Dec. 2010, 24 Jul. 2013, 15 Feb. 2017) **Other information:** Responsible for Usama bin Laden's (deceased) security. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681065> [click here](#)

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**QDi.322 Name:** 1: ABUBAKAR 2: MOHAMMED 3: SHEKAU 4: na**Name (original script):** أبو بكر محمد الشكوي

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1969 **POB:** Shekau Village, Yobe State, Nigeria **Good quality a.k.a.:** Abubakar Shekau **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Mohammed Abubakar bin Mohammed b) Abu Muhammed Abubakar bi Mohammed c) Shekau d) Shehu e) Shayku f) Imam Darul Tauhid g) Imam Darul Tawheed **Nationality:** Nigeria **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Nigeria **Listed on:** 26 Jun. 2014 **Other information:** Member of the Kanuri tribe. Physical description: eye colour: black; hair colour: black. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. Leader of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) (QDe.138). Under Shekau's leadership, Boko Haram has been responsible for a series of major terrorist attacks. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5800048> [click here](#)

**QDi.017 Name:** 1: THARWAT 2: SALAH 3: SHIHATA 4: na**Name (original script):** ثروت صالح شحاته

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 29 Jun. 1960 **POB:** Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Tarwat Salah Abdallah b) Salah Shihata Thirwat c) Shahata Thirwat d) Tharwat Salah Shihata Ali (previously listed as) **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 (amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 16 Dec. 2010) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1423219> [click here](#)

**QDi.122 Name:** 1: PARLINDUNGAN 2: SIREGAR 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 25 Apr. 1957 b) 25 Apr. 1967 **POB:** Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Siregar, Parlin b) Siregar, Saleh Parlindungan **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4493407> [click here](#)

**QDi.124 Name:** 1: YAZID 2: SUFAAT 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Jan. 1964 **POB:** Johor, Malaysia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Joe b) Abu Zufar **Nationality:** Malaysia **Passport no:** A 10472263 **National identification no:** 640120-01-5529 **Address:** a) Taman Bukit Ampang, State of Selangor, Malaysia (previous address) b) Malaysia (in prison since 2013) **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 3 May 2004, 1 Feb. 2008, 10 Aug. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010, 16 May 2011, 11 Oct. 2016, 22 Sep. 2017) **Other information:** Founding member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092) who worked on Al-Qaida's (QDe.004) biological weapons program, provided support to those involved in Al-Qaida's 11 Sep. 2001 attacks in the United States of America, and was involved in JI bombing operations. Detained in Malaysia from 2001 to 2008. Arrested in Malaysia in 2013 and sentenced to 7 years in Jan. 2016 for failing to report information relating to terrorist acts. Due for release in Feb. 2020. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1989 (2011) was concluded on 6 Mar. 2014. Photos included in INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424794> [click here](#)

**QDi.349 Name:** 1: BAMBANG 2: SUKIRNO 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 Apr. 1975 **POB:** Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Pak Zahra b) Abu Zahra **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** Indonesia A2062513 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 13 Mar. 2015 **Other information:** A senior leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) who has held leadership positions in Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) (QDe.147). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5854969> [click here](#)

**QDi.123 Name:** 1: YASSIN 2: SYAWAL 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** Approximately 1972 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Salim Yasin b) Yasin Mahmud Mochtar c) Abdul Hadi Yasin d) Muhamad Mubarak e) Muhammad Syawal f) Yassin Sywal (formerly listed as) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Seta b) Mahmud c) Abu Muamar d) Mubarak **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Sep. 2003 (amended on 12 Dec. 2014) **Other information:** At large as at Dec. 2003. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1424789> [click here](#)



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**QDi.057 Name:** 1: IBRAHIM 2: ALI 3: ABU BAKR 4: TANTOUSH**Name (original script):** ابراهيم علي أبو بكر تانتوش

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 2 Feb. 1966 **POB:** al Aziziyya, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Abd al-Muhsin b) Ibrahim Ali Muhammad Abu Bakr c) Abdul Rahman d) Abu Anas e) Ibrahim Abubaker Tantouche f) Ibrahim Abubaker Tantoush g) 'Abd al-Muhsi h) 'Abd al-Rahman i) Abdel Ilah Sabri (false identity related to fraudulent South African identification number 6910275240086 linked to South African passport number 434021161, both documents have been confiscated) **Low quality a.k.a.:** Al-Libi **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no.:** a) Libya number 203037, issued in Tripoli, Libya b) (Libyan passport number 347834, issued under name Ibrahim Ali Tantoush, expired on 21 Feb. 2014) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Tripoli, Libya (as at Feb. 2014) **Listed on:** 11 Jan. 2002 (amended on 31 Jul. 2006, 4 Oct. 2006, 16 May 2011, 10 Jul. 2015) **Other information:** Associated with Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069), Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS)(QDe.070) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (QDe.011). Photograph and fingerprints available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UNSC Special Notice. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1446790> [click here](#)

**QDi.241 Name:** 1: ANGELO 2: RAMIREZ 3: TRINIDAD 4: na**Name (original script):**

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 20 Mar. 1978 **POB:** Gattaran, Cagayan Province, Philippines **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Calib Trinidad b) Kalib Trinidad **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abdul Khalil b) Abdukahliil c) Abu Khalil d) Anis **Nationality:** Philippines **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** 3111 Ma. Bautista, Punta, Santa Ana, Manila, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Distinguishing marks include scars on both legs. Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (QDe.128), and associated with the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). In detention in the Philippines as of May 2011. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1524882> [click here](#)

**QDi.056 Name:** 1: MOHAMMED 2: TUFAIL 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 5 May 1930 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Tufail, S.M. b) Tuffail, Sheik Mohammed **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Pakistan **Passport no.:** na **National identification no.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 24 Dec. 2001 (amended on 19 Jan. 2011) **Other information:** Served as a director of Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) (QDe.068). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 1 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1972145> [click here](#)

**QDi.390 Name:** 1: NAYEF 2: SALAM 3: MUHAMMAD 4: UJAYM AL-HABABI**Name (original script):** نايف سلام محمد عجم الحبابي

**Title:** Sheikh **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1981 b) Approximately 1980 **POB:** Saudi Arabia **Good quality a.k.a.:** Nayf Salam Muhammad Ujaym al-Hababi **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Faruq al-Qahtani b) Faruq al-Qatari c) Farouq al-Qahtani al Qatari d) Sheikh Farooq al- Qahtani e) Shaykh Imran Farouk f) Sheikh Farouq al-Qatari **Nationality:** a) Saudi Arabia b) Qatar **Passport no.:** Qatari passport number 592667 (issued on 3 May 2007) **National identification no.:** na **Address:** Afghanistan (since 2009) **Listed on:** 28 Mar. 2016 **Other information:** Al-Qaida (QDe.004) emir for the eastern zone of Afghanistan. Has led an Al- Qaida battalion in Afghanistan since at least mid-2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5937412> [click here](#)

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**QDi.290 Name:** 1: DOKU 2: KHAMATOVICH 3: UMAROV 4: na**Name (original script):** Умаров Доку Хаматович

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 13 Apr. 1964 b) 13 Apr. 1965 c) 12 May 1964 d) 1955 **POB:** Kharsenoy Village, Shatoyskiy (Sovetskiy) District, Chechenskaya Respublika, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Lom-ali Butayev (Butaev) born 1955 b) Dokka Umarov born 13 Apr. 1964 c) Dokka Umarov born 13 Apr. 1965 **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** a) Russian Federation b) USSR (until 1991) **Passport no:** Russian Federation 96 03 464086, issued on 1 Jun. 2003 **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 10 Mar. 2011 (amended on 2 Jun. 2014, 30 Dec. 2014) **Other information:** Physical description: 180 cm tall, dark hair, 7-9 cm. long scar on the face, part of the tongue is missing, has a speech defect. Resides in the Russian Federation as at Nov. 2010. International arrest warrant issued in the year 2000. INTERPOL Special Notice contains biometric information. Reportedly deceased as of April 2014. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4065325> [click here](#)

**QDi.031 Name:** 1: OMAR 2: MAHMOUD 3: UTHMAN 4: na**Name (original script):** عمر محمود عثمان

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 30 Dec. 1960 b) 13 Dec. 1960 **POB:** Bethlehem, West Bank, Palestinian Territories **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Al-Samman Uthman b) Umar Uthman c) Omar Mohammed Othman **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Abu Qatada Al-Filistini b) Abu Umr Takfiri c) Abu Omar Abu Umar d) Abu Umar Umar e) Abu Ismail **Nationality:** Jordan **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** Jordan (since July 2013) **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 14 Mar. 2008, 24 Mar. 2009, 25 Jan. 2010, 22 Jul. 2013) **Other information:** Associated with Al-Qaida-related groups in the United Kingdom and other countries. Convicted in absentia in Jordan for involvement in terrorist acts in 1998. Arrested in Feb. 2001 in the United Kingdom, was further detained between Oct. 2002 and Mar. 2005 and between Aug. 2005 and Jun. 2008. In custody since Dec. 2008. Deported to Jordan from the United Kingdom on 7 July 2013 to face terrorism charges. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 19 Oct. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4511485> [click here](#)

**QDi.397 Name:** 1: AYRAT 2: NASIMOVICH 3: VAKHITOV 4: na**Name (original script):** Айрат Насимович Вахитов

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 27 Mar. 1977 **POB:** Naberezhnye Chelny, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation **Good quality a.k.a.:** Salman Bulgarskiy (original script: Салман Булгарский) **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Russian Federation **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 3 Aug. 2016 **Other information:** May use a fake passport of a Syrian or Iraqi citizen. Member of the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (ANF) (QDe.137), "Bulgar Group", leads a group of 100 fighters. Photo available for inclusion in the INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5966088> [click here](#)

**QDi.037 Name:** 1: ABDUL RAHMAN 2: YASIN 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** عبد الرحمن ياسين

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 10 Apr. 1960 **POB:** Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Taha, Abdul Rahman S. b) Taher, Abdul Rahman S. c) Yasin, Abdul Rahman Said d) Yasin, Aboud **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** United States of America **Passport no:** 27082171 (United States of America, issued on 21 Jun. 1992 in Amman, Jordan) **National identification no:** (SSN 156-92-9858 (United States of America)) na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 (amended on 10 Apr. 2003) **Other information:** Abdul Rahman Yasin is in Iraq. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4475465> [click here](#)

**QDi.261 Name:** 1: ADEM 2: YILMAZ 3: na 4: na

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 4 Nov. 1978 **POB:** Bayburt, Turkey **Good quality a.k.a.:** na **Low quality a.k.a.:** Talha **Nationality:** Turkey **Passport no:** Turkey TR-P 614 166 (issued by the Turkish Consulate General in Frankfurt/M. on 22 Mar. 2006, expired on 15 Sep. 2009.) **National identification no:** na **Address:** a) (In prison in Germany (since Sep. 2007).) b) Südliche Ringstrasse 133, Langen, 63225, Germany (previous address) **Listed on:** 27 Oct. 2008 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) **Other information:** Associated with the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), also known as the Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119). Associated with Fritz Martin Gelowicz (QDi.259). In detention in Germany as of Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1491645> [click here](#)

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**QDi.198 Name:** 1: HANI 2: AL-SAYYID 3: AL-SEBAI 4: YUSIF**Name (original script):** هاني السيد السباعي يوسف**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 1 Mar. 1961 b) 16 Jun. 1960 **POB:** Qaylubiyah, Egypt **Good quality a.k.a.:**a) Hani Yousef Al-Sebai b) Hani Youssef c) Hany Youseff d) Hani Yusef e) Hani al-Sayyid Al-Sabai f) Hani al-Sayyid El Sebai g) Hani al-Sayyid Al Siba'i h) Hani al-Sayyid El Sabaay i) El-Sababt j) Abu Tusrin k) Abu Akram l) Hani El Sayyed Elsebai Yusef m) Abu Karim n) Hany Elsayed Youssef **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Egypt **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2005 (amended on 6 Oct. 2005, 18 Aug. 2006, 25 Jan. 2012) **Other information:** Father's name is Mohamed Elsayed Elsebai. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 29 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4489874> [click here](#)**QDi.139 Name:** 1: IMED 2: BEN MEKKI 3: ZARKAOUI 4: na**Name (original script):** عماد بن مكّي زرقاوي**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 15 Jan. 1973 **POB:** Tunis, Tunisia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Dour Nadre born 15 Jan. 1974 in Morocco b) Dour Nadre born 15 Jan. 1973 in Morocco c) Daour Nadre born 31 Mar. 1975 in Algeria d) Imad ben al-Mekki ben al-Akhdar al-Zarkaoui (previously listed as) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Zarga b) Nadra **Nationality:** Tunisia **Passport no:** Tunisia M174950, issued on 27 Apr. 1999 (expired on 26 Apr. 2004)**National identification no:** na **Address:** 41-45 Rue Estienne d'Orves, Pré Saint Gervais, France **Listed on:** 12 Nov. 2003 (amended on 20 Dec. 2005, 31 Jul. 2006, 10 Aug. 2009, 16 May 2011) **Other information:** Mother's name is Zina al-Zarkaoui. Imprisoned in France since 1 Feb. 2010 on charges of criminal conspiracy in relation to a terrorist organization. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 6 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4497025> [click here](#)**QDi.223 Name:** 1: MERAI 2: ABDEFATTAH 3: KHALIL 4: ZOGHBI**Name (original script):** مرعي عبدفتاح خليل زغبّي**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 4 Apr. 1969 b) 4 Apr. 1960 c) 4 Jun. 1960 **POB:** Bengasi, Libya **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Mohamed Lebachir born 14 Jan. 1968 in Morocco b) Meri Albdefattah Zgbye born 4 Jun. 1960 in Bendasi, Libya c) Zoghbai Merai Abdul Fattah d) Lazrag Faraj born 13 Nov. 1960 in Libya e) Larzg Ben lla born 11 Aug. 1960 in Libya f) Muhammed El Besir g) Merai Zoghbai (previously listed as, in Arabic: (مرعي زغبّي) **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) F'raji di Singapore b) F'raji il Libico c) Farag d) Fredj born 13 Nov. 1960 in Libya **Nationality:** Libya **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 2 Aug. 2006 (amended on 3 Jun. 2009, 1 Sep. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011, 21 Mar. 2017) **Other information:** Considered a fugitive from justice by the Italian authorities and sentenced in absentia to 6 years imprisonment on 20 Nov. 2008. Member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (QDe.011). Son of Wanisa Abdessalam. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1440426> [click here](#)**QDi.187 Name:** 1: ZULKARNAEN 2: na 3: na 4: na**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** 1963 **POB:** Gebang village, Masaran, Sragen, Central Java, Indonesia **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Zulkarnan b) Zulkarnain c) Zulkarnin d) Arif Sunarso e) Aris Sumarsono f) Aris Sunarso g) Ustad Daud Zulkarnaen h) Murshid **Low quality a.k.a.:** na **Nationality:** Indonesia **Passport no:** na **National identification no:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 16 May 2005 **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/4681385> [click here](#)

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**QDi.289 Name:** 1: SAID JAN 2: 'ABD AL-SALAM 3: na 4: na**Name (original script):** سعيد جان عبد السلام

**Title:** na **Designation:** na **DOB:** a) 5 Feb. 1981 b) 1 Jan. 1972 **POB:** na **Good quality a.k.a.:** a) Sa'id Jan 'Abd-al-Salam b) Dilawar Khan Zain Khan born 1 Jan. 1972 **Low quality a.k.a.:** a) Qazi 'Abdallah b) Qazi Abdullah c) Ibrahim Walid d) Qasi Sa'id Jan e) Said Jhan f) Farhan Khan g) Aziz Cairo h) Nangiali **Nationality:** Afghanistan **Passport no.:** a) Afghan number OR801168 , issued on 28 Feb. 2006 (expires 27 Feb. 2011, under name Said Jan 'Abd al-Salam) b) Pakistan number 4117921 , issued on 9 Sep. 2008 (expires 9 Sep. 2013, issued under name Dilawar Khan Zain Khan) **National identification no.:** Civil Identification number 281020505755 (issued under name Said Jan 'Abd al-Salam) **Address:** na **Listed on:** 9 Feb. 2011 **Other information:** In approximately 2005, ran a "basic training" camp for Al-Qaida (QDe.004) in Pakistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/1928966> [click here](#)

**B. Entities and other groups****QDe.144 Name:** ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES (AAB)

**A.k.a.:** a) Abdullah Azzam Brigades b) Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades c) Yusuf al-'Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** (Operates in Lebanon, Syria and the Arabian Peninsula) **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** An armed group that has carried out joint attacks with Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5817658> [click here](#)

**QDe.001 Name:** ABU SAYYAF GROUP

**A.k.a.:** Al Harakat Al Islamiyya **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Philippines **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092). Current leader is Radulan Sahiron (QDi.208). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278422> [click here](#)

**QDe.069 Name:** AFGHAN SUPPORT COMMITTEE (ASC)

**A.k.a.:** a) Lajnat ul Masa Eidatul Afghania b) Jamiat Ayat-ur-Rhas al Islamiac c) Jamiat Ihya ul Turath al Islamia d) Ahya ul Turas **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Headquarters – G.T. Road (probably Grand Trunk Road), near Pushtoon Garhi Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan b) Cheprahar Hadda, Mia Omar Sabaqah School, Jalabad, Afghanistan **Listed on:** 11 Jan. 2002 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (QDe.070). Abu Bakr al-Jaziri (QDi.058) served as finance chief of ASC. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235582> [click here](#)

**QDe.107 Name:** AL FURQAN

**A.k.a.:** a) Dzemilijati Furkan b) Dzem'ijjetul Furqan c) Association for Citizens Rights and Resistance to Lies d) Dzemijetul Furkan e) Association of Citizens for the Support of Truth and Supression of Lies f) Sirat g) Association for Education, Culture and Building Society-Sirat h) Association for Education, Cultural, and to Create Society -Sirat i) Istikamet j) In Siratel k) Citizens' Association for Support and Prevention of lies – Furqan **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) 30a Put Mladih Muslimana (ex Pavla Lukaca Street), 71 000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina b) 72 ul. Strossmajerova, Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina c) 42 Muhameda Hadzjahica, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina d) 70 and 53 Strossmajerova Street, Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina e) Zlatnih Ljiljana Street, Zavidovici, Bosnia and Herzegovina **Listed on:** 11 May 2004 ( amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 24 Mar. 2009 ) **Other information:** Registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a citizens' association under the name of "Citizens' Association for Support and Prevention of lies – Furqan" on 26 Sep. 1997. Al Furqan ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision number 03-054-286/97 dated 8 Nov. 2002). Al Furqan was no longer in existence as at Dec. 2008. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 15 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235578> [click here](#)

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**QDe.139 Name:** AL MOUAKAOUNE BIDDAM**Name (original script):** الموقعون بالدم

**A.k.a.:** a) Les Signataires par le Sang b) Ceux Qui Signent avec le Sang c) Those Who Sign in Blood **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 2 Jun. 2014 **Other information:** Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136). Active in the Sahel/Sahara region. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5794758> [click here](#)

**QDe.140 Name:** AL MOULATHAMOUN**Name (original script):** الملتمون

**A.k.a.:** a) Les Enturbannés b) The Veiled **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Mali b) Niger c) Algeria **Listed on:** 2 Jun. 2014 **Other information:** Founded in 2012 as a splinter group of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). On 20 Aug. 2013, Al Moulathamoun merged with the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134) and established Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141). Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136). Active in the Sahel/Sahara region. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5794759> [click here](#)

**QDe.141 Name:** AL MOURABITOUN**Name (original script):** المرابطون

**A.k.a.:** a) Les Sentinelles b) The Sentinels **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 2 Jun. 2014 **Other information:** Founded on 20 Aug. 2013 as result of a merger between Al Moulathamoun (QDe.140) and the Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136). Active in the Sahel/Sahara region. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5794760> [click here](#)

**QDe.005 Name:** AL RASHID TRUST

**A.k.a.:** a) Al-Rasheed Trust b) Al Rasheed Trust c) Al-Rashid Trust d) Aid Organization of the Ulema, Pakistan e) Al Amin Welfare Trust f) Al Amin Trust g) Al Ameen Trust h) Al-Ameen Trust i) Al Madina Trust j) Al-Madina Trust **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Kitas Ghar, Nazimabad 4, Dahgel-Iftah, Karachi, Pakistan b) Jamia Maajid, Sulalman Park, Melgium Pura, Lahore, Pakistan c) (Office Dha'rbi-M'unin, Opposite Khyber Bank, Abbottabad Road, Mansehra, Pakistan) d) (Office Dha'rbi-M'unin ZR Brothers, Katcherry Road, Chowk Yadgaar, Peshawar, Pakistan) e) (Office Dha'rbi-M'unin, Rm No. 3, Moti Plaza, Near Liaquat Bagh, Muree Road, Rawalpindi, Pakistan) f) (Office Dha'rbi-M'unin, Top Floor, Dr. Dawa Khan Dental Clinic Surgeon, Main Baxae, Mingora, Swat, Pakistan) g) (Kitab Ghar, Darul Ifta Wal Irshad, Nazimabad No. 4, Karachi, Pakistan, Phone 6683301; Phone 0300-8209199; Fax 6623814) h) (302b-40, Good Earth Court, Opposite Pia Planitarium, Block 13a, Gulshan -I Iqbal, Karachi, Pakistan; Phone 4979263) i) (617 Clifton Center, Block 5, 6th Floor, Clifton, Karachi, Pakistan; Phone 587-2545) j) (605 Landmark Plaza, 11 Chundrigar Road, Opposite Jang Building, Karachi, Pakistan; Phone 2623818-19) k) (Jamia Masjid, Sulaiman Park, Begum Pura, Lahore, Pakistan; Phone 042-6812081) **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 21 Oct. 2008, 10 Dec. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Headquarters are in Pakistan. Operations in Afghanistan: Herat Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar Sherif. Also operations in Kosovo, Chechnya. Involved in the financing of Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Until 21 Oct. 2008, this entity appeared also as "Aid Organization of the Ulema, Pakistan" (QDe.073), listed on 24 Apr. 2002 and amended on 25 Jul. 2006. The two entries Al Rashid Trust (QDe.005) and Aid Organization of the Ulema, Pakistan (QDe.073) were consolidated into this entity on 21 Oct. 2008. Founded by Mufti Rashid Ahmad Ledahyanoy (deceased). Associated with Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019). Banned in Pakistan since Oct. 2001. Despite the closure of its offices in Pakistan in February 2007 it has continued its activities. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 6 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235590> [click here](#)

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**QDe.121 Name:** AL-AKHTAR TRUST INTERNATIONAL

**A.k.a.:** a) Al Akhtar Trust b) Al-Akhtar Medical Centre c) Akhtarabad Medical Camp d) Pakistan Relief Foundation e) Pakistani Relief Foundation f) Azmat-e-Pakistan Trust g) Azmat Pakistan Trust **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) ST-1/A, Gulsahn-e-Iqbal, Block 2, Karachi, 25300, Pakistan b) Gulistan-e-Jauhar, Block 12, Karachi, Pakistan **Listed on:** 17 Aug. 2005 ( amended on 10 Dec. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Regional offices in Pakistan: Bahawalpur, Bawalnagar, Gilgit, Islamabad, Mirpur Khas, Tando-Jan-Muhammad. Akhtarabad Medical Camp is in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan. Registered by members of Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019). Associated with Harakat ul-Mujahidin/ HUM (QDe.008), Lashkar I Jhanghvi (LJ) (QDe.096) and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). Banned in Pakistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 14 Sep. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235573> [click here](#)

**QDe.109 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN & AL MASJED AL-AQSA CHARITY FOUNDATION

**A.k.a.:** a) Al Haramain Al Masjed Al Aqsa b) Al Haramayn Al Masjid Al Aqsa c) Al-Haramayn and Al Masjid Al Aqsa Charitable Foundation d) Al Harammein Al Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Branch Address: 2A Hasiba Brankovica, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina b) 14 Bihacka Street, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina c) 64 Potur mahala Street, Travnik, Bosnia and Herzegovina d) Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina **Listed on:** 28 Jun. 2004 ( amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 16 Sep. 2008, 24 Mar. 2009 ) **Other information:** Used to be officially registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina under registry number 24. Al-Haramain & Al Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision on cessation of operation number 03-05-2-203/04). It was no longer in existence as at Dec. 2008. Its premises and humanitarian activities were transferred under Government supervision to a new entity called Sretna Buducnost. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5864240> [click here](#)

**QDe.103 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (INDONESIA)

**A.k.a.:** Yayasan Al-Manahil-Indonesia **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** (Jalan Laut Sulawesi Blok DII/4, Kavling Angkatan Laut Duren Sawit, Jakarta Timur 13440 Indonesia (at time of listing); Tel.: 021-86611265 and 021-86611266; Fax.: 021-8620174) **Listed on:** 26 Jan. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235596> [click here](#)

**QDe.104 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (PAKISTAN)

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** House #279, Nazimuddin Road, F-10/1, Islamabad, Pakistan (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 26 Jan. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 19 Oct. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566695> [click here](#)

**QDe.116 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (UNION OF THE COMOROS)

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** B/P: 1652 Moroni, Union of the Comoros (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 28 Sep. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566795> [click here](#)

**QDe.071 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION

**A.k.a.:** a) Vazir b) Vezir **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) (64 Poturmahala, Travnik, Bosnia and Herzegovina) b) Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina **Listed on:** 13 Mar. 2002 ( amended on 26 Dec. 2003, 16 Sep. 2008, 16 Jun. 2011 ) **Other information:** Under criminal investigation by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of Nov. 2007. Employees and associates include Najib Ben Mohamed Ben Salem Al-Waz (listed under permanent reference number QDi.104). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566495> [click here](#)

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**QDe.072 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION (SOMALIA)**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Somalia **Listed on:** 13 Mar. 2002 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 15 Jun. 2015 )**Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282114> [click here](#)**QDe.110 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN: AFGHANISTAN BRANCH**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Afghanistan (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 6 Jul. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 )**Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566815> [click here](#)**QDe.111 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN: ALBANIA BRANCH**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Irfan Tomini Street, #58, Tirana, Albania (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 6 Jul. 2004( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566835> [click here](#)**QDe.112 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN: BANGLADESH BRANCH**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** House 1, Road 1, S-6, Uttara, Dhaka, Bangladesh (at time of listing) **Listed on:**6 Jul. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235594> [click here](#)**QDe.113 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN: ETHIOPIA BRANCH**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Woreda District 24 Kebele Section 13, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (at time of listing)**Listed on:** 6 Jul. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235587> [click here](#)**QDe.114 Name:** AL-HARAMAIN: THE NETHERLANDS BRANCH**A.k.a.:** Stichting Al Haramain Humanitarian Aid **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Jan Hanzenstraat 114, 1053SV, Amsterdam,The Netherlands (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 6 Jul. 2004 ( amended on 13 Apr. 2012, 15 Jun. 2015 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 28 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235591> [click here](#)**QDe.105 Name:** AL-HARAMAYN FOUNDATION (KENYA)**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Nairobi, Kenya (at time of listing) b) Garissa, Kenya (at time of listing) c)Dadaab, Kenya (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 26 Jan. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:**Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566735> [click here](#)**QDe.106 Name:** AL-HARAMAYN FOUNDATION (TANZANIA)**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) P.O. Box 3616, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (at time of listing) b) Tanga, Tanzania(at time of listing) c) Singida, Tanzania (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 26 Jan. 2004 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 )**Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566755> [click here](#)

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**QDe.002 Name:** AL-ITIHAAD AL-ISLAMIYA / AIAI**Name (original script):** الاتحاد الاسلامي

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 21 Dec. 2007, 13 Dec. 2011, 18 Mar. 2013 ) **Other information:** Reported to have operated in Somalia and Ethiopia and to have merged with Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab), which was accepted as an affiliate of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) by Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) in Feb. 2012, and is also subject to the sanctions measures set out in Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (see <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751>). Leadership included Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki (QDi.172) and Hassan Dahir Aweys (QDi.042). AIAI has received funds through the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (Somalia) (QDe.072). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5547355> [click here](#)

**QDe.137 Name:** AL-NUSRAH FRONT FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE LEVANT**Name (original script):** جبهة النصره لاهل الشام

**A.k.a.:** a) جبهة النصره (the Victory Front; Jabhat al-Nusra; Jabhet al-Nusra; Al-Nusra Front; Al-Nusra Front) b) جبهة الشام (Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front) c) Conquest of the Levant Front d) The Front for the Liberation of al Sham e) Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant f) Front for the Liberation of the Levant g) Front for the Conquest of Syria h) شبكة أنصار المجاهدين (Ansar al-Mujahideen Network - sub-unit name) i) مجاهدو الشام في ساحات الجهاد (Levantine Mujahideen on the Battlefields of Jihad - sub-unit name) **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Syrian Arab Republic (Operates in) b) Iraq (Support network) **Listed on:** 14 May 2014 ( amended on 7 Jun. 2017 ) **Other information:** Associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Brought Syrian and foreign Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) and Asbat al-Ansar (QDe.007) fighters, along with other foreign Al-Qaida operatives, to join local elements in Syrian Arab Republic to carry out terrorist and guerrilla operations there. Previously associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), and its leader Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QDi.299) but separated from that group in 2013. In Jul. 2016, Abu Mohammed Al-Jawlani (QDi.317), the leader of Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant, announced the group had changed its name to Jabhat Fath al-Sham and was no longer affiliated with any external entity. Despite the announcement and attempts to distinguish itself from Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant, the group remains aligned with Al-Qaida and continues to carry out terrorist operations under this new name. Previously listed between 30 May 2013 and 13 May 2014 as an aka of Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5790822> [click here](#)

**QDe.004 Name:** AL-QAIDA**Name (original script):** القاعدة

**A.k.a.:** a) "The Base" b) Al Qaeda c) Islamic Salvation Foundation d) The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites e) The Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Places f) The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders g) Usama Bin Laden Network h) Usama Bin Laden Organization i) Al Qa'ida j) Al Qa'ida/Islamic Army **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 5 Mar. 2009, 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278330> [click here](#)

**QDe.115 Name:** AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ**Name (original script):** القاعده في العراق

**A.k.a.:** a) AQI b) al-Tawhid c) the Monotheism and Jihad Group d) Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers e) Al-Qaida of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers f) The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers g) The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers h) The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia i) Tanzim Qa'idat Al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn j) Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini k) Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad l) JTJ m) Islamic State of Iraq n) ISI o) al-Zarqawi network p) Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 18 Oct. 2004 ( amended on 2 Dec. 2004, 5 Mar. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011, 30 May 2013, 14 May 2014, 2 Jun. 2014 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278296> [click here](#)



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**QDe.129 Name:** AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)**Name (original script):** القاعدة في جزيرة العرب

**A.k.a.:** a) Al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula b) Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab c) Al-Qaida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) d) Al-Qaida in the South Arabian Peninsula e) Ansar al-Shari'a (AAS) **F.k.a.:** Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY) **Address:** na **Listed on:** 19 Jan. 2010 ( amended on 4 Oct. 2012, 15 Jun. 2015, 24 Jun. 2016 ) **Other information:** AQAP is a regional affiliate of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and an armed group operating primarily in Arabian Peninsula. Location: Yemen. Alternative location: Saudi Arabia (2004 – 2006). Formed in Jan. 2009 when Al-Qaida in Yemen combined with Saudi Arabian Al-Qaida operatives. Leader of AQAP is Qasim Mohamed Mahdi Al-Rimi (QDi.282). Ansar al-Shari'a was formed in early 2011 by AQAP and has taken responsibility for multiple attacks in Yemen against both government and civilian targets. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282104> [click here](#)

**QDe.146 Name:** ANSAR AL CHARIA BENGHAZI**Name (original script):** أنصار الشريعة - بنغازي

**A.k.a.:** a) أنصار الشريعة (Ansar al Charia) b) Ansar al-Charia c) Ansar al-Sharia d) Ansar al-Charia Benghazi e) Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi f) أنصار الشريعة بليبيا (Ansar al Charia in Libya (ASL)) g) كتبة أنصار الشريعة (Katibat Ansar al Charia) h) Ansar al Sharia **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) (Operates in Benghazi, Libya) b) (Support network in Tunisia) **Listed on:** 19 Nov. 2014 **Other information:** Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141), Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) (QDe.143), and Ansar al Charia Derna (QDe.145). The leader is Mohamed al-Zahawi (not listed). Runs training camps for foreign terrorist fighters travelling to Syria, Iraq and Mali. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5864235> [click here](#)

**QDe.145 Name:** ANSAR AL CHARIA DERN**Name (original script):** أنصار الشريعة – درنة

**A.k.a.:** a) Ansar al-Charia Derna b) Ansar al-Sharia Derna c) أنصار الشريعة (Ansar al Charia) d) Ansar al-Sharia e) Ansar al Sharia **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) (Operates in Derna and Jebel Akhdar, Libya) b) (Support network in Tunisia) **Listed on:** 19 Nov. 2014 **Other information:** Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) (QDe.143) and Ansar al Charia Benghazi (QDe.146). Runs training camps for foreign terrorist fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5863845> [click here](#)

**QDe.098 Name:** ANSAR AL-ISLAM**Name (original script):** أنصار الإسلام

**A.k.a.:** a) Devotees of Islam b) Jund al-Islam c) Soldiers of Islam d) Kurdistan Supporters of Islam e) Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan f) Followers of Islam in Kurdistan g) Kurdish Taliban h) Soldiers of God i) Ansar al-Sunna Army j) Jaish Ansar al-Sunna k) Ansar al-Sunna **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 24 Feb. 2003 ( amended on 31 Mar. 2004, 5 Mar. 2009, 18 Mar. 2009, 21 Oct. 2010, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** The founder is Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad (QDi.226). Associated with Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Located and primarily active in northern Iraq but maintains a presence in western and central Iraq. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282119> [click here](#)

**QDe.143 Name:** ANSAR AL-SHARI'A IN TUNISIA (AAS-T)

**A.k.a.:** a) Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia b) Ansar al-Shari'ah in Tunisia c) Ansar al-Shari'ah d) Ansar al-Sharia e) Supporters of Islamic Law f) Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Tunisia **Listed on:** 23 Sep. 2014 **Other information:** A Tunisian armed group with links to the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). The leader is Seifallah ben Hassine (QDi.333). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5817661> [click here](#)

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**QDe.135 Name:** ANSAR EDDINE**Name (original script):** أنصار الدين

**A.k.a.:** Ansar Dine **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Mali **Listed on:** 20 Mar. 2013 **Other information:** Was founded in December 2011 by Iyad ag Ghali (QDi.316). Linked to the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Associated with Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566155> [click here](#)

**QDe.142 Name:** ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS SUDAN**Name (original script):** أنصار المسلمين في بلاد السودان

**A.k.a.:** a) Ansaru b) Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan c) Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (JAMBS) d) Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan (JAMBS) e) Jamma'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan (JAMBS) f) Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa g) Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Nigeria **Listed on:** 26 Jun. 2014 **Other information:** Terrorist and paramilitary group established in 2012 and operating in Nigeria. Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014), Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) (QDe.138) and Abubakar Mohammed Shekau (QDi322). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5800046> [click here](#)

**QDe.006 Name:** ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP**Name (original script):** الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة

**A.k.a.:** a) Al Jamm'ah Al-Islamiah Al- Musallah b) GIA c) Groupe Islamique Armé **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 7 Apr. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5281693> [click here](#)

**QDe.007 Name:** ASBAT AL-ANSAR**Name (original script):** عصبة الأنصار

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Ein el-Hilweh camp, Lebanon **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 30 Jan. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Active in northern Iraq. Associated with Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278387> [click here](#)

**QDe.093 Name:** BENEVOLENCE INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

**A.k.a.:** a) Al Bir Al Dawalia b) BIF c) BIF-USA d) Mezhdunarodnyj Blagotvoritel'nyl Fond **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) 8820 Mobile Avenue, IA, Oak Lawn, Illinois, 60453, United States of America b) P.O. Box 548, Worth, Illinois, 60482, United States of America c) (Formerly located at) 9838 S. Roberts Road, Suite 1W, Palos Hills, Illinois, 60465, United States of America d) (Formerly located at) 20-24 Branford Place, Suite 705, Newark, New Jersey, 07102, United States of America e) P.O. Box 1937, Khartoum, Sudan f) Bangladesh g) (Gaza Strip) h) Yemen **Listed on:** 21 Nov. 2002 ( amended on 24 Jan. 2003, 28 Apr. 2011, 18 May 2012 ) **Other information:** Employer Identification Number (United States of America): 36-3823186. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 22 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5999801> [click here](#)

**QDe.102 Name:** DJAMAT HOUMAT DAAWA SALAFIA (DHDS)**Name (original script):** جماعة حماة الدعوة السلفية

**A.k.a.:** Djamaat Houmah Al-Dawah Al-Salafiat **F.k.a.:** Katibat el Ahouel **Address:** Algeria **Listed on:** 11 Nov. 2003 ( amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 7 Apr. 2008, 25 Jan. 2010, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (QDe.006) and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 30 Jul. 2009. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278400> [click here](#)

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**QDe.088 Name:** EASTERN TURKISTAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT (ETIM)

**A.k.a.:** a) The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party b) The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah c) Islamic Party of Turkestan d) Djamaat Turkistan **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 11 Sep. 2002 ( amended on 3 Oct. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Active in China, South Asia and Central Asia. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282108> [click here](#)

**QDe.003 Name:** EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

**Name (original script):** الجهاد الإسلامي المصري

**A.k.a.:** a) Egyptian Al-Jihad b) Jihad Group c) New Jihad d) Al-Jihad e) Egyptian Islamic Movement **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 5 Mar. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Co-founded by Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006), who was also its military leader. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282058> [click here](#)

**QDe.131 Name:** EMARAT KAVKAZ

**Name (original script):** Эмират Кавказ

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Jul. 2011 **Other information:** Mainly active in the Russian Federation, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Led by Doku Khamatovich Umarov (QDi.290) INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235592> [click here](#)

**QDe.091 Name:** GLOBAL RELIEF FOUNDATION (GRF)

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) 9935 South 76th Avenue, Unit 1, Bridgeview, Illinois, 60455, United States of America b) P.O. Box 1406, Bridgeview, Illinois, 60455, United States of America **Listed on:** 22 Oct. 2002 ( amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 20 Dec. 2005, 25 Jul. 2006, 24 Mar. 2009, 11 Mar. 2010, 25 Mar. 2010, 28 Apr. 2011, 21 Feb. 2012, 14 Feb. 2014 ) **Other information:** Other Foreign Locations: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza, Somalia and Syria. Federal Employer Identification Number (United States of America): 36-3804626. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5566535> [click here](#)

**QDe.153 Name:** HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC)

**Name (original script):** مكتب حنيفة للصرافة

**A.k.a.:** a) Hanifah Currency Exchange b) Hanifeh Exchange c) Hanifa Exchange d) Hunaifa Office e) Hanifah Exchange Company f) Hanifa Money Exchange Office **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Albu Kamal (Al-Bukamal), Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Money exchange business in Albu Kamal (Al-Bukamal), Syrian Arab Republic, facilitating the movement of funds on behalf of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Used exclusively for ISIL-related transactions. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/6116591> [click here](#)

**QDe.149 Name:** HAKARAT SHAM AL-ISLAM

**A.k.a.:** a) Haraket Sham al-Islam b) Sham al-Islam c) Sham al-Islam Movement **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 29 Feb. 2016 **Other information:** Moroccan-led terrorist organization formed in Aug. 2013 and operating in Syrian Arab Republic. Principally composed of foreign terrorist fighters and associated with Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5930739> [click here](#)

**QDe.008 Name:** HAKARAT UL-MUJAHIDIN / HUM

**A.k.a.:** a) Al-Faran b) Al-Hadid c) Al-Hadith d) Harakat Ul-Ansar e) HUA f) Harakat Ul- Mujahideen **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Pakistan **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with Jaish-i-Mohammed (QDe.019), Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) (QDe.096) and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118). Active in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Banned in Pakistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282053> [click here](#)

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**QDe.130 Name:** HAKARAT-UL JIHAD ISLAMI

**Name (original script):** حركة الجهاد الاسلامي

**A.k.a.:** a) HUJI b) Movement of Islamic Holy War c) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami d) Harkat-al-Jihad-ul Islami e) Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami f) Harakat ul Jihad-e-Islami **F.k.a.:** a) Harakat-ul-Ansar b) HUA **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Aug. 2010 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Was established in Afghanistan in 1980. In 1993, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami merged with Harakat ul-Mujahidin (QDe.008) to form Harakat ul-Ansar. In 1997, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami split from Harakat ul-Ansar and resumed using its former name. Operations are in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Banned in Pakistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282215> [click here](#)

**QDe.147 Name:** HILAL AHMAR SOCIETY INDONESIA (HASI)

**A.k.a.:** a) Yayasan Hilal Ahmar b) Indonesia Hilal Ahmar Society for Syria **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 13 Mar. 2015 **Other information:** Ostensibly humanitarian wing of Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092). Operates in Lampung, Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Solo, Surabaya and Makassar, Indonesia. Has been recruiting, funding and facilitating travel of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria. Not affiliated with the humanitarian group International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5854978> [click here](#)

**QDe.009 Name:** ISLAMIC ARMY OF ADEN

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 **Other information:** Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 9 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278444> [click here](#)

**QDe.099 Name:** ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (IIB)

**A.k.a.:** a) The Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade b) The Islamic Peacekeeping Army c) The International Brigade d) Islamic Peacekeeping Battalion e) International Battalion f) Islamic Peacekeeping International Brigade **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 4 Mar. 2003 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Linked to the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) (QDe.100) and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) (QDe.101). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 17 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278447> [click here](#)

**QDe.119 Name:** ISLAMIC JIHAD GROUP

**A.k.a.:** a) Jama'at al-Jihad b) Libyan Society c) Kazakh Jama'at d) Jamaat Mojahedin e) Jamiyat f) Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami g) Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov h) Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan i) al-Djihad al-Islami j) Zamaat Modzhakhedov Tsentralnoy Asii k) Islamic Jihad Union **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 1 Jun. 2005 ( amended on 19 Apr. 2006, 20 Feb. 2008, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Founded and led by Najmiddin Kamoliddinovich Jalolov (deceased) and Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov (deceased). Associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010) and Emarat Kavkaz (QDe.131). Active in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, Central Asia, South Asia region and some European States. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278465> [click here](#)

**QDe.010 Name:** ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

**A.k.a.:** IMU **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (QDe.088), Islamic Jihad Group (QDe.119) and Emarat Kavkaz (QDe.131). Active in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, northern Afghanistan and Central Asia. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278466> [click here](#)

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**QDe.019 Name:** JAISH-I-MOHAMMED

**A.k.a.:** Army of Mohammed **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Pakistan **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Based in Peshawar and Muzaffarabad, Pakistan Associated with Harakat ul-Mujahidin / HUM (QDe.008), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (QDe.118), Al-Akhtar Trust International (QDe.121), and Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (QDe.130). Banned in Pakistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282011> [click here](#)

**QDe.020 Name:** JAM'YAH TA'AWUN AL-ISLAMIA

**A.k.a.:** a) Society of Islamic Cooperation b) Jam'iyat Al Ta'awun Al Islamiyya c) Jit **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Kandahar City, Afghanistan **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Founded by Usama Mohammad Awad bin Laden (deceased) in 2001. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282077> [click here](#)

**QDe.138 Name:** JAMA'ATU AHLIS SUNNA LIDDA'AWATI WAL-JIHAD

**A.k.a.:** a) Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad b) Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad c) جماعة أهل السنة والدعوة والجهاد d) Boko Haram e) Western Education is a Sin **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Nigeria **Listed on:** 22 May 2014 **Other information:** Affiliate of Al-Qaida (QDe.004), and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014). Associated with Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru). The leader is Abubakar Shekau. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5792299> [click here](#)

**QDe.152 Name:** JAMAAT-UL-AHRAR (JuA)

**Name (original script):** جمات ال احرار

**A.k.a.:** a) Jamaat-e-Ahrar b) Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan Jamaat ul Ahrar **F.k.a.:** Ahrar-ul-Hind **Address:** a) Lalpura, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan border region (since Jun. 2015) b) Mohmand Agency, Pakistan (as at Aug. 2014) **Listed on:** 6 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Splinter group of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (QDe.132). Associated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115). Formed in Aug. 2014 in Mohmand Agency, Pakistan. Operates from Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. Banned in Pakistan on 21 Nov. 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/6114258> [click here](#)

**QDe.092 Name:** JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

**A.k.a.:** a) Jema'ah Islamiyah b) Jemaah Islamiya c) Jemaah Islamiah d) Jamaah Islamiyah e) Jama'ah Islamiyah **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 25 Oct. 2002 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Operates in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Associated with the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 25 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282122> [click here](#)

**QDe.133 Name:** JEMMAH ANSHORUT TAUHID (JAT)

**A.k.a.:** a) Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid b) Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid c) Jem'mah Ansharut Tauhid d) Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid e) Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid f) Laskar 99 **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Jl. Semenromo number 58, 04/XV Ngruki, Cemani, Grogol, Sukoharjo, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia (Telephone: 0271-2167285, Email: [info@ansharuttauhid.com](mailto:info@ansharuttauhid.com)) **Listed on:** 12 Mar. 2012 **Other information:** Founded and led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (QDi.217). Established on 27 Jul. 2008 in Solo, Indonesia. Associated with Jemmah Islamiya (JI) (QDe.092). Website: <http://ansharuttauhid.com/> INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282133> [click here](#)

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**QDe.151 Name:** JUND AL-KHILAFAH IN ALGERIA (JAK-A)

**A.k.a.:** a) Jund al Khalifa b) Jund al-Khilafah fi Ard al-Jaza'ir c) Jund al-Khalifa fi Ard al-Jazayer d) Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria e) Soldiers of the Caliphate of Algeria f) Soldiers of the Caliphate in the Land of Algeria **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Kabylie region, Algeria **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 **Other information:** Emerged on 13 Sep. 2014. Most known for its abduction and subsequent beheading of French national Herve Gourdel. Claimed responsibility for attacking police and gendarmes in Algeria and continued planning future attacks. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5919300> [click here](#)

**QDe.155 Name:** Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed

**A.k.a.:** a) Khalid ibn al-Walid Army b) Liwa Shuhada al-Yarmouk c) Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islamia **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Joined the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), in May 2015. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/6116594> [click here](#)

**QDe.156 Name:** Jund Al Aqsa

**A.k.a.:** a) The Soldiers of Aqsa b) Soldiers of Aqsa c) Sarayat Al Quds **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Idlib Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic b) Hama Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Associated with the Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/6116596> [click here](#)

**QDe.096 Name:** LASHKAR I JHANGVI (LJ)

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 3 Feb. 2003 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011, 20 Nov. 2017 ) **Other information:** Based primarily in Pakistan's Punjab region and in the city of Karachi. Active in Pakistan although banned as at 2010. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 2161 (2014) was concluded on 23 Dec. 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282017> [click here](#)

**QDe.118 Name:** LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA

**A.k.a.:** a) Lashkar-e-Toiba b) Lashkar-i-Taiba c) al Mansoorian d) al Mansooreen e) Army of the Pure f) Army of the Righteous g) Army of the Pure and Righteous h) Paasban-e-Kashmir i) Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith j) Pasban-e-Kashmir k) Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith l) Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis m) Pashan-e-ahle Hadis n) Lashkar e Tayyaba o) LET p) Jamaat-ud-Dawa q) JUD r) Jama'at al-Dawa s) Jamaat ud-Daawa t) Jamaat ul-Dawah u) Jamaat-ul-Dawa v) Jama'at-i-Dawat w) Jama'at-ud-Dawa x) Jama'at-ud-Da'awah y) Jama'at-ud-Da'awa z) Jamaati-ud-Dawa aa) Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 2 May 2005 ( amended on 3 Nov. 2005, 10 Dec. 2008, 14 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Associated with Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (QDi.263) who is the leader of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282105> [click here](#)

**QDe.011 Name:** LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP

**Name (original script):** الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة الليبية

**A.k.a.:** LIFG **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Libya **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 5 Mar. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Members in Afghanistan merged with Al-Qaida (QDe.004) in Nov. 2007. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5281977> [click here](#)

**QDe.012 Name:** MAKHTAB AL-KHIDAMAT

**Name (original script):** مكتب الخدمات

**A.k.a.:** a) MAK b) Al Kifah **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 5 Mar. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Absorbed into Al-Qaida (QDe.004). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282030> [click here](#)

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**QDe.089 Name:** MOROCCAN ISLAMIC COMBATANT GROUP**Name (original script):** الجماعة الاسلامية المغربية المقاتلة

**A.k.a.:** a) Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain b) GICM **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Morocco **Listed on:** 10 Oct. 2002 ( amended on 5 Mar. 2009 ) **Other information:** Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 20 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282051> [click here](#)

**QDe.136 Name:** MUHAMMAD JAMAL NETWORK (MJN)**Name (original script):** شبكة محمد جمال

**A.k.a.:** a) Muhammad Jamal Group b) Jamal Network c) Abu Ahmed Group d) Al-Qaida in Egypt (AQE) **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Operates in Egypt, Libya and Mali **Listed on:** 21 Oct. 2013 **Other information:** Terrorist and paramilitary group established by Muhammad Jamal al Kashif (QDi.318) in 2011 and linked to Al-Qaida (QDe.004), Aiman al-Zawahiri (QDi.006), and the leadership of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129) and the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014). Funded and supported by AQAP. Multiple terrorist training camps in Egypt and Libya. Reportedly acquiring weapons, conducting training and establishing terrorist groups in the Sinai, Egypt. Training suicide bombers, foreign fighters and planning terrorist attacks in Egypt, Libya and elsewhere as of Sep. 2013. MJN members were reported to be involved in the attack on the United States Mission in Benghazi, Libya, on 11 Sep. 2012. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5719715> [click here](#)

**QDe.150 Name:** MUJAHIDIN INDONESIA TIMUR (MIT)

**A.k.a.:** a) Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia b) East Indonesia Mujahideen c) Mujahidin Indonesia Timor d) Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB) e) Mujahidin of Western Indonesia **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Indonesia **Listed on:** 29 Sep. 2015 ( amended on 30 Mar. 2017 ) **Other information:** Terrorist group linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (QDe.092), and Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) (QDe.133). Operates in Java and Sulawesi, Indonesia and also active in Indonesia's eastern provinces. Its former leader was Abu Wardah, a.k.a. Santoso (deceased). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5919482> [click here](#)

**QDe.134 Name:** Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO)**Name (original script):** حركة التوحيد والجهاد في غرب إفريقيا

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Mali b) Algeria **Listed on:** 5 Dec. 2012 **Other information:** Associated with The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014) and Mokhtar Belmokhtar (QDi.136). Active in the Sahel/Sahara region. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282020> [click here](#)

**QDe.021 Name:** RABITA TRUST

**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Room 9a, 2nd Floor, Wahdat Road, Education Town, Lahore, Pakistan b) Wares Colony, Lahore, Pakistan (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 17 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012, 18 Jun. 2015 ) **Other information:** Banned in Pakistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235575> [click here](#)

**QDe.128 Name:** RAJAH SOLAIMAN MOVEMENT

**A.k.a.:** a) Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement b) Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Barangay Mal-Ong, Anda, Pangasinan Province, Philippines b) Sitio Dueg, Barangay Maasin, San Clemente, Tarlac Province, Philippines c) Number 50, Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City, Philippines **Listed on:** 4 Jun. 2008 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Founded and headed by Hilarion Del Rosario Santos III (QDi.244). Associated with the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001), Jemaah Islamiyah (QDe.092) and Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani (QDi.180). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 13 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235583> [click here](#)

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**QDe.070 Name:** REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC HERITAGE SOCIETY**Name (original script):** جمعية احياء التراث الاسلامي**A.k.a.:** a) Revival of Islamic Society Heritage on the African Continent b) Jamia Ihya ul Turath c) RIHS d) Jamiat Ihia Al-Turath Al-Islamiya e) Al-Furqan Foundation Welfare Trust f) Al-Furqan Welfare Foundation **F.k.a.:** na**Address:** a) Pakistan b) Afghanistan **Listed on:** 11 Jan. 2002 ( amended on 25 Jul. 2006, 5 Mar. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011, 15 Jun. 2015 ) **Other information:** NOTE: Only the Pakistan and Afghanistan offices of this entity are designated. Associated with Abu Bakr al-Jaziri (QDi.058) and Afghan Support Committee (ASC) (QDe.069). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 8 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5281996> [click here](#)**QDe.100 Name:** RIYADUS-SALIKHIN RECONNAISSANCE AND SABOTAGE BATTALION OF CHECHEN MARTYRS (RSRSBCM)**A.k.a.:** a) Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion b) Riyadh-as-Saliheen c) The Sabotage and Military Surveillance Group of the Riyadh al-Salihin Martyrs d) Firqat al-Takhrib wa al-Itstila al-Askariyah li Shuhada Riyadh al-Salihin e) Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage battalion of Shahids (martyrs) **F.k.a.:** na**Address:** na **Listed on:** 4 Mar. 2003 ( amended on 25 Jul. 2006, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with the Islamic International Brigade (IIB) (QDe.099), the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) (QDe.101) and Emarat Kavkaz (QDe.131). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 17 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5281893> [click here](#)**QDe.154 Name:** SELSELAT AL-THAHAB**Name (original script):** سلسلة الذهب للصرافة**A.k.a.:** a) Silsilet al Thahab b) Selselat al Thahab For Money Exchange c) Silsilat Money Exchange Company d) Silsilah Money Exchange Company e) Al Silsilah al Dhahaba f) Silsalat al Dhab **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Al-Kadhumi Complex, Al-Harthia, Baghdad, Iraq b) Al-Abbas Street, Karbala, Iraq **Listed on:** 20 Jul. 2017 **Other information:** Money exchange business facilitating the movement of funds on behalf of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), as of Apr. 2016. Conducted over one hundred financial transfers into ISIL-controlled territory. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/6116598> [click here](#)**QDe.101 Name:** SPECIAL PURPOSE ISLAMIC REGIMENT (SPIR)**A.k.a.:** a) The Islamic Special Purpose Regiment b) The al-Jihad-Fisi-Sabililah Special Islamic Regiment c) Islamic Regiment of Special Meaning **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** na **Listed on:** 4 Mar. 2003 ( amended on 25 Jul. 2006, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Linked to the Islamic International Brigade (IIB) (QDe.099) and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) (QDe.100). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 17 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278482> [click here](#)**QDe.108 Name:** TAIBAH INTERNATIONAL-BOSNIA OFFICES**A.k.a.:** a) Taibah International Aid Agency b) Taibah International Aid Association c) Al Taibah, Intl. d) Taibah International Aide Association **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) 6 Avde Smajlovica Street, Novo Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina b) 26 Tabhanska Street, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina c) 3 Velika Cilna Ulica, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina d) 26 Tabhanska Street, Visoko, Bosnia and Herzegovina **Listed on:** 11 May 2004 ( amended on 24 Mar. 2009 ) **Other information:** In 2002-2004, Taibah International – Bosnia offices used premises of the Culture Home in Hadzici, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The organization was officially registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a branch of Taibah International Aid Association under registry number 7. Taibah International – Bosnia offices ceased its work by decision of the Ministry of Justice of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation (decision on cessation of operation number 03-05-2-70/03). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235580> [click here](#)



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**QDe.132 Name:** TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)**Name (original script):** تحريك طالبان پاکستان**A.k.a.:** a) Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan b) Tehrik-e-Taliban c) Pakistani Taliban d) Tehreek-e-Taliban **F.k.a.:** na**Address:** na **Listed on:** 29 Jul. 2011 ( amended on 15 Jun. 2015 ) **Other information:** Tehrik-e Taliban is based in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Formed in 2007, its leader is Maulana Fazlullah (QDi.352). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5282130> [click here](#)**QDe.148 Name:** THE ARMY OF EMIGRANTS AND SUPPORTERS**Name (original script):** تنظيم جيش المهاجرين و الأنصار**A.k.a.:** a) Battalion of Emigrants and Supporters b) Army of Emigrants and Supporters organization c) Battalion of Emigrants and Ansar d) Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JAMWA) **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Jabal Turkuman area, Lattakia Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic **Listed on:** 6 Aug. 2015 **Other information:** Established by foreign terrorist fighters in 2013. Location: Syrian Arab Republic. Affiliated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115) and Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5887669> [click here](#)**QDe.014 Name:** THE ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB**Name (original script):** تنظيم القاعدة ببلاد المغرب الاسلامي**A.k.a.:** a) AQIM b) Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) **F.k.a.:** a) Le Groupe Salafiste pour La Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) b) Salafist Group For Call and Combat **Address:** a) Algeria b) Mali c) Mauritania d) Morocco e) Niger f) Tunisia **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 26 Apr. 2007, 7 Apr. 2008, 17 Jul. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Headed by Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232). Zone of operation includes Algeria and parts of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Tunisia and Morocco. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278467> [click here](#)**QDe.090 Name:** TUNISIAN COMBATANT GROUP**Name (original script):** الجماعة التونسية المقاتلة**A.k.a.:** a) Groupe Combattant Tunisien b) Groupe Islamiste Combattant Tunisien c) GICT **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** Tunisia **Listed on:** 10 Oct. 2002 ( amended on 26 Nov. 2004, 5 Mar. 2009, 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Associated with the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 6 May 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5278433> [click here](#)**QDe.068 Name:** UMMAH TAMEER E-NAU (UTN)**A.k.a.:** na **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Street 13, Wazir Akbar Khan, Kabul, Afghanistan b) Pakistan **Listed on:** 24 Dec. 2001 ( amended on 13 Dec. 2011 ) **Other information:** Its directors included Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din (QDi.055), Majeed Abdul Chaudhry (QDi.054) and Mohammed Tufail (QDi.056). Banned in Pakistan. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235577> [click here](#)**QDe.015 Name:** WAFSA HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION**A.k.a.:** a) Al Wafa b) Al Wafa Organization c) Wafa Al-Igatha Al-Islamia **F.k.a.:** na **Address:** a) Jordan House No. 125, Street 54, Phase II Hayatabad, Peshawar, Pakistan (at time of listing) b) Saudi Arabia (at time of listing) c) Kuwait (at time of listing) d) United Arab Emirates (at time of listing) e) Afghanistan (at time of listing) **Listed on:** 6 Oct. 2001 ( amended on 21 Mar. 2012 ) **Other information:** Headquarters was in Kandahar, Afghanistan as at 2001. Wafa was a component of Al-Qaida (QDe.004) in 2001. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 21 Jun. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: <https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5235574> [click here](#)

Exhibit 22

Summary Minutes of Extraordinary Session of the Council, 31 July 2017 ICAO doc. C-WP/14640 (Restricted)



**International Civil Aviation Organization**

C-MIN Extraordinary Session (Closed)  
22/8/17

**COUNCIL — EXTRAORDINARY SESSION**

**SUMMARY MINUTES**

**(THE COUNCIL CHAMBER, MONDAY, 31 JULY 2017, AT 1000 HOURS)**

**CLOSED MEETING**

President of the Council: Dr. Olumuyiwa Benard Aliu

Secretary: Dr. Fang Liu, Secretary General

**PRESENT:**

Algeria	— Mr. A.D. Mesroua	Kenya	— Ms. M.B. Awori
Argentina	— Mr. G.E. Ainchil	Malaysia	— Mr. Y.-H. Lim
Australia	— Mr. S. Lucas	Mexico	— Mr. D. Méndez Mayora
Brazil	— Mrs. M.G. Valente da Costa	Nigeria	— Mr. M.S. Nuhu
Cabo Verde	— Mr. C. Monteiro	Panama	— Mr. G.S. Oller
Canada	— Mr. M. Pagé	Republic of Korea	— Mr. J. Hur
China	— Mr. Shengjun Yang	Russian Federation	— Mr. A.A. Novgorodov
Colombia	— Mr. A. Muñoz Gómez	Saudi Arabia	— H.E. A.M. Al-Tamimi President of GACA
Congo	— Mr. R.M. Ondzotto	Singapore	— Mr. T.C. Ng
Cuba	— Mrs. M. Crespo Frasquiere	South Africa	— Mr. M.D.T. Peege
Ecuador	— Mr. I. Arellano	Spain	— Mr. V.M. Aguado
Egypt	— H.E. S. Fathi, Minister of Civil Aviation	Turkey	— Mr. A.R. Çolak
France	— Mr. P. Bertoux	United Arab Emirates	— H.E. S. Al Mansoori, Minister of Economy
Germany	— Mr. U. Schwierzinski	United Kingdom	— Mr. M. Rodmell
India	— Mr. A. Shekhar	United Republic of Tanzania	— Mr. R.W. Bokango
Ireland	— Mrs. A. Smith Floch	United States	— Mr. S. Kotis (Alt.)
Italy	— Mr. M.R. Rusconi	Uruguay	— Mr. M. Vidal
Japan	— Mr. S. Matsui		

**ALSO PRESENT:**

Mr. H. Yoshimura	— President ANC
Mrs. M.F. Loguzzo (Alt.)	— Argentina
H.E. K.B.A. Mohammed, Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications (Obs.)	— Bahrain
Mr. S.M. Hasan (Obs.)	— Bahrain
Mr. P. Langlais (Alt.)	— Canada
Mr. Chunyu Ding (Alt.)	— China
Mr. A. Khedr (Rep.)	— Egypt
Mr. H.Y. Eladawy (Alt.)	— Egypt
Ms. A. Salama (Alt.)	— Egypt
Ms. S. Elmowafi (Alt.)	— Egypt
Mr. M. Millefert (Alt.)	— France
Mr. N. Naoumi (Alt.)	— Germany
Mr. M. Usami (Alt.)	— Japan
Mr. K.A. Ismail (Alt.)	— Malaysia
Mrs. D. Valle Álvarez (Alt.)	— Mexico
H.E. J.B.S.A. Al-Sulaiti, Minister of Transport and Communications (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. A. Al-Hamadi (Obs.)	— Qatar

**SECRETARIAT:**

Mrs. J. Yan	— C/OSG
Mr. B. Djibo	— D/ATB
Mr. J.V. Augustin	— D/LEB
Mr. S. Creamer	— D/ANB
Mr. C. Radu	— DD/SAF
Mr. M. Fox	— C/PRC
Mr. B. Verhaegen	— SELO
Mr. Y. Nyampong	— LO
Ms. C. Kim	— TO/AMO
Mr. M. Boyd	— TO/AMO
Mr. A. Larcos	— ACC
Mr. M. Vaugeois	— LEB
Miss S. Black	— Précis-writer

C-MIN Extraordinary Session (Closed)

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**ALSO PRESENT (CONTINUED):**

Mr. E.A. Al-Malki (Obs.)	— Rep. of Qatar to ICAO
Mr. F.M. Kafood (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. A. Al-Subaey (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. A. Al-Shahwani (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. N. Al Suwaidi (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. A.M.A. Ishaq (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. E. Mandany (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. J. Al Haroon (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. F. Atti (Obs.)	— Qatar
Mr. S. Kim (Alt.)	— Republic of Korea
Mr. K. Lee (Alt.)	— Republic of Korea
Mr. D. Subbotin (Alt.)	— Russian Federation
Mr. S.A.R. Hashem (Rep.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. M.S. Habib (Alt.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. S. Alhamdan (Alt.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. N.B. Alsudairy (Adv.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. W.M.A. Alidrissi (Adv.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. I.B. Al Jabri (Adv.)	— Saudi Arabia
Mr. Ö. Doğrukol (Alt.)	— Turkey
Miss A. Alhameli (Rep.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. H. Al Belushi (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. S. Al Suwaidi (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. A. Al Naqbi (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. M. Al Shehhi (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. L. Weber (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. J.C. Salazar (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Ms. L. Coquard-Patry (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Ms. S. Aminian (Alt.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. V. Singh (Obs.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mr. A. Yanovich (Obs.)	— United Arab Emirates
Mrs. K.L. Riensema (Alt.)	— United Kingdom
Mr. J. Méndez (Alt.)	— Uruguay

**Representatives to ICAO**

Cameroon  
Chile  
Cyprus  
Greece  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  
Lebanon  
Libya  
Peru  
Qatar  
Sudan

Airports Council International (ACI)  
Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO)  
European Union (EU)  
International Air Transport Association (IATA)

**Subject No. 14: Subjects relating to air navigation**  
**Subject No. 14.3: Other air navigation activities**  
**Subject No. 27: Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)**

**Request of Qatar – Item under Article 54 n) of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation***

1. The President referred to the Council's earlier consideration, at the Tenth Meeting of its 211th Session (211/10) on 23 June 2017, of the request by Qatar for the inclusion in the Council's work programme, pursuant to Article 54 n) of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*, of a "top-urgent item" related to the "matter of the actions of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to close their airspace to aircraft registered in the State of Qatar". He recalled that the Council had decided at that meeting to convene, in accordance with Rule 19 of its Rules of Procedure (Doc 7559), an Extraordinary Session to consider the item as soon as practicable, following the first Air Traffic Management (ATM) Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar at the ICAO Middle East (MID) Regional Office (Cairo) on 6 July 2017 and the related technical coordination meeting on 9 July 2017 in Doha, Qatar, on the understanding that the Extraordinary Session would occur before the end of July 2017, taking into account the need to ensure that representatives from all of the Parties could attend, as well as the need to prepare and circulate documentation that would form the basis for the Council's deliberations.
2. The President noted that the Council had, at that time, also emphasized the need to clearly differentiate between any actions that it, as a governing body, might consider taking in relation to Article 54 n) of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*, which stipulated that it was a mandatory function of the Council to "consider any matter relating to the Convention which any Contracting State refers to it", and any actions that it might consider taking in relation to Article 84 thereof, which provided a process for the settlement of any disagreement between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention and its Annexes which cannot be settled by negotiation.
3. The President further highlighted that, pursuant to the Council's said decision (211/10), an informal briefing *Qatar: Technical issues* had been given during the 211th Session on 30 June 2017 by the Secretary General, with the support of the Secretariat and the ICAO Regional Director, MID Regional Office.
4. The President noted that in accordance with Article 53 of the Convention and Rule 31 of the *Rules of Procedure for the Council* (Doc 7559), and following the Council's approval (cf. President's memorandum PRES OBA/2666 dated 11 July 2017), he had invited Bahrain and Qatar to participate, without a vote, in this Extraordinary Session on grounds of special interest. Furthermore, in the absence of any objections by close of business on 26 July 2017 in response to his e-mails dated 19 July 2017, the President had, in accordance with Rule 32 a) of the said Rules of Procedure, invited the European Union (EU), Airports Council International (ACI), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to participate therein as Observers.
5. On behalf of the Council, the President then extended a warm welcome to the following distinguished high-level Government officials who were duly accredited to represent their respective affected Member States during this Extraordinary Session: H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohammed, Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications of Bahrain; H.E. Sherif Fathi, Minister of Civil Aviation of Egypt; H.E. Jassim Ben Saif Ahmed Al-Sulaiti, Minister of Transport and Communications of Qatar; H.E. Abdulhakim M. Al-Tamimi, President of the General Authority of Civil Aviation of Saudi Arabia; and H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori, Minister of Economy of the United Arab Emirates. In addition, he welcomed the Directors General, Advisers and other officials from the said five Member States who were also in attendance.

6. In accordance with ICAO's mandate and its own mandate under the Convention, the Council proceeded to consider the technical issues relating to the aforesaid urgent Article 54 n) matter on the basis of the following three papers: **working paper C-WP/14641 Restricted** [*Request of the State of Qatar for consideration by the ICAO Council under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention*], presented by Qatar; **working paper C-WP/14640 Restricted** [*Response to Qatar's submissions under Article 54 n)*], jointly presented by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and **information paper C-WP/14639 Restricted** (*Contingency arrangements to facilitate the flow of traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region*), presented by the Secretary General.

*Introduction of C-WP/14641 Restricted*

*[Request of the State of Qatar for consideration by the ICAO Council under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention]*

7. H.E. Jassim Ben Saif Ahmed Al-Sulaiti (Qatar) introduced C-WP/14641 Restricted, which elaborated on the actions taken on 5 June 2017 by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to close their respective airspace to Qatar-registered aircraft and to impose what Qatar considered to be severe restrictions on such aircraft with respect to access to international airspace over the high seas adjacent to their territorial airspace [with effect from 0000 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) on 6 June 2017], which in Qatar's view caused serious concern for the continuing safety, security, regularity and economy of international air navigation and air transport. The paper also highlighted the repeated efforts made by Qatar to coordinate with the ICAO MID Regional Office in order to develop contingency routes, summarized the general and specific legal obligations and fundamental principles which Qatar considered had been violated by the said four Member States, and proposed actions by the Council.

8. H.E. Al-Sulaiti began by expressing Qatar's gratitude: to ICAO, for its relentless efforts for the benefit of international civil aviation and for assuming its responsibility by convening this Extraordinary Session of the Council to review Qatar's requests regarding the said unjust air blockade imposed upon it by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and to Council Member States, for having agreed to hold the Extraordinary Session at such a critical time, which reflected the importance ICAO attached to the aviation-safety- and security-related matter at hand.

9. H.E. Al-Sulaiti also voiced Qatar's deep appreciation to all ICAO Bureaus involved, including the MID Regional Office, for their efforts since the beginning of the said air blockade on Qatar on 5 June 2017. He underscored, however, that the first ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar held at the MID Regional Office with the four blockading Member States on 6 July 2017 and the subsequent technical coordination meeting held in Doha, Qatar on 9 July 2017 had not achieved the desired results, due to the procrastination of the said Member States under unsubstantiated pretexts regarding certain technical issues, thus preventing Qatar from having full access to international air routes.

10. H.E. Al-Sulaiti noted that Qatar had evinced, over the years, its profound respect for all rules and institutions established by the international civil aviation community to govern relations between countries. He emphasized that Qatar was proud to have adhered to the 1944 Chicago Convention and its Annexes and to be an active participant in the activities of ICAO, a United Nations (UN) Specialized Agency, in support of a safe, secure and sustainable civil aviation sector. H.E. Al-Sulaiti further underscored that Qatar was committed to implementing, with a high degree of professionalism, ICAO's international Standards relating to the peaceful use of airspace, the freedom of air navigation over the high seas, and aviation environmental protection.

11. H.E. Al-Sulaiti indicated, however, that as there was a high level of global compliance with ICAO instruments, Qatar had been taken aback by the successive NOTAMs and arbitrary action taken by the four blockading Member States starting on 5 June 2017, in flagrant violation of all relevant ICAO international Standards, as well as of relevant ICAO instruments to which they were parties. That action had included the publication by Saudi Arabia, on 6 June 2017, of a NOTAM on behalf of Yemen which had:

imposed a similar restriction on the use of Yemen's airspace by Qatar-registered aircraft, with immediate effect, in total disregard of Yemen's sovereignty over the airspace above its territory; and urged other Member States to close their airspace to Qatar-registered aircraft. H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that while the NOTAM was to have taken immediate effect, less than two hours after its issuance its effective date had been changed to 0001 UTC on 7 June 2017.

12. H.E. Al-Sulaiti noted that the arbitrary measures had continued, when the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates had banned non-Qatar-registered civil aircraft flying to/from Qatar from crossing its Flight Information Region (FIR), including the airspace above its territory and the airspace over the high seas. When Qatar had appealed to ICAO to resolve that issue, the United Arab Emirates had published a NOTAM conforming to the Organization's international Standards relating to transit through airspace over the high seas. However, the air traffic control tower in Doha had been shocked when that NOTAM had been revoked verbally, as indicated in the technical document that had been submitted to the Council, in a blatant violation that put at risk passengers' lives and undermined aviation safety and security.

13. H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that the four blockading Member States had persisted in their unjustifiable aggressive behaviour and had continued to misinterpret international law, without any regard for aviation safety and security, leaving a grave humanitarian impact on civil aviation users in Qatar and all around the world. Thus a large number of innocent passengers, including the elderly, women and children who were practicing their religious rites in the holy sites during the month of Ramadan, had been stranded at the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah while Saudi Arabia's General Authority of Civil Aviation had ignored Qatar's appeals and had not paid attention to ICAO's international Standards relating to NOTAMs in such humanitarian situations.

14. H.E. Al-Sulaiti noted that Qatar, in affirming its profound respect for the provisions of the Chicago Convention and its commitment to upholding them, had consequently decided to appeal to ICAO's august Council and to document its position and the actions it requested the Council to take, in particular, Qatar's urgent request for the enforcement of Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention to lift the unjust air blockade that had been imposed upon it by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar deemed that necessary in order to be able to exercise its sovereign right of overflight over the high seas in those countries' respective FIRs, in accordance with the principles of international law and related binding conventions. H.E. Al-Sulaiti emphasized that the matter at hand was of utmost importance, not solely to Qatar but to all parties to the Chicago Convention, as it was a dispute that touched upon the Convention's essence and could seriously compromise aviation safety and security.

15. In highlighting that the said four Member States had unfortunately stood against Qatar's requests by word and deed, H.E. Al-Sulaiti noted that they claimed that it was legitimate for them to exercise sovereign and border control rights in the airspace above their territory and the airspace over the high seas, including the exclusive right to prevent all aircraft, whether registered in Qatar or not, from flying to and transiting through Qatar using their respective FIRs. Qatar considered that that went beyond the rights enshrined in the Chicago Convention and constituted an abuse of such rights in a way that undermined the Convention itself and misinterpreted its provisions. In Qatar's view, the fact that the said Member States had actually reversed some of their decisions undeniably proved the extent of uncertainty and lack of transparency on their part and constituted an implicit confession of their grave breaches of international law.

16. Recalling that Qatar and Bahrain had signed an Agreement under which Qatar had delegated the provision of air navigation services within its sovereign airspace to Bahrain from April 2000 onwards (cf. paragraph 1.3 of C-WP/14641 Restricted), H.E. Al-Sulaiti indicated that that had been a gesture of support for the Bahraini national economy, turning it into a major hub in the Middle East, in line with Qatar's tradition of supporting the economies of neighbouring countries. He underscored that Bahrain had, however, broken its pledge and annulled that Agreement without prior notice, as documented.

Moreover, Bahrain had arbitrarily enforced some measures in clear violation of ICAO's international Standards with the intention of undermining aviation safety in Qatar. H.E. Al-Sulaiti emphasized that Bahrain had acted unilaterally in so restricting the use of international airspace and routes that were beyond its sovereign right.

17. H.E. Al-Sulaiti highlighted that the said measures taken by Bahrain had compelled Qatar to manage its own FIR, according to the highest standards of safety. Its civil aviation authorities were acting in a highly-professional way, which was widely praised and recognized.

18. H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that over the course of 70 years of safe international civil aviation no country in the world had ever faced such an air blockade and a blatant violation of international law as Qatar. In emphasizing that the behaviour of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates towards Qatar was lamentable and against the interests of the world at large, he stressed that tolerating such conduct would encourage other Member States to attempt to play the role, and have the authority, of the UN and its organizations, while ignoring all the obligations arising from binding international and regional instruments to which they were parties.

19. H.E. Al-Sulaiti noted that the Delegation of Qatar had not come to this Extraordinary Session to discuss political issues and false accusations, but rather to present issues related to the safety and security of international civil aviation and the right of overflight over the high seas according to international law. He thus urged not only the four blockading Member States, but all Council Member States, which represented the whole international aviation community, to be neutral in the present discussion, based on the principles of international law, the UN common system and relevant binding conventions. H.E. Al-Sulaiti emphasized that Qatar did not wish to live in a world where the law of the jungle and capriciousness prevailed and where international instruments were infringed upon and distorted to serve the narrow interests of individual Member States. In Qatar's view, the four blockading Member States had placed themselves above international law, in total disregard of aviation safety and security, thus endangering the lives of the flying public. It considered that failure to hold them accountable would lead to the recurrence of such violations, which constituted a gross breach of safety, security and the right of overflight over the high seas.

20. Recalling that the 103rd anniversary of the first-ever scheduled commercial passenger flight had recently been celebrated, H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that ICAO had achieved much progress and prosperity since its own establishment in 1944. He noted that its 191 Member States had placed their full trust in the Council and its Members, who represented the world and who were the voice of the voiceless. In particular, they trusted Council Members to take the necessary action and to draw on their conscience in order to ensure the continued safety and security of civil aviation, given the Council's essential role as the main arbitrator in the implementation of all binding conventions, in particular the 1944 Chicago Convention, and its Annexes.

21. In conclusion, H.E. Al-Sulaiti reiterated Qatar's deep appreciation for all of the efforts which ICAO had made and would continue to make towards resolving the matter at hand due its paramount importance, not only for Qatar, but also for the Gulf region and indeed the whole world. He affirmed that it was also of utmost importance for the safety of international civil aviation and the legal framework for international air navigation, adopted by the international community after long and hard deliberations that had spanned many years.

22. H.E. Al-Sulaiti looked forward to all present assuming their collective responsibility in tackling this dangerous precedent. He had full trust in the integrity of this process, as well as in the Council's demonstrated credibility, transparency and sound judgment to resolve the matter at hand.



23. H.E. Al-Sulaiti then gave the floor to Mr. A. Al-Hamadi, the Director, Air Safety Department of the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, to elaborate further on various elements of C-WP/14641 Restricted and the actions which the Council was invited to take.

24. Mr. Al-Hamadi prefaced his remarks by reiterating Qatar's gratitude to Council Members for their willingness to meet in an Extraordinary Session, outside the normal schedule of the Council, and in the middle of their summer holidays. In its view, the urgency of the matter at hand justified their selfless sacrifice.

25. In stressing that Qatar was not bringing before the Council any matters of a political nature, Mr. Al-Hamadi underscored that any such matters should be ruled to be out of order and should not be permitted to overshadow the real issue of its submission in C-WP/14641 Restricted, which was strictly based on Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention, according to which it was a mandatory function of the Council to "consider any matter relating to the Convention which any Contracting State refers to it". He highlighted that there was no provision requiring that such matter be urgent in nature. Nevertheless, Qatar was convinced that violations of the Chicago Convention and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA) were matters of high priority. Indicating that it was hard to imagine anything more urgent for the Council to consider, Mr. Al-Hamadi underscored that the consequences of those violations of legal obligations were unprecedented in the entire history of international civil aviation and had caused serious concern for the continuing safety, security, regularity and economy of international civil aviation. He reiterated that such violations could be repeated elsewhere in the world unless condemned by the international community, and that tolerance thereof could undermine the very foundation of ICAO.

26. Mr. Al-Hamadi noted that C-WP/14641 Restricted described the situation after the said four blockading Member States had published, on 5 June 2017, NOTAMs prohibiting all Qatar-registered aircraft from overflying their FIRs and banning them from landing at or departing from their airports. Those Member States had also restricted foreign-registered aircraft flying to/from Qatar via their FIRs by imposing additional approval processes. Qatar considered that those actions posed a direct and imminent threat to the continuing safety, security, regularity and economy of international civil aviation, in particular for Qatar-registered aircraft.

27. Mr. Al-Hamadi underscored that the paper's core emphasis was on the applicable rules of international law that were binding for all ICAO Member States. Reference was made to the rules created by the States themselves, to which the States had committed themselves to respect in good faith. Qatar considered that the actions of the four blockading Member States contravened the spirit of the Chicago Convention as expressed in its Preambular Clause 2, which read "... it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;". In addition, their numerous violations of several provisions of the Chicago Convention, as listed in C-WP/14641 Restricted, caused serious concern for the continuing safety, security, regularity and economy of international civil aviation.

28. Referring to the IASTA, Mr. Al-Hamadi highlighted that it was in force for 131 ICAO Member States, including Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which thereby granted to the other IASTA Contracting Parties the following two freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: the privilege to fly across its territory without landing i.e. overflight; and the privilege to land for non-traffic purposes (cf. Article I, Section 1). He stressed that it would be profoundly incorrect to state that any issues relating to the IASTA must be considered as a dispute under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. Mr. Al-Hamadi noted that, in fact, the IASTA clearly indicated in Article II, Section 1 that any complaint made thereunder must be considered by the Council. He affirmed that the present meeting was the time for the Council to act under that provision of the IASTA.

29. Mr. Al-Hamadi then drew attention to the executive summary of C-WP/14641 Restricted, in which Qatar invited the Council to:

- a) urge the said four blockading Member States to lift all the restrictions over the high seas to accommodate traffic flow within their respective FIRs for Qatar departures and arrivals. Alternatively:
- b) provide alternative routes/route segments to transit through airspace over the high seas; and
- c) urge the blockading Member States which were Contracting Parties to the 1944 IASTA to comply in *good faith* with their obligations concerning overflight freedom stipulated in that multilateral treaty in order to allow Qatar-registered aircraft to resume normal transit flights within the airspace of Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

*Introduction of C-WP/14640 Restricted  
[Response to Qatar's submissions under Article 54 n)]*

30. On behalf of the co-presenters (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) introduced C-WP/14640 Restricted, which set forth their response to the submissions sent by Qatar to ICAO between 5 and 15 June 2017 to invoke Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention on an urgent basis and underlined their full commitment to the safety of international civil aviation and of the flying public in their region and worldwide as their highest priority. It also provided an analysis of the situation and an overview of the contingency measures adopted, set forth the co-presenters' viewpoint on the various types of relief requested by Qatar from the Council, and proposed actions by the Council.

31. H.E. Al Mansoori took this opportunity to reaffirm the co-presenters' strong commitment: to the principles and rules of the Chicago Convention, as well as to ICAO's Strategic Objectives and principles as confirmed during the recent 39th Session of the Assembly; and, as Member States of ICAO, to achieving their mutual objective of ensuring the safety of international civil aviation at all times, which also applied in special situations such as the present one in the Gulf region. In highlighting that Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates commended the work of the President of the Council, as well as that of the Secretary General and the Secretariat, he noted that the Secretariat, particularly at the MID Regional Office, had worked tirelessly with all Member States concerned and had encouraged cooperation and the implementation of contingency measures that enabled the safe operation of civil aviation in the Gulf region.

32. H.E. Al Mansoori stressed that the actions taken by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates did not constitute an "air/sea blockade" of Qatar as alleged by the latter in its paper (C-WP/14641 Restricted). Noting that under international law the term "blockade" meant action preventing entry and exit of all vessels (boats), and by analogy, arrival at and departure from airports, he emphasized that that was not the action which the said Member States had taken, as made evident by the facts that Qatar continued to receive vessels and goods and all international air traffic continued to operate normally to and from Qatar using its airspace. H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that the measures which the four Member States had taken were airspace closures, of which there were numerous precedents in ICAO. Those Member States maintained that their airspace closures were legitimate, justified, and a proportionate response to Qatar's actions and were permitted under international law.

33. Turning to C-WP/14640 Restricted, H.E. Al Mansoori indicated that the co-presenters respectfully submitted that the Council should limit its deliberations to the urgent Article 54 n) matter which was related to the safety of international civil aviation, and to defer the other non-urgent matters properly falling under other related procedures until such procedures were taken up, taking into account that

the present meeting had been requested on the basis of urgency. He referred, in this context, to the position taken by the Council at the Tenth Meeting of its 211th Session (211/10) where it had emphasized the need to clearly differentiate between any actions that it, as a governing body, might consider taking in relation to Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention and any actions that it might consider taking in relation to Article 84 thereof (cf. paragraph 2 above). H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that as a result of the extensive work of the Member States involved in this matter, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with the cooperation of ICAO, had successfully established contingency measures that ensured the safety of international civil aviation in the Gulf region, as highlighted in C-WP/14640 Restricted. Furthermore, as a result of the excellent cooperation of several other Member States which administered the adjacent FIRs, to date they had considered nine contingency routes in total, six of which were operational. Two additional routes had been agreed upon, but their implementation was still pending due to the need to obtain the approval of adjacent Member States. Another additional route had been agreed upon but the ICAO MID Regional Office had deemed it unsuitable for implementation for the time being.

34. In then addressing Qatar's paper, C-WP/14641 Restricted, which had been issued on 19 July 2017, the same date as the co-presenters' paper, H.E. Al Mansoori highlighted that the proposed actions in the executive summary were different from those previously requested by Qatar in the five letters which it had sent to ICAO between 5 and 15 June 2017. It was unclear whether those actions replaced all the numerous actions which Qatar had previously requested from the Council or whether they supplemented or modified them. With regard to action paragraphs a) and b) of C-WP/14641 Restricted, he noted that the contingency routes already agreed upon and implemented with the active involvement of the MID Regional Office were situated over the high seas, as would be explained in the accompanying technical PowerPoint presentation. H.E. Al Mansoori emphasized that the said four Member States did not restrict or limit access of Qatar-registered aircraft to the high seas airspace, as confirmed in paragraph 2.1 of the Secretary General's paper (C-WP/14639 Restricted). He stressed that as a result of the implementation of the contingency routes over the high seas already agreed upon between the Parties, as clearly substantiated in the Secretary General's paper and in the paper co-presented by the four Member States (C-WP/14640 Restricted), the actions requested by Qatar under paragraphs a) and b) had essentially already been met and were therefore moot.

35. In noting that the action requested by Qatar in paragraph c) of the executive summary of its paper overlapped with Article 84 proceedings, H.E. Al Mansoori quoted paragraph 20 of the decision taken by the Council at the Tenth Meeting of its 211th Session (C-DEC 211/10), which read "The Secretary General indicated that separately, in a letter dated 13 June 2017, Qatar had stated that two formal Applications along with supporting materials, would be lodged, one pursuant to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and the other pursuant to the International Air Services Transit Agreement. Subsequently, two applications and memorials were delivered on 15 June 2017 ...". The four Member States therefore requested that the Article 84 proceedings and the rights of the Parties thereunder should not be pre-empted.

36. In reaffirming to the Council and the international community the full commitment of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to the safety and security of international civil aviation, H.E. Al Mansoori emphasized that they were open to sitting down with all Member States concerned, including Qatar, to cooperate in order to ensure the safe operation of air traffic in the Gulf region under ICAO's auspices. He noted that the actions requested by the said four Member States were set forth in the executive summary of C-WP/14640 Restricted. As they considered that updated information on the present status of the contingency measures described in Appendix B to their paper was essential to the Council's discussion of the urgent safety aspects of the matter at hand, H.E. Al Mansoori asked Mr. H. Al Belushi, the Director of Air Traffic Management of the General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates, to give a PowerPoint presentation thereon on their behalf.

*PowerPoint presentation relating to C-WP/14640 Restricted*  
(available on the Council's secure website)

37. During his PowerPoint presentation, Mr. Al Belushi underscored that pursuant to Annex 11 – *Air Traffic Services*, Attachment C, contingency arrangements were temporary in nature and remained in effect only until the services and facilities of the regional air navigation plan were reactivated and thus did not constitute amendments to the regional plan requiring processing in accordance with the *Procedure for the Amendment of Approved Regional Plans*. Contingency arrangements were used for: the establishment of contingency/new/additional routes; and the implementation of traffic flow restrictions to enable the use of established contingency routes within neighbouring FIRs.

38. In displaying, in a colour-coded aeronautical chart of the Gulf region, the contingency routes that were currently being implemented, as well as those that would soon be activated, Mr. Al Belushi underscored that Qatar-registered aircraft were allowed to fly those routes, contrary to the statement made earlier by Mr. Al-Hamadi (Qatar). Referring to a corresponding table which set forth, for each contingency route, its name (if applicable), routing (points being flown), as well as the date of issuance, number and issuing authority (FIR) of each NOTAM, Mr. Al Belushi noted that Route 2 (unnamed), via the points PATOM-TOKMA-DAVUS, was the only operational contingency route without a NOTAM reference as it had been established by an internal agreement between Bahrain and Qatar. In further highlighting that Route 10 (unnamed), via the points L305, TATLA and NANPA, was the only contingency route that was still under consideration, he underscored that the ICAO MID Regional Office had deemed that it was not feasible for the time being in view of the availability of Route 5 (T800/UT800) for the same purpose and the fact that Route 10 was in a highly-congested area, which increased the safety risks for air traffic.

39. Mr. Al Belushi then elaborated on the contingency arrangements in each of the Bahrain, Cairo, Jeddah, Sana'a and Emirates FIRs, as follows:

40. Bahrain FIR: In highlighting the inbound and outbound routes to/from Qatar currently used by Qatar Airways, Mr. Al Belushi stressed that from the outset Qatari traffic had never been stopped by any of the said four Member States from using any of those routes during the departure and arrival phases. Thus no Qatar-registered aircraft had been grounded by any of them. Mr. Al Belushi noted that additional flight levels (FL200, 220, 240, and 260) had been granted by the Bahrain Area Control Centre (ACC) to the Tehran ACC purely for Doha arrivals to ensure that the aircraft were safely vertically separated when arriving. He further indicated that a departure route to the northwest was being implemented, and that one to the northeast had been established in coordination with colleagues in Tehran. There was another departure route to the north.

41. Cairo FIR: Mr. Al Belushi underscored that confirmation had just been received that the bi-directional contingency route proposed by the ICAO MID Regional Office had been agreed to by the Tripoli FIR and would become operational from tomorrow, 1 August 2017, at 0100 UTC, following the issuance of a NOTAM of activation by the Cairo ACC. He noted that the route was available at two flight levels, FL300 for westbound traffic and FL310 for eastbound traffic, with the standard ICAO 10 minutes longitudinal separation to separate the traffic safely.

42. Jeddah FIR: Mr. Al Belushi highlighted that as part of the contingency measures within this FIR, Saudi Arabia had issued a NOTAM restricting the use of FL310 and FL350 at point TOKRA, the convergence point between the Muscat ACC in Oman and the Jeddah FIR, in order to ensure the safety of Qatari operations.

43. Sana'a FIR: Mr. Al Belushi underscored that since the start of military operations in Yemen in March 2015, all traffic, without exception, was prohibited from overflying its territory. He noted that, from that time onwards, the air traffic services (ATS) routes over the high seas within the Sana'a FIR (B400, B403 and B404) were the routes used by civil aircraft, including Qatar-registered aircraft.

44. Emirates FIR: In outlining the network of contingency routes in the Emirates FIR, Mr. Al Belushi noted that he had just received confirmation today that the United Arab Emirates had published a NOTAM indicating that Route 8 (T665) would be activated on 7 August 2017, subject to confirmation from the Tehran ACC. He highlighted that in order to ensure aviation safety the following flight levels had been reserved for the exclusive use of Qatar-registered aircraft: FL310 at point TUMAK (the coordination point between the Emirates FIR and the Bahrain FIR); FL310 at point GABKO (the coordination point between the Emirates FIR and the Tehran FIR); FL310 and FL350 at points TONVO, TARDI and LABRI (on all of the eastern boundaries of the Emirates FIR with the Muscat FIR).

45. In summarizing the Qatar contingency route proposal, Mr. Al Belushi noted that the ICAO MID Regional Office had coordinated multiple meetings to review the contingency measures currently in place and to discuss additional proposals for Qatar-registered aircraft operations over the high seas, as even prior to the said first ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar on 6 July 2017 the four Member States had already taken measures to ensure safe accessibility into the Gulf region.

46. Mr. Al Belushi indicated that, as presented, the United Arab Emirates had received two proposals, an eastbound proposal to accommodate Qatar-registered aircraft departures, and a westbound proposal to accommodate Qatar-registered aircraft arrivals. He underscored that despite the challenges and extra workload – the Emirates FIR handled more than 2 600 movements per day – the United Arab Emirates had still agreed to implement the westbound proposal route for Qatar-registered aircraft arrivals into Doha, subject to neighbouring States' acceptance. That route (T665) would become active on 7 August 2017.

47. In summary, Mr. Al Belushi affirmed that Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were contributing significantly to the safe and successful implementation of the ICAO MID Region ATM Contingency Plan along with other neighbouring Member States. He emphasized that the said four Member States were committed to providing air traffic services when and where required to all aircraft during in-flight emergencies, regardless of their nationality. In highlighting that they were working in close coordination with the MID Regional Office to improve the regional contingency arrangements' safety for Qatar-registered aircraft, Mr. Al Belushi reiterated that safety was their priority.

48. H.E. Abdulhakim M. Al-Tamimi (Saudi Arabia) indicated that his State, as well as Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, considered that the statement made by H.E. Al-Sulaiti (Qatar) in introducing C-WP/14641 Restricted was an infringement of the Council's agreement to limit its discussion to the technical issues relating to this urgent Article 54 n) matter and consequently opposed it. The said four Member States wished to focus on the said technical issues, with all due respect for every Member State's complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory under Article 1 of the Chicago Convention. Referring to the point raised by H.E. Al-Sulaiti regarding the restriction imposed on the use of Yemen's airspace by Qatar-registered aircraft, H.E. Al-Tamimi clarified that Saudi Arabia had issued a NOTAM on 6 June 2017 imposing that restriction on the basis of a written request by Yemen, in which the latter had confirmed that military operations were still underway in its territory.

49. In commenting on C-WP/14640 Restricted, H.E. Al-Sulaiti (Qatar) noted that the four co-presenters claimed, in paragraph 4.4 thereof, that "The submissions of Qatar to the Council to provide for contingency measures on a basis of urgency under Article 54 n) have therefore become largely moot." They invited the Council, in paragraph 5.1 c) and in action paragraph c) of the executive summary, to "note the contingency measures agreed so far between the Parties and concur that they are adequate to maintain a safe air navigation system in the region and to avoid disruption of air traffic;". The co-presenters also claimed, in paragraph 4.1, that there were: six contingency routes over the respective FIRs of Bahrain, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Oman; two additional contingency routes accepted by the United Arab Emirates; and one additional contingency route accepted by Egypt. H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that Qatar strongly objected to these statements by the co-presenters, which it considered did not reflect the status of the agreed outcome regarding the contingency routes available for Qatar-registered aircraft or the current situation for the arrivals/departures of such aircraft.

50. In that regard, H.E. Al-Sulaiti presented the following facts for the Council's consideration: With regard to the Bahrain FIR, he highlighted that on 5 June 2017 Bahrain had issued a NOTAM imposing restrictions on the use of its entire airspace, including over the high seas, by Qatar-registered aircraft. Bahrain had assigned two routes, one for inbound traffic and one for outbound traffic, via points RAGUS and MIDSI, as a single corridor for use by Qatar-registered aircraft regardless of their destination. That NOTAM had been in effect from 6 June 2017 until 12 June 2017, when Bahrain had modified it to enable Qatar-registered aircraft to fly over the high seas within the Bahrain FIR. Qatar did not consider those two routes as contingency routes in view of the lifting of the said restriction over the high seas airspace. In noting that Qatar's proposals for additional inbound routes to Doha through the Bahrain FIR had not been accepted by Bahrain due to operational challenges, H.E. Al-Sulaiti emphasized that Bahrain had not presented any alternative proposals.

51. With respect to the Emirates FIR, H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that since the imposition of the air blockade effective 6 June 2017 the United Arab Emirates had not implemented any of Qatar's proposals for a contingency route within its FIR. He recalled that the first day after the four Member States concerned had modified their NOTAMs to lift the restrictions over the high seas airspace in their respective FIRs Qatar had submitted a proposal for a single contingency route for outbound traffic from Doha via the Emirates FIR heading toward Tehran FIR but it had been rejected for operational reasons. Referring to paragraph 4.1 e) of C-WP/14640 Restricted, in which it was indicated that the United Arab Emirates had accepted Qatari proposals for two contingency routes, H.E. Al-Sulaiti noted that that had been the outcome of the ATM Contingency Coordination Meeting for Qatar held in Cairo on 6 July 2017. He underscored, however, that although the United Arab Emirates had indicated its ability to implement those proposals for two contingency routes within 48 hours from the time of the final agreement, it was only today, some three weeks later, that confirmation had been received that it had issued a NOTAM establishing route T665 with effect from 7 August 2017. H.E. Al-Sulaiti stressed that all of the proposals for contingency routes over the high seas considered at the said meeting had been submitted by Qatar and not by ICAO or the other four Member States concerned.

52. H.E. Al-Sulaiti indicated that, on the basis of the above facts, Qatar considered that the obstacles presented by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had only been partially removed. Qatar-registered aircraft had only been granted a single contingency route outbound from Doha, T800, which had been activated on 22 July 2017. The rest of the route, which went via points RAGUS, MIDSI, VELAM and BAYAN, was an established ATS route and was part of the MID regional air navigation plan. H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that although it was claimed in paragraph 4.1 f) of C-WP/14640 Restricted that there were nine contingency routes in the Gulf region, there was still no operational contingency route within the Emirates FIR.

53. H.E. Al-Sulaiti reiterated that Qatar was inviting the Council, in the executive summary of C-WP/14641 Restricted, to urge the said four blockading Member States to lift all the restrictions over the high seas to accommodate traffic flow within their respective FIRs for Qatar departures and arrivals. He emphasized that if the Council did not take such action during the present meeting, then each Member State would consider that it had the right to blockade airspace over the high seas without prior consultations and without taking into account ICAO's rules and regulations.

*Introduction of C-WP/14639 Restricted*

*(Contingency arrangements to facilitate the flow of traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region)*  
(available on the Council's secure website with the PowerPoint presentation)

54. In her introduction of C-WP/14639 Restricted (which was accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation), the Secretary General indicated that she had received a letter from Qatar on 5 June 2017 informing her of "the closure of Bahrain, Cairo, Jeddah and UAE Flight Information Regions (FIRs) for traffic to/from Qatar, including Qatar Airways flights landing to/or overflying the respective FIRs" and had

brought that matter immediately to the attention of the President. The Council had been informed accordingly (211/4).

55. The Secretary General noted that an informal briefing *Qatar – Technical issues* had also been given on 30 June 2017, during which the Secretariat had reported to the Council primarily on the issue of contingency arrangements in general, and the role ICAO played, as well as on the specific steps which had thus far been taken in this particular case to ensure the safe and orderly flow of air traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region. It had been highlighted that contingency arrangements, or plans, may be applied to existing routes in the regional air navigation plan or for any temporary routes established for contingency purposes. Contingency arrangements may also include application of various ATM measures, such as a flight level allocation scheme, changes in separation minima or flow management techniques.

56. To that end, the contingency arrangements provided for Qatar-registered aircraft in the hours and days following 5 June 2017 ultimately included inbound and outbound routes available to the north-west, inbound and outbound routes to the north of Doha, and an outbound route to the northeast. All of those routes operated through the Bahrain, Kuwait, Muscat and Tehran FIRs.

57. The longitudinal separation minima for those routes were variously 10, 20 and 30 nautical miles, depending on various operational considerations, including some requirements placed on those States by ACCs further afield. Workload issues still existed within the Bahrain, Muscat and Tehran FIRs; however, the Secretariat was confident that the environment posed less risk than at the start of the restrictions and was a great deal more stable. In line with a safety management system approach, the post-implementation monitoring was expected to be a key factor in determining the effectiveness of the said contingency arrangements and the extent to which they may be enhanced. Continued coordination in that regard was referred to under paragraph 4.4, Proposal 2 of C-WP/14639 Restricted.

58. The Secretary General reiterated that, in addition to constant and continued coordination with all the relevant Member States in the Gulf region, the ICAO Secretariat had organized two technical coordination meetings, the first held at the ICAO MID Regional Office in Cairo on 6 July 2017 with participants from Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia the United Arab Emirates and IATA, which had discussed in detail the proposals made by Qatar related to contingency arrangements over the high seas. The results of that discussion had been reported to a second technical coordination meeting held in Doha on 9 July 2017, which had been attended by Iran (Islamic Republic of), Oman and Qatar.

59. The Secretary General had remained in very close contact with the ICAO Regional Director, MID Regional Office, in his role of acting for all Member States in the Gulf region. She was pleased to advise all present that since that time Iran (Islamic Republic of), Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had reached agreement for an additional temporary route inbound to Doha via the Muscat, Tehran and Emirates FIRs, which was the inbound portion of Proposal 3 – Emirates FIR in paragraph 4.4 of the paper. In addition, the United Arab Emirates had published today NOTAM A1065/17 establishing route T665 with effect from 0000 UTC on 7 August 2017. Iran (Islamic Republic of) was in the process of issuing a corresponding NOTAM defining its portion of the same route. Furthermore, several Member States had reached agreement on a contingency route from Beirut to Tunis via the Beirut, Nicosia, Cairo, Tripoli and Malta FIRs. NOTAMs for the temporary route had been promulgated for the Cairo and Tripoli FIRs with an implementation date of 0001 UTC on 1 August 2017. The longitudinal separation would be 10 minutes. That was Proposal 1 – Cairo FIR (Beirut-Tunis) in paragraph 4.4 of the paper.

60. The Secretary General took this opportunity to thank all Member States concerned for their cooperation and support in the development and establishment of contingency arrangements to facilitate the flow of traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region for the safe operation of civil aviation. The ICAO Secretariat would continue to coordinate with them to find optimal technical solutions for increased safety and more efficient operations in the airspace over the high seas. The Secretary General would also continue to keep the President of the Council informed and facilitate his coordination with all Parties.

61. In supplementing the Secretary General's introductory remarks, the Director of the Air Navigation Bureau (D/ANB) noted that contingency arrangements included the utilization of existing routes in the MID regional air navigation plan and/or any temporary routes or procedures which might be established to augment and/or replace those existing routes should that be deemed necessary for safety or for capacity and efficiency needs. He emphasized that while to date only one temporary route had been established (T800), a second temporary route (unnamed) would become operational on 1 August 2017 and a third (T665), on 7 August 2017. D/ANB underscored that those routes were part of a network of contingency arrangements which provided access to and from various portions of the surrounding airspace from Qatar even though they were not numbered specifically.

62. D/ANB noted that the Secretariat, through the MID Regional Office, was in constant dialogue with the air traffic and safety professionals in the Member States concerned to provide guidance and counsel on the best way to meet their ICAO-mandated responsibilities to provide open access across the high seas airspace in the Gulf region. While there was room for technical disagreement about the level of risk or the level of acceptability of specific contingency arrangements that had been made, he commended all of the Member States concerned for the technical discussion which was taking place despite the very difficult challenges they faced at the diplomatic level. In underscoring that contingency arrangements continued to be developed, D/ANB indicated that the Secretariat expected to see continued progress, with the arrangements currently in place being optimized on the basis of feedback received from the relevant operational personnel.

63. Referring to the Secretary General's comments relating to Proposal 1 – Cairo FIR (Beirut-Tunis) in paragraph 4.4 of C-WP/14639 Restricted, D/ANB clarified that the route to the west of Beirut out into the Malta FIR would not require additional NOTAMs for its activation as the routes in the Beirut, Nicosia, and Malta FIRs were existing routes. D/ANB noted that this would allow the route in Proposal 1 to become operational on 1 August 2017.

### ***Discussion***

64. During the ensuing discussion, all Representatives who took the floor expressed gratitude for the high-level representation of the five Parties at the present meeting, as well as for the documentation they had provided and their detailed presentations. They also voiced appreciation for the excellent work done, on an urgent basis, by the Secretariat, both at ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office, in developing and establishing contingency arrangements to facilitate the flow of air traffic over the high seas in the Gulf region in coordination with the Member States concerned.

65. In response to a query by the President, the Director of the Legal Affairs and External Relations Bureau (D/LEB) noted that, as the Council had previously been informed (211/10), Qatar had, on 15 June 2017, hand-delivered to the Office of the Secretary General two applications and memorials referred to as Applications 1 and 2. Under the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782), the Secretary General was required to verify that the applications and memorials were in compliance with certain provisions thereof. As the Secretariat had identified certain deficiencies in both applications and memorials, the Secretary General, in a letter dated 21 June 2017, had requested Qatar to rectify them.

66. D/LEB underscored that as no response to that letter had thus far been received, as of today the two applications and memorials submitted by Qatar were considered not to have been officially lodged with ICAO due to the said unrectified deficiencies. He indicated that, if and when Qatar rectified the identified deficiencies, the Secretary General would proceed to take the appropriate steps under the *Rules for the Settlement of Differences* (Doc 7782), which would include, inter alia, immediate notification of the formal receipt of the applications and memorials, and circulation thereof, to all parties to the instruments whose interpretation or application was in question, as well as to all Council Members.



67. The President concluded that it was therefore unnecessary to refer to the Article 84 procedure during the present discussion as it had not been officially initiated. He then sought clarification as to the scope of application of Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention, in particular, whether it covered the international treaties referred to in Qatar's paper (C-WP/14641 Restricted).

68. Recalling that Article 54 n) stipulated that it was a mandatory function of the Council to "consider any matter relating to the Convention which any Contracting State refers to it", D/LEB advised the Council to consider only those matters relating to, or which could reasonably be brought within the ambit of, the Chicago Convention and not matters which related exclusively to other international treaties.

69. Noting this clarification, the President requested that the Council, consistent with the decision it had taken to convene this Extraordinary Session (211/10), focus its discussion on finding technical solutions to the matter at hand as there were other fora for resolving the overarching political issues.

70. In welcoming the present meeting, the Representative of France underscored that it was important for the Council to be able to hear the views of a non-Council Member State when Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention was invoked. He considered, however, that it could and should have been held earlier, as close as possible to the two technical coordination meetings of 6 and 9 July 2017. That being said, the Representative of France reiterated that his State was a friend of each of the five Member States involved in the matter now before the Council, and that ICAO was not the appropriate forum for addressing political issues. In hoping for a rapid resolution of the disagreement between those brother countries, France supported the efforts being made by Kuwait and other actors to mediate.

71. The Representative of France highlighted that his State's key concern in the matter at hand was to have an absolute guarantee of flight safety in the Gulf region, regardless of the flights' origin and destination and the nationality of the air operator. To that end, it was necessary to scrupulously uphold the rules established under the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and all other relevant documents. In noting that ICAO was the guarantor of the freedom of overflight of international routes, France commended the efforts of the Organization, in particular those of its MID Regional Office, in coordination with the Member States concerned, to identify and establish contingency measures in the Gulf region to that end. It called for the continuation and intensification of the dialogue with and between the Member States concerned to optimize those measures, and highlighted the need to apply any lessons learned therefrom over the longer term to the ICAO MID Region ATM Contingency Plan for the Gulf region. France considered that it was important that the Council follow up on this item at its next (212th) session in October/November 2017 to ensure that such dialogue was taking place as it should, and that it be regularly informed by the Secretariat, in the interim, of any technical developments, or lack thereof. France was also of the view that the President of the Council and the Secretary General should offer their good offices, if and when necessary, to facilitate the said dialogue, which it hoped would be fruitful.

72. The Alternate Representative of the United States indicated that his State acknowledged the progress made at the technical coordination meeting held at the MID Regional Office in Cairo on 6 July 2017 to establish contingency routes in international airspace in the Gulf region and that it was closely monitoring the ongoing implementation of those contingency measures. The United States' immediate concern was to ensure the safe operation of civil aviation in the Gulf region, and to stress the importance that all steps should be taken to ensure that transiting aircraft were not subject to unsafe conditions due to the ongoing rift between the five Parties. In the interest of mitigating the safety risk, the United States supported implementation of the new contingency routes identified at the said technical coordination meeting.

73. The Alternate Representative of the United States highlighted that over the past two months his Delegation had met with special representatives from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and had listened to their stated positions. It had also discussed the operational situation

with experts in the United States' Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), as well as with experts in ICAO's ANB. While welcoming those informal briefs that had been received from all sides, and thanking ICAO for its immediate and proactive steps to find solutions to identified safety issues, especially in light of the Organization's paramount responsibilities with respect to the safety and security of international civil aviation in the Gulf region, the United States remained concerned about the administration of the international airspace in that region. It underscored the principle that Member States administering FIRs were responsible for providing safe and efficient air navigation services in delegated international airspace. The United States therefore considered that the closure, or threat of closure, of international airspace to civil operations, particularly on a selective basis, was a matter of concern for it and that it should also be a matter of concern for all other ICAO Member States. It also urged the Member States involved to continue their dialogue on this matter in an effort to limit the impact on international aviation. In noting that the United States was in close communication with all Parties to assist in de-escalating and resolving the underlying irritants that had led to the said airspace closures, the Alternate Representative of the United States emphasized that it was critical to maintain strong ties among key partners to sustain the fight against terrorism and violent extremist ideology. Those ties extended to commercial aviation activities. The Alternate Representative of the United States again stressed that all steps to ensure safe and secure civil air operations should be taken in the Gulf region.

74. With respect to the allegations by Qatar that the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not complying with applicable obligations under the Chicago Convention and IASTA, the Alternate Representative of the United States indicated that his State took any such allegations seriously as a general matter. It was aware that the Government of Qatar might be taking steps to file applications and memorials with ICAO under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention as explained by D/LEB. The United States consequently considered that the present meeting should focus on pressing safety and administrative concerns related to international airspace in order not to prejudice any such potential Article 84 proceedings.

75. The Representative of Spain indicated that, in view of Spain's traditional friendship with all of the Member States in the Gulf region, it would have liked to have seen the matter at hand resolved through negotiations between the five Parties. As that had not been possible, the Council was now considering, during this Extraordinary Session invoked under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention, those aspects thereof that were directly related to the safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation. It was necessary for the Council to perform its function as custodian of the Chicago Convention, as well as of all related Conventions and Protocols.

76. The Representative of Spain observed that disagreements between Member States had existed in the past, existed at the present time, and would continue to exist in the future. Nevertheless, in drawing inspiration from Preamble Clause 2 of the Chicago Convention, which indicated that "the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world ...", it could be seen, once again, today, that aviation can serve as an essential instrument for agreement among Member States. With regard to the present case, the Representative of Spain noted, with much satisfaction, that since at least 6 July 2017 a whole range of contingency measures had been established for air traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region and that the situation continued to evolve as a result of the ongoing collaboration between the Member States concerned. He underscored the high importance of ensuring that the introduced contingency arrangements did not affect international air traffic using that airspace and that the airlines of third parties could operate normally therein. The Representative of Spain likewise noted, with much satisfaction, that the five Parties had expressed their full commitment to ensuring the safety of international civil aviation and of the flying public in their papers and/or during the present meeting.

77. Having heard the Parties' presentations, the Representative of Spain noted that one fundamental question remained unanswered: whether the contingency routes instituted by the various Member States concerned were sufficient to address the situation in the Gulf region.

78. The Representative of Spain then suggested that the Council take the following actions as its decision on this item: remind all Parties of the need to respect their obligations under international law and international conventions to which they had freely subscribed; review Assembly Resolution A38-12 (*Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and associated practices related specifically to air navigation*) with regard to airspace over the high seas; take note of the various contingency measures thus far agreed upon by the various Member States concerned to maintain the safe operation of air navigation in the Gulf region and to avoid the disruption of air traffic, and request that those measures be consolidated and promulgated as soon as possible; acknowledge, with satisfaction, that the Parties were cooperating to implement the contingency measures necessary to ensure the safety of international civil aviation in the Gulf region, it being well-recognized that aviation safety should never be compromised under any circumstances; encourage the Parties to continue to cooperate in their search for additional technical solutions to the matter at hand; request the Secretariat, both at ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office, to continue to work in coordination with all Member States concerned to ensure the safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation; and request the Secretariat: to maintain the ICAO MID Region ATM Contingency Plan up-to-date; and to gather data on the NOTAMS published, as well as on any safety-related incidents and other incidents that might arise from the traffic flow in the Gulf region, and to inform the Council thereof at the next (212th) session.

79. The Representative of Australia noted that his State welcomed the fact that the Council was now discussing these important issues raised by an ICAO Member State in accordance with Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention. It recognized that the aviation component of the situation in the Gulf region was but one part of a complex political environment and that ICAO's role within that environment was to administer an international aviation system that delivered safe and efficient air navigation for all Member States. The Government of Australia encouraged the five Parties to continue to engage in negotiations in the appropriate fora to resolve the overall situation.

80. Highlighting that the range of air traffic services routes facilitated as part of the contingency arrangements was being delivered thanks, in no small part, to the ICAO Secretariat at the MID Regional Office and at Headquarters, the Representative of Australia acknowledged their excellent work. He also acknowledged the cooperation and collaboration by Member States in the Gulf region to deliver those contingency arrangements, including adjacent Member States not directly engaged in the matter at hand. The Representative of Australia emphasized that continued collaboration and information-sharing under ICAO's auspices was very important to ensure that contingency arrangements were made without unnecessary delay and that the reasons for any delays or denials were clearly understood by all Member States concerned. He affirmed that it was of the utmost importance, in situations such as this, that all Member States comply with all of their legal obligations under international law. The Representative of Australia recognized that the aviation situation in the Gulf region had evolved significantly through June into July 2017 and that it continued to evolve. He noted that, as highlighted earlier by the presentations, in particular, the Secretary General's presentation, any paper on this matter was out-of-date almost as soon as it was published as more contingency routes were implemented.

81. In response to the Parties' various requests for action by the Council, the Representative of Australia indicated that his Government considered that the Council should: emphasize that the safety of air navigation must be the highest priority for the Organization and all Member States; recognize the excellent work of the ICAO Secretariat at the MID Regional Office and at Headquarters, in collaboration with Member States concerned; request the Secretariat and Member States concerned to continue timely collaboration in support of contingency arrangements in the Gulf region to ensure safe and efficient air navigation over the high seas; note the importance of all Member States complying with their obligations under international law; and encourage the five Parties to continue to negotiate in the appropriate international fora to resolve the overarching political issues.

82. Reiterating that it was highly important that the five Parties fulfill their international obligations, the Representative of Turkey emphasized that it was a pity to see such problems among Member States with which all pursued brotherly relations. He sincerely urged the Parties to solve those problems as soon as possible, not only for their own benefit, but also for the benefit of the other Member States in the Gulf region and around the world. He listened very carefully to the Parties' presentations, the Representative of Turkey expressed appreciation for the improvements in the Gulf region resulting from the implementation of the contingency measures and underscored the importance of Qatar verifying that the latter were operational and satisfactory. He emphasized that any enhancements to those contingency measures would further ensure the safety of international air traffic and of international airspace in the Gulf region.

83. The Representative of Mexico noted, with appreciation, the presentations made by the Ministers and other members of their high-level Delegations on the sensitive situation in the Gulf region as it had evolved since the beginning of June 2017. He concurred with previous speakers that this matter should be considered strictly under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention in order to maintain the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation operations in the said region. The Representative of Mexico underscored that the various contingency routes should become operational immediately after the Parties' agreement thereto had been obtained. He stressed that the Council should place emphasis on dialogue and negotiation as the fundamental ways to settle differences between Member States.

84. In line with the proposals made earlier by the Representative of Spain, the Representative of Mexico suggested that the Council take the following action: note the various contingency measures thus far agreed under the auspices of ICAO; urge the Secretariat to continue its efforts to improve the harmonization of such measures between the Member States concerned to maintain the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation operations in the Gulf region; urge all of the Parties to continue to cooperate to address this matter and to observe the provisions of the Chicago Convention and other applicable instruments of international law, including ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), so as to ensure that air navigation operations in the Gulf region were safe, regular, efficient and non-discriminatory; and request the Secretariat to provide the Council with timely updates on developments relating to the contingency measures to enable it to closely monitor the situation to ensure that the latter were satisfactory and that the Parties were continuing their negotiations in order to resolve their disagreement.

85. The Representative of Uruguay thanked the President of the Council for convening the present meeting, the Secretariat, for its hard work, and in particular the Ministers and other high-level Government officials from the five Parties, for their participation, which signaled their support for the work of ICAO and the Council in addressing this matter and, by extension, their support for, and commitment to, multilateralism and international law. While agreeing that the Council should limit its discussion to the technical issues, he underscored that there were important principles at play. The Representative of Uruguay was pleased to note from the discussion that, despite their said disagreement, which could be resolved, the five Parties all seemed to agree on those same principles. He emphasized that, in its decision, the Council should accordingly highlight the need to comply with public international law, in particular, both the letter and the spirit of the Chicago Convention, so as to ensure: the safety of air navigation, which was the highest priority and required total commitment; the efficiency of air navigation; and non-discrimination. In endorsing the actions proposed by previous speakers, the Representative of Uruguay reiterated the need for the Council to have all relevant information in real time so that it could closely monitor the situation in the Gulf region.

86. The Representative of China expressed appreciation to the five Parties for demonstrating their willingness to seek a solution, through dialogue and consultations at ICAO, to the technical safety issues relating to the matter at hand. Underscoring that the Organization was a large family comprising 191 Member States, he affirmed that the President would be able to prove once again his wisdom and leadership in guiding the Council to tackle this family matter in an appropriate manner. The Representative of China suggested, in this context, that the Council take the following actions: note the request of Qatar for

consideration by the Council under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention as set forth in C-WP/14641 Restricted; note the response of Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to Qatar's submissions under Article 54 n) as set forth in C-WP/14640 Restricted; express its appreciation to the Secretariat at ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office for carrying out urgent coordination among the Member States concerned to reach agreement on contingency arrangements in accordance with Annex 11 – *Air Traffic Services* and applicable rules and for presenting a report to the Council on the actions taken and progress made in C-WP/14639 Restricted; direct the Secretariat to continue to take measures to carry out further coordination among the Member States concerned to refine the contingency arrangements and to take concrete steps to implement them so as to ensure the safety of international civil aviation in the Gulf region; and encourage the five Parties to continue their dialogue and consultations so as to settle their differences and maintain the safe and efficient operation of international civil aviation in the Gulf region through joint endeavours.

87. In emphasizing that ICAO played a vital role in ensuring the safety and regularity of international civil aviation, the Representative of Canada affirmed that Member States' commitment in that regard was essential. As such, Canada commended the excellent work of ICAO, including its MID Regional Office, in developing and establishing contingency routes in order to ensure the safety and regularity of flights in the Gulf region. Canada was also appreciative of the collaboration of all Member States involved in that process and emphasized that such collaboration should continue going forward. Canada supported the request that the Council continue to be informed in the timeliest manner of all ongoing developments.

88. The Representative of Italy noted that he had always been very much in favour of convening the present meeting to allow a Member State to bring to the Council's attention an issue relating to the Chicago Convention that was of interest to that Member State. He emphasized that it was of the utmost importance that the Council address such issues in due time, especially when the safety, security, regularity and efficiency of air navigation were at stake. The Representative of Italy appreciated that the five Parties had demonstrated good will to cooperate following the imposition of the said restrictions on Qatar-registered aircraft, and affirmed that important progress had undeniably been made since that time. He also commended the active role played by the MID Regional Office, with the full support of the Secretariat at ICAO Headquarters, which had coordinated efforts to find technical solutions, particularly as far as contingency routes were concerned. The Representative of Italy reiterated the importance of the Secretariat keeping the Council informed on a regular basis of developments and of the outcomes of the contacts between the Parties. In noting, from the information provided by the Secretariat and the Parties, that a possible satisfactory solution seemed to be within reach, he urged the five Parties to maintain and possibly intensify their willingness to dialogue and collaborate in order to achieve that objective. The Representative of Italy stressed that it was essential that all Member States respect all of their international obligations and duly and promptly comply with the rules to which they had committed themselves to abide by.

89. In endorsing most of the comments made by previous speakers, the Representative of Brazil reiterated that ensuring the safety of international civil aviation was the Organization's highest priority and emphasized the consequent need to continue to take all possible measures to ensure flight safety in the Gulf region. Echoing the question posed earlier by the Representative of Spain, the Representative of Brazil enquired of the Delegation of Qatar whether the existing contingency routes, together with the envisaged contingency routes which were to become operational on 1 and 7 August 2017, fully took safety into consideration in all phases of flight and whether they were sufficient to maintain the safety of air navigation in the Gulf region. She underscored the importance of the Council being kept abreast of developments regarding the effective implementation of the said envisaged contingency routes. In highlighting the extreme importance of dialogue between the five Parties, the Representative of Brazil emphasized the need for the Council to stimulate the continuation of their discussions of the technical issues despite the underlying problems that existed in the political arena and other arenas. Reiterating that the ICAO Secretariat, both at Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office, and the five Parties had done

excellent work in addressing the technical issues, she expressed the hope that the envisaged new contingency routes would further calm the situation in the Gulf region.

90. Observing that many Representatives had referred to the need for continuous dialogue between the Parties, the President of the Council stressed that it was important, notwithstanding their political situation, that their technical aviation experts be able to sit down face-to-face across the table to discuss the technical issues relating to the urgent Article 54 n) matter at hand. He sought the commitment of the Parties to make that possible.

91. H.E. Sherif Fathi, Minister of Civil Aviation of Egypt, assured the Council that Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had demonstrated full cooperation and commitment to ensuring the safety of international civil aviation. In underscoring that those four Member States had extended all possible cooperation to ICAO in its efforts to develop and establish contingency routes in the Gulf region on the basis of all of the proposals that had been brought forward, he reiterated that that cooperation was ongoing. H.E. Fathi emphasized that the four Member States' high-level representatives had not come to the present meeting to enter into political debates or to try to confuse the Council; on the contrary, they had come to state the facts. The key fact was that the four Member States were committed – a strong word – to ensuring the safety of international civil aviation and to take whatever action was necessary to that end, including holding discussions with any country interested in promoting the safety of air navigation, including Qatar, at whatever venue was most convenient, including at the ICAO MID Regional Office in Cairo, Egypt.

92. H.E. Fathi underscored that the Government of Egypt, the host country, and he himself, on a personal level, were committed to extending all possible support, cooperation and facilitation to the MID Regional Office, which they recognized as being, and which they made known to be, an independent entity. He highlighted, as an example, the Government's willingness to facilitate the issuance of entry visas for delegates to ICAO meetings convened in Egypt.

93. Referring to the issue raised of compliance with international obligations and international treaties, H.E. Fathi highlighted the need for the Council to take a comprehensive view thereof instead of considering it only from the perspective of the Chicago Convention and other international air law instruments as that issue did not relate solely to aviation but rather to all aspects of life, including political relations.

94. In concluding, H.E. Fathi extended an invitation to all present to attend the Regional Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security in Africa and the Middle East Regions to be held in Sharm El Sheikh from 22-24 August 2017.

95. In supporting the above intervention by H.E. Fathi (Egypt), H.E. Abdulhakim M. Al-Tamimi, President of the General Authority of Civil Aviation of Saudi Arabia, assured the Council that Saudi Arabia was willing to meet with the technical experts of the other Parties, under the umbrella of ICAO, to discuss any technical issues relating to the matter at hand.

96. In expressing appreciation for the comments made by H.E. Fathi (Egypt), H.E. Jassim Ben Saif Ahmed Al-Sulaiti, Minister of Transport and Communications of Qatar, indicated that his State was very grateful for all the work carried out by the ICAO MID Regional Office in developing and establishing contingency routes in the Gulf region. In noting that Qatar supported the presence of that Regional Office in Cairo, he underscored that it was well-staffed and well-run and that its said activities were being carried out in a transparent manner. H.E. Al-Sulaiti recalled that Egypt had been the first country to address Qatar on the subject of cooperation in terms of respecting international obligations. He also thanked H.E. Al-Tamimi for his comments, and H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed (Bahrain) and H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) for taking part in the present meeting. H.E. Al-Sulaiti emphasized that while the five Parties had a disagreement, they also had links of friendship and brotherhood that they needed to respect. In

affirming that the Parties were ready to work together, under ICAO's auspices, to resolve their disagreement, he stressed the need for them to not only hold discussions but also take concrete actions in that regard. Highlighting that technical experts had been included in the Parties' Delegations with a view to developing technical solutions to the matter at hand, H.E. Al-Sulaiti underscored that Qatar was interested in not only establishing some new contingency routes but also having proper air traffic services and a proper flow of air traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region.

97. In thanking all of the Council Members who had taken the floor, H.E. Al-Sulaiti expressed particular appreciation to the Representatives of Spain and Brazil who had highlighted the need to determine whether the existing and envisaged contingency routes in the Gulf region met Qatar's needs. He emphasized that Qatar was ready to sit down with its brother countries and ICAO officials at any time to continue to discuss the technical issues related to the matter at hand and to develop optimal technical solutions thereto.

98. In expressing pleasure at participating in this Extraordinary Session of the Council, H.E. Kamal Bin Ahmed Mohammed, Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications of Bahrain, underscored that its purpose was to discuss aviation safety, an issue of high importance to all attendees. Having heard the presentations by the five Parties and the more important presentation by the Secretary General, he noted with satisfaction that the latter's conclusions reflected exactly the conclusions set forth by the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the four co-presenters of C-WP/14640 Restricted (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). H.E. Mohammed emphasized that Bahrain was ready to continue to work and cooperate with all Member States concerned, including Qatar. Underscoring that Bahrain's civil aviation authorities were already in contact with their Qatari counterparts on a daily basis and were serving aircraft in Qatar's airspace, he affirmed that Bahrain had never closed Qatar's airspace. However, within five days of the imposition of the said restrictions on Qatar-registered aircraft Bahrain had re-routed two existing ATS routes as they had fallen within the airspace above its territorial water (12 nautical miles from its coastline). With regard to the sufficiency of the contingency routes, H.E. Mohammed assured all present that, to Bahrain's knowledge, the number and the efficiency of the routes now available to Qatar-registered aircraft in the Bahrain FIR under the contingency arrangements were greater than those of the pre-contingency routes. He indicated that Bahrain's civil aviation authorities were willing to discuss those contingency routes with their Qatari colleagues, in the presence of ICAO officials, if there was an issue with them.

99. In expressing pleasure at hearing all of the positive comments made during the discussion, H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori, Minister of Economy of the United Arab Emirates, underscored that while there were challenging political issues to be addressed in the Gulf region, the safety and security of international civil aviation as a whole was a high priority for all of the Member States concerned, including their representatives at the present meeting, all of whom were frequent flyers.

100. H.E. Al Mansoori noted that while he was now the Minister of Economy, he had previously worked in the aviation industry, at Dubai International Airport, and thus knew first-hand of the connectivity achieved through the brotherhood of aviation in which all Member States were a part. He supported the Council's agreed-upon approach of focusing on addressing the technical issues of the matter at hand and coming up with an amicable agreement. H.E. Al Mansoori emphasized, however, that that was a very challenging and complicated undertaking as the Gulf region encompassed many different countries and some of the busiest routes in the world. He underscored that the technical implementation of the contingency routes in the Gulf region was also challenging, particularly as it was necessary to obtain the prior agreement of the many Member States concerned. H.E. Al Mansoori stressed that progress was nevertheless being achieved, due to the role played by ICAO in the form of the President of the Council, the Secretary General and her team. In taking this opportunity to thank the MID Regional Office for its excellent work in bringing the sides together, he noted that there were lessons to be learned therefrom. H.E. Al Mansoori underscored that it was necessary to somehow find a way for all five Parties to sit together and

continue that process to make sure that they addressed the issue of the safety and security of international civil aviation, which as he had mentioned earlier was a priority for all of them.

101. The Representative of Ecuador thanked the President for his openness to dialogue and compromise, two of ICAO's governing principles. He underscored that the Council should view the presentations and interventions by the Parties with optimism and recognize that the latter were open to finding a solution to the difficult situation in the Gulf region which undeniably had global implications. The Representative of Ecuador emphasized that the Council should seek a consensus solution to the matter at hand in order to maintain the high level of aviation safety and security, as well as the operational levels of international civil aviation.

102. Noting that the contingency routes proposed by the Secretariat had largely been accepted by the five Parties, the Representative of Ecuador stressed the need for ICAO Member States to comply with the principles established in the Chicago Convention and other international air law instruments to which they were parties. In that regard, he affirmed that the settlement of differences could be done through openness to dialogue, which was what the Parties were demonstrating in expressing their good intentions. The Representative of Ecuador recommended that the President, on behalf of the Council, provide direct mediation in the matter at hand to enable the continuation of the in-depth dialogue on the related technical issues, which could assist the Organization in its associated work. He emphasized that the agreed contingency routes were an indication of the progress being made in achieving an amicable and timely solution that would guarantee the safety of international air transport. The Representative of Ecuador further recommended that the Secretariat develop a plan for the immediate implementation of the various contingency measures over the short-term within the broad framework of an integrated plan, taking into consideration the underlying principles of the harmonized and coordinated regional and global plans for international air navigation.

103. The Representative of Cuba noted the information presented by the Secretariat in C-WP/14639 Restricted, as enriched by the updated data provided orally on the contingency arrangements in the Gulf region. She voiced appreciation for the role being played by the Organization, both at ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office, in developing and establishing contingency routes to ensure aviation safety in that region. The Representative of Cuba also expressed special thanks for the attendance of the high-level Government officials and aviation experts from the five Parties and for their related papers and presentations.

104. In reaffirming the importance of addressing, and resolving, the technical issues relating to the matter at hand, the Representative of Cuba expressed the hope that the Council and the Secretariat would play their respective roles in an impartial, neutral and transparent manner. Emphasizing that it was encouraging to see the progress that had thus far been made and to hear the firm commitment by each of the five Parties to ensure aviation safety in the Gulf region, she stressed the need to continue to move forward to achieve concrete technical solutions. The Representative of Cuba underscored that the Council should further urge all of the Parties to continue to cooperate to resolve the technical issues while upholding the provisions of the Chicago Convention, the SARPs contained in its technical Annexes, its Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANSs), and other applicable documents so as to ensure the safety and efficiency of operations in the Gulf region. The Representative of Cuba stressed the need to ensure that the contingency arrangements did not complicate international air traffic and in particular did not complicate the performance of the air traffic controllers in the FIRs involved. She reiterated the importance of the Council continuing to closely monitor the situation in the Gulf region until a final technical solution was achieved.

105. Observing that a number of Representatives had highlighted the need for the contingency arrangements to ensure aviation safety not only for aircraft operating in the Gulf region but also for transiting aircraft, the President of the Council emphasized that that had been taken into consideration by the Secretariat in its technical work.



106. D/ANB confirmed that airspace management in the Gulf region ensured safe access for all aircraft.

107. The Representative of Nigeria voiced appreciation to the President of the Council, the ICAO Secretariat, and especially the MID Regional Office for their relentless, and untiring efforts to address this situation from the outset. In thanking the President for seeking, and obtaining the commitment of all five Parties to sit down together to discuss the technical issues relating to the matter at hand with a view to finding optimal technical solutions, he affirmed that this was a very positive step towards resolving the matter as far as ICAO was concerned. Recalling that several Representatives had raised the issue of safety and efficiency of air transportation within the Gulf region, and globally, the Representative of Nigeria emphasized that the Parties' said commitment was a right step towards attaining that objective. He expressed gratitude to the Ministers of Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Members of their high-level Delegations, for their presentations and their extremely important commitment to seek optimal technical solutions for this matter.

108. Noting that his State was closely monitoring the evolving situation in the Gulf region, the Representative of Argentina reiterated that the Council should once again urge all five Parties to commit to dialogue in order to find a solution that was satisfactory to all. He supported the ongoing mediation efforts by the various actors to create channels of dialogue and negotiation with which to bring the Parties closer together. In that context, the Representative of Argentina underscored the need to ensure that moderate decisions and actions were taken that were in accordance with international law. In noting the new contingency routes that had been announced during the present meeting, he emphasized that it was essential that all such routes be effectively implemented, with the agreement, and to the satisfaction, of all Parties. The Representative of Argentina underscored that even if there were justified delays for their implementation, it was always necessary to ensure the safety of international civil aviation. He agreed with the Secretariat and other Representatives on the importance of strict compliance with the letter and spirit of the Chicago Convention and other instruments applicable to international civil aviation. The Representative of Argentina noted with much satisfaction the positive interventions made by the five Parties in which they committed to continue their consultations with a view to finding optimal technical solutions. He expressed general support for the Council actions proposed by previous speakers, in particular, the Representative of Mexico.

109. In associating himself with the comments made by other Representatives, the Representative of the Republic of Korea expressed appreciation for the impartiality, neutrality and professionalism demonstrated by the MID Regional Office in developing and establishing contingency arrangements in the Gulf region. Observing that the five Parties had evinced a common friendship, as well as patience, in their efforts to address the matter at hand, he underscored that their continuing efforts, and those of ICAO, would show the world how differences between Member States could be resolved in a civilized manner.

110. The Representative of Singapore noted that the very high level of representation of the five Parties reinforced the primacy of ICAO as the forum for addressing international civil aviation issues. In commending the Secretariat, both at ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office, for their urgent and difficult work in developing and establishing contingency routes in the Gulf region, he encouraged all involved to press on with the planning and coordination of those routes and to expeditiously implement the ones that had been agreed upon so that they would be available to the aviation industry. The Representative of Singapore requested that there be periodic reviews of the contingency routes, perhaps with feedback from the aviation industry, to ensure their adequacy, and that the Secretariat keep the Council well-informed of developments.

111. Endorsing many of the comments made by previous speakers, the Representative of Singapore reaffirmed the emphasis which C-WPs/14640 Restricted and /14641 Restricted placed on freedom of overflight over the high seas. In reiterating the need for Member States to ensure the freedom of

overflight for international air traffic over the high seas as provided for under international agreements such as the Chicago Convention and the IASTA, he noted that all of the five Parties were working together to establish that, with ICAO's facilitation. The Representative of Singapore supported the strong emphasis placed on safety and reaffirmed the need for Member States to abide by the rule of law and to continue fulfilling their commitments and duties under, inter-alia, the UN Charter, as well as the Chicago Convention and the IASTA, even as they worked to resolve their issues, so as to ensure the continued safety, efficiency and regularity of international civil aviation. Like other Representatives who had called for consultations and negotiations among the five Parties, he was very encouraged to hear that all of them were so willing to cooperate together and to discuss their issues at the technical level in order to find optimal technical solutions. In recalling that under Article 2, Section 1, of the IASTA, when a State brought a disagreement relating to the interpretation or application of that Agreement before the Council, the latter "shall call the States concerned into consultation" as a first step, the Representative of Singapore indicated that it would be appropriate for the Council, in the present case, to encourage all five Parties to hold consultations, which was separate from the Article 84 process referred to in Article 2, Section 2, of the IASTA. He joined previous speakers in advocating that the good offices of the President of the Council be called upon, if necessary, to mediate, with the Secretariat's support and collaboration.

112. Recalling the clarification provided by D/LEB (cf. paragraph 68 above), the President indicated that the Council could call for dialogue and consultations among the five Parties without, however, making any particular reference to other international treaties.

113. The Representative of the Russian Federation noted, with great satisfaction, that the Council had demonstrated its full commitment to the spirit of the Chicago Convention and that the five Parties had expressed their sincere willingness to engage in negotiations to find optimal technical solutions to the technical issues now under discussion. In sharing the views expressed by the Representative of France, he also endorsed the actions proposed by other Representatives. The Representative of the Russian Federation underscored the need to continue to regard aviation as the basis for creating and preserving friendship and understanding and for promoting peace and cooperation among the nations and peoples of the world, in line with the Preamble of the Chicago Convention, and expressed the hope that it would be in that spirit that all future work relating to the matter at hand would be conducted.

114. The Representative of Japan highlighted the Council's paramount responsibility to ensure aviation safety under any circumstances, as well as adherence to the rules of international law during any phase of consultations which it established, the Council having called for consultations between Member States on several occasions over the years. In addressing the regional safety and security concerns in the present case, he expressed the hope that, as the Extraordinary Session had been convened on an urgent basis, the agreed contingency routes would accordingly be implemented as soon as possible, on an official basis. The Representative of Japan emphasized that the solution to this matter as a whole must be found based on the shared factual understanding of the status of contingency arrangements in the Gulf region and their implementation, with due respect for each Member State's sovereign rights in full accordance with the rule of law. In light of the discussion, he encouraged all five Parties to jointly seek a solution through cooperation and the emerging "spirit of Montréal".

115. In noting that his State's position was aligned with a great number of the statements already made by other Representatives, the Representative of the United Kingdom only wished to emphasize the point made by the Representative of Singapore that of freedom of overflight for international air traffic over the high seas was a matter of principle which the Council must ensure was given the highest degree of attention. With regard to the long-term issues surrounding the matter at hand, he agreed that it would be sufficient for the Council: to urge all Member States to ensure that they were in compliance with their international obligations; and to urge the five Parties, and indeed ICAO itself, to continue negotiations through appropriate fora in order to resolve such difficulties as existed.

116. The Representative of the United Kingdom noted, however, that there were also a number of short-term issues to be dealt with by the Council. While it was fairly clear that a degree of progress had been made with regard to the development and establishment of contingency routes to address the immediate situation in the Gulf region, there was still some lack of clarity as to the adequacy of that process and the extent to which contingency routes had been agreed in principle or had actually been operationalized and were fully available. The Representative of the United Kingdom indicated that it was clear that there was, in each case, a continuum along the line of progress between agreement in principle and actual operationalization where the Council needed to be better informed. As highlighted earlier by the Representative of Australia, the information provided to the Council quickly became out-of-date. He therefore considered it important that the Council have not only timely but also quite frequent updates thereon. Recalling the Secretary General's memorandum SG 2373/17 dated 17 July 2017 on the outcomes of the two technical coordination meetings held on 6 and 9 July 2017, which had served as a useful point of reference for the Council, the Representative of the United Kingdom suggested that two or three updates be provided between now and the beginning of the next (212th) session in October/November 2017 to ensure that Representatives were as well-informed as possible and to enable them to decide, on the basis of the degree of progress made, if it was necessary for the Council to return to the matter more urgently.

117. Reiterating that this matter was before the Council for reasons that went beyond civil aviation, the Representative of Ireland looked forward to the Parties' continued discussions in the appropriate fora towards the overall resolution of the situation in the Gulf region. Emphasizing that the Council, as the guardian of the Chicago Convention, nevertheless had the responsibility to remind Member States of the importance of respecting their international obligations, she supported calls made by previous speakers in that direction. In expressing gratitude to the Secretariat, both at ICAO Headquarters and the MID Regional Office, for its work and its update on the contingency measures that had thus far been implemented, the Representative of Ireland looked forward to the full implementation of what had been discussed and agreed to date, such that international airspace would be open to aircraft of all nationalities on an equitable basis as indicated by D/ANB, subject only to safety and technical considerations. She agreed with other Representatives that the Council should be kept informed regularly on the implementation of those contingency measures to ensure safe and efficient air navigation in the Gulf region.

118. Adding to the positive comments that had been made by previous speakers, the Representative of Colombia also thanked the high-level Delegations from Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for attending this Extraordinary Session and for their presentations, and the Secretariat, at both ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office, for its work and its presentation. Underscoring that all present wished to ensure the safety, security, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation, he observed, from the discussion, that all agreed on its underlying principles and on the need to fulfill obligations under international law. In noting the coherency of the contingency routes in the Gulf region, the Representative of Colombia urged the Secretariat to continue its work thereon in close cooperation with the Parties, including the evaluation of the routes' safety and capacity, and to report to the Council, which was monitoring developments. The Representative of Colombia affirmed that the existing and envisaged contingency routes would contribute to ensuring that civil aviation continued to unify the world.

119. The Representative of Germany expressed pleasure that the five Parties had been working on technical solutions to their problems prior to the present meeting. In also noting, with satisfaction, that implementation of the contingency routes was in progress, he encouraged the Parties to continue their efforts to implement them as soon as possible. The Representative of Germany very much appreciated the commitment made earlier by the five Parties to continue to work on technical solutions to further improve the situation in the Gulf region. He shared the sentiments expressed by other Representatives regarding compliance with international obligations, free and unrestricted access to, and movement in, international airspace on a non-discriminatory basis, and continuing to ensure that the ICAO principles of safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation were complied with at all times and under all

circumstances. In addition, the Representative of Germany fully supported the calls made by previous speakers for follow-up actions.

120. The Representative of Turkey applauded the Heads of the Delegations of the five Parties for their contributions to the positive atmosphere in the Council, which he appreciated very much. He underscored that it was extremely important that the Parties had agreed that the matter at hand be addressed, for the time being, within the framework of contingency measures in the Gulf region and not the dispute resolution process under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. The Representative of Turkey emphasized that the acknowledgement and full implementation of the explained contingency measures by all of the Parties was critical to ensure the safety and security of air traffic in the international airspace over the high seas in the Gulf region. He stressed that if, as anticipated by the media, a Press conference on the outcome of this Extraordinary Session were given, then it would be necessary for the message delivered by the President on behalf of the Council and ICAO to be precise so as to avoid being challenged by the Parties.

121. Noting the media's interest in the results of the Council's deliberations, the President underscored that it was, by now, aware that the Council always conducted its work in a spirit of compromise, consensus, collaboration and cooperation, which ensured that aviation was the safest mode of transport. He enjoined all Representatives to interact in that spirit.

122. In welcoming all of the Ministers attending the present meeting, who were from brother countries, the Representative of Algeria informed the Council that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria was currently touring the Gulf region in order to come up with common approaches to resolving the matter at hand which were in line with the underlying principles of aviation safety and security which all supported. Algeria encouraged its brother countries of Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to continue to dialogue with a view to rectifying the technical issues.

123. Observing that his position was quite similar to those of other Representatives, the Representative of India noted, with satisfaction, the work done by the ICAO Secretariat, particularly at the MID Regional Office, in identifying the technical solutions which had been presented to the Council. He supported all interventions made regarding the need to continue discussions and negotiations to identify further technical solutions and to ensure their adequacy, as well as to keep the Council informed of developments. The Representative of India also supported the comment made by the Representative of Singapore and others that the good offices of the President of the Council should be called upon, if necessary, to mediate, with the Secretariat's support and collaboration.

124. The Representative of Panama endorsed the interventions by previous speakers. In recalling the comments made by H.E. Al Mansoori (United Arab Emirates) on the brotherhood of aviation (cf. paragraph 100 above), he reiterated that international civil aviation united countries. In underscoring that not only the safety but also the efficiency of operations were of high importance to airlines, he stressed the need, when establishing and implementing contingency routes in the Gulf region, to take into consideration their economic aspects and to shorten flight times whenever possible.

125. In expressing support for the interventions made by the Representatives of Spain, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Representative of South Africa referred to the recent comments by the Representative of Turkey and reiterated the high importance of the Council speaking to the media in one voice, through its President, on the achievements of this Extraordinary Session in the event that a Press conference were held.

126. The Representative of Kenya leant her support to the various proposals put forward for Council action whereby it would, inter alia: recognize the work of the Secretariat at ICAO Headquarters and the MID Regional Office, in collaboration with Member States concerned, to develop and establish the contingency arrangements in the Gulf region and request the continuation of that work; encourage the five Parties to pursue their consultations in that regard, while also encouraging them to continue to discuss the

larger political issues in the appropriate fora; and request the Secretariat to provide regular and timely updates on developments relating to the implementation of the said contingency arrangements, including at the next (212th) session.

127. In also supporting such action by the Council, the Representative of the Congo emphasized that a definitive solution to the crisis in the Gulf region would not be found through the resolution of the technical issues under ICAO's auspices but rather through the resolution of the larger political issues in other fora.

128. Note was taken of the above-mentioned additional information provided during the presentation of the three papers, as well as of the comments made by Council Representatives and the representatives of the five Parties and the clarifications provided in response by the President, D/LEB and D/ANB during the Council's discussion.

129. The Council took the action then proposed by the President in light of its deliberations and:

- a) noted C-WPs/14641 Restricted [*Request of the State of Qatar for consideration by the ICAO Council under Article 54 n) of the Chicago Convention*], /14640 Restricted [*Response to Qatar's submissions under Article 54 n)*] and /14639 Restricted [*Contingency arrangements to facilitate the flow of traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region*] and expressed appreciation to the presenters of those three papers;
- b) expressed appreciation for the work done by the Secretariat at ICAO Headquarters and particularly at the MID Regional Office (Cairo), in close coordination with the relevant Member States, to develop and establish the said contingency arrangements in the Gulf region;
- c) requested the Secretariat to continue the above-mentioned work in close coordination with Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and neighbouring Member States to ensure the expeditious implementation of the said contingency arrangements;
- d) encouraged all five Parties to continue their collaboration in that regard and welcomed the commitment expressed by their representatives at the present meeting to continue consultations, including under the aegis, and through the platform, of ICAO, to ensure the promotion of the implementation of optimal technical solutions;
- e) while noting ICAO's priority focus on the safety and security of international civil aviation, recognized that there were overarching political issues to be addressed and encouraged the said five Parties to continue to collaborate and to discuss those larger issues in the appropriate fora with a view to their resolution;
- f) requested the Secretariat to provide regular and timely updates on developments with respect to the implementation of the contingency arrangements in the Gulf region, and to present a comprehensive progress report thereon for its consideration during the next (212th) session of the Council in October/November 2017;
- g) urged all ICAO Member States, in compliance with the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*, to continue to collaborate, in particular to promote the safety, security, efficiency and sustainability of international civil aviation; and
- h) expressed appreciation to all five Parties for the spirit of compromise and consensus which they had demonstrated during the present meeting.

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130. Emphasizing that the Council always worked in a spirit of compromise, consensus, collaboration and cooperation, the President urged the five Parties to fulfill the commitment they had made before the Council to continue their discussions of the matter at hand and to collaborate, particularly at the technical level, in order to find optimal technical solutions thereto. He indicated that, as requested by several Representatives, he would continue to offer his good offices to support that process of coordination and mediation among the five Parties, with the support and collaboration of the Secretariat, both at ICAO Headquarters and at the MID Regional Office.

131. On behalf of the Council, the President thanked the distinguished representatives of Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and their Delegations for their participation in this Extraordinary Session of the Council, which underscored the importance they attached to ICAO, and encouraged their continuous cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral level.

132. The Secretary General expressed gratitude to the Council for its recognition of the Secretariat's achievements thus far relating to the development and establishment of contingency arrangements to facilitate the flow of traffic over the high seas airspace in the Gulf region. She reiterated her appreciation to ICAO Member States, both within and outside that region, for their cooperation and support in that regard. In addition, the Secretary General thanked D/ANB, the ICAO Regional Director of the MID Regional Office and their staff for their hard work in putting those contingency arrangements in place.

133. Reiterating that aviation safety was the paramount objective of ICAO and its Member States, the Secretary General assured all present that the Secretariat would continue to coordinate proactively with the Member States involved in the said contingency arrangements with a view to enhancing the latter so as to ensure the safety, as well as the security, efficiency and sustainability, of global air transport, including in the Gulf region. The Secretary General confirmed that she would keep the Council abreast of developments in that regard by reporting thereon in a regular and timely manner, including through the presentation of a comprehensive progress report during the upcoming (212th) session.

134. The meeting adjourned at 1330 hours.

— END —

Exhibit 23

Transcript from telephone conversation between Doha ATC and UAE ACC on 13th June 2017  
confirming the possibility of using UAE FIR over high seas

[Excerpt from the Appendix of the Extraordinary Session of the Council, 19 July 2017 ICAO  
doc. C-WP/14640 (Restricted)]

**TRANSCRIPT FROM TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DOHA ATC  
AND UAE ACC ON 13<sup>TH</sup> JUNE 2017 CONFIRMING THE POSSIBILITY OF  
USING UAE FIR OVER HIGH SEAS**

<b>TIME HHMMSS (UTC)</b>	<b>COMM.</b>	<b>AGENCY</b>	<b>TEXT</b>
<b>10:16:24</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Doha
<b>10:16:24</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Hello Doha, uhm someone called the Sheikh Zayed Centre about the definition in the NOTAM about UAE airspace and the restriction
<b>10:16:34</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Yeah, eh can you, just one second
<b>10:16:35</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Thank you
<b>10:17:06</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Hello
<b>10:17:06</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Hello Doha
<b>10:17:07</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Yes
<b>10:17:08</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Hello yes, just reference the UAE NOTAM 0848 /17
<b>10:17:15</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Yeah
<b>10:17:15</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Yeah the definition we have now is that the, eh it refers to territorial airspace
<b>10:17:21</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Territorial, so if they are going over high seas at high level that is not a problem
<b>10:17:25</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	It is, it is not a problem, but it, it is over territorial waters, over territorial airspace
<b>10:17:31</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Only over territorial
<b>10:17:33</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Territorial yes
<b>10:17:34</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	All right, so as long as it is avoiding the UAE territorial airspace, uhm there's no issue
<b>10:17:40</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	There is no issue, but just for your information, to eh, to flight plan from Doha to the other side of our airspace, or transit our airspace at all, any flight plan will bring



			the aircraft over territorial airspace
<b>10:17:55</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Yeah, I mean, just eh just needed clarification
<b>10:17:57</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	That's no problem, yeah yeah, that's and that's the clarification I got from management here also
<b>10:18:00</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	All right
<b>10:18:01</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	That's great
<b>10:18:02</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	Just the territorial
<b>10:18:02</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Territorial affirm
<b>10:18:03</b>	TELEPHONE	DOHA ATC	All right
<b>10:18:04</b>	TELEPHONE	UAE ACC	Oh kay, thanks very much, thank you, bye bye

--End Part 4--